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Abstract 
Is dependency theory dead as an explanation of underdevelopment in today’s global 
economy? Has the rise of new economic powerhouses and an increasing share of higher 
value-added manufacturing in the global south cast the notions of subordination, 
peripherality and dependence into the dustbin of history? Today, a broad consensus 
answers these questions in the affirmative. In stark contrast to this commonly-held 
contention in the current development discourse, this study aims to bring these notions 
back to critical development studies by offering an up-to-date and analytically valid 
conceptualisation of dependency in today’s global south. Taking the historical-structural 
dependency perspective as a point of departure, the study revisits and builds upon the 
notion of dependent development by drawing on a set of conceptual insights derived from 
Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, Global Value Chain analyses and a class-relational 
articulation of the developmental state. In doing so, the study shows how core-like and 
periphery-like activities have clustered in time and space, leading to polarisation in 
today’s global economy, and how new forms of dependency have been spatially re-
produced along hierarchically-structured global value chains through the interplay of 
transnational corporations, states and classes. Based on this framework, the study then 
explores the limits and prospects of capitalist development and its implications for wider 
society in today’s global south. With occasional references to cases of dependent 
development in Latin America and East Asia, the study examines changing dynamics and 
rise of new forms of dependency relations in Turkey and the Turkish automotive 
industry. Adding a sense of change and movement, the study shows how dependent 
nature of Turkish capitalist development has concretised and taken new forms along 
automotive value chains through shifting configurations of class forces and state-society 
relations, and their manifold interactions with the world economy, from the early years of 
modern Turkey to the present. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Problematique 
Over the last 30 years or so, a substantial geographical shift has taken place in the world 
economic map, with the growth of manufacturing powerhouses, first in the newly 
industrialised countries of East Asia and then in the rest of the developing world such as 
China, Brazil, India, Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia. There is a growing 
perception that the emergence of new economic powers has already altered the geo-
economic landscape of power and division of labour in the world. The global spread of 
production over the past 30 years has appeared to bring with it a ‘developmental’ rise of 
the south and a transformation through convergence in the sense of catching up with the 
‘developed’ world. The emerging countries’ share of GDP, manufacturing output, 
exports and inward FDI in the global economy has increased on a substantial level, 
representing a structural change of historical significance (Dickens, 2011; Kiely, 2015). 
Today, through dense networks of global production and trade, a greater number of 
countries in the global south have increased the role of manufacturing-exports in their 
economies, diversified the range of goods they produce and risen to the ranks of world-
class competitors in higher value-added products. 
Thus, there is much talk these days that the world’s economic centre of gravity has been 
moving from the advanced economies of North America and Europe to the east and 
south, indicating some kind of convergence in the international economic order (OECD, 
2010; Pape, 2009; Khanna 2009). The force of these arguments intensified in the 2000s 
with the rise of BRICs and BRIC-like countries such as Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia 
as key drivers of global economic growth. Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWCs) predicts 
that by 2050 the E7 group of emerging economies, namely the BRICs plus Mexico, 
Turkey and Indonesia, will be around 50% larger than the current G7 countries 
(Hawksworth and Cookson, 2008, p.2). Albeit not for the first time, the rise and high 
rates of economic projections of BRICs and BRIC-like countries have given weight to 
arguments that the global south has emerged as a real economic and political power, 
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that has moved beyond dependence on erstwhile advanced countries to form a new 
centre of economic power in its own rights (Altman, 2009; Yeyati and Williams, 2012).  
Therefore, both on the terrain of intellectual currents and within policy circles, the idea 
of dependency and peripherality has once again come under criticism from various 
quarters as one that is a product of the past century. Emphasis has increasingly been 
given to the integrated nature of the global division of labour and the dissemination of 
industrial, technological and financial capabilities that the emerging economies have 
wielded over the last few decades. This rhetoric has been even exemplified by Ben 
Bernanke (2006), two terms Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who states that “the 
traditional distinction between the core and the periphery is becoming increasingly less 
relevant, as the mature industrial economies and the emerging-market economies 
become more integrated and interdependent”. Seen in this way, the rise of the global 
south, together with the epoch-shifting transformation in the world economy, has 
revived the contentions that we live in a world of convergence that spreads 
opportunities, wealth and capabilities globally across borders, and therefore stands at 
odds with ideas of peripherality and dependency. 
However, despite the recent popularity and appeal of these contentions, there is ground 
for the more sceptical view that the rise of the global south has been exaggerated and is 
limited in developmental, technological and geopolitical terms.1 Indeed, the rise of 
global south, more recently in the BRICs and BRIC-like countries in particular, clearly 
has some basis in reality. In the last one and half decades, countries such as Brazil, 
India, Mexico, Turkey and above all China have experienced high rates of growth, and 
at the same time their share of global output has risen substantially (Kiely, 2015). It 
could be claimed that the south has converged with and even overtaken the north in 
terms of industrialisation, share of global output, economic growth and overall GDP, 
leading to progress in many dimensions of human development. However, as many 
counter-argue (see e.g. Arrighi et al. 2003; Abbott, 2009; Fischer, 2015; Kiely, 2015), 
this does not necessarily mean that the divide and socio-spatial disparities between 
south and north have dissipated, or that the lagging and subordination of the former 
have been replaced with a process of economic/technological upgrading and overall 
                                                          
1 For some pessimistic and sceptical accounts of the rise of the global south, BRICs and BRIC-like 
countries, see Arrighi et al. (2003); Schwartz (2010); Bond and Garcia (2015); Kiely (2015) and the 
special issue of Third World Quarterly with the editorial introduction by Gray and Murphy (2013).    
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convergence similar to Germany in the nineteenth century or Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan in the twentieth century. 
There is much ground that despite monumental changes in global production and the 
diffusion of industrial, technological and financial capabilities, the rise of the global 
south has not been accompanied by convergence in levels of per capital income, and the 
lagging has not dissipated in the realms most significant to wealth and power, such as 
technology, innovation and high-value added activities in global production (Fischer, 
2015; Kiely, 2015). As many argue (Doner, 2016; Schwartz, 2010; Kiely, 2015), these 
countries have experienced difficulties in upgrading their economies and moving into 
high value-added products and activities, with high levels of efficiency, local input and 
developmental outcomes for the wider society. Then, the question to be asked is to what 
extent the recently emerging countries have upgraded in economic and social terms, and 
whether this has lessened the subordination, peripherality and dependence of these 
economies in the current international economic order. 
Whilst a broad consensus replies to this question in the affirmative, some recent studies 
suggest a resounding ‘no’. In stark contrast to optimism emanating from different 
versions of the global convergence thesis, a number of studies (e.g. Arrighi et al.2003; 
Kay and Gwynne, 2004; Abbott, 2009; Schwartz, 2010; Fischer, 2015; Kiely, 2015) 
have revealed that despite the rise of the south, the polarizing tendency of the world 
economy is still at work producing and reproducing income gaps and 
economic/technological divergences between the developed and developing world, thus 
giving currency to the central tenets of the dependency perspective. One way or another, 
these studies have echoed the ideas first postulated by the dependency school, 
particularly by the strand associated with the Cardosian version of dependency thinking, 
which conceives dependency less as a grand theory of underdevelopment and more a 
specific condition of late capitalist development. In so doing, these studies emphasise 
the continued relevance of the dependency perspective. However, none of these works 
has provided a systematic understanding or operational framework of how dependency 
and development works under the new dynamics of global capitalism.   
This study seeks to fill that gap in the current literature by developing an up-to-date and 
analytically operational framework of the new form of dependent development under 
the dynamics of contemporary globalization. To that end, the present study reveals that 
subordination, hierarchy and dependency relations have not faded away with the rise of 
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southern countries and contemporary globalisation, but rather have taken new forms and 
become an issue that needs to be addressed both theoretically and empirically. Rather 
than reasserting superseded contentions and orthodoxies of dependency theory, and 
uncritically embracing the latest approaches in development discourse, this study in fact 
calls for a renewal of the critical spirit propounded by a particular variant of the 
dependency approach called historical-structural dependency analysis, which conceives 
dependency as a concrete situation that varies over time and from country to country. It 
is argued that historical-structural dependency analysis offers basilar conceptual tools 
which to a greater extent let us comprehend current mechanisms of dependency through 
a system of global class relations, changing state-society complexes and the historical 
specificities of today’s global world.  
Having conceived dependency as a concrete situation, and taking sides with historical-
structural dependency analysis, the study revisits and builds on the notion of dependent 
development by drawing on a set of conceptual insights from the Schumpeterian theory 
of innovation, Global Value Chain analyses and class-relational articulation of the 
developmental state. In doing so, the study aims to move beyond the theoretical impasse 
surrounding dependency analyses, and examine new dynamics of dependent 
development in relation to recent shifts in the global economy. The study admits that the 
world economy has undergone a far-reaching transformation towards a more integrated 
and coordinated global division of labour in production and trade, which renders a 
territorially-bounded and structurally-determined understanding of core-periphery 
relations increasingly elusory. Rather, the study conceives the current process of global 
stratification and economic disparities through both global class relations and socio-
spatial reconfiguration of the core-periphery model. Drawing on Schumpeter’s theory of 
innovation the proposed framework reveals that core-like and periphery-like activities 
have not only clustered in time but also in space, leading to polarisation in the world 
economy and a socio-spatial reconfiguration of core-periphery relations. 
The study then broadens the proposed framework by elucidating how and in what ways 
the current process of global stratification and re-configuration of the core-periphery 
model has given rise to new forms of dependency relations along hierarchically 
structured global value chains. In so doing, the study operationalises the notion of 
dependency relations via the current utility of value chain metaphor and analysis, which 
are largely dominated by leading TNCs, but at the same time argued to be conditioned 
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in a socio-spatial terms by ongoing interplay between TNCs, the state, local bourgeoisie 
and labouring classes. Nevertheless, despite the admitted utility of value chain analysis, 
the study concurrently argues that an unmediated adherence and incorporation of value 
chain analysis is likely to culminate in firm-centric, techno-industrial and market-based 
conceptions of global production and dependency relations.  
Thus, the study suggests putting the matter of upgrading and dependency along value 
chains into a wider socio-political, institutional and class-relational context. Deriving 
insights from a class-relational articulation of the developmental state, the study 
demonstrates why and how economic, technological and social upgrading along value 
chains takes place within particular entities or national economies but not in others, and 
what roles state-society complexes, class relations and institutional settings play in this 
respect. While building such an analytical framework, the study also refers to cases of 
dependent development in Latin American and East Asian countries. The main 
endeavour herein is not to provide anything close to a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of these two regions, given their enormous diversity with respect to population 
sizes, resource endowments, geopolitical dynamics, political regimes and class 
structures. Instead, from a theoretical point of view, the modest intention is to derive 
insights with regard to divergent patterns of dependency and development in the global 
periphery.  Although the Latin American and East Asian cases by no means cover the 
entire spectrum of differentiating patterns of capitalist development in the wider global 
periphery, they provide a general but nevertheless useful comparative ground to 
confront any case with the paradigmatic and deviant cases of dependent development 
they respectively offer.  
1.2 The Significance of Turkey as a Case  
Drawing on this comprehensive analytical framework, this study seeks to revisit the 
question of dependency and development in today’s global world by assessing the 
nature of Turkey’s rapid economic growth and integration into the global economy 
since the 1980s, and more particularly in the post-2001 period. It is argued that Turkey 
constitutes a critical case for studying how the current dynamics of the global economy 
and transnational capitalist classes have produced and reproduced new forms of 
dependent development through their interplay with the state, local bourgeoisies and 
social classes within a particular social-formation. Akin to the BRICs and other 
emerging countries, Turkey has gone through a substantial structural and industrial 
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transformation in the last few decades, after having implemented import-substituting 
and state-led development for about five decades, with a short interval in the early 
1950s. Although the initial surge in industrialisation and structural transformation took 
place during the 1960s and 1970s period, constituting the backbone of the present 
industrial structure, Turkey was still exhibiting the characteristics of a resource-based, 
agrarian economy, with almost 65% of exports consisting of primary products in the 
early 1980s (Kaya, 2008, p.168) 
In this respect, the 1980s are widely considered a turning point for the structural and 
industrial transformation of the Turkish economy due to the launching of a drastic, 
export-oriented market liberalisation programme. Having embraced an export-oriented, 
pro-globalisation development strategy since the early 1980s, Turkey has increasingly 
integrated into global networks of production and trade through close alliances with 
leading transnational corporations. Since then, a considerable surge in overall exports 
and export manufacturing has occurred, paving the way for an export-led industrial 
growth trajectory which thrived in the 2000s. During this period, overall export volume 
increased from less than $3 billion in 1980 to about $28 billion and $158 billion in 2000 
and 2014, respectively (Turkstat, 2015). As the main driving sector behind export 
growth, the manufacturing industry’s share of total exports has soared to 93% in 2014 
from about 36% in 1980, signifying the substantial transformation Turkey has 
experienced (Turkstat, 2015).  
Along with the rise of export-led manufacturing, the sectoral and technological 
composition of exports has also changed, similar to in other emerging countries. 
Following changes in its economic development policy, Turkey has diversified the 
range of goods it produces and risen to the ranks of world-class manufacturing hub in 
higher value-added products. Whereas in the 1980s and early 1990s Turkey essentially 
exported low-technology, labour-intensive goods such as textiles, food, tobacco and 
paper products, by the second half of the 2000s it achieved  substantial structural change 
by shifting its manufacturing output and exports towards non-traditional and technology 
intensive areas such as automotive, machinery, electronics and chemical products. 
Driven by the rise of export-led manufacturing and coupled with increasing foreign 
investment inflows, Turkey has enjoyed a period of stable and solid economic growth, 
particularly in the last one and half decades. Between 2002 and 2007, Turkey’s GDP 
experienced an annual average growth rate of 7.2% (Turkstat, 2015). Due to the global 
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turmoil in 2008, the growth rate first slowed down and dropped to 0.7% and -4.7% in 
2008 and 2009, but later rebounded to 9% and 8.5% in 2010 and 2011, respectively, 
making Turkey the sixteenth largest economy in the world and the sixth largest in 
Europe, according to GDP figures (at PPP) in 2012 (Turkstat, 2015). 
With daring aspirations to be in the top 10 largest economies in the world by 2023, 
Turkey stands out as a promising emerging economy with a fairly well-developed 
industrial base, and today it is perceived as ‘Europe’s BRIC’ or ‘the China of Europe’. 
Nevertheless, despite such aspirations, and the substantial transformation that has 
recently taken place, Turkey’s capitalist development is laden with a series of structural 
limitations, economic and social contradictions and developmental challenges, which 
have to be addressed. In fact, as many argue (Erdem, 2010; Taymaz and Voyvoda, 
2012), the recent growth and economic transformation in Turkey has been to a large 
extent linked to the increase of foreign investment inflow and the use of sub-contracting 
agreements by TNCs. Underpinned by a unique geographical location, a cheap, docile 
and skilled workforce, and its attractive investment environment, Turkey has benefited 
from benevolent global capital markets, particularly for developing countries, since the 
early 2000s.  
Albeit still limited compared to other emerging countries, particularly China, Brazil and 
India, Turkey has attracted record levels of long-term FDI inflow, especially following 
the launch of its post-2001 reform programme. The cumulative volume of FDI inflow 
totalled $14.6 billion in the 80 years from the foundation of the Turkish Republic to 
2003; it has increased more than 10 times over a decade, reaching over $149 billion in 
2014 (Turkstat, 2015). Thus, over a broadly similar period, leading TNCs have 
increasingly penetrated into the economy and become an important capital bloc through 
greenfield investments, joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and privatization, which 
indicates the denationalisation and dispossession of the economic structure in Turkey. 
In fact, the increased penetration of foreign capital has further driven the integration of 
Turkey into cross-border networks of production, finance and trade, but in turn has also 
marked the capital-dependent nature of this economic growth, as the rate and direction 
of capital accumulation has been highly correlated with the inward flow of global 
capital (Erdem, 2010). Given that domestic savings rates are low and fall short of 
investments, the growth of the Turkish economy is dependent on foreign capital and 
global liquidity conditions, which places certain structural limits on the sustainability of 
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Turkey’s long-term growth performance and makes the overall economy vulnerable to 
external shocks.2  
The limitations of Turkey’s economic growth not only manifest themselves as ever-
expanding dependence on FDI inflow and favourable external liquidity conditions. 
More importantly, the recent growth and structural transformation in the Turkish 
economy has also heavily relied on foreign capital in technological, managerial and 
market terms, and has lacked the indigenous dynamics necessary to develop capacities 
in high-technology and high value-added niches of global production, with genuine 
developmental outcomes on the side of domestic capital and wider society. As 
mentioned earlier, coupled with an export-led development strategy, the growth of 
foreign penetration and closer collaboration with global capital has increased the role of 
manufacturing and driven structural change in the Turkish economy. Turkey has 
emerged as an important manufacturing hub, diversified the range and technological 
composition of the goods it produces, and moved into the ranks of world-class 
competitors, particularly in the range of medium-low and medium-high technology 
industries. This indicates a substantial structural change as a few decades ago the 
Turkish economy predominantly specialised in resource-based, labour-intensive sectors.  
However, despite such structural changes in the recent past, Turkey, alongside other 
emerging countries, has had a harder time upgrading its economy by moving into high 
value-added activities and products at considerable levels of local input, both material 
and technological, from domestic firms, and with genuine development outcomes on the 
side of wider society. The evidence reveals that with an overall share of 68.6% in total 
manufactured exports, the low-tech and the medium-low tech industries still constitute 
the main areas of Turkey’s specialization within the global division of labour (Turkstat 
2015). Turkey has thus reached a significant but still constrained level of development 
compared to both the erstwhile advanced economies of the north and the first-tier 
NIEs of East Asia which to a large extent upgraded their economies into technology-
intensive and high value-added areas at high levels of export competitiveness and local 
input. 
                                                          
2 For further accounts on FDI inflow and the capital-dependency of the Turkish economy, see Öniş and 
Kutay (2013); Öniş and Bayram (2008); for critical assessments, see Yeldan (2007); Bağımsız Sosyal 
Bilimciler (2012). 
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Even the growing involvement of Turkey in technology-intensive and higher value-
added production has not necessarily increased the value captured by the local 
economy, and has not generated genuine development outcomes for wider society. In 
fact, akin to processes in many other countries in the south, the restructuring of the 
Turkish economy has driven the rise and diversification of manufactured exports and 
the shift to higher value-added production, but local producers have accounted for 
relatively little of this value. Though there are only limited data for the period since the 
early 1980s, the rise and diversification of manufacturing exports seems to have been 
accompanied by a disproportionally low share of globally created value (Köse and 
Öncü, 2000; Taymaz et al., 2011). Indeed, Turkey’s involvement in higher technology 
production is inseparable from the global strategies and investment decisions of leading 
TNCs. While Turkey, in close collaboration with global capital, has increasingly hosted 
technology intensive and higher value-added production, local producers have rather 
experienced a lower road of progress and development, mainly characterised by 
increasing share of manufacturing exports and productivity, albeit with series of 
limitedness in increasing returns to scale, developing endogenous R&D competencies, 
innovating in new products and processes and thus moving up to high-value added 
niches of global production. 
Thus, the rise and diversification of export-led manufacturing in Turkey represents a 
less impressive picture. Although higher value-added manufacturing exports seem to 
have increased, the real contribution of local industry has remained stuck at the 
downstream stages of production, typically characterised by activities like application of 
routinized technologies and production, and testing and packing for leading 
transnationals. Local producers have therefore displayed limited achievement in 
expending their control over the creation of value-added and remained mostly 
dependent on leading transnationals in aspects ranging from having cutting-edge 
production technologies to developing product designs and concepts, from owning 
patents to accessibility to export markets. Turkey’s involvement into higher value-added 
production thus seems to be dualistic in nature. While partnering or subcontracting 
transnationals seem to specialise in high value-added segments of production given high 
barriers to entry, accessibility to foreign markets and levels of R&D competencies, 
locally-owned or governed producers, benefiting from low cost production advantages 
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and large amounts of surplus labour, rather follow a lower road of articulation with a 
disproportionally low share of globally created value-added. 
The formation of domestic industry along these lines has given local producers 
considerable level of manufacturing capability and competitive advantages, but on the 
other hand has generated limited and even impoverishing economic growth in wider 
society. As domestic industrialists mostly entered global production at the lower end of 
value relations, mainly as subsidiaries, subcontractors or suppliers, they have been 
subjected to fierce cost-down pressure from leading TNCs on the one hand, and cut-
throat competition with dozens of counterparts on the other, which has in turn translated 
into low wages and little if any social upgrading for the salaried and labouring classes. 
As several studies have revealed (Aydin, 2005; Yeldan, 2007; Öngel and Tanyılmaz, 
2013), the rise and diversification of manufacturing exports has rather intensified the 
social and economic exclusion of the mass of Turkish population from the economic 
growth process. In a sense, the growth of higher value-added manufacturing exports and 
Turkey’s increasing integration in global networks of production and trade has put the 
burden of economic growth on the shoulders of the poorer and weaker classes, making 
Turkey one of the most inegalitarian countries, with Gini coefficient ranges between 40 
to 43 over the last decade (World Bank, 2014). 
To sum up, given the main characteristics of its recent development experience, Turkey 
constitutes an illustrative case for studying an important but mostly neglected question: 
namely dependency and development in today’s global world. Turkey has achieved 
stunning GDP growth rates, increased the role of manufacturing in its economy, and 
become a global exporter in a wide range of industrial products, but this has been driven 
by FDI inflow and favourable external liquidity conditions, and it has remained 
dependent on leading TNCs in technological, managerial and marketing terms. A 
central paradox of Turkey’s ‘growth model’ is consistently high rates of economic 
growth and industrial diversification on the one hand, but low levels of local value 
added on the other. This paradox is, in turn, based upon a low-wage economy with 
relatively little upgrading on the side of domestic capital. Thus, Turkey’s recent 
experience has not led to a real convergence with the developed world or rendered the 
concept of dependency irrelevant, but has seemed to reproduce it within the new context 
of contemporary globalisation. 
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Given the lack of concern in the current development literature, addressing such a 
developmental paradox is empirically important and theoretically challenging. As noted 
earlier, little has been written about how and in what ways dependency and 
development work under the new dynamics of global capitalism. Many studies 
concentrate on either the long-standing success stories of the first tier East Asian NICs, 
where the penetration of foreign capital is less pervasive and the developmental role of 
the state is well-accepted, or on the new regional powers and ‘catch-up states’, such as 
China India and Brazil, which have recently grown with the help of high levels of FDI 
inflow. As an intermediate case highlighting both the potential and the limits of 
dependency and development in the south, the Turkish experience has received less 
attention and remained relatively unexplored.  
Following the dominant trend in international development literature, studies of Turkish 
development have either neglected or given little attention to the contradictory and 
dependent nature of development in Turkey. The majority of research has been trapped 
between two broad schools of thought, namely market-led neoclassical explanation 
(Smithian/Ricardian) versus the state-led development perspective 
(Listian/Gerschenkronian). When it comes to understanding the limited development 
and the question of economic/social upgrading in Turkey, market-led explanations 
mainly put the blame on a combination of factors, such as continuity of market 
imperfections, deviation from the reform programme and the unorthodox manner of 
Turkish economic liberalization, characterised by populist and ineffective state 
practices.3 Represented by pro-globalization and market-friendly elites in the 
bureaucracy, the media and academia, this mainstream line of thinking portrays the 
global economy as a source of developmental opportunities for developing counties, 
and attributes Turkey’s limited performance to the persistence of market-distorting 
economy policies and institutional formations. On the other hand, the state-led 
development perspective has put emphasis on the need for proactive economic 
governance and state institutions, through which Turkey could overcome the hurdles of 
late development and launch a state-led catching-up process.4 Confronting Turkey with 
the success stories of East Asian late-developers such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, 
these studies mainly propound that the main culprit for Turkey’s relatively low 
                                                          
3 For this line of explanation see Alper and Yilmaz (2003); Uğur (2004); Çetin (2010); Derviş (2014). 
4 For the state-led development perspective, see Sönmez (2001); Kozlu (2003); Belet (2006); Öniş and 
Şenses (2007); Tuncel (2014). 
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economic performance and upgrading is the lack of autonomy and developmental 
capacity of state institutions, which are unable to solve social and distributional 
conflicts or pursue long-term strategic development policy. 
Although few and far between, there are also some critical accounts of Turkey’s 
development performance inspired by Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations of 
development theories. In general, critical accounts mainly tend to attribute Turkey’s 
relatively limited economic performance to a series of contradictions emanating from 
country’s integration into the global economy.5 Almost diametrically opposed to pro-
globalisation and free-market development discourse, these explanations see the 
capitalist development and global integration of Turkey as a dynamic but inherently 
uneven process which in fact undermines the prospects for sustained capital 
accumulation and development. Seen in this way, the question of economic/social 
upgrading is answered in relation to the malign nature of global capitalism, and 
Turkey’s firm and blind commitment to neoliberal pro-globalisation development 
policies, due to which the economy has entered in a high-debt, FDI-led growth pattern 
marked by limited outcomes for the local economy and labouring classes.  
Taking their cue from neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment, some of these studies 
(see Boratav, 2007, 2009; Erdem, 2010) reveal that the increased foreign capital inflow 
-particularly the speculative kind- and the growing indebtedness of the economy have 
led to net resource transfer from Turkey to the core of the capitalist world. These 
studies, in a sense, echo the structuralist and economistic views of the dependency 
perspective, by showing how Turkey has disadvantageously deepened its reliance on 
global capital, and how net resource transfer from Turkey to the metropoles has 
actualised in the form of debt payments, interest revenues and profit remittances. 
Indeed, at a very general, abstract, macro level, these studies have highlighted the 
dependent nature of Turkish development. However, like many other studies, they say 
very little if anything about how dependency and development works under the current 
dynamics of global capitalism, and how the integration of the Turkish economy with 
global capitalism through a particular type of accumulation pattern, a configuration of 
class forces and state-society relations, has set the parameters for economic and social 
upgrading in this context. 
                                                          
5 Despite some variations and discussion within them, some of the critical accounts of Turkish 
development are Yeldan (2005, 2007); Boratav (2009); Erdem (2010); and Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler 
(2012). 
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1.3 Aims, Scope and Research Questions 
Moving beyond the explanatory limitations in the literature and using the Turkish 
experience as an illustrative case, this study aims to examine how and in what ways 
dependency and development have been produced and re-produced in today’s global 
south. The study develops an understanding of dependency as a process that in essence 
emerges from the historical, class-relational and socio-institutional specificities of a 
particular territorial formation. One of the principle concerns of the study is to move 
beyond an economistic, state-bounded and ahistorical meta-theorisation of dependency, 
to an analysis of the changing nature of dependency relations, firmly grounded in the 
historical and social conditions of late capitalist development. The study seeks to do so 
by exploring the nature of interaction between the state, domestic classes and foreign 
capital, and their relationship with the wider global economy, and by discussing how the 
nature of these relations identifies the prospects of dependency, development and 
economic upgrading in the global periphery.  
Drawing on such a perspective, this study critically examines the matter of dependency 
and development in Turkey by putting it into a broader historical and comparative 
context, in which Turkey’s recent development experience is retrospectively and 
comparatively discussed through not only the changing dynamics of world economy but 
also the historical transformation of class configurations and state-society relations in 
Turkey. The study in a sense employs an articulation of the historical materialist 
methodology to reveal how the contradictory and dependent nature of Turkish capitalist 
development was formed, perpetuated and transformed through deep conflicts in inter- 
and intra-class relations, and their manifold interactions with the state and the world 
capitalist economy. Recognising the limitedness of a single-case study for the purposes 
of large-scale generalisations, the study also adopts a loosely comparative perspective 
by contrasting Turkey with the emerging but still developmentally challenged cases of 
Latin America such as Brazil and Mexico, and the East Asian success stories of Korea 
and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the objective is not to provide a comprehensive 
cross-regional analysis of these countries, but to derive general insights in order to 
understand the divergent nature and consequences of dependency in the global south, 
and to place Turkey in the wider context of north–south relations 
This examination of the Turkish case ultimately aims to avoid totalising, deterministic, 
stagnationist and mechanico-formal formulations of dependency, and rather aims to 
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build a concrete analysis that grasps the divergent and changing nature of dependency 
relations, given the richness of concrete historical situations. Adding a sense of change 
and continuity, the study not only seeks to trace how the contradictory and dependent 
nature of Turkish capitalist development has been perpetuated and has taken new forms 
throughout class structures and state-society complexes that are in flux, but also to 
reveal how it has more recently manifested itself along asymmetrical and hierarchically 
structured global value chains which are by and large dominated by leading TNCs, but 
at the same time been conditioned by the broader historical, institutional and class-
relational context of Turkish capitalism. In doing so, the study offers a refreshing 
reading of the Turkish political economy which carefully adopts and integrates 
historical, class-relational and institutional analyses of dependency relations into the 
matter of economic and social upgrading along value chains. 
Building on this country-level analysis, the study then combines the merits of country 
study with the demonstrativeness of sectoral analysis by taking the Turkish automotive 
industry as a representative case, which will add empirical rigor, deeper insight and 
further validation at the lower level of analysis. The reason for choosing the automotive 
industry is presented in the related chapter, but can be summarised as follows. First, 
having been the export champion of the last ten years, with an annual production of 
over 1.3 million vehicles and a considerable share of employment (more than 400,000 
people), no other sector reflects the success and limitations of Turkey’s recent structural 
transformation (OSD, 2016). Equally importantly, as a highly globalised but still 
hierarchical sector, the auto industry provides an excellent case to explore the constrains 
and prospects of economic upgrading and dependency considering entry barriers, 
currently marked by increasing economies of scale, skyrocketing capital requirements, 
rapidly changing product and process technologies, and intensifying competition in 
global markets. 
Considering its significance on both national and global levels, this study further 
concerns itself with the analysis of dependency relations in the Turkish auto industry in 
order to concretise the findings and discussions presented in the country-level analysis. 
In so doing, the study aims to move beyond the generality and abstraction of country 
analysis, and to provide more elaborative and empirical insights into how dependency 
relations have actually emerged, been perpetuated and been reproduced through the 
interrelationship between transnational auto-firms, the state and local classes. Following 
15 
 
 
 
the retrospective and comparative perspective in the country-level study, the sectoral 
analysis explores how the Turkish auto industry has been historically integrated into 
global networks of production and trade in asymmetrical and dependent terms. Special 
attention is concordantly given to shifting configurations of class forces, state-society 
relations and institutional settings in Turkey with occasional references to the insights 
derived from auto industrialisation in the Latin American and East Asian cases. 
Drawing on this longitudinal and comparative analysis of the Turkish auto industry, the 
study reveals the changing dynamics and working mechanisms of dependency relations 
in today’s global world. 
In line with these objectives, this study, at the broader level, seeks answers to the 
following set of interrelated questions: 
1- Has the rise of the global south and new economic powerhouses really cast the 
notions of subordination, peripherality and dependence into the dustbin of 
history in development studies? Is dependency dead as an explanation of 
underdevelopment in today’s global world? 
2- If not, to what extent is the idea of dependency relevant in explaining 
development and underdevelopment, and how does it actually work under the 
current dynamics of global capitalism? 
Lying at the heart of these main questions, the study also explores consequential sub-
questions, as follows:  
3- Looking at the wider periphery, how does dependency and development 
manifest themselves in diversifying forms over time and across different 
geographies?  
4- Why have some countries in the south managed to overcome developmental 
challenges and dependencies and move into industrial innovation, global 
competitiveness and high value-added production at considerable levels of 
efficiency and local inputs, while others like Turkey have remained limited in 
this respect? 
5- How and in what way has Turkey’s integration with the global capitalist 
economy through a particular configuration of class forces, state-society 
relations and institutional arrangements set the parameters for its relatively 
limited and asymmetrically dependent development performance?  
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6- Lastly, how has the rise of dependent development in the Turkish economy 
manifested itself in more concrete forms over time and across companies at the 
lower level of sectoral analysis in the Turkish automotive industry? 
1.4 Research Design, Methodology and Data Collection 
In addressing these questions, the study employs a mixed-methods approach that 
integrates both qualitative and quantitative data. The basic rationale for utilising a 
mixed-methods approach is not to replace either of the methods (qualitative or 
quantitative) but rather to draw on the strengths of each and offset the limitations of one 
with the other in a single research programme. Broadly speaking, the primary 
philosophy of mixed-methods research is based on the contention that all type of 
methods, either qualitative or quantitative, are inherently biased and have weaknesses, 
so use of multiple methods helps to minimise the weaknesses of monomethod research 
and enhance the validity and richness of research findings. The design of a mixed-
methods study is in fact contingent on the research questions raised and the ontological 
and epistemological nature of academic inquiry. Since the primary foci of this study is 
explanation of the changing dynamics of dependency relations in Turkey and the 
Turkish automotive industry, particularly the nature of interaction between TNCs, the 
state and classes over time, it is explanatory and interpretive in its nature. Therefore, 
this study mainly utilises the qualitative method of analysis, more precisely semi-
structured in-depth interviews, to address the research questions. Guided by open-ended 
questions, semi-structured interviews ensure the free flow of country- and sector-level 
information, provide broader scope for an understanding of the perceptions and attitudes 
of different stakeholders, and help us to deal with the complexities of the research 
phenomenon.  
However, the findings and analysis of interview-based qualitative research are hard to 
generalise from and easily influenced by the biases and idiosyncrasies of the researcher. 
Therefore, in order to reach a more generalisable view with respect to the subject of 
inquiry and reduce the subjectivity of personal interpretations, the insights gathered 
from semi-structured interviews were also supported and supplemented by closed-end 
survey questions and basic descriptive statistics in order to address descriptive types of 
research questions and to assess cause-effect relationships. Overall, employing a 
qualitative dominant mixed-methods research design, this study seeks to enhance the 
validity and generalisability of research findings and provide a deeper understanding 
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and fuller picture of the investigated phenomenon through a triangulation of multiple 
data gathered from in-depth interviews, questionnaire surveys, general statistics, 
historical records and public information. 
When it comes to examining the changing dynamics of dependency and development in 
Turkey at the country level, the study utilises an articulation of the historical-structural 
methodology that lets us understand the ways in which inherited socio-economic, class-
relational and institutional characteristics have shaped and influenced the dynamics of 
dependency and development throughout Turkey’s history. As a dialectical approach, 
historical structuralism ensures the examination of social reality and causal-mechanisms 
not only through structural and systemic imperatives, but also through the historical 
transformation of class configurations, changing dynamics of state-society relations and 
social relations of production. In this sense, the study employs a process-tracing method 
in a historical materialistic sense. Given its macro nature, the country-level analysis, in 
terms of the data employed, relies heavily on both primary and secondary sources such 
as country statistics, official records, development plans, speeches, reports, books and 
articles.  
The country-level analysis lets us explore the historical, class-relational, institutional 
and political economic context in which dependency relations first emerged and were 
then reproduced up to the present, by moulding the general contours of capitalist 
development in Turkey. However, an empirical examination of these relations, by its 
very nature, requires an in-depth engagement with industrial and trade relations, where 
dependency and development materialise in more concrete forms. Therefore, the present 
study also employs case study research in the automotive sector to add empirical rigor 
to the analyses. The principal data for the sector-level analysis were obtained through 
both semi-structured in-depth interviews and questionnaire surveys, which are expected 
to provide first-hand insights into how dependency and development work under actual 
conditions. The interviews and surveys were conducted in five different cities (Istanbul, 
Kocaeli, Bursa, Izmir and Ankara), where the automotive final-assemblers and most of 
the auto component/part firms are located.   
Out of a total of 15 final-assemblers in Turkey, seven passenger-car or commercial-car 
producers took part in the interviews and surveys, while two tractor producers were 
excluded from the sample as they are considered off-road vehicles (see Appendix, 1). 
For the final-assemblers, interviews and surveys were held with a person in a 
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managerial position, such as executive director, vice general manager or with a 
department manager such as an R&D director or product development manager. Apart 
from final-assemblers, 35 auto component/part manufacturers (see Appendix, 2) were 
interviewed and surveyed separately, subjected to specifically prepared interview and 
survey questions for the auto sub-industry. As in the case of final-assemblers, 
interviews and surveys were mainly conducted with those in high-ranking positions, 
such as CEO, chief executive or board member, or with one in a managerial position 
such as R&D manager, production manager or quality manager. Although sample sizes 
of final-assemblers and component/part manufacturers are relatively small and do not 
perfectly represent the research population, they were purposively selected to give an 
indicative picture of the Turkish automotive sector. Based on a purposive sampling 
methodology, the study seeks to ensure diversity within the sample by interviewing a 
comparable number of firms in terms of size, ownership structure, field of activity and 
geographical location (for details see Appendices 1 and 2). 
In order to obtain additional insights about the Turkish automotive industry, separate in-
depth interviews were also held with directors of business/industry associations, 
bureaucrats, academics and experts who were/are actively involved in policy-making 
processes related to the auto industry (see Appendix 3). In addition, of the 42 auto firms 
interviewed, the interviewees of seven firms were/are also directors, board members and 
representatives of the industry/business associations. From these interviewees, 
additional information was obtained regarding the activities of industry/business 
associations and their relations with the state. Lastly, a wide range of separate 
interviews and surveys were also conducted with auto-workers (see Appendix 4) in 
order to explore the implications of auto-led development on the labouring classes, and 
their respective position and role within the industry. None of the worker-level 
interviews were carried out within work premises since this could inconvenience 
interviewees and impact the quality of information obtained. Again, to get an indicative 
picture of workers’ opinions, interviews were purposely held with a comparable number 
of workers in terms of workplace size and field of activity. 
In collecting the data, questionnaire surveys were concurrently conducted along with in-
depth interviews (see Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8). Each interview was held face-to-face, 
lasted about 80-90 minutes on average and was tape-recorded for further analysis. 
Preceding or following some of the interviews, I was also invited to make direct 
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observations on the factory floor. The direct observations of factory sites, and random 
interviews with line managers, engineers and technical personnel, provided further 
information and insights into the dynamics of the manufacturing process, application of 
technological changes, organisation of production and management of the labour force 
at shop-floor level. Besides, public information gathered from firm websites, industry 
magazines, sector statistics, publications by industry/business associations and press 
releases provided additional information to crosscheck and enrich the primary findings 
gathered from the field study.  
In evaluating the data collected, our approach was not a typical positivist methodology, 
involving empirical observations and data measurement for a precise assessment of 
causal relationships between variables, but rather an approach that can be best defined 
as a qualitative analysis backed by quantitative findings. As the present study aims to 
explore the changing nature of dependency and development within the Turkish 
automotive industry, primarily by looking into interaction among leading TNCs, local 
classes and the state, it is explanatory in nature in its attempt to ensure an in-depth 
understanding of the matter under investigation. Thus, the evaluation of data involved a 
qualitative method of analysis that mainly seeks to address ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of 
questions.  
A qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews provided deeper understanding of a wide 
range of questions, such as how the Turkish auto industry has been incorporated into 
global networks of production and trade on unequal and dependent terms; how domestic 
auto firms have interacted with transnational corporations, state, non-state actors, and 
other social classes; how the Turkish auto industry responded to developmental 
challenges and opportunities in a way that reshaped its learning process and upgrade 
path; why the Turkish auto industry has been confined to a certain upgrading process 
and has failed to generate genuine developmental outcomes for both domestic capital 
and the labouring classes. The insights gathered from in-depth interviews was 
complemented and supported by survey data, which provided descriptive evidence to 
identify the factors and actors affecting the dynamics of dependency and upgrading in 
the Turkish auto industry; to reveal the effects of dependency, development and 
internationalisation on local firms and the labouring classes; and to trace the inter-
relationship and delegation of decision making authorities in the auto industry on 
sectoral- and firm-levels. Nevertheless, a quantitative method of (descriptive) analysis 
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was only applied to the extent that it contributes and gives rigor to the overall 
interpretive analysis. Thus, the validity of the empirical findings for the interpretive case 
study was achieved by the triangulation and evaluation of multiple data gathered from 
surveys, in-depth interviews, direct observations and public information. 
1.5 Plan of the Study 
Equipped with the above-given research design and choice of methodological approach, 
this study revisits and sheds light on the matter of dependency and development in 
seven chapters. Chapter 2 commences with a critical survey and discussion of relevant 
literature on dependency school giving special emphasis to its complex intellectual 
roots, the diversity of analyses and the variety of its different interpretations. Here the 
first steps are taken towards an up-to-date and analytically valid conceptualisation of 
dependency and development, via a critical discussion of the barrages of criticisms 
levied against it, and an exploration of its current relevance and applicability. Beginning 
with such a critical survey is a tactical prerequisite, since any revisiting of the 
dependency perspective is prone to confront an outright and sweeping dismissal right 
off the bat. The chapter rather claims that critiques of the dependency school have gone 
too far, ignoring its overall contributions and contemporary relevance, and counter-
argues that a more sophisticated variant within it, historical-structural dependency 
analysis still offers an analytical value and basilar IPE framework to build upon. 
Building on the discussion given in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 lays out the analytical and 
conceptual framework of the study and situates it within various strands of current 
development research. This chapter develops a novel analytical framework of 
dependency and development by selectively drawing on a set of conceptual tools and 
insights from Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, Global Commodity Chain/Global 
Value Chain analyses and a class-relational articulation of the developmental state. By 
critically engaging with the Schumpeterian theory of innovation, the chapter argues that 
the polarising tendency of the world capitalist economy continues to generate global 
inequalities and disparities, leading to clustering of core-like and periphery-like 
activities in socio-spatial terms. The chapter then elucidates how and in what ways the 
current process of global stratification and re-configuring of core-periphery relations 
gives rise to the reproduction of dependency situations, particularly along hierarchically 
structured global value chains. With the help of the chain metaphor, the chapter aims to 
reveal how new forms of dependency are concretised in today’s global economy. 
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However, despite its utility, the chapter also argues that an unmediated adherence to 
value chain analysis is likely to culminate in a firm-centric, techno-industrial and 
market-based analysis, as seen in the current research literature. Thus the chapter 
concludes the proposed framework by putting the analysis of dependency and upgrading 
along value chains into a wider social, institutional and class-based context, derived 
from a class-relational articulation of developmental state. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 the ideas and analytical framework presented in the theory chapter 
are developed, refined and concretised via direct confrontation with the political 
economic context of Turkish capitalist development. These chapters together trace the 
changing nature of dependency relations from the early years of modern Turkey to the 
present, with references to insights derived from the Latin American and East Asian 
cases. Adding a sense of change and movement, these two complementary chapters 
show how the dependent and contradictory nature of Turkish capitalist development has 
been perpetuated and has taken new forms through shifting configuration of class forces 
and state-society relations that are in flux, but still bringing with it the legacies of earlier 
periods. These two chapters reveal that given long-standing inter- and intra-class 
cleavages and the uneasy nature of state-society relations, Turkey, despite its recent 
economic performance, has lacked the class-relational and institutional capacities to 
successfully cope with changing developmental challenges and dependencies over time, 
and thus has not moved into high value-added niches of global production with genuine 
developmental outcomes either for the domestic bourgeoisie or wider society.  
Chapters 6 and 7, later on, combine the merits of country-level study with the 
concreteness of industry analysis. The two chapters together provide in-depth insights 
into how dependency relations emerged, developed and transformed over time within 
the global network of auto production and trade. Chapter 6 explores the formation of 
domestic auto value chains in the Turkish Auto industry, and discusses earlier forms of 
dependency relations and auto-led development, with reference to the interplay between 
the state, social classes and transnational auto firms in Turkey. Completing our 
industry-level analysis, Chapter 7 shifts the focus to the recent process of restructuring 
in the Turkish auto sector since the early 1980s, and discusses how the re-articulation of 
the Turkish automotive industry with global auto value chains, through particular 
patterns of accumulation, configuration of class forces and state-society relations, has 
generated a new form of dependent and exploitative auto-led development in Turkey. 
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Finally, the last chapter concludes with a review of the arguments and key findings of 
the study, and discusses their contributions, generalisability and implications for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Towards an Up-to-Date and Analytically Valid Conceptualisation of 
Dependent Development 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Is dependency theory truly dead as a possible explanation in today’s development 
studies? Does the dependency perspective no longer provide conceptual and analytical 
tools for the study of underdevelopment under the dynamics of contemporary 
globalization and the new international division of labour? Has the rise of a number of 
newly industrialized countries in Asia and Latin America refuted the central tenets and 
foundations of dependency approach? Today, a broad consensus not only in 
development agencies but also in academia answers these questions in the affirmative. 
For policy-making circles and most development agencies, dependency theory has been 
among the least favoured perspectives for a long time now. On the terrain of intellectual 
currents, even the whole concept of dependency is a cursed notion, which is likely to 
sideline someone in recent development debates. 
In retrospect, after coming to prominence in the 1960s, dependency perspective made a 
tremendous impression in academic circles as an outstanding development paradigm of 
the time. However, by the early 1980s the dependency approach was on the wane, and 
today it has been almost relegated to footnote status in the fields of both development 
studies and International Political Economy (IPE). The reasons behind this swift demise 
are miscellaneous but identifiable in broad strokes. As Stallings (1992, p.48) simply 
puts it, “the combination of intellectual critiques and reinforcing international trends 
had a devastating effect on dependency analysis”. On a number of occasions, 
dependency analyses have been subject to a barrage of criticism not only for falling 
behind the times but also for being intellectually and theoretically flawed in and of 
themselves. As a corollary, there is today a well-accepted presumption among the 
overwhelming majority of academics that dependency analysis no longer provides a 
feasible framework or practical value for the examination of the problematique of 
economic backwardness. 
24 
 
 
 
In stark contrast to the commonly-held presumptions in today’s development discourse, 
this study counter-argues that the validity of certain aspects of dependency analyses 
remain standing, since the issues and problems that inform the dependency approach 
have not disappeared, but rather gained increased relevance under new forms and in 
different ways. Among many others, one of the premier factors behind these issues is 
the persistence of asymmetries of power and wealth that characterize global economic 
relations today. In fact, the world economy has experienced a far-reaching move 
towards a more integrated and coordinated global division of labour in production and 
trade over the last few decades. Today, the global spread of production has brought with 
it a far-flung convergence in levels of industrialization between former First and Third 
World countries, making the dichotomy between ‘industrialized’ and ‘non-
industrialized’ increasingly elusory. 
However, despite the rise of transnationalised production networks and the convergence 
in levels of industrialisation, the asymmetric and polarised nature of the world economy 
is still extant. The global spread of industrialization has been accompanied by new 
asymmetrical power relations that mostly take place throughout hierarchically 
structured chains/networks of global value relations. The emergence of new hierarchy 
structures along these chains/networks comes into existence through a matrix of power 
conflicts between states, transnational companies, local capitalists and labouring 
classes.  
At the heart of all these circumstances lies the question of whether such asymmetrical 
power relations along the value chains give currency to the persistence of dependency 
relations under new forms, forcing us to re-engage with the dependency perspective. In 
response to this widely ignored question, this study affirmatively reveals how 
dependency relations persist in new forms along the networks/chains of global value 
relations. To that end, the study develops an up-to-date and analytically operational 
framework of dependent development, in order not only to interrogate the 
developmental outcomes of Turkey’s integration with global capitalism as the main 
focus of the research, but also to provide a rebuttal to the widely-accepted argument that 
the notion of dependency is no longer a valid analytical framework to study the current 
dynamics of underdevelopment in the wider global south. 
Bearing this objective in mind, this chapter takes the first steps towards an up-to-date 
and analytically valid conceptualisation of dependent development under the new 
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dynamics of today’s global capitalism. The chapter commences with an introductory 
section which provides a retrospective overview of the dependency school. Here the 
purpose is not to comprehensively review dependency literature, as many works have 
already done so, but to briefly explore the complex roots of dependency analyses and a 
variety of intellectual currents within it. Such an introductory section seem to be a 
prerequisite to situating our own theoretical formulation within the broad church of the 
dependency tradition. The subsequent section then critically discusses the barrages of 
criticisms levied against the dependency school, since any revisiting of this archaic line 
of thought might be quite easily subjected to an outright and sweeping dismissal 
beforehand. In doing so, this section does not aim to blindly defend obsolete 
formulations within the dependency tradition, but to reveal how critiques of the 
dependency school have gone too far to ignore its sophisticated variants, overall 
contributions and contemporary relevance. More importantly, gaining greater insight 
into the critiques of the dependency tradition helps us to move from solid and 
employable analytical grounds. Lastly, drawing on this critical survey, the final section 
discusses how and to what extent a specific method of dependency analysis, called 
historical-structuralism, offers important analytical value and insights on which we will 
build our own framework, later in the subsequent chapter.  
2.2 An Overview of Dependency Literature: The Rise and Fall of the Dependency 
School 
In retrospect, the origins of dependency analyses can be traced back to the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, when Latin American intellectuals (pensadores) enunciated criticism 
of the liberal and diffusionist views of modernisation theory as the orthodox economic 
pensée of the time. Under the direction of its executive secretary Raúl Prebisch, a group 
of economists and social scientists who worked for the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) searched for an alternative explanation to the persistence of 
underdevelopment (subdesarrollo) across the continent (Seers, 1981). Contrary to the 
classic theory of foreign trade and its basic ideas of comparative advantage, Prebisch, 
along with Hans Singer, a well-known heterodox economist, developed a theory of the 
secular trends of exchange relations which propounded that the terms of trade had 
retrospectively deteriorated to the disadvantage of periphery-like countries. 
Although the Prebisch-Singer thesis is taken with a pinch of salt, particularly by policy 
circles in the Northern hemisphere, it profoundly influenced development discourse in 
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Latin America, laying the foundations for the idea that industrialisation in peripheral 
countries should be boosted through state-led developmentalism (desarrollismo) and 
import-substitutions (Kay, 2011). The original propositions of Prebisch-Singer, such as 
the centre-periphery paradigm, the peculiarity of peripheral capitalism and declining 
terms of trade, enjoyed a high degree of popularity and came to have far-reaching policy 
implications. Thus, Latin American countries pursued strategies professedly conducive 
to autonomous, self-sustaining development. Likewise, they aspired to industrialise and 
diversify their export compositions behind high tariff walls, with the ultimate goal of 
reducing the continent’s dependence on multinational manufactures and thus on the 
developed north.  
However, the goals and expectations of the ECLA’s model of development ran into 
problems, starting in the early 1960s. The situation in Latin American economies took a 
turn for the worse: the balance of payment crisis exacerbated, real wages did not 
increase far enough to stimulate aggregate demand, unemployment grew even more 
acute and the industrialisation process lost its dynamism (Palma, 1978; Larrain, 1989). 
These developments sparked a new wave of pessimism, leading to trenchant criticism of 
old established paradigms, namely modernisation theories as well as the ECLA’s 
structuralist approach. To put it another way, the real-life crisis of import substitution 
and desarrollismo generated new and possibly more dangerous forms of dependence 
that gradually converted the ECLA structuralists into dependency theorists (Seer, 1981, 
p.140).  
Nevertheless, despite its eminently critical character, the dependency school kept a line 
of continuity with previous analyses, including classical sociology, Marxian political 
economy, and earlier theories of imperialism and some structuralist theories of IPE that 
are avowedly non-Marxist (Palma, 1989; Kay, 2011). Among these, two main features 
of the intellectual origins of dependency analyses could be highlighted. First, the 
ECLA’s formulation of centre-periphery paradigm and its asymmetrical trade relations 
was the instrumental starting point (Larrain, 1989). In this respect, Prebisch can be 
rightly credited not only as the leader of the ECLA’s structuralist school but also a 
forerunner of dependency analysis. Secondly, much of the dependency literature drew 
inspiration from classical sociology, Marxian political economy analysis of 
backwardness, as well as earlier accounts of imperialism, by which dependency 
analyses sought to integrate determination of economic structures with the agency, 
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social and political aspects of the development process and strategies of class 
domination (Palma, 1978). 
Drawing inspiration from such a complex base of intellectual traditions, dependency 
analysis appealed to a broad church of writers and scholars from different political 
perspectives. Therefore, it was, by nature, a heterogeneous paradigm, as its formulations 
tended to be employed flexibly, meaning quite different things to different people. Such 
diversity is not necessarily a problem if we approach any other paradigm or tradition in 
social sciences, but it makes any attempt at a comprehensive survey difficult. Among 
many others (Blomström and Hettne, 1984; Larrain, 1989; Kay, 2011), Palma (1978) 
suggested a useful classification of three intellectual variants within the dependency 
school, upon which this study draws for the sake of developing an up-to-dated 
analytical framework.  
The first variant, best represented by Sunkel (1969) and Furtado (1970), grew out of the 
critique of the ECLA’s analyses as a reformulation which put greater emphasis on the 
obstacles to national development stemming from exogenous factors. Being reformist in 
nature, this strand did not simply add new elements (both social and political) into the 
analysis, it also sought to move beyond the ECLA tradition which in turn popularised 
the dependency paradigm throughout Latin America. The second variant within the 
dependency school sought to uncover the ‘laws’ of dependency and construct a general 
theory of underdevelopment. The principal tenets of this variant are that 
underdevelopment of peripheral countries is directly caused by their dependence on 
core economies and that capitalism itself in peripheral economies is incapable of 
bringing forth a process of economic development.  
The deterministic and stagnationist assumptions of North American Marxists Baran and 
Sweezy (1952) exercised a major influence on this current of dependency thinking, 
making their works quite different from the original dependendist views developed in 
Latin America (Larrain, 1989). Palma (1978) here notes the works of A.G. Frank (1967; 
1969), followed by Dos Santos (1970), Hinkelammert (1972), Marini (1972) and others. 
Most notable among them, A.G. Frank increasingly shifted the focus of analysis from 
socio-economic and socio-political variables and institutional factors to the structural 
dynamics of the world capitalist system, leaving little room for questions of political 
and class agency in economic development.  
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The idea of dependency had in fact emerged as a nativist and post-colonial intellectual 
reaction in Latin America, but after reaching campuses in the US and Europe it acquired 
the status of what might be called orthodoxy. Particularly, US Marxist A.G. Frank 
quickly became the well-known and most important representative of the dependency 
school. Thus, the reception of dependency analyses in the English-speaking world gave 
inordinate space to the writings of Frank, thanks to their higher accessibility vis-à-vis 
the literature in Spanish and Portuguese (Cardoso, 1977). Moreover, Frank proposed a 
formalistic and ‘fully-worked’ out theory of dependency which was easily consumed by 
academic circles in the northern hemisphere as series of variables, isolated and 
measured through the full panoply of quantitative methods.  
In fact, the earlier accounts of dependency relations mostly worked with ahistorical and 
highly stylized models, which led to a distorted perception of the dependency approach, 
particularly outside Latin America. However, following the lead of Cardoso and Faletto 
(1979), a new wave of dependency analyses emerged as the third variant within the 
dependency tradition, which deliberately refrained from developing a mechanico-formal 
theory of dependency and underdevelopment. Such an approach to dependency is best 
associated with a particular line of thinking called associated-dependent development, 
originally proposed by Cardoso and Faletto6 (1969/1979) and later adopted and 
crystallized by many others such as Evans (1979), Gereffi (1983), Bennett and Sharpe 
(1985), Lim (1985), and Gold (1986). This unorthodox variant of the dependency 
school outspokenly denounced the formalism of both the empirical measurers of 
dependency relations and the doctrinaires who constructed an overarching theory of 
dependency, applicable to all situations. Rather, as discussed in depth later in this 
chapter, authors in this tradition proposed the most sophisticated conception of 
dependency, expressed as a concrete historical situation through the interplay of state 
policies, class relations and interests, both domestically and externally.  
Thus, the variants outlined so far show that the dependency school is natively a 
heterogeneous movement of authors, lacking internal uniformity. Given its mixed 
parentage and the diversity of its intellectual roots, the dependency school offers rich 
but disparate modes of analyses that hold diverse tools, concepts and prognoses. As Kay 
(1989) has stressed, dependency studies have not yet constituted a single coherent and 
                                                          
6 Cardoso and Faletto’s seminal work first circulated as a mimeographed version in 1967, and was then 
published as a book in Spanish in 1969. It was only a decade later when its English translation appeared 
that it became more accessible to the English-speaking world. 
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fully worked-out theory of underdevelopment, but rather should be considered an 
approach, a paradigm, a framework, and so on. What is problematic in this respect is 
that, as contributors to the dependency tradition are devoid of internal cohesion, it 
makes any attempt to pin down its credos, mechanisms or even its conception an 
impossible task. Thus, in order to judge and appreciate the value of the dependency 
tradition, it seems essential to bear this diversity in mind and make sense of the variants 
of dependency that have been discerned so far.  
Likewise, considering its diverse nature, it is hardly surprising that the dependency 
approach has been subjected to a storm of criticism from within and outside of the 
dependency school on methodological, theoretical, empirical and stylistic grounds. Its 
overarching popularity in the 1960s and 1970s was superseded by the emerging 
orthodoxy of globalization, succeeding the earlier import-substation phase. A new 
common sense began to crystallize by the mid-1980s on behalf of the benefits of open 
trade, foreign direct investment and less state intervention. Due to the rise of NICs, 
dependency discourse, particularly its vulgar and orthodox form associated with Frank’s 
works, began to lose its allure in analytical terms. Moreover, the crisis of real 
socialism/communism also hammered another nail in the coffin of the dependency 
movement, which was in turn accompanied by the resurgence of neoclassical theory and 
neoliberal policies under the guise of globalisation. 
Thus, it eventually became commonplace to confirm an impasse in development theory 
and practice. This impasse, to a great extent, was self-constructed through critics of 
mainstream economics who sought to come back to the fold. A flourishing literature on 
globalisation and neoliberalism became a candidate to transcend this impasse, revealing 
the self-proclaimed triumph of capitalism and the demise of any alternative 
development project associated with right/reformist and revolutionary/Marxist 
positions. Thus, dependency, as an allied theory of Marxism, experienced much the 
same fate, and eventually lost its entire credibility among students and practitioners of 
development studies. The end result of this fading popularity was an outburst of 
misplaced and sweeping critiques and outright dismissal of the dependency tradition 
which has gone so far as to ignore its overall contributions, more sophisticated 
formulations, as well as its contemporary relevance. Keeping this handicap in mind, the 
next section gives greater space to the critiques of the dependency school in order to 
capture the value of the dependency tradition in a more precise manner. 
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2.3 Dependency as an Obsolete Theory of Underdevelopment 
Providing a comprehensive survey of critiques of the dependency school is beyond the 
scope of this research given the mass of writing that has appeared so far7. However, by 
cautiously dwelling on this barrage of critiques we can not only refrain from 
oversimplified criticism of the dependency perspective but also reach a streamlined 
understanding of dependency relations, which offers analytically employable tools to 
explicate the asymmetrical and exploitative nature of today’s global economy. For 
convenience, I shall categorize these critiques under two broad headings, non-Marxist 
and Marxist. Non-Marxist critics of the dependency approach have provided a general 
sort of critique which probes dependency analysis as a scientific and testable theory. 
They scrutinise and look into matters such as internal consistency, formation of 
hypotheses, operational strength of variables, reliability and relevance of empirical 
evidence. Here one comes across authors like Philip O’Brien (1975), Sanjaya Lall 
(1975), Robert A. Packenham (1992) and Stephan Haggard (1990). Marxist critique on 
the other hand scrutinises issues such as the stagnationist assumptions of dependency 
school which overlooks the inherently dynamic nature of capitalism, lack of class 
analysis as a cornerstone of capitalist development, and indifference to the correlation 
between different modes of production and underdevelopment. Here one come across 
authors such as Bill Warren (1973, 1980), Bernstein (1979, 1982), Dale L. Johnson 
(1983, 1985), Gabriel Palma (1978, 1989) and James Petras (1981). Needless to say, the 
critical literature on the dependency school is vast and is not limited to these, but in 
what follows the principal and more often repeated criticisms are examined, since it is 
impossible to capture this Tower of Babel within the limited space of the chapter. 
2.3.1 Non-Marxist Critiques of Dependency  
One of the most serious critiques of the dependency approach by a non-Marxist author 
came in 1975 when O’Brien constructively but deficiently engaged in the dependency 
debate, relying on a positivist hypothetical-deductive methodology. In fact, O’Brien 
(1975, p.25) was not utterly against dependency theory, since he admits that the 
                                                          
7 For surveys of critiques, see Kay’s (2011) Latin American Theories of Development and 
Underdevelopment; Larrain’s (1989) Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and 
Dependency; Blomström and Hettne’s (1984) Development Theory in Transition. For a survey of Marxist 
critiques of the Dependency approach see Dependency and Marxism by Chilcote (1982) in which one can 
find a collection of essays, published in Journal of Latin American Perspective. For another far-reaching 
critique of dependency approach see Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment by Seers (1982) which 
involves a series of papers, presented in the Institute of Development Studies’ conference, at the 
University of Sussex. 
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interplay between internal domestic structures and international structures is a critical 
starting point that has vital importance for understanding the process of development in 
Latin America. However, O’Brien methodologically points out the totalizing and 
abstract characteristics of dependency analysis. He conceives the dependency approach 
as an attempt to establish a new paradigm whose objective is to pose a higher level and 
general hypothesis within which lower level explanations and various heterogeneous 
phenomena are accommodated and analysed. Based on this reading of the dependency 
approach, he points out the danger that dependency analysis can readily become a 
pseudo-concept which explains everything in general and nothing in particular 
(O’Brien, 1975, p.12). In this way, the employment of dependency theory, in the hands 
of unsophisticated authors, has become a deus ex machina explanation for everything in 
Latin America.   
In fact, O’Brien’s critique is appropriate to a greater extent when it is applied to the 
works of some neo-Marxist and dependency authors such as Baran (1968), Frank 
(1969), Wallerstein (1974, 1976) and Amin (1974, 1976), in which an abstract and 
totalizing conception of dependency is apparent in different tones. In a similar vein, this 
totalizing and abstract reading, as Smith (1979) argues, sacrifices the parts to the whole 
in the historiography of dependency relation. Several times, such critiques were 
manifested within dependency thinking as well, since key figures like Cardoso (1973) 
and Palma (1989) repeatedly laid stress on the dialectical unity of the whole and the 
parts in particular. Indeed, as Cardoso (1972) once warned, what critics like O’Brien 
principally miss is that the problem of dependency theory is not the misemployment of 
it, but its very totalizing and abstract conception, which is believed to construct a 
paradigm in sophisticated hands. This is why the employment of dependency in such a 
manner – a totalizing paradigm - is one way or another doomed to fail in constructing a 
viable framework for the articulation of dependency relations. 
Being chary of the dependency approach, O’Brien raises thought-provoking questions, 
some of which found further expression in the more concrete and detailed analysis of 
Sanjaya Lall (1975). On similar methodological premises, Lall (1975) questioned 
whether dependency was a useful concept that was casually related to the persistence of 
underdevelopment. Answering this question, Lall (1975, p.800) set forth two criteria 
that the notion of dependency should meet if it aspires to be regarded as useful in the 
analysis of underdevelopment:  
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1- It must lay down certain characteristics of dependent economies which are not 
found in non-dependent ones. 
2- These characteristics must be shown to adversely affect the course and pattern of 
development of the dependent countries. 
To find out whether the first criterion had been fulfilled, Lall went though both the 
static and dynamic traits of dependent countries held out by dependency authors. Like 
O’Brien, he concluded that the concept of dependence as applied to peripheral countries 
was impossible to define, since the characteristics used to describe dependent countries 
were also present in core countries. He shows how countries like Canada and Belgium 
were far more dependent on foreign investment than countries like India and Pakistan, 
but the former cannot be classified as dependent economies. Moreover, for critics such 
as Lall, the reliance on foreign technology, another salient aspect of dependency, is as 
commonplace in core countries as it is in peripheral economies. From this point forth, it 
was argued that the characteristics applied to dependent economies are not peculiar 
expressions of dependent capitalism but rather typical of capitalist development in 
general (Lall, 1975). 
Lall’s second criterion dealt with the matter of whether there is a causal connection 
between the characteristics of dependency and underdevelopment. Again and not 
surprisingly, Lall (1975) did not find such a causality relation, and thus no basis for a 
theory of underdevelopment in Latin America. For him, what one might call 
dependency theory is a catalogue of social, economic political and cultural factors, 
which nonetheless are incapable of explaining the dynamics of underdevelopment. 
Therefore, Lall (1975, p.800), like O’Brien, pointed out that when reading the literature, 
one occasionally gets the impression that “dependence is defined in a circular manner: 
less developed countries (LDCs) are poor because they are dependent, and any 
characteristics that they display signify dependence”. 
There is little doubt that if one tests dependency theory through the standpoint of Lall 
or, in more plain words, through what O’Brien has called 'positivist hypothetical-
deductive methodology', it is no surprise that the theory of dependency does not seem to 
pass the class. What authors like O’Brien and Lall errantly do in their critiques is to 
conceive ‘dependency’ as a theory with a set of propositions whose validity is 
empirically tested and measured through precisely defined variables. Subjecting 
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dependency analysis to such a positivist and deductive methodology principally goes 
against the essential characteristics of dependency studies: to put it bluntly, its emphasis 
on historical analysis of class formation, class struggles, and the reformation of existing 
order through shifting class coalitions, social movements and the state’s actions. As 
many (see Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1979; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) put it, 
dependency, as a concept, does not hold a particular empirical reference, due to which it 
cannot be dealt with as a ‘variable’ to assess relative degrees of dependence and 
interdependence among divergent national units.  Thereby, dependency, as Larrain 
(1989) has counter-argued, does not refer to a formal theory that can be granted 
meaning through a number of static and dynamic variables related to external relations 
between national units which bear no relation to domestic contradictions and class 
struggles.  
In brief, what critics like Lall principally miss is that they conceive dependency in 
Frankian terms, as if it referred to a set of distinctive characteristics that necessarily lead 
to underdevelopment. Thus, they simply counter-argue that the relative level of 
technological dependency and foreign capital penetration in countries like, say, Canada 
and Belgium, is as commonplace as it is in economies like Brazil, Chile or Thailand. 
However, the former two are not literally viewed as dependent economies, or the level 
of dependency in these economies does not lead to underdevelopment. What these 
critics are not aware of is twofold. First, the former countries can be as dependent as the 
latter in technological and capital terms, yet these economies have a diversified and 
uneven pattern of development due to immeasurable factors such as class dynamics, 
historical peculiarities and state formation, all of which redefine dependency in a 
different manner. Second, these critiques are erroneous and misleading given the fact 
that many dependency authors like Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Evans (1979) and Lim 
(1985) have already demonstrated that the state of dependency does not necessarily lead 
to underdevelopment.  
Perhaps, one of the most extensive and devastating critique of the dependency school 
was presented by Stanford’s Professor Robert Packenham.8 As one of the most 
                                                          
8 For many, Packenham’s critique stands as perhaps the most well-rounded. As for me, what makes his 
critique so crowd-pulling is the bitterness of his criticism, which targets not only the whole dependency 
movement but also a considerable number of eminent scholars in Latin American studies, making it a 
polemical book that is difficult to ignore. However, as a significant number of scholars have counter-
argued, Peckham is just as polemical and ideological as some of the dependentistas he criticised, and he is 
34 
 
 
 
trenchant critics from the non-Marxist camp, Packenham (1992) shares similar 
methodological premises with Lall, but what makes his critique worth mentioning here 
is the strident allegation that the entire dependency approach is patently an unscientific, 
tautological and politicized ‘scholarly’ endeavour. On a primarily epistemological basis, 
Packenham (1992) argued that a scholarly endeavour is only scientific when 
independent empirical facts are utilized to falsify hypotheses arising from a 
nomological-deductive theory, and thus having its roots in Marxism the dependency 
approach is utopian, unfalsifiable and politicized. No doubt Peckenham is right in the 
sense that much of the dependency approach one way or another partakes of the core 
premises of Marxism. However, what he fails to understand is that identifing with 
Marxism is not prima facie proof of being unscientific, since whether or not to qualify 
Marxism as social science depends on one’s benchmark for science. Therefore, for one 
like Packenham who is a combatant logical empiricist in the epistemological tradition of 
Karl Popper, the dependency approach can be viewed as unscientific, but it must be 
borne in mind that this naive mode of inquiry was renounced as untenable more than 
four decades ago. Today, it is widely accepted that facts are inescapably theory-laden, 
so they are never truly as independent as expected in the Popperian sense. Hence, 
hypotheses, as well, can never be falsified in the strict sense of Peckenham’s criteria for 
being regarded as science. In other words, no one today can truly assert that any 
epistemology is so superior as to claim the mantle of Science single-handedly. 
Needless to say, not all critiques are as sweeping and unfair as Peckenham’s. In one 
non-Marxist variant, Stephan Haggard (1990) presented a reasonable critique which 
adroitly draws attention to overlooked shortcomings of the dependency approach. From 
a comparative political economy perspective, Haggard not only provided a critique of 
former dependency studies, but by drawing on East Asian cases, he also offered new 
evidence on how different state policies and paths of industrialization lead to different 
developmental outcomes under conditions of dependency. Haggard (1990) rightly 
stressed how much dependency writing ignores and obfuscates the independent policy 
choices of states and the wide variation in their responses to the constraining conditions 
of dependency. By comparing Latin American dependency with the East Asian cases, 
he argues that dependency is as much an effect of national policies, and the 
developmental role of multinational firms is only an intervening variable in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
blinded by his obsession to eradicate dependency thinking from academia no matter what intellectual and 
practical value it offers. 
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formation of different development paths. Therefore, despite the conception of many 
dependency authors, the international economic system, for Haggard (1990), is not a 
rigidly determined structure that produces dependency relations unilaterally, but a set of 
shifting constraints in which states learn and develop an array of manoeuvres in dealing 
with situations of dependency. Hereby, Haggard’s comparative look does not invalidate 
the basic dependency insight but offers a differentiated conception of international 
constraints by giving state responses and policies more elbow room in the analysis of 
dependency.  
2.3.2 Marxist Critiques of Dependency 
Many Marxists remained rather unresponsive in the earlier stages of the debate initiated 
by the dependency school. However, the silence of Marxists was broken in the early 
1970s, not for the purpose of sidelining the contributions of the dependency approach, 
but rather to put dependency analysis on an employable track. Such critiques mainly 
revolved around questions such as: how effective is the conception of capitalist 
penetration and underdevelopment in the dependency approach? How and to what 
extent do dependency studies take the dynamics of class struggle and relations of 
production into their analysis of dependency relations? How and to what extent do 
external and internal factors shape dependency relations? As in the non-Marxist variant, 
while some of these critiques are instructive and thought-provoking, a considerable 
number of them are sweeping and insensitive to the diversity and richness of modes of 
explanation in the dependency school. Again as in the non-Marxist variant, many 
Marxist critics failed to capture the dependency perspective in its complexity and 
entirety, since they mostly targeted particular group of dependency studies, mainly 
represented by Frank (1969, 1978), Wallerstein (1973, 1974) and Amin (1976). 
Therefore, the barrage of Marxist criticism directed at these authors often turned into a 
blanket condemnation of all dependency studies. Keeping this handicap in mind, this 
sub-section engages with these critiques in an empathetical and yet critical manner in 
order to later build on an operationally valid conception of dependency, arising out of 
these storms of criticism. 
Although Marxist critiques differ in many aspects, most of them one way or another 
partake in Marx’s early optimistic belief in the inherently dynamic nature of capitalist 
development in the periphery. Therefore, they are highly critical of the notions of 
underdevelopment and dependency, which are often thought of as inseparable as if the 
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latter necessarily leads to the former as long as the peripheral social formation remains 
attached to the world capitalist system. Such a stagnationist way of thinking, that 
underestimates the prospects of capitalist development in the periphery, is 
commonplace not only in the writings of neo-Marxists and early dependentistas such as 
Baran (1968), Frank (1969) and Amin (1974, 1976), but also in the works of 
structuralist approaches to dependency such as Sunkel (1972, 1973) and Furtado (1970). 
One of the harshest critiques of such stagnationist thinking came in 1973 when Bill 
Warren, a notable British Communist, systematically questioned the hypothesis of the 
development of underdevelopment. Warren (1973) launched a frontal attack on the 
thesis that imperialism (in a sense, capitalist penetration) poses an obstacle to domestic 
capitalist development in the periphery. Warren’s work (1973) empirically argued that 
considerable capitalist development, which meant industrialization in his understanding, 
had already taken place in the peripheral countries, particularly since the Second World 
War. Contrary to Baran and a stream of stagnationist writings in the early dependency 
school, Warren (1973, 1980), in a highly optimistic manner, counter-argues that 
imperialism and capitalist penetration facilitated capitalist development in the periphery 
by breaking down static and archaic structures and thus paving the way for 
industrialization. Therefore, potential obstacles to development should not be sought 
among external factors, but among internal contradictions in peripheral social 
formations.  
In fact, Warrenite criticism of the dependency school is correct in some aspects, since a 
series of empirical studies have revealed that the development of underdevelopment 
thesis and the stagnationist assumptions in dependency thinking are no longer tenable, 
with the spread of core-like industrial activities to peripheral countries and the rise of 
newly industrialized countries as mass manufacturing hubs. However, we should still 
approach these sorts of critiques with caution for two reasons. Firstly, such criticisms 
cannot be applied to the whole dependency school, since some eminent dependency 
authors such as Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Dos Santos (1970), Evans (1979, 1982) and 
Palma (1978) must be excluded due to their recognition of the historical progressiveness 
of capitalism in Latin America.9 Second, an unquestioned optimism regarding the 
                                                          
9 Dos Santos’ work on the ‘New Dependency’ and Cardoso’s well-known conception of associated-
dependent development had already moved beyond the stagnationist trap in dependency thinking, well 
before these criticisms. However, since their works were first published in Spanish in the late 1960s, the 
English-speaking world only became familiarised with their ideas in the 1970s (Dos Santos, 1970; 
Cardoso, 1973), when the dependency school was being subjected to a storm of criticism.  
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progressiveness of capitalism in the periphery commits an opposite error by 
overestimating the developmental role of capitalist penetration, and by obscuring the 
reproduction of new power asymmetries and economic unevenness through constant 
revolutionizing of production relations.10    
Another relevant and frequently articulated criticism levied against the dependency 
school is that dependency analysis overrates the determinative role of external factors 
and neglects the power of internal forces, which also constitutively shapes development 
trajectories in the periphery. In this respect, the critiques of Marxist authors such as 
Brenner (1977), Bernstein (1982), Week and Dore (1979), and Petras (1981) come to 
mind here. Putting more emphasis on the dynamics of class struggle and relations of 
production, authors like Brenner (1977) and Week and Dore (1979) argued that internal 
forces rather than external circumstances had considerable influence on dependency 
relations and capitalist development in the periphery.  Put another way, this line of 
thinking does not simply advocate excluding external relations, but starts the analysis of 
dependency by looking into the contradictions internal to each country. In a similar 
manner, Bernstein (1979, 1982) argued that the dichotomous thinking of external and 
internal should be transcended by analysing any social formation within its specificity 
as a complex expression of class struggles and social relations of production. Similar 
points were also held by Petras (1981) and Petras and Brill (1985) who examined the 
globalist dogma in dependency and world system approaches. Petras (1981) emphasized 
that the transformation of a peripheral social formation through its insertion into the 
capitalist world economy must be viewed as a ceaseless reciprocal relationship between 
class forces and relations of production within that social formation and those that 
operate on a global scale. Nevertheless, the globalist perspective in dependency and 
world system approaches depicts a scenario of domination in which the periphery and 
class forces within it are conceived of as if they were ready to be shaped and exploited 
by the core as passive bearers of external factors.  
Again, this line of criticism is more appropriate when levelled against the Frankian type 
of dependency studies or world system theory in general. A specific segment of 
dependency writers like Frank, or ‘external dependency’ reformists like Sunkel and 
Furtado, hold the view that external forces are the prime determinants of dependency 
                                                          
10 For a brilliant critique of Warren’s stupefying fascination with capitalism and the progressive role of 
imperialism for the periphery, see Ahmad’s (1983) chapter in which he adopts a more nuanced approach 
by properly drawing on Marx’s and Lenin’s writings. 
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and underdevelopment. This line of thinking is inherently lodged with much of the neo-
Marxist approaches which conceive the capitalist world economy in a functionalist 
manner, as if it was an abstract system independent of its constituent parts and inner 
dynamics. Such a holistic bias in theorization utterly goes against the conception of 
systemness in Marxian usage as a dialectically operating entity. To a greater extent, 
dependency authors such as Dos Santos, Cardoso and Faletto, and Evans, once more are 
exempt from this indictment. 
Last but not least, at the heart of all these critiques, the conception and theorization of 
capitalism in dependency studies has been highly questioned by Marxist critics. 
Dependentistas have been charged witheing economistic, static, reductionist and 
mechanistic in their analyses of capitalist development and underdevelopment in the 
periphery. Dependency theory has allegedly remained economistic in the sense that the 
roles of social classes, politics, the ideology and the state have been overshadowed by 
economic determinants of the world capitalist system (Leys, 1977). Essentially, 
dependentistas theorize capitalism though categories such as commodity production, the 
market and exchange relations rather than social relations of production, class dynamics 
and modes of production (Bernstein, 1979; Johnson, 1985). Due to the placement of 
dependency analyses in the sphere of circulation rather than in the social relations of 
production, dependentistas are doomed to adopt a mechanistic and static position which 
incorrectly assumes that the process of capitalist development in the periphery is 
mechanistically determined by the world capitalist system. Their position is also 
regarded as static because such a mechanistic understanding of development and 
underdevelopment takes dependency as a given, only subjected to change in its form but 
not to decline or fade away as a phenomenon.   
Again, such criticisms concerned with the conception and theorization of capitalism are 
true to a certain extent, and more appropriate when applied to some dependency authors 
but not all. In the strictest sense, most dependency writers, such as Frank, Dos Santos, 
Marini and even Cardoso, have been charged with lacking a class analysis in theorizing 
capitalism and underdevelopment in the periphery (Henfrey, 1981; Myer, 1975). As 
more reasonable and prudent critics like Johnson (1983, 1985) have argued, scores of 
books and numerous articles guided by the dependency perspective fall mainly within 
the class analysis framework in some sort. Therefore, they aimed to employ a method of 
class analysis in changing degrees but of the wrong kind (Johnson, 1983). In fact, 
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excessive deterministic zeal and under-emphasis on class analysis is more commonly 
held among dependency writers such as Frank and Marini, but cannot be extended to 
those like Cardoso and Evans, as if they overlooked internal structures and class 
struggles in their analysis. However, Cardoso’s conception of class has also been 
subjected to Marxist critique (Myer, 1975; Johnson, 1983). Of course, Cardoso did not 
adopt a universal and orthodox Marxist view of classes in its strictest sense, but his 
conception of class has a broader zeal, containing structural and institutional factors, 
gender, race, ethnicity as well as religion, all of which could be utilized for the 
functioning of peripheral societies. In a nutshell, as Larrain (1989) argues the Cardosian 
version of dependency does not obscure or replace Marxist analyses of class, relations 
of production and productive forces. However, it contextualizes them with respect to the 
specificity of capitalist development in the periphery as once hinted at by Marx in all 
but name in his discussion of a new and international division of labour (Larrain, 1989, 
pp.200-201). 
2.4 Moving Beyond the Theoretical Impasse: Towards an Analytically Applicable              
Conception of Dependency 
As argued so far, the critique of the dependency school has gone so far that even 
employable aspects of the dependency perspective have been defamed as an outcast way 
of thinking. To put it more clearly, criticizing the dependency approach, as Haggard 
(1990, p.19) states, has become an academic industry of the worst sort. Its vulgar 
formulations have been vehemently denounced; its overall contribution and more 
erudite versions have been ignored. Thus, as many state, such criticism has threatened 
to throw away the baby with the bath water (see Larrain, 1989; Ghosh, 2001; Abbott, 
2003 Holloway, 2003). From this point of view, this section aims to explore the validity 
and critical spirit of the dependency tradition in order to move towards an analytically 
applicable conception of it for the study of underdevelopment today. As the forgoing 
discussion has given a preliminary idea that the dependency approach is gravely flawed, 
particularly by virtue of the efforts of some practitioners who employed it as a fully-
fledged and autonomous theory, as in the vulgar dependency writers, or as it is 
employed by some critics in a positivist, hypothetically-deductive manner. 
Nevertheless, the real value of dependency thinking still offers a viable IPE framework 
as far as it employs Marx’s methodological approach of historical materialism to 
provide a detailed analysis of dependency in peripheral social formations as an 
40 
 
 
 
expression of changing class relations.11 In fact, such an approach lets us abstain from a 
mechanico-formal theory of dependency by instead viewing dependency as a concrete 
situation of late capitalist development in the periphery.  
Such an approach to dependency is mostly associated with a particular kind of 
dependency analysis famously labelled associated-dependent development, spearheaded 
by Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and later utilised by many others.12 It is no wonder that 
this new wave of thinking has significantly diverged in various aspects from the earlier 
theories of dependency. What really makes the Cardosian version of dependency studies 
distinctive and analytically appealing is the method of historical-structuralism which 
allows its practitioners to move beyond the theoretical flaws surrounding earlier 
dependency analyses.13 Unlike the mechanico-formal theorization of dependency, this 
line of thinking adopts a more complex and flexible conception by examining concrete 
situations of dependency which emerge through historical specificities of particular 
social formations such as configurations of class forces, peculiarities of state-society 
relations and social relations of production. In this manner, the historical-structural 
approach to dependency employs a sort of historical materialist approach in analysing 
capitalist development in the periphery. 
Shifting the focus of analysis from exogenous, structural, market- and exchange-based 
relations to domestic economic/political alliances and socio-historical peculiarities, the 
Cardosian version of dependency thinking has paved the way for a multidimensional, 
historically-sensitive and class-relational analysis of dependency relations. For authors 
in this tradition, dependency is not simply either an external phenomenon or an internal 
one, but is conceived through the interaction between internal and external elements, all 
of which form a complex and interwoven whole to be explored (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979). In other words, Cardoso and Faletto aspire to explore diversity within the unity 
of different historical phases, rather than searching for unity with diversity as the 
Frankian variant of dependency has done. In so doing, they have developed a 
                                                          
11 Stressed in different ways, the contention that the dependency perspective is viable as long as it applies 
a historical materialist approach has so far been held by many scholars, such as Palma (1988), Larrain 
(1989), Abbott (2003) and Domingues (2013).    
12 See Evans (1979), Gereffi (1983), Lim (1985) and Gold (1986), and more recently Abbott (2003). 
13 As was argued in perhaps the most widely cited review of dependency literature (Palma, 1978), the 
historical-structuralism is considered to be heuristically the most fertile and possibly the only viable 
variant of the dependency school. For an in-depth and excellent version of this discussion see Palma’s 
(1989) unpublished PhD thesis at the University of Sussex, Development, Dependency and Marxism: A 
Critical Reappraisal and Case Study of Chile.   
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dependency perspective that is more sensitive to the question of how internal factors 
such as class formations, social and economic alliances, and political processes interact 
with external forces and determinants in shaping the dynamics of dependent 
development. Therefore, in the Cardosian lexicon, a situation of dependency is not 
mechanically determined and unilaterally imposed by external and structural factors, but 
the particular domestic configuration of a peripheral social formation develops a 
specific response within a series of external limits and parameters, historically set by the 
capitalist world economy. 
This stream of thinking analytically provides broader room for peripheral countries to 
undertake actions to redefine patterns of dependency in their own interest, depending on 
their internal class alliances and political coalitions. In this respect, the state of 
dependency is not necessarily or directly associated with backwardness or 
underdevelopment of the periphery, as initially argued by reformist dependentistas such 
as Furtado or notoriously articulated by the Frankian model of dependency. In contrast 
to many other dependency authors, Cardoso (1972, 1973) did not adhere to a 
stagnationist conception of dependency and argued against the development of 
underdevelopment thesis by revealing that both development and industrialization take 
place in the periphery despite the continuity or even the escalation of a state of 
dependency.14 By allying with local capital and bargaining with multinational 
corporations, peripheral states can pursue certain development policies, whether 
outward oriented or inward-oriented, with the aim of securing capital accumulation for 
their own interests (Cardoso, 1972; Evans, 1976). Based on the historical experience of 
Brazil, it was Cardoso (1973) who first shifted focus to the question of how the ongoing 
interplay between the state, domestic bourgeoisies and multinationals generates 
structural change and economic dynamism in the capitalist development of the 
periphery. In a word, for the Cardosian variant, dependency’s links with the 
international economy does not make development infeasible, but produces and 
                                                          
14 Contrary to stagnationist claims, Cardoso (1972) vehemently rejects the notion that when the links of 
dependency intensify, growth and development falter, and when they are loosened, growth gets better. 
Therefore, he carefully distinguished his approach from the mechanistic formulations of dependency by 
coining the term associated-dependent development. In a similar vein, Palma (1989) argued that 
underdevelopment of the periphery cannot be attributed to dependency per se, as it is inherent in capitalist 
development in its general terms, even though underdevelopment has some peculiarities in dependent 
social formations that need to be explored. 
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reproduces substantial contradictions to be overcome if a peripheral country aims to 
change its position in the international division of labour.      
Carefully building on the notion of associated-dependent development, Evans (1979) 
proposed a sophisticated analytical framework to analyse the mechanisms and outcomes 
of dependent development. In a similar vein to Cardoso, he rejects any economistic and 
mechanical conception of dependency relations by which a country is doomed to stick 
in a state of underdevelopment due to its economic and technological reliance on the 
world capitalist economy. Rather, dependency is conceived as a historical process of 
late capitalist development which manifests itself through the interaction of domestic 
classes and political/economic alliances with classes and groups in the world economy. 
What really makes Evans’ work analytically notable for the analysis of dependency 
relations is the centrality of the well-defined notion of the triple alliance, by which he 
refers to an ongoing interplay among transnational corporations, the state and local 
industrial capital as the three main pillars of dependent capitalist development. The 
relationships among these three main actors are seen as both cooperative and 
conflictual, since each possesses different interest, objectives and leverages (Evans, 
1979, pp.34-50).  
Based on a close analysis of the triple alliance, Evans (1979, p.52) hypothesized that 
there are “no irreconcilable differences between local industrialists and the 
multinationals or between the state and multinationals” even though the relative 
dominance of each actor may differ from industry to industry, by country, or over time. 
This hypothesis clearly stands in contrast to earlier articulations of the dependency 
approach that see the relationship between multinationals and local capital, or 
multinationals and the state, as inherently conflictual, necessarily leading to the 
capitulation of local capital to imperialism. Based on the simultaneous possibility of an 
alliance and robust bargaining, neither the dominance of multinationals nor the 
subordination of local capital is taken for granted. Rather it is assumed that both local 
capital and the state enjoy certain political and economic advantages vis-à-vis 
multinationals, varying from industry to industry and over the course of time. As a 
result, forming the dominant class constellation of the domestic social structure, the 
three partners of the alliance, to a large extent, have common interests in capital 
accumulation and in the subordination of the mass population. 
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In sum, the Cardosian version of dependency thinking to a greater extent moves beyond 
the theoretical flaws surrounding earlier dependency analysis. Particularly, by 
employing different articulations of the method of historical-structuralism, the 
Cardosian variant does manage to avoid the totalising, deterministic, stagnationist and 
reductionist conception of dependency relations. It is fair to say that due to this 
historically-dynamic, non-stagnationist and class-relational reading of dependency 
relations, the Cardosian variant, to a considerable extent, still offers conceptual and 
analytical insights for addressing today’s development problems, particularly in the 
global periphery. Since the issues that inform the dependency perspective have not 
disappeared in today’s global economy, the notion of dependent development is still 
with us and still appeals to some scholars to various degrees and with different 
ideological hues.15 Therefore, despite being mostly considered a paradigm of the past, 
the Cardosian approach to dependency still holds relevance today on several counts.16 
First and foremost, the polarizing tendencies of the world economy are still at work and 
continue to generate economic divergences both between and within countries. The 
convergence in industrialization levels and the rise of NICs have not heralded neither 
‘the end of the Third World’, as Harris (1986) has propounded, nor ‘the disintegration 
of the Third World’ as Killick (1990) has argued. Of course, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union made the notions of First World and Third World anachronistic, and the spread 
of production capabilities to the global periphery has led to a global industrial 
convergence that makes the dichotomy between ‘industrialized’ and ‘non-industrialized’ 
increasingly elusory. Nevertheless, as many reveal (Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 2003; 
Schwartz, 2010), the global industrial convergence has not diminished the income and 
wealth gap between the developed countries of the former First World and the 
developing/undeveloped countries of the former Third World, and the hierarchical 
nature of the world economy remains a fundamental dimension of contemporary global 
dynamics. Moreover, the nature of the contemporary global economy also gives 
currency to the Cardosian variant of dependency analysis, since the emergence of global 
production and trade has not only intensified the links and interactions among states, 
                                                          
15 See Abbott (2003), Birch and Mykhenko (2009), Nolke and Vliegenthart (2009), Kohli, (2009) 
Domingues (2013), Becker and Jäger (2010). 
16 For different interpretations regarding the relevance of the dependency approach in the neoliberal 
period, see Kay (1993), Kay and Gwynne (2000) and Ghosh (2001). For how the concepts and some 
central ideas of dependency theory are rephrased in the development discourses of some globalization 
theories, see Herath (2008).  
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local economic elites and transnational capital, but also asymmetrically redefined their 
structural and bargaining power vis-à-vis each other. As the Cardosian version of 
dependency analysis offers a unified and interdisciplinary historico-social framework 
for examining the mechanisms and power asymmetries shaping the world economy, it 
continues to provide analytical insights for the development problems of today.  
However, to say that the Cardosian or historical-structural dependency perspective still 
has relevance and explanatory power does not, no doubt, mean that the it is without 
shortcomings and limitations of its own. Indeed, the shortcomings and limitations of 
historical-structural dependency studies have become much more apparent today, given 
the global restructuring of the world economy and its impacts on developing countries 
since the early 1970s. Perhaps one of the most salient limitations of the Cardosian 
version of dependency analysis is that it is deprived of an up-to-date and systematic 
framework in which to examine the dynamics of the new global division of labour and 
the far-reaching structural restructuring the global periphery has undergone in the last 
35 to 40 years. Today, it has increasingly become apparent that the traditional division 
and the classic relationship between the core and periphery of the world economy has 
become vaguer under the transnational and integrated system of production and trade.  
As two of the most salient aspects of the contemporary world economy, the 
globalization of production and trade have to a considerable extent narrowed the gap 
between developed and developing countries in terms of industrialization. With their 
highly diversified export-oriented manufacturing capacity, the NICs of the global 
periphery have not only caught up with but overtaken the developed world in their 
levels of industrialization. These changes have not only redefined the hierarchical and 
asymmetrical relations in the world economy, but also encourage part of the global 
periphery to reinsert into the world economy on the basis of more competitive branches 
of production and high-value industrial niches. Since it was mostly employed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the Cardosian version of dependency analysis offers a 
conventional and basilar industry analysis, mostly looking at concrete situations of 
dependency based on the interplay among the main actors of the alliance. However, it 
has little to say about how recent changes in the nature and governance of today’s 
global system of production and trade sets economic and political parameters for the 
matter of development in the global periphery. 
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Moreover, the global convergence in industrialization levels and the emergence of NICs 
not only bring a bifurcation or differentiation within the global periphery, but also 
revive the matter of the state’s role in economic development and in the reduction of 
economic vulnerabilities and constrains. In this respect, the development experience of 
East Asian NICs offers a different social, historical and geopolitical context to rethink 
and revise limitations of the notion of dependent development with respect to the 
developmental role of the state.17 In fact, the Cardosian version of dependency analysis 
puts special emphasis on the role of the active and entrepreneurial state in dependent 
capitalist development and in the successful process of capital accumulation.  
However, it remains limited due to the lack of a well-crafted, all-round conception of 
how the developmental role of the state in dependent development comes into being in 
various ways and differs significantly from the one that has been observed in the rest of 
the developing world. A comparative look at class-relational analyses of East Asian 
developmental states provides valuable insights to move beyond previously slighted 
aspects of the developmental role of the state, which was less salient in the Latin 
American socio-historical and geopolitical context. Such a comparative approach to the 
matter of dependent development also unearths another related limitation, common to 
many historical-structural analyses. The overemphasis on the interplay among the three 
main actors of the triple alliance with respect to the matter of industrialization may run 
the risk of neglecting the role of broader class configurations and inter- and intra-class 
conflicts in the formation of development-oriented alliances and states apparatuses.  
2.5 Conclusion  
As discussed so far in this chapter, given its complex intellectual roots and variety of 
analyses, the dependency approach has a highly abstruse diversity within itself, which 
leads critics to treat this broad church of thought as if it was a single theory whose 
fundamental premises were shared by its adherents. In this respect, the analytical value 
and contemporary relevance of the dependency tradition have remained largely clouded 
by the outright dismissal and misplaced critiques, particularly in today’s development 
                                                          
17 For some scholars (Amsden, 1979, 1985; Sanchez, 2003), the rise of East Asian NICs has not only 
called into question the tenets of the dependency approach, but also brought the demise of the dependency 
school, believed to be completely at odds with the East Asian Miracle. Indeed, the East Asian experience 
adds fuel to the fire that has burned out some of the simplistic and mechanical propositions with which 
the dependency approach became burdened. However, studies (Gold, 1986; Lim, 1985; Evans, 1987; 
Haggard, 1990) have revealed that the rise of East Asian NICs does not invalidate the dependency school 
altogether, but rather requires further cases and reinterpretations for the propositions of the historical-
structural version of dependency thinking. 
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discourse. Contrary to this general tendency, the chapter has explored the broad array of 
dependency analyses, revealed their main differences, and discussed the most relevant 
criticism levied against them. It has been contended here that the dependency approach 
certainly has many shortcomings, particularly when it comes to some of its practitioners 
who convert it into an ahistorical, fully-fledged and formal theory of underdevelopment.   
Besides, it has also been argued that historical-structural dependency analysis, as a 
method for the analysis of concrete situations, offers relevance and analytical value in 
examining the mechanism of underdevelopment and dependency, even under the new 
dynamics of today’s global economy. However, despite its relevance, heuristic value 
and explanatory power, this chapter contends that it needs to be re-examined and re-
articulated with a fresh look, given the limitations and shortcomings explored so far. In 
fact, the Cardosian version of dependency analysis offers a basilar IPE framework for 
examining underdevelopment, but a straight employment of it runs the risk of 
conceiving today’s global political economy in an anachronistic way. Therefore, as has 
been argued by many sympathetic reviewers (Kay, 1993; Albott, 2003; Domingues, 
2013), any revisiting of dependency perspective needs not only to examine the specific 
forms that dependency relations take in each social formation, but also to analyse it in 
relation to the recent structural shifts in the global economy, and changes in the function 
and characteristics of state structure. Thus, moving from this point of view, the next 
chapter aims to builds on and extends the historical-structural dependency analysis by 
drawing on a set of conceptual insights from Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, Global 
Value Chain analyses and a class-relational conception of the developmental state. The 
purpose here is not to advance the critique of the Cardosian version of dependency 
analysis, but to offer an operational framework to employ its central tenets and viable 
aspects in a more up-to-date, systematic and comprehensive manner. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Conceptual Framework: Revisiting the Dependency Approach in the 
Age of Globalization 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A lot has changed since the heydays of the 1960s and 1970s, when the dependency 
perspective was adopted as an explanatory framework for the study of 
underdevelopment. Today, the international economic and political landscape is quite 
different from when the assumptions and tenets of dependency analyses were being 
vehemently formulated by its proponents. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, what makes this approach, particularly that associated with the Cardosian 
version, analytically viable is its potential to offer a basilar conceptual framework for 
conducting a historically-sensitive and class-relational analysis of changing dependency 
situations in peripheral social formations.  
Hence, the notion of dependency in this research is employed in a critical and selective 
manner. Rather than taking dependency as a general theory of underdevelopment in its 
structuralist and economistic sense, this study embraces and builds on an articulation of 
the historical materialist approach, which lets us comprehend concrete mechanisms of 
dependency through systems of global class relations, changing state-society complexes 
and social relations of production. Thus, having conceived dependency as a concrete 
situation, this chapter moves from a particular kind of dependency approach called 
associated-dependent development, in which the rate and direction of capital 
accumulation, and prospects for economic and social development are conditioned, 
based on diverse forms of interplay between domestic and international factors.  
In Evans’ (1979) account, dependent development refers to a set of distinctive features 
in the capitalist development of peripheral social formations, such as the accumulation 
of capital, the growth and diversification of industrial production, the emergence of a 
sophisticated state structure and the restructuring of class relations. The outcome of 
dependent development varies given the diverse nature of state-society relations, class 
configurations and geopolitical conditions in peripheral social formations. Nevertheless, 
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in broad strokes, it combines a considerable degree of structural change and economic 
growth with unequal forms of appropriation of internationally created surplus value, 
which is in turn accompanied by economic/social/political disarticulations and 
exclusions on the side of the periphery.  
The starting point for any analysis of dependent development is what Evans (1979) calls 
the triple alliance of the multinationals, the state and the domestic industrial 
bourgeoisie. Until recently, this offered an integrative framework for examining the 
political economy of dependent development, not only in Latin American countries but 
also in East Asian cases. Even today, the mechanism and outcomes of dependent 
development, as mentioned earlier, are reproduced in new forms under the dynamics of 
the current global economy, and therefore the explanatory power of the triple alliance 
still offers valuable insights into new situations of dependent development in today’s 
global periphery.  
Thus, taking sides with historical-structural dependency analysis and building on the 
notion of the triple alliance, this chapter aims to develop an up-to-date and analytically 
operational framework of new forms of dependent development under the dynamics of 
contemporary globalization. The chapter builds on and extends the notion of dependent 
development by selectively drawing on a set of conceptual tools and insights from 
Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, Global Commodity Chain/Global Value Chain 
analyses and a class-relational articulation of the developmental state. The first section 
reveals how the polarising tendency of the global capitalist economy has continued to 
produce and re-produce inequalities and disparities in socio-spatial terms. I conceive 
this current process of global stratification and economic disparities through both global 
class relations and a socio-spatial reconfiguration of the core-periphery model. 
Critically drawing on Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, this section explores how 
core-like and periphery-like activities have not only clustered in time but also space, 
giving currency to new forms of dependent development. This section then broadens the 
proposed framework by elucidating how new forms of dependency situations are 
concretised along hierarchically-structured global value relations, which are by and 
large dominated by leading TNCs, but at the same time conditioned in socio-spatial 
terms by ongoing interplay between TNCs, the state, local bourgeoisies and labouring 
classes. 
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Originally taking sides with historical-structuralism, this framework also stresses the 
drawbacks of the firm-centric, techno-industrial and market-based analysis that 
surrounds current GVC literature. Although admitting the utility of chain analysis, this 
framework rather argues that any engagement with GVC analysis should be carried out 
within the domain of political economy and the sociology of development. The second 
section aims to transcend these drawbacks by putting the matter of dependency and 
upgrading along value chains into a wider social, institutional and class-based context. 
Drawing on the works of East Asianist dependentistas and developmental state 
literature, section two propounds that a closer study of the broad variations of state-
society complexes, historically-given class-configurations, state institutions and 
development strategies offers valuable insights into the matter of dependency and 
economic/social upgrading along global value chains. This section develops and utilises 
a class-relational articulation of developmental state analysis, in which the matter of 
economic and social upgrading is better conceived as the process of resolving a set of 
collective action problems that inherently lie at the bottom of inter- and intra-class 
conflicts and contested interests among various groups (both domestic and 
international). Thus, deriving insights from a class-relational articulation of the 
developmental state, this section offers an analytically integrative framework that 
complements our earlier discussion on the reproduction of socio-spatial inequalities and 
dependency along global value chains. Lastly, after proposing such a complementary 
analytical framework, the final section concludes with an overview of the chapter and 
gives final remarks on the proposed framework.  
3.2 The Global Economy and Reproduction of Dependent Development 
Since the diverse situations of dependency are to a considerable extent produced and 
reproduced by the global expansion of the capitalist system, the starting point for 
dependency analyses has traditionally been the manifold relationships that social classes 
and the state have with the external world. Development is not a phenomenon that 
comes into being within a country in isolation, but rather a process that is conditioned 
and limited by what is happening in the international/global context of capitalism. To 
analyse the development outcomes of dependency relations on the global periphery, it is 
therefore essential to understand the international/global context in which peripheral 
social formations are embedded. Therefore, any revisiting of the notion of dependent 
development requires not only an analysis of changing forms of class configuration and 
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the state structure within a particular social formation, but also a priori analysis of the 
structural changes in the international/global context of the world capitalist system. 
International dependency relations in the classical sense take place through the 
metropolis-satellite networks in which the economic and social development of a 
dependent country is conditioned by the expansion and development of the other(s). For 
many years, such a conception was common among dependency thinking because the 
dynamics of world capitalism were predominantly structured within the nation state 
framework, one way or another. Such antecedent understanding of dependency found its 
most typical expression in Dos Santos’ (1970, p.231) frequently-cited definition: 
The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and these and 
world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant 
ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent 
ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a 
positive or negative effect on their immediate development. 
Such a conception of dependency is a product of the 1950s and 1960s, when production 
tended to be organized alongside national borders, and international trade was, to a large 
extent, composed of raw materials from peripheral countries and manufactured exports 
from core countries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this state-centric view of 
dependency relations was problematised with the restructuring of production and trade 
under the emerging dynamics of global capitalism; although the earlier appraisals of 
these shifts in the world economy and their impacts on dependency relations were again 
articulated within the dependency school. In this respect, Cardoso and Faletto have 
propounded that:  
There is no such thing as a metaphysical relation of dependency between one 
nation and another, one state and another. Such relations are made concrete 
possibilities through the existence of a network of interests and interactions which 
links certain groups to other social groups, certain classes to other social classes. 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1973 cited in Evans, 1979, p.27) 
Such an understanding has not only challenged the state-centrism of the dependency 
approach, but also blazed the trail for analysis of dependency in relation to structural 
shifts in the world economy that were later categorised under the buzzword 
‘globalization’. Based on such an approach, dependency relations started to be 
understood in increasingly class-bound and transnational terms, which take the matter 
of internationalisation seriously. However, the rise of contemporary globalization has 
triggered the idea that the dependency approach should be transcended or even 
abandoned. One of the earliest expressions of this idea was Cox’s (1981) argument that 
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core/periphery relations were better conceived primarily though global class relations 
and hegemonic block categories. Intentionally or unintentionally in a similar vein to the 
Cardosian version of dependency analysis, Cox (1981) argued against state-bound and 
exchange-focused dependency thinking by dialectically exploring the social relations of 
production and the transformative role of global class structures on national classes. 
One of the first radical scholars of post-imperialism, Cox has however said very little 
about whether and how the internationalization of the state, associated with the 
internationalization of production, generates new forms of socio-spatial inequalities and 
dependency relations.  
The critique of state-centric dependency has gone so far as to obscure the intrinsically 
asymmetric and polarizing nature of global capitalism, which generates socio-spatial 
inequalities and reproduces new forms of dependency relations alongside national 
borders. Such a negligent reading of emerging global capitalism found a more vehement 
expression when Harris (1986) professed that the emergence of a global manufacturing 
system brings a new and levelling division of labour that cuts across national boundaries 
and makes dichotomies such as North/South or core/periphery increasingly obsolete. 
Harris’s argument has enjoyed wide credence among recognized doctrinarians of 
globalization such as Hoogvelt (1997), Castells (2000), Hardt and Negri (2000), and 
Robinson (2002).18 One of the most radical articulations of this idea appeared in Hardt 
and Negri’s hotly-debated book Empire. They argued that due to the ‘unifying process 
of capitalist development and the transition from the industrial to informational 
economy, geographical demarcation as North-South is no longer tenable, but rather the 
core and the periphery have clearly infused into one another’ (Hardt and Negri, p.334). 
These and similar contentions arise from a one-sided reading of structural shifts in the 
world economy since the crises of the 1970s and 1980s. No doubt, as two of the most 
widely accepted aspects of the global economy, the restructuring of production and 
trade on a global scale has reshaped international divisions of labour to a considerable 
extent. Contrary to the post-war expansion of world capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the dismantling of production processes accompanied by dynamic growth in world trade 
has narrowed the gap between core and peripheral countries in terms of 
                                                          
18 For Castell (1996/2000), due to the diffusion of networking logic as the new social morphology of 
today’s global system, the world is no longer divided between north and south, but between localities and 
people that are on/off the emerging networks of global system. Castell’s networking logic was later 
adopted and reformulated in Hardt and Negri (2000), who synthesise it with a Foucauldian analysis of 
biopolitics. 
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industrialization. The global spread of manufacturing capabilities to former peripheral 
economies makes dichotomous denominations such as ‘industrialized’ and ‘non-
industrialized’ increasingly untenable. Moreover, production is increasingly taking 
place in the framework of global value chains through which capital-, technology- and 
knowledge-intensive processes are dispersed to a greater number of countries, including 
developing ones. All these structural shifts become more obvious as time goes by. 
However, the question remains: whether all these changes have brought economic and 
technological convergence between peripheral and core countries, and diminished the 
income gap between them in socio-spatial terms.   
In response to this question, Arrighi et al. (2003, pp.12-16) suggest that despite 
widespread convergence in levels of industrialization, the development gap and income 
disparity between the Global South and Global North have not been diminished but 
reproduced. Their findings reveal that the South as a whole converged with and even in 
some cases overtook the North in terms of industrialization levels. While the north’s 
manufacturing sector comprised 28.9% of GDP in 1960, it later incrementally 
descended to 24.5% by 1980 and to 19.8% by 1999. On the other hand, the percentage 
of manufacturing in the South’s GDP exhibits an opposite trend, ascending from 21.6% 
in 1960 to 24.3% in 1980, with a slight fall to 23.3% in 1999.19 Thus, the Global 
South’s percentage of GDP in manufacturing as a percentage of the Global North’s rose 
from 74.6% in 1960 to 99.4% and 118% in 1980 and 1998, respectively. However, 
Arrighi et al. empirically prove that the convergence in industrialization levels has not 
been accompanied by convergence in levels of income. As a proportion of the north’s 
GNP per capita, GNP per capita in the Global South has remained almost stagnant, with 
very slight changes from 4.5% in 1960 to 4.3% and 4.6% in 1980 and 1998, 
respectively (Arrighi et al., 2003, pp.12-16). 
The persistence of north-south income disparity, despite apparent industrial 
convergence, reveals that the polarizing tendency of the world capitalist system is still at 
work and continuing to reproduce economic disparities between different socio-spatial 
entities. Despite the bifurcation within the global south – due to conspicuous cases such 
as South Korea and Taiwan – geographical asymmetries in income levels remain among 
the premier issues informing the notion of dependent development. As mentioned 
                                                          
19 The United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s report reveals very similar figures 
regarding the period between 1980 and 2000. See UNIDO (2004, p.137). 
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earlier, under the dynamics of contemporary globalization, core/periphery relations are 
better conceived though global class relations, but a special emphasis on socio-spatial 
and geographical disparities is needed, just as Cardoso (1977, p.20) once argued: 
 When one examines the relations between economies of dependent-associated 
development and the central economies, it is not hard to perceive that the 
international division of labour persists, based on very unequal degrees of wealth, 
on unequal forms of appropriation of international surplus and on monopolization 
of dynamic capitalist sectors by the central countries.  
For Arrighi et al. (2003), the conflation of industrialization with development, or 
industrialized with wealthy, rests upon a partial interpretation of capitalist expansion 
that deserves further explanation here. Just as Evans20 (1979, pp.27-28, 36-37) once 
touched on to elaborate the notion of dependent development, Arrighi et al. (2002) draw 
on Schumpeter’s theory of innovation and Venon’s product life cycle model to answer 
why the current global spread of industrialization is not accompanied by income 
convergence but new hierarchical structures in today’s global economy.  
The essential aspect of capitalism, for Schumpeter, is its dynamic and evolutionary 
nature, which emanates from innovation by entrepreneurs. These entrepreneur-driven 
innovations, that set and keep the capitalist engine in motion, are broadly defined as the 
introduction of (1) new products, (2) new methods of production, (3) new sources of 
supply, (4) new trade routes and markets, and lastly (5) new forms of organization 
(Schumpeter, 1983). The introduction of industrial innovation and its diffusion 
generates what Schumpeter (2003, p.83) calls creative destruction, which ‘incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one’. The process of creative destruction generates two main 
effects. First, through these innovations, entrepreneurs enjoy the Schumpeterian 
windfall profits and entrepreneur rents that place them in an advantageous position, on 
unequal terms in relation to non-innovative, normal businessman. Secondly, innovation 
generates new equilibria and cutthroat competition, which makes pre-existing 
productive structures obsolete, and brings widespread losses for the rest (Schumpeter, 
2003).  
Thus, profit-oriented innovation reshapes and re-energizes capitalism by creating 
leading sectors clustered in time. Throughout this process of creative destruction, while 
                                                          
20 To see how transfer of surperprofits stems from the subordination of dependent economies, see Evans’ 
(1979) chapters three and four, particularly the discussion of denationalization and the monopoly control 
of technology by MNCs. 
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a small minority of businessmen and firms enjoys exorbitant rates of profit and so 
economic/political power, the majority is content with modest, if any, profits. In 
retrospect, creative destruction, as an internal dynamic of capitalism, generated a wave 
of leading sectors via a cluster of innovations, such as cotton textile, iron and water 
power (1780s-1820s); steel, steam engines and railways (1840-1870); industrial 
chemicals, electricity and intra-urban trams (1890s-1920s); the internal combustion 
engine, petroleum and motor vehicles (1940s-1970s). Drawing on insights from 
Akamatsu’s ‘flying geese’ model and Raymond Vernon’s ‘product-cycle’ model, 
Arrighi et al. (2003) hypothesize that profit-oriented innovations not only cluster in time 
but also in space. They argue that industrial innovation as a spatially structured process 
tends to appear in developed countries due to a series of favourable conditions, and 
thereby generates a ‘self-reinforcing “virtuous circle” of high incomes and innovations. 
As mirror-image of this tendency, less-developed countries, like Schumpeter’s majority 
of non-innovating businessmen, reap few, if any, benefits of the innovations since the 
diffusion of innovation to the peripheral economies tends to become a reality after their 
routinization (Arrighi et al., 2003, pp.17-18). Thus, as in the state of dependent 
development, capital accumulation and diversified industrialization occur in peripheral 
economies, accompanied by the manufacturing of more and more products over time. 
However, apart from a small number of cases (explained later), this does not eradicate 
contradictions between core and periphery, since these products continue to share 
certain characteristics.   
Building on and extending Arrighi et al.’s insights, Selwyn (2014) reformulates the 
notion of creative destruction through an engagement with a Marxian understanding of 
capitalist competition. With respect to dependent development, what makes Selwyn’s 
reformulation worth mentioning here is its broadened conceptual basis, which grasps 
global socio-spatial dynamics in relation to both class and international economic 
relations. In conceptualizing the notion of creative destruction, Selwyn argues (2014, 
pp.112-114), Schumpeter is indebted to Marx in two aspects. Firstly, creative 
destruction acclaimed and – one-sidedly – rephrased Marx’s comprehension of 
capitalism’s internally-driven transformative nature, which expresses itself through the 
role of the bourgeoisie in revolutionizing the instruments of production and also the 
social relations of production. Secondly, Schumpeter’s concepts of entrepreneurial 
profits and rents resemble Marx’s surplus and super profit, which arise from intra-
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capitalist competition and the capitalist impetus to increase surplus value extraction. 
However, since Schumpeter intentionally rejects the Marxian labour theory of value and 
conflictual class relations, his notion of creative destruction is far from conceiving the 
hierarchical and exploitative nature of capitalist expansion in its entirety. 
Drawing on Marxian notions of capitalist competition, Selwyn (2014) moves beyond 
these limitations surrounding the concept of creative destruction. Selwyn (2014, p.115-
116) argues that Schumpeterian entrepreneurial profits stem from the capitalistic 
impetus to increase the rate of relative surplus value by diminishing what Marx called 
socially necessary labour time, or what is widely known in mainstream economics as 
average unit labour cost. In general terms, capitalists, particularly the innovative ones as 
in Schumpeterian jargon, achieve this objective through introducing new technologies, 
mechanisation and rationalisation, with the ultimate aim of yielding more and more 
output per hour of labour. Since the non-innovative or market-follower firms lag behind 
in adopting the innovations, they tend to compensate for their cost-disadvantages 
through increasing the rate of absolute surplus value extraction (lengthening working 
hours) or through immiseration (cutting wages).  
While the notion of creative destruction explains how entrepreneurial profits are 
circulated unevenly among firms, it obscures how underlying class relations co-
determine the process of industrial innovation and its diffusion. As Selwyn (2014) 
argues, Schumpeter adopted a functionalist and elite theory of class, diametrically and 
purposefully opposed to the Marxian one. In Schumpeterian logic, each social class 
performs a different role according to its position within the social division of labour, 
and is rewarded on the basis of its contribution to society. Entrepreneur classes, placed 
at the heart of the capitalist system, act as the engine of capitalist expansion, and enjoy 
high rewards based on their technological and managerial innovations. Intra-capitalist 
competition and entrepreneurs’ search for profit lies behind processes of technological 
and managerial innovation, cycles of boom and bust, and the monopolization of high-
profit economic activities.  
However, in Marxian logic the process of innovation is also embedded into exploitative 
and conflictual class relations in which the conflict between entrepreneur classes and 
labour also constitutes a source of innovation. As the struggle of the labouring classes 
intensifies, posing an obstacle to increasing rates of surplus value extraction, 
entrepreneur classes search for new means of re-establishing control over labour 
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through industrial, organizational innovations (Mandel, 1980 cited in Selwyn, 2014, 
p.119). As Schwartz (2010, pp.71-73) argues, Mandel’s periodization of labour 
processes and forms of labour organization chronologically overlaps with Schumpeter’s 
leading sectors that clustered in time (see Appendix 9). In short, the introduction of new 
leading-sector products usually come into being within a new institutional setting, with 
new labouring processes and organizational forms of labour. 
To sum up, through an engagement with a Marxian understanding of capitalist 
competition, Selwyn (2014) formulates a broadened and crystallized rearticulation of 
Arrighi et al.’s (2003) insights, which conceive current processes of global stratification 
and economic disparity both in relation to social classes and socio-spatial dynamics of 
core-periphery relations. Following Arrighi et al. (2003), O’Hearn (1994), Schwartz 
(2010) and many others, Selwyn (2014) argues that, in socio-spatial terms, industrial 
and technological innovation tends to occur within core economies due to various 
factors, such as: higher incomes generate greater demand and larger market potentials; 
higher production costs put pressures on entrepreneurs for technical innovation; and 
greater credit capabilities facilitate the financing of innovations. Therefore, on one hand, 
market-leading firms in core economies are more likely to benefit from Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur profits or Marxian surplus profit, and thus are more likely to have greater 
re-investible capital. On the other, industrial innovation is less likely to occur in 
peripheral economies, which are mostly populated by market-following firms that end 
up with relatively modest entrepreneurial profits and are structurally precluded from 
innovating (Figure 3.1). Complementing socio-spatial dynamics with forms of 
exploitations that prevail across different economies, Selwyn (2014, p.122) further 
argues that the market innovating firms that exist mostly in core economies tend to 
increase their profit rates through relative surplus value extraction. Since the market-
follower firms that mostly prevail in peripheral economies adopt routinized 
technologies and production methods, they are most likely to opt for absolute value 
extraction or immiseration to raise their profit rates (Figure 3.2). 
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Although neither Arrighi et al. nor Selwyn explore how concrete situations of dependent 
development are produced and reproduced through new power asymmetries and 
economic disparities in today’s global economy, they move from a similar point of 
departure as Evans (1979) adopted in elaborating the notion of dependent development. 
Evans (1979, p.37) stated: 
The ability to produce new products which other firms cannot replicate is one of 
the most important source of multinationals’ profits. Knowledge is hard to 
monopolize- harder if its production is not highly centralized. Multinationals have 
then ever motivation to keep the innovation side of their businesses as close to 
home as possible. As long as they are free to make that choice, the 
industrialization of the periphery will remain partial. Facilities for the production 
of new knowledge will not be located there. 
Much has changed since the 1970s, but this analysis reveals that despite the global 
spread of industrialization and the diversification in industrial outputs in peripheral 
economies, the economic disparities and asymmetrical power relations between 
different socio-spatial entities, firms as well as capital and labour, still remain. Since 
these asymmetrical power relations underlie today’s global capitalism, the existence of 
diverse situations of dependent development across different socio-spatial entities 
remains a matter of inquiry. Under the new dynamics of global capitalism, these diverse 
situations are increasingly concretized along global value relations. These global value 
relations, which are hierarchical and conflictual in nature, come into being through 
ongoing power conflicts among transnational corporations, the state, local capitals and 
Figure 3. 1 Marx and Schumpeter on 
Core and Periphery 
Figure 3. 2 Surplus and Normal Profits- 
Relative and Absolute Surplus Value 
 
 
Source: Selwyn (2014, p.117 and p.123) 
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labouring classes within a particular socio-spatial entity. Therefore, under the new 
dynamics of global capitalism, dependency does not refer to a structural and 
economistic relation between one nation and another or one nation and others, but a 
series of hierarchical relationships among classes of unequal power that prevails in 
socio-spatial terms. In this respect, rearticulation of these new dynamics through 
Schwartz’s (1989) mapping of Cardosian dependency relations provides an illustrative 
pathway.  
Drawing on Marx’s concept of circulation of capital, Schwartz (1989) proposes a 
schema which offers abstract but useful insights into how diverse situations of 
dependency occur through control over capital accumulation. In its simplest form, 
circulation of capital occurs along a formula: M→C→ (M+m). Basically, the formula 
means that the money form of capital (M) transforms into commodity capital (C), 
whose value is realized in sales as money capital with added increment value (m). 
Schwartz (1989, p.20) then proposes an extended version: 
M→C→P{mp+l}→(C+c)→(M+m) 
Here money capital transforms into commodity capital through purchase of raw 
materials and intermediate goods, before entering into production process in which they 
are added to productive capital (means of production (mp) and labour power (l)). They 
are then transformed into new commodities (C+c) which contain more value (c, added 
increment) that capitalists extract from the labouring classes. Lastly, the value of new 
commodities is realized in sales as money capital (M) with a new increment of value 
(m). Building on Cardoso and Fatetto’s (1979) conception of situations of dependency, 
Schwartz (1989, pp.22-25) suggests diverse situations of dependency occur when any of 
the steps along the cycle is controlled by foreign capital to siphon away created surplus 
value and thus externally condition the capital accumulation.21 As in what Cardoso and 
Faletto (1979) call the enclave situation (Figure 3.3), in which almost all the capital 
comes from outside the domestic production site, foreign capital largely dominates the 
realization of value by controlling M, C, and most of the P parts of the cycle. The only 
                                                          
21 Neither Cardoso and Faletto nor their followers have done this kind of mapping regarding diverse 
situations of dependency. Although Schwartz’s formulation fits with historical structural dependency 
analysis, we should keep in mind that such a mapping is not inclusive of all possible situations of 
dependency and might remain highly abstract, if it is not complemented with concrete analysis of class 
relations.  
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part the domestic economy involved in production is labour (l).22 Because the 
accumulation is predominantly controlled by foreign capital, the sources of dependency 
are more apparent. Since domestic capital has very limited, if any, control over 
accumulation, it does not extract surplus value, but as comprador bourgeoisies they 
appropriate it as revenue from the foreign capital based on the deal they have. Under 
these conditions, local capital is denied from increasing its own accumulation by the 
productivity rise, and so is economically, ideologically and politically dependent 
(Schwartz, 1989, p.22).   
                            Figure 3. 3 Enclave Economy and Dependency 
                           
Locally controlled part is bold; boxed area takes place 
domestically. 
Source: Schwartz (1989, p.22). 
In what Cardoso and Faletto (1979) called the local bourgeoisie situation, the 
production process (P) is apparently domestically controlled, but dependency occurs 
(Figure 3.4): when the process of realization (C+c)→(M+m) is controlled by foreign 
capital; when domestic capitalists actualise production through foreign provision of 
money capital; or when part of production process  is controlled by foreign capital. In 
these situations, as Schwartz argues (1989, p.23), one can talk about a degree of 
dependency, since the accumulation process continues to be restricted and conditioned 
externally. This is related to the question of how much surplus value domestic capital 
loses to foreign financiers and to core monopolies that have control over sales, 
marketing and branding. Since local capital has control over production processes, 
diverse situations of dependency arise due to the domination of foreign capital in a 
number of different aspects. Dependency may occur when foreign capital grants a loan 
of money capital (M) to embark on production in the dependent economy (b in figure 
3.4). Or it may arise when part of the production process is dominated by foreign capital 
due to its control over technology, management, capital goods, or situations in which 
domestic firms supply goods to transnational corporations for further transformation (c 
                                                          
22 One of the most typical examples of this situation is the Mexican Maquiladoras. 
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and d in Figure 3.4). Or it may come into being when foreign capital has control over 
realization through branding, marketing and shipment (a in Figure 3.4).   
 Figure 3. 4 Local Bourgeoisie and Dependency 
  
 
  
        
Locally controlled parts are bold; boxed areas take place 
domestically. Although it is not indicated in the figure, the 
initial provision of M can be local. 
Source: Adopted from and build on Schwartz (1989, p.24). 
In contrast to comprador capital, local bourgeoisies to greater extent have unmediated 
access to productive process and surplus value, through which they exercise some 
control over capital accumulation. However, they remain ideologically and politically 
dominated, since their circuits of capital are embedded into broader circuits which are 
controlled by leading transnational corporations. As Schwartz (1989) argues, they may 
depend on core TNCs to reach global markets and sell products overseas. Or, they may 
be dependent in the sense that they produce intermediate goods to be incorporated into 
TNCs’ commodity chains. Hence, the interior accumulation of local bourgeoisies is 
conditioned by the broader cycle of TNCs. Since local bourgeoisies, along with their 
dependency, have greater access to surplus value and have some control over local 
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production processes, they enjoy greater capability to expand their control over the 
entire circuits of accumulation.  
Today, such mapping of dependency situations has been increasingly concretised along 
hierarchically-structured global value chains, which are by and large dominated by 
leading TNCs, conditioning the accumulation process in different socio-spatial entities 
based on asymmetrical power relations between diverse units of capital, and between 
capital and labour. There is remarkable affinity between Schwartz’s mapping of 
dependency situations and the types of global value chains. For example, Gereffi’s 
(1994, 1999) two classical types of value chain structure, namely buyer-driven and 
producer-driven, correspond to Schwartz’s mappings of a and d (Figure 3.4), 
respectively. In fact, research on global commodity chains/global value chains 
intentionally abstains from speaking about situations of dependency, but Henderson et 
al. (2002, p.440) claim it is ‘set within the (broadly defined) “dependency” tradition of 
analysis’. This framework thus argues that a pragmatic usage of GCCs/GVCs analysis 
lets us not only examine new forms of dependent development in today’s global 
economy but also search for ways of transcending those constraints. However, from an 
analytical point of view, one who intends to do this should bear in mind that an 
unmediated adherence to GCCs/GVCs literature is likely to culminate in firm-centric, 
techno-industrial and market-based analysis.23 Rather, from a historical-structural 
dependency perspective, any engagement with GCCs/GVCs24 analysis should be carried 
out within the political economy and sociology of development. 
For the sake of historical-structural dependency analysis, what makes GVCs analysis 
analytically appealing is threefold. First, the central question of how ‘core-like’ (high 
value-added) and ‘periphery-like’ (low value-added) activities are dispersed in different 
nodes along GVCs presents a leap forward in untangling the unequal distribution of 
rewards among various participants of an overarching division of labour. GVCs are 
characterized by a combination of high value-added and low value-added nodes, which 
cut across state boundaries. Some of these nodes, which exhibit core-like activities and 
                                                          
23 For criticisms regarding firm-centricism and market-based analysis see Selwyn (2011, 2012), Bair 
(2005, 2014), Palpacuer (2008).  
24 Since there is significant continuity between GCCs research and recent GVCs analysis, this framework 
refers to these two analyses jointly. However, it should be noted that despite sharing a common analytical 
and conceptual ground, GVCs research has shifted the research agenda from its sociological orientation to 
an international business-related focus. For surveys of the similarities and differences of these two chain 
approaches, see Bair (2005) and Neilson and Pritchard (2009). 
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have higher barriers to entry, generate higher returns (entrepreneur profit/surplus profit), 
while other nodes, which exhibit globally dispersed and highly competitive activities, 
see lower returns (normal business income/profit). Thus, complementing our earlier 
discussion on the Marxian rearticulation of Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, 
GCCs/GVCs analysis offers an insight into the reproduction of stratification in today’s 
global economy. 
Secondly, occupying the apex of asymmetrical global value relations, leading TNCs 
have an inherent tendency to take measures to secure control over the ‘core-like’ nodes, 
with the aim of recapturing sources of high revenue. Particularly by re-establishing and 
maintaining high entry barriers through branding, patenting, advertising and marketing, 
they secure control over high profit margins along GVCs. As argued by Nolan (2001) 
and Nolan et al. (2008), since the early 1980s the world economy has witnessed an 
epochal degree of industrial consolidation and centralization of business power on a 
global scale, in which TNCs have sold off their non-core businesses to develop their 
core competencies with the aim of securing entrepreneurial profits. Leading TNCs, 
mostly headquartered in high income economies,25 enjoy a monopoly/monopsony 
position within global value relations due to their concentration in high value-added 
segments of GVCs. Moreover, as many (Schmitz and Knorriga, 2000; Schmitz, 2006; 
Schrank, 2004; Neilson and Pritchard, 2009) argue, leading TNCs tend to discourage, if 
not obstruct, upstream (subordinate) manufacturers from taking part in high value-added 
segments of value chains such as designing, branding, marketing, retailing. Thus, 
complementing our occasional revisiting of Evans’ contentions, GVCs analysis offers a 
refreshed insight into how and in what respect the monopoly and entrepreneur rents of 
core TNCs have been maintained. 
Last but not least, complementing Schwartz’s mapping of dependency situations, 
GCCs/GVCs analysis also offers a leap forward in examining the reproduction of 
dependency relations along value chains. As mentioned above, Gereffi’s (1994, 1999) 
two types of chain governance correspond to Schwartz’s mappings of a and d (Figure 
3.4).26 Gereffi's (1999, p.1) model of buyer-driven chains refers to those industries in 
                                                          
25 Looking into Interbrand’s (2014) 100 best global brands in the last five years, whereas the 
overwhelming number are headquartered in the USA, Europe and Japan, only four to five global brands 
are located in other countries such as South Korea (Hyundai, Samsung, Kia), Taiwan (HTC) and Mexico 
(Corona). See Nolan et al. (2008). 
26 For the sake of simplicity, this framework draws on two classical types of governance structure in 
global value relations which provides a basilar and inclusively explanatory model for further articulations. 
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which leading transnational retailers, branded marketers and trading companies play 
pivotal roles in managing complex, ‘decentralized production networks in a variety of 
exporting countries, typically located in the third world’. These types of chains are more 
evident in labour-intensive industries such as apparel, footwear, houseware, toys and 
horticulture, in which production is undertaken by tiered networks of manufactures, 
mostly in the global south, that produce for leading TNCs. In buyer-driven chains, high 
barriers to entry are established both in downstream activities such as marketing and 
network retailing, and in upstream activities such as product conception and design 
(Rabach and Kim, 1994). By concentrating in these core-like segments of value chains, 
TNCs are able to not only enjoy an oligopsonistic presence within the value chains, but 
also to exert indirect control over production and thereby value creation processes. 
Thus, turning to Schwartz’s mapping of a (Figure 3.4), due to high entry barriers in 
these segments of value chains, leading TNCs enjoy control over the realization 
{(C+c)→(M+m)} stage of the accumulation process, through which they unequally 
siphon away surplus value. Since these asymmetrical power relations along buyer-
driven chains unequally reward leading TNCs, their interest lies in holding contractors 
dependent in terms of markets accessibility, retailing networks and branding. 
In contrast, the model of producer-driven chains implies those industries in which 
‘TNCs or other large integrated industrial enterprises play the central role in controlling 
the production system, including its backward and forward linkages’ (Gereffi, 1994, 
p.115). These chains are characteristically identified with capital- and technology-
intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, computers and electrical machinery. 
The highest barriers to entry in producer-driven chains are mostly established in 
upstream activities such as research and development (R&D), and product conception 
and design, through which leading TNCs enjoy an oligopolistic presence within chains. 
In producer-driven chains, access to these cutting-edge activities requires economies of 
scale that mostly belong to transnational oligopolies (Gereffi, 1999). The competition 
waged by TNCs in these cutting-edge niches characteristically corresponds to strong 
competition in Schumpeterian terms. It revolutionizes capitalist production, and 
exceptionally rewards ‘first movers’ with the highest returns as entrepreneurial profits 
                                                                                                                                                                          
In current research, the typologies of value chains have been broadened based on the application of 
diverse criteria. For alternative typologies see Humphery and Schimitz (2001); Gereffi et al. (2005). Any 
further attempt to associate Schwartz’s mapping with value chain typologies requires a broadened 
rearticulation of the Marxian notion of circulation of capital.   
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or surplus profits in Marxian jargon. Thus, core TNCs occupy a predominant position in 
production processes, not only in terms of profits, but also in their capacity to control 
both backward linkages (suppliers of raw materials and components), and forward 
linkages (retailing and distribution) (Gereffi, 1999). Complementing Schwartz’s 
analysis, producer-driven chains present an affinity with Schwartz’s mapping of d 
(Figure 3.4), in which local production is incorporated into the broader production 
circuits of leading TNCs. In this situation, contract manufacturers or component 
suppliers are more likely to be dependent in terms of accessibility to cutting edge 
technologies, patents and capital goods, since their accumulation relies on TNCs’ own 
cycles. 
Nevertheless, from a historical-structural point of view, saying that subordinate 
manufacturers and suppliers are ‘dependent’ does not indicate that their relationship 
with leading TNCs is immutably fixed. Rather, dependent development might be a 
transitory situation for the subordinated domestic bourgeoisie or for socio-spatial 
entities, given their class dynamics and state-society relations. Therefore, the state of 
dependency is also subject to change over time, differing from industry to industry or by 
country based on socio-historical peculiarities. As Cardoso (1977, p.16) once stated:  
…the dependentistas affirm the existence of domination and struggle. The 
question, how does the transition from one situation of dependency to another 
occur? Or how can situations of dependency be eliminated? Ought to be asked in 
terms of who are the classes and groups which, in the struggle for control or for 
the reformulation of the existing order (through parties, movements, ideologies, 
the state, etc.), are making a given structure of domination historically viable or 
are transforming it? 
Similarly, Schwartz (1989, p.25) argues that since subordinated manufacturers and 
suppliers have partial control over production processes, and enjoy a greater (but still 
mediated) access to surplus value, “they have a partial ability to make investments on 
their own, and gradually expand their control of the entire circuit of accumulation”. This 
means they can transform themselves into what Schwartz calls “national” bourgeoisie, 
exerting far more autonomous control over the entire circuit of accumulation (in the 
light of Figure 3.4). In the lexicon of GCCs/GCVs analysis, securing control over the 
accumulation circuit bears some affinity with the matter of export roles, through which 
local bourgeoisies and different socio-spatial entities are integrated into global value 
relations. As Gereffi (1994, 1999) conceptualizes, different capital groups and countries 
have been connected to value chains through a set of five export roles, namely: primary 
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commodity exports, (export-processing (or in-bond) assembly operations, component-
supply subcontracting, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and original brand-
name manufacturing (OBM) (Gereffi, 1994, p.121).  
Progressively, each type of export role represents a more difficult export-manufacturing 
stage, requiring a higher degree of technological, entrepreneurial and managerial 
competencies, as well as domestic integration (multiplier effect). Thus, the movement of 
local bourgeoisies and thereby countries from one stage to another indicates the 
enhancement of industrial development in capitalist terms. Different socio-spatial 
entities are connected to value chains through the employment of these export roles in 
multiple ways (Gereffi, 1994; Bair and Gereffi, 2003). The primary commodity export 
role has been employed by almost all Third World countries. However, their proportion 
has been substantially and deliberately reduced due to their well-recognized 
disadvantage as an export base (Gereffi, 1994). Export-processing roles refer to the 
labour-intensive assembly of manufactured goods within foreign-owned factories, 
which typically transforms imported components into simple consumer goods. This type 
of role is often taken in export-processing zones (EPZs) in the global south, like the 
Mexican Maquilarodas. This recalls the Cardosian enclave situation (Figure 3.3), in 
which foreign capital almost entirely dominates the realization of value by controlling 
M, C and most of the P parts of the cycle, and the only part of the production process 
the domestic economy is involved in is labour. The role of component-supply 
subcontracting mostly takes place in more technologically advanced industrial bases in 
the global south, which provide components and intermediate goods for final assembly 
in foreign-owned plants. This type of export role recalls situation d (Figure 3.4), in 
which local production is incorporated into the broader production circuits of TNCs. 
The fourth type of export role, original equipment manufacturing, refers to the 
manufacture of finished consumer goods in domestically owned factories whose 
products are distributed and marketed abroad by leading TNCs such as branded 
marketers and large retailers. This export role corresponds to situation a (Figure 3.4) in 
which leading TNCs enjoy control over the realization {(C+c)→(M+m)} stage of 
accumulation. The final stage in the development of an export economy is original 
brand-name manufacturing, which gives local bourgeoisies overall control of 
accumulation process, and makes their presence autonomous and more visible in global 
value relations.  
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In the jargon of GCCs/GVCs analysis, industrial upgrading is associated with a 
progressive shift from the export-processing assembly to more integrated types of 
manufacturing and marketing, such as OEM and OBM export roles (Schmitz and 
Knorringa, 2000; Bair and Gereffi, 2003). The notion of ‘upgrading’ in GCCs/GVCs 
analysis is closely attached to the types of value chain governance. The association of 
upgrading with type of value chain, as the two flagship ideas of chain analysis, has 
provided a mechanism for examining how producers’ positions within chains either 
enhance or restrict their capacities in terms of upgrading. GCCs/GVCs analysis 
provides an efficacious and up-to-date framework for addressing how the organizational 
structures of globalized production set parameters that precondition the terms under 
which participants of the chain function (Humphrey, 2005).27 The specification of 
asymmetrical power relations within the value chains forms an analytical basis for 
examining how value is created and captured by the actors within the diverse types of 
governance structures.   
However, any utilization of value chain analysis for the sake of operationalizing the 
notion of dependent development should bear in mind a series of drawbacks in current 
analyses. Firstly, as Selwyn (2011, 2012) argues, having its early underpinnings in 
World System Theory, GVCs analysis is prone to conceptualize capitalism in a 
reductionist manner, due to which much GVC analysis fails to examine the social 
relations of production underlying current global value relations. Conceiving capitalism 
as mainly exchange-based or market-based relations, GVCs analysis implicitly or 
explicitly embraces a neo-Smithian conception of capitalist development, in which 
global value relations are reduced to a system of production for profit. Briefly, this way 
of thinking in GVC analysis fails to address the historically-specific and class-based 
nature of capitalist development, intrinsically embedded not in market relations but in 
social relations of production (Selwyn, 2011, 2012). 
Secondly, mainstream chain analyses have an inherently firm-centric orientation, due to 
which they fail to address the transformative role of other actors such as states, local 
authorities and labouring classes in value chains governance and economic upgrading. 
Much of the discussion of governance patterns revolves around the dynamics of inter-
                                                          
27 Based on the categorization of Humphrey and Schmitz (2001, p.5) and Humphrey (2005, p.22), these 
parameters, in broad terms, can be specified as: what is to be produced (product design and 
specifications); how it is to be produced (process specifications); how much is to be produced; and when 
it is to be produced (production scheduling and logistics). 
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firm relations in globalized industries. As Bair (2005, 2008) argues, a one-and-a-half 
decade-long discursive change in value chain research has shifted the focus from the 
macro, holistic structure of the world economy and its social consequences, to meso-
level, firm-centric and performance-oriented research (see inter alia, Gereffi et al., 2005; 
Cattaneo et al., 2013). Thus, due to its techno-managerial and narrow focus on the 
governance of inter-firm transactions, mainstream chain analysis fails to comprehend 
how value chains operate in broader institutional, regulatory and class-based contexts, 
in which capital accumulation is conditioned and re/shaped by ongoing interplay 
between TNCs, local capital, states and labour. 
Thirdly, due to its profoundly optimistic approach to the matter of economic upgrading, 
GVC analysis fails to properly interrogate the exploitative and dependent nature of 
capitalist development along global value chains. GVC literature offers an operational 
framework to assess to what extent manufacturing suppliers can improve their 
respective positions in global value chains through either upgrading within production, 
such as product and process upgrading, or through upgrading beyond production, such 
as functional and inter-sectorial upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Schmitz, 
2006). The work of some scholars (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Schmitz and 
Knorringa, 2000; Schmitz, 2006) and many others (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; 
Özatağan, 2011) has revealed that upstream (subordinate) manufacturers have greater 
prospects for upgrading within production by improving product quality, adopting 
flexible production techniques and increasing productivity. However, they make very 
little progress in either functional upgrading, by shifting into higher value-added 
segments of the chain (such as designing, branding, marketing, retailing), and in inter-
sectorial upgrading, by moving into more technology-intensive sectors.  
Given the asymmetrical distribution of power along value chains, and the limited 
prospects for functional and inter-sectorial upgrading, most manufacturing suppliers in 
developing countries depend on foreign buyers in terms of technology transfer, 
industrial upgrading, access to foreign markets and capital investment. Characterized by 
multifaceted dependency relations with foreign capital, manufacturing suppliers in the 
developing world have relatively limited room for further capital accumulation through 
high value-added activities. Despite having stressed the limited upgrading prospects of 
upstream manufacturers, GVC literature implicitly or explicitly abstains from 
addressing the questions of what kind of new dependency relations are rooted in global 
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value chains, and how the mode of articulation with global value chains (through a 
particular state-society complex and a particular configuration of class forces and state-
society relations) produces/reproduces different forms of dependency relations and 
upgrading paths. 
The following section aims to transcend these drawbacks. To that end, it is argued that a 
rearticulation of the historical-structural perspective offers valuable insights to further 
develop our analytical framework, which adopts and integrates the methods of 
historical-structuralism into the matter of value chain governance and economic 
upgrading in global value relations. The framework emphasizes the need for directing 
the focus of analysis to changing configurations of class forces, state-society complexes 
and domestic relations of production, in order to fully grasp the underlying institutional, 
regulatory and class-relational context in which global value relations operate. In so 
doing, the framework aims to overcome the firm-centric orientation in GCCs/GVCs 
literature by bringing the notions of class configuration and state-society relations into 
analysis of value chain governance. Despite the widely-accepted assumption of current 
chain analyses, this framework proposes that global value chains operate in a broader 
institutional, regulatory and class-based context, in which capital accumulation and 
prospects for economic upgrading are conditioned and depend on ongoing interplay 
among the partners of the alliance, namely leading TNCs, the state, and local capital and 
social classes. In a nutshell, the underlying assumption of this framework is that these 
two approaches, historical structural dependency studies and value chain analyses, 
complement each other in that the weakness of each approach is covered by the 
strengths of the other (for a detailed mapping, see Appendix 10).  
3.3 Bringing the Social Context Back in: Social Classes, States and Global Value 
Relations 
Aligning with the historical-structural dependency perspective, this framework argues 
that any engagement with GCCs/GVCs analysis should be carried out within the 
political economy and sociology of development. The relationship between external 
control of TNCs and the domestic development of peripheral social formations is a 
central concern of historical-structural dependency studies. Nevertheless, due to the 
simultaneous possibility of both captive alliance and robust bargaining, neither the 
dominance of multinationals nor the subordination of local bourgeoisies is taken for 
granted. Rather, it is presupposed that there is a wide range of responses from peripheral 
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social formations to world production system, given their diversified internal class 
configuration and state-society relations. In the words of Cardoso and Faletto (1979, 
p.20):  
What we seek are the characteristics of the national societies that express relations 
with the outside. The internal socio-political factors – linked naturally to the 
dynamic of the hegemonic centers – are precisely the ones that may produce 
policies taking advantage of the new conditions or new opportunities for 
economic growth. Similarly, it is the internal forces that give socio-political scope 
to the spontaneous diversification of the economic system. 
Thus, it is no wonder that the historical-structural perspective puts special emphasis on 
the internal social and political dynamics of different social formations. The central 
question then is how and to what extent the strategies and interests of TNCs are 
internalized through historically given configurations of class structure and state 
apparatus within a particular socio-spatial entity. For historical-structural dependency 
studies, the asymmetric and polarizing pressures of the world capitalist economy are 
closely intertwined with the dynamics and issues of late capitalist development in our 
recent history. As an East Asianist dependentista, Lim28 (1985), argues, the notion of 
dependent development differs from the historical experiences of both the early 
developers of England, France and the USA, and the late developers of Germany and 
Japan. It is rather related to the late-late capitalist development of peripheral social 
formations such as Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan and Korea, that manifests itself through the 
interaction of domestic classes and political/economic alliances with classes and groups 
in the capitalist world economy (Lim, 1985, p.80). 
Since the relationship between foreign control and domestic development is a central 
concern of historical-structural dependency studies, a special emphasis is placed upon 
conflicts of interests or developmental contradictions between leading TNCs and 
economic and political forces within a peripheral social formation. The contention of 
interdependence or interconnectedness between leading TNCs and domestic economic 
actors obscures the multifaceted nature of asymmetrical power relations that is apt to 
favour leading TNCs more than domestic forces (local bourgeoisies and labouring 
classes). Thus, given the underlying asymmetrical relationships among these units, two 
                                                          
28  As mentioned earlier, for some scholars of East Asia like Amsden (1979) the dependency approach 
does not fit development experiences in East Asia. However, many East Asianists have rebutted this 
argument. In their doctoral research, Gold (1981) and Lim (1982) applied the historical-structural 
dependency approach to the cases of Taiwan and Korea, respectively. See Lim (1985) and Gold (1986); 
see also Deyo (1981), Evans (1987), Haggard (1990).  
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major developmental outcomes are likely to emerge. First, industrial growth of 
peripheral social formations tends to generate uneven distribution of benefits, favouring 
leading TNCs. Second, the global expansion of capitalism (largely through the activities 
of TNCs) is likely to restrict and distort local development options with regards to local 
bourgeoisies as well as labouring classes. 
As Evans once argued (1979, p.39), the local bourgeoisie can be regarded as the 
stepchild of global capitalist economy, never completely abandoned but never given a 
full opportunity to develop. The emerging local bourgeoisies, as latecomers, enter the 
so-called “global level playing field” under conditions remarkably disadvantageous to 
their own interests.29 A retrospective view of capitalist industrialization in peripheral 
social formations reveals that local bourgeoisies (particularly industrial ones) have been 
historically given a restricted opportunity to build political domination or economic 
hegemony on their own. As early movers, leading TNCs have already occupied the 
world historical role of what dependentistas once called the conquering bourgeoisie 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). In this respect, industrialization in latecomers has 
historically appeared as a project built on compromise, not on bourgeoisie domination 
that fits the classic pattern of industrial bourgeoisie (Evans, 1982).  
In the words of Cardoso and Faletto (1973, cited in Evans 1979, p.39), industrialization 
“represents more a policy of accords, between diverse groups from agrarian to popular-
urban, than the imposition of interests or will to power of a conquering bourgeoisie”. 
Thus, from a historical-structural point of view, what explains capitalist 
industrialization in peripheral social formations is the multifaceted relationship between 
local social classes and the state, with respect to conditioning impressions of the 
international environment. The state has been believed to play a central role in both the 
process of local industrialization and late capitalist development.30 As Evans (1979, 
                                                          
29 The global spread of production and trade, particularly post-1980, reinforced the belief that firms in 
developing countries have been offered limitless opportunities to catch up with the first movers, since 
they compete under the free market conditions of a global playing field. Friedman (2005) has gone so far 
as to argue that this level playing field has connected all over the planet, in the sense that every firm is 
potentially an equal competitor to each other. For trenchant and devastating criticism of this contention 
see Nolan (2001); Nolan et al. (2007). 
30 Even though the state is believed to occupy a central role in capitalist development in various ways, 
there is no monolithic theory of the state commonly employed in historical-structural dependency studies. 
While some scholars like O’Donnell (1978) emphasise the emergence of the ‘bureaucratic authoritarian 
state’ as a reactionary unit of peripheral social formation, others like Bennett and Sharpe (1980, 1985) 
remark on the institutional and autonomous capacity of states in a Gerschenkronian sense. This 
framework offers a more nuanced conception of the state, building on a class-relational articulation of 
developmental state.  
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p.43) put it, “unless the state can enforce a priority on local accumulation and push 
industrialization effectively, there is no effective sponsor for peripheral 
industrialization”.  
Nevertheless, from a historical-structural perspective, the role of the state in capitalist 
development is not taken for granted, in two respects. First, its role is believed to be 
properly understood in relation to class conflicts and alliances at the local level. In this 
sense, the state, as Johnson (1985) states, is mainly conceived as an institutional 
expression of class relations within a particular peripheral formation. In other words, the 
interests and strategies of local economic and social forces vis-à-vis TNCs are usually 
expressed through institutional arrangements and the policies of the state apparatus. 
Second, the state’s role in capitalist development is understood as part of a triple 
alliance that includes TNCs and local capitalist groups. In this sense, the state is 
conceived as a major nexus of economic transformation which, under certain 
circumstances, has the capacity and will to renegotiate and redefine the terms of local 
capital accumulation vis-à-vis TNCs. As there is the likelihood of conflict between the 
global rationality of TNCs and the developmental priorities of a local economy, the 
state occupies a pivotal role in coercing or cajoling the TNCs when the matter of local 
accumulation is at stake. 
A comparative look at Latin American and North-East Asian experiences proves 
instructive in addressing these issues. As cited earlier in the chapter, many scholarly 
works which have confronted the East Asian experience with the historical-structural 
dependency approach have revealed that East Asian cases are more confirmatory than 
contradictory, both in the theoretical and empirical sense (Lim, 1985; Gold, 1986; 
Haggard, 1990). As in Latin America, in cases like South Korea and Taiwan, there has 
been a triple alliance preparing the ground for dependent capitalist development. East 
Asian countries, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, have experienced greater 
progress in industrialization and capitalist development, despite being largely dependent 
upon foreign markets, capital and technology. In comparison to their Latin American 
counterparts, they today occupy a distinctive structural position in the global division of 
labour as exporters of capital goods and technology-intensive products, but usually at 
the expense of the welfare of their labouring classes.   
At the heart of this relative “success” story lies the role and capacity of the state in 
shaping the local accumulation process, and overcoming the negative consequences 
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stemming from the incorporation of a local economy into the world economic system. 
On this point, the works of East Asianist dependentistas have revealed that, allying with 
local bourgeoisies, the state has played a critical role in the project of local 
accumulation. In paradigmatic Latin American cases like Brazil and Mexico, the state is 
deemed a critical actor in the triple alliance, although many studies hold the view that 
the global priorities and interests of TNCs tend to prevail in the last instance (Cardoso 
and Faletto, 1979; Evans, 1979; Gereffi and Evans, 1981; Bennet and Sharpe, 1985). 
However, in the deviant cases of East Asia like Korea and Taiwan, the state’s role in the 
triple alliance is more decisive, despite being subjected to the global rationality of TNCs 
and the world economic system. As Lim (1985, 99) suggests regarding Korea, “the state 
was undoubtedly in the advantageous position vis-a-vis both the local bourgeoisie and 
the MNCs for enlisting them in the process of capital accumulation.” In a similar vein to 
Lim, Gold’s work (1986) on Taiwan also revealed that among a series of variables, such 
as US security interest, the influences of world market forces, the declining power of 
landlords, and the emergence of the capitalists and middle classes, the locus of power in 
Taiwan’s triple alliance was the state, which enjoyed a relatively strong position in 
regards to local accumulation process. 
At this point, it should be noted that providing an inclusive cross-country comparison of 
East Asian and Latin American development experiences is not a central concern of this 
framework, and is beyond the scope of this study, given their diverse socio-historical 
and socio-political conditions. However, from a theoretical point of view, worth 
mentioning for the sake of historical structural methodology is how the wide variation 
of state capacities and responses to the global economic system generates different paths 
of development within the global south. The centrality of the state in peripheral 
capitalist development is a phenomenon that has been prevalent across the developing 
world, both in the “success stories” and the failures. In this sense, what makes the East 
Asian cases worth studying is not the phenomenon of state involvement in the economy, 
but rather the type and quality of state capacity, which has not simply taken shape 
within the state itself, but by the unique socio-historical dynamics of state-society 
relations and political/economic alliances that condition different responses to the world 
economy. 
A series of studies have concluded that the role of the state in the East Asian experience 
differs from that of other developing countries. The state there has been interventionist, 
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just as its counterparts have been elsewhere; however, it has managed to succeed in 
hauling the local economy up to higher productivity and efficiency levels, whereas 
many others, like Brazilian, Indian, Turkish or Thai states, have not. In this sense, the 
capacity of East Asian states is accounted for by a particular type of state institution, 
what we now call the developmental state. Led most notably by Chalmers Johnson 
(1982), Alice Amsden (1989) and Robert Wade (1990), whose works have gained 
classical status, characterisation of the developmental state has erroneously tended to be 
equated with the notion of the ‘strong state’. 
The prevailing conceptualization of the developmental state has fallen prey to what this 
framework loosely calls the Weberian context that conceives the state as an insulated 
entity separable from societal dynamics and class relations on one hand, and from the 
conditioning impacts of the external world on the other. The focus of most analyses 
revolves around political elites and dynamics within the state apparatus, given the 
scanty apprehension that what matters is essentially institutional that is going on within 
the state structure. This theoretical commitment to state-centrism has been reinforced by 
the works of most developmental state writers. Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989) and 
Wade (1990) have all regarded a weak society as a constitutive prerequisite for the 
state’s developmental capacity to formulate and implement its economic policies, 
sometimes even in spite of the opposition by societal actors.31 For them, a talented 
bureaucracy and well-functioning state apparatus are two outstanding features that 
assure the internal cohesiveness of state capacity. Along with its internal cohesion, the 
developmental state also needs to be equipped with institutional mechanisms and 
channels through which development-oriented bureaucracy can communicate with and 
discipline domestic firms around the industrialization strategy.  
Despite being limited in his efforts, Evans (1995, p.22) has disavowed sympathy for 
statist conception of the developmental state by arguing that “a revival of open-ended 
faith in the state as a solution to the problem of underdevelopment is neither possible 
nor desirable”. Evans (1995) partially moves beyond the naive statism of earlier 
characterizations of the developmental state by introducing the theory of embedded-
autonomy. Autonomy in Evans’ conception refers to the presence of a coherent and 
                                                          
31 In this context, Wade’s (1990) Governed Market Theory exemplifies a well-known variant of such a 
statist approach, in which he wittingly idealises the authoritarian and corporatist character of the 
developmental state that indirectly enables a variety of authoritarian and repressive politics in 
development practice. 
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effective state apparatus able to identify and implement developmental goals while not 
being overwhelmed by the particularistic interests of any social group. Evans’ emphasis 
on state autonomy is complimented by the notion of embeddedness, referring to “a 
concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular 
social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation” (1995, p.56). 
By introducing the notion of embedded-autonomy Evans has argued against the 
simplistic and artificial state-society dichotomy that is central to the caricature of the 
developmental state approach. Paradoxically, his effort has remained limited in the 
sense that the state’s embeddedness in society is reduced to state-business relations at 
the expense of the dynamics of class relations within wider society.32 
Within the developmental state tradition, a more nuanced approach to state-society 
relations has come from Linda Weiss (1998), whose major contribution to the 
transformative role of the state has been formulized under the theoretical approach 
called governed interdependence. Unlike both Wade’s governed market theory and 
Evans’ embedded-autonomy, Weiss has refused the contention that the state’s capacity 
to define developmental goals over economic and societal actors is essential to its 
transformative role. She rather emphasises the centrality of cooperative and negotiated 
relationships between government (state elites) and industry (local firms) around a 
shared development project. According to the governed interdependence model, 
developmental policies “are not simply imposed by bureaucrats and politicians, but are 
the result of regular and extensive consultation, negotiation and coordination with the 
private sector” (Weiss, 1998, p.39). Contrary to the commonly-shared premise of 
Johnson, Wade and Evans, the presence or emergence of a strong capital sector is 
supposedly not inimical either to a state’s transformative capacity nor to its exiting 
developmental features, but is a constituent element of the state’s transformative task. 
The works of developmental state theorists have provided valuable evidence for the 
earlier contentions of East Asianist dependentistas, notably with regard to the role of the 
developmental state in late capitalist development. Their endeavours to transcend the 
dichotomous conception of state-market relations in conceptualising the institutional 
linkages between the developmental state and the market ought to be acknowledged. 
                                                          
32 Evans (1997) later addresses the limitedness of embedded-autonomy by coining a new concept of state-
society synergy which adopts a more inclusive approach to state-society relations, but still fails to grasp 
the essentials of societal dynamics and class relations that underlay the developmental nature of the state. 
For a critique of Evans, see Chang (2009). 
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However, despite its heuristic value, the conception and postulations of the 
developmental state remain troubled and ambiguous in several aspects.  
Unlike the historical-structural methodology and the earlier works of East Asianist 
dependentistas, developmental state theorists have failed to conceive how the 
developmental role of the state within a particular socio-spatial entity is installed based 
on historically-given class configurations and their relation to the external world. Rather 
than problematising its socio-historical underpinnings, adhering to the Weberian 
tradition, the developmental state has more often taken for granted an autonomous 
institutional setting that secures ‘national development’.33 In such a statist conception, 
policies and institutions of the developmental state are dissociated from underlying class 
relations and social grounding. The so-called state-society perspective in developmental 
state theory has mostly referred to state-business relations, due to its prevalence in late 
capitalist development (Cammack, 2007; Oğuz, 2003). Contrary to the works of Lim 
(1985) and Gold (1986), the crucial role intra-class and capital-labour play in the 
instalment of a developmental state has been overshadowed in the statist tradition. The 
question of how the position of commercial and agricultural bourgeoisies within the 
class configuration has played a constitutive or hampering role in the deployment of 
industrial projects serves as a perfunctory narrative.34 Again, unlike in the research 
interests of East Asian dependentistas,35 the matter of labour in the statist conception of 
the developmental state is either absent or reduced to a secondary position vis-à-vis 
capital relations.   
The conception of the developmental state in such a statist tradition is primarily trapped 
within the methodological nationalism which neglects historically-given international 
dynamics as determining factors in the installation of developmental policies and 
institutions within the East Asian context. From a historical-structural point of view, the 
central trouble with developmental state theory is not simply the level of analysis, in the 
sense of an external versus an internal mode of explanation. Rather, the question of how 
developmental state practices and institutions have come into being in the East Asian 
                                                          
33 For an earlier discussion opposed to the Weberian conception of the state and pioneering 
developmental state theorists, see Cammack’s (1989) denouncement of the authors of Bringing the State 
Back In (1985). 
34 For the constitutive role of land reform in the deployment of the developmental state in Korea and 
Taiwan see Lim (1985) and Gold (1986). For comparative discussions of the significance of land reform 
and agricultural policies for industrialization and development in East Asian and Latin American contexts 
see Kay (2002) and  Grinberg and Starosta (2009). 
35  See inter alia Deyo (1981), Lim (1985), Gold (1986). For further discussion, see Deyo (1989).  
76 
 
 
 
context but not elsewhere in the world requires a concurrent analysis of inter-societal 
change in relation to international and geopolitical dynamics. Earlier works of East 
Asian dependentistas on Korea and Taiwan have shown how US geopolitical concerns 
in East Asia stimulated societal change, and thereby the installation of a developmental 
state, through foreign aid and facilitation of agricultural reforms and industrial policies 
(see, respectively, Lim, 1985 and Gold, 1986). As Lim (1985, p.131) bluntly puts it, 
“the triple alliance under U.S. security umbrella had to facilitating tremendous 
economic growth and structural change in Korea”.36   
In short, within former peripheral and dependent geographies only a few countries have 
succeeded in achieving notable and consistently high rates of economic growth with 
widespread industrial upgrading and high levels of locally captured value-added. This is 
particularly the case for East Asian NICs, whose response to the world capitalist system 
differs from the rest of the developing world, given their diverse socio-historical and 
socio-political conditions, and their particular relations with the economic and political 
system. At the heart of this “success” story lies the role and capacity of the state in 
shaping local accumulation process, and overcoming negative consequences, stemming 
from the incorporation of a local economy into the world economic system. This has 
once more validated the postulation of historical-structural dependency analysts, who 
point out the developmental role of the state in the process of local industrialization and 
late capitalist development. Nevertheless, in the historical-structural perspective, the 
role of the state in capitalist development is not taken for granted, but properly analysed 
in relation to both historically given class-configurations, state-society relations within a 
particular locality and their specific interaction with the international environment. 
Roughly speaking, as a major nexus of economic transformation in a particular socio-
spatial locality, the state emerges as an institutional expression of a historically-given 
class configuration and its specific relation to the external world. The developmental 
state’s institutions and policies cannot come into being overnight, standing above the 
differentiating penetration of conflicting class interests and the conditioning pressures 
of the external world. Consequently, subjected to these complex and multifaceted 
interactions with internal social forces and external dynamics, states develop particular 
sets of institutional capacities and arrangements, leading to divergent developmental 
                                                          
36 For detailed discussion of Korea see Lim’s (1985) chapter 4 and conclusion. For Taiwan see Gold’s 
(1986) chapter 5. For up-to-date and comparative analyses on East Asian late development in relation to 
its particular geopolitical context see Gray (2011a, 2011b, 2014). 
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outcomes. Through these institutional innovations and arrangements, states cope with 
and overcome different collective action problems that are inherent in the process of late 
capitalist development.  
As Waldner (1999) and many others (Doner, 2009; Schwartz, 2010) have discussed, 
different levels of capitalist development require tasks and institutional innovations that 
vary in difficulty. In broad strokes, late capitalist development involves two sets of 
collective action dilemmas: those that relate to structural change and those that relate to 
the matter of upgrading. Following the authors just noted, these dilemmas can be 
broadly distinguished as ‘Gerschenkronian collective action problems’, and ‘Kaldorian 
collective action problems’. Gerschenkronian collective problems, as Schwartz (2010, 
p.59) states, require “state mobilization of capital for social overhead capital (such as 
the provision of the transportation networks needed to get exports to market), for the 
provision of capital to producers, and for the creation of a labour supply. As Doner 
(2009) puts it, overcoming Gerschenkronian collective problems involves overall 
structural change, economic diversification and even high but interrupted rates of 
growth, yet in the long run dooms countries to be stuck in a ‘middle income trap’. 
Kaldorian collective action problems, on the other hand, involve a set of interrelated 
phenomena such as increasing returns to scale, moving up the product cycle with greater 
efficiency and local inputs, and learning by doing (Schawartz, 2010; Doner, 2009). 
Kaldorian collective action dilemmas present hurdles greater than structural change and 
economic diversification pose, since they require investment in innovation and intensive 
industrialization, regardless of any existing comparative disadvantages or advantages. 
Therefore, rather than a passive process in which a particular socio-spatial entity relies 
on its existent position in international divisions of labour and waits for the diffusion of 
new production capabilities and technologies, it requires an endogenous, cumulative 
learning process through which local industry moves up to a level that enables it to 
compete with first movers in the global economy.    
Overcoming these two broad sets of collective action problems is complex, both in 
political and sociological terms, and requires different institutional capacities. 
Nevertheless, given diverse internal class configurations and differing external 
dynamics, a few countries in the global south have managed to construct and 
institutionalize the capacities necessary to overcome these collective action dilemmas. 
The formation of these institutional capacities is itself a challenging collective action 
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problem that inherently lies at the bottom of politics and class conflicts, taking place 
within a particular socio-spatial entity. Looking into the recent history of the global 
economy in broad terms, developing countries within the geographies of Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and South-East Asia have managed to overcome Gerschenkronian 
collective dilemmas with structural economic changes and diversified export 
manufacturing capabilities. However, only the developmental states of East Asia have 
managed to resolve both Gerschenkronian and Kaldorian collective dilemmas, which 
has brought industrial upgrading in genuine terms and put them on a distinctive 
trajectory of economic development (Schwartz, 2010; Doner 2009).37 
Complementing our earlier discussion on the reproduction of dependent development 
and GCCs/GVCs analysis, the success in upgrading seems mostly limited to East Asian 
NICs and thereby is unsatisfactory in the rest of the developing world. In this sense, not 
structural change but upgrading distinguishes the East Asian cases from other 
developing countries, which have still not reached the levels of capitalist development 
as early comers have. As discussed in the previous section, the global spread of 
manufacturing capabilities to former peripheral economies makes dichotomous 
denominations such as ‘industrialized’ and ‘non-industrialized’ increasingly untenable. 
In parallel to recent changes in the global economy, developing countries have 
experienced an overall structural shift in their economies, given the expansion and 
diversification of their manufactured exports, accompanied with considerable increase 
in medium/high-tech production. However, with regard to local linkages and local 
technological capacities, East Asian NICs differ from the rest of the developing world, 
which has led to a bifurcation within the global periphery. In contrast to East Asian 
NICs, the economies of the rest of the developing world seem characteristically 
dualistic, in which leading TNCs are in the driver’s seat in terms of holding high-tech 
and branded exports, due to which local firms account for little of the created surplus 
value.38 
                                                          
37 For the cases of Latin America and Eastern Europe see Schwartz’s (2010) chapters 11-12. For South-
East Asian cases such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines see chapters 1-2-5-7.  
38 A typical example is Malaysia’s semiconductor industry, which has ascended to being the second 
largest exporter of semiconductors to the US, but has remained stuck at the ‘lower-road’ of production, 
since it still does assembly, testing and packaging for leading TNCs. Similarly, the Thai hard-disk drive 
industry has become one of the world’s largest, but the multiplier effect and local linkages have remained 
limited. Similarly, the Turkish and Polish automotive industries can be regarded as illustrative cases, in 
which the local firms that are producing for leading TNCs account for a limited share of created surplus 
value. 
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With respect to Schwartz’s (1989) mapping of dependency situations and their 
association with the export roles of developing countries in global value relations, East 
Asian NICs also differ from the rest of the global south. The countries in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and South-East Asia have mostly remained stuck in the downstream 
stages of export roles, such as primary commodity exports, export-processing (or in-
bond) assembly operations, component-supply subcontracting and original equipment 
manufacturing. Given their lower-road development trajectories and weak institutional 
capacities, they (apart from a few exceptional firms) have failed to shift to the upstream 
stages of exporting (e.g. original design manufacturing and original brand 
manufacturing). Hence, as discussed above, the rate and direction of local accumulation 
in these countries has remained externally conditioned, since they have relatively more 
limited and mediated capacity to exert control over the entire circuit of accumulation. 
Since the interior accumulation of local bourgeoisies is conditioned by the broader cycle 
of leading TNCs, diverse situations of dependency occur alongside the hierarchically-
structured global value chains.  
As discussed above, the developmental and institutional capacity of the state can 
overcome some of the challenges posed by asymmetrical and hierarchically-structured 
global value relations. Therefore, when properly conceived in relation to local class 
configuration and its interaction with external forces, the state’s role in this sense 
appears as an institutional expression of class relations within a particular social 
formation. More explicitly, the interests and strategies of local economic and social 
forces vis-à-vis TNCs are expressed through the institutional arrangements and policies 
of the state apparatus. Thus, as a major nexus of economic transformation, the state has 
the capacity and will to renegotiate and redefine the terms of local capital accumulation 
vis-à-vis TNCs, and to coerce or cajole TNCs when the matter of local accumulation is 
at stake. In a complementary manner, the absence or presence of such a state role can be 
determinative in shaping the environment for incorporation into global value relations. 
To put it another way, “state action and inaction generates the enabling conditions that 
shape whether and how firms, regions and nations are able to engage with global value 
relations, and their capacities to upgrade these engagements” (Neilson et al., 2014, p.3). 
Nevertheless, looking into the current literature, the conceptual prisms of mainstream 
chain analyses in GCCs/GVCs frameworks tend to downplay questions about the role of 
social classes and the state in shaping global value relations. As Bair (2005, 2008) and 
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others (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; Selwyn, 2011, 2012; Smith, 2014) argue, since the 
notion of upgrading and the matter of chain governance are narrowly focused on issues 
of firm-level competitiveness and affairs within a particular industry, they cast a very 
partial light upon outstanding questions about the agential and transformative role of 
other factors, such as state institutions, social classes and labour. While the original 
GVC analysis tends to underestimate the role of the state and social classes in shaping 
value relations within a particular socio-spatial entity, Global Production Networks 
(GPNs) analysis, a sibling approach in value chain analysis, seems more explicit in 
incorporating national, regional and local institutions, and other stakeholders such as 
business and labour groups that frame global value relations (see inter alia, Dicken et 
al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; Coe et al., 2004; Yang and Coe, 2009).  
Evolved in dialogue with, and as a critique of, GCCs/GVCs literature, the GPNs 
approach re-conceptualizes global value relations through a complex network metaphor 
in which “there are intricate links – horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical – forming 
multi-dimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activity (Henderson et al., 2002, 
p. 442). In so doing, the network imagery in GPNs discourse not only provides a 
broader lexicon with which to consider the multi-scalar geographical and institutional 
complexity of value relations, that has been trivialised in much GCC/GVC literature, 
but also encompasses non-firm relationships and actors that bring about the versatility 
of value relations in terms of time and space (Coe, Dicken and Hess 2008). GPNs 
researchers endeavour to provide a heuristic framework that moves beyond the valuable 
but practically simplistic typologies of governance structures in GCCs/GVCs literature. 
Instead, they seek to provide time- and space-sensitive explanations of global value 
relations by demonstrating the complexity of production networks that are “inherently 
dynamic and are always in flux organisationally and geographically in response to both 
internal and external circumstances” (Yang and Coe, 2009, p.33).  
In fact, the further theoretical advancement through the network metaphor transcends 
some of the deficiencies surrounding GCCs/GVCs analyses by highlighting the multi-
actoral geographical and institutional complexity in which value chains operate. The 
pioneering works of Henderson et al. (2002), Coe et al. (2004) and Yeung (2009; 2014) 
present an array of conceptual categories, such as territorial embeddedness and strategic 
coupling, to consider the geographical dynamics of the globalization of production. 
Combining insights gained from actor-network-theory and varieties of 
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capitalism/business systems with ideas derived from chain analysis, GPNs researchers 
such as Dicken et al. (2001) and Henderson et al. (2002) pay special attention to the 
multi-actor characteristics and territorial embeddedness of global production. In a 
similar vein, Coe et al. (2004, p.469) and Yeung (2009; 2014) develop an illustrative 
notion of strategic coupling, which focuses on the process of the coupling of 
regional/territorial assets with the global rationality of production networks through a 
range of institutional activities across different geographical and organizational scales.39 
Success or failure of upgrading and development along value chains/networks is thereby 
associated with the nature of the coupling process that frames the dynamics of value 
creation, enhancement and capture. 
The conceptual categories of GVCs/GPNs narratives have one way or another 
prefigured fundamental questions on the role of state and social actors in shaping 
conditions for incorporation into global production. However, despite their theoretical 
advancements, none of these approaches offers an explanation of why or how economic 
and social upgrading takes place in particular regional and national economies, and 
what roles states and society play in this respect. Rather an explicit theorisation of the 
state has been somewhat lacking, and thus chain/networks analyses have remained 
limited in examining the role of state and class relations with respect to the matter of 
governance and upgrading.  
In this regard, this section concludes that the above-presented class-relational 
articulation of the developmental state offers a more nuanced analysis of the role of the 
state in shaping the integration of domestic capital and industry into global value 
relations. Instead of conceiving state as all powerful and unitary entity cajoling 
domestic firms, the proposed framework incorporates divergent class configurations, 
state-society relations and institutional/regulatory settings to fully inform the potential 
role of the state in the incorporation of domestic industries into global production. In so 
doing, the framework furthers the multi-actor and multi-scaler approach in 
                                                          
39 An alternative approach to Yeung’s notion of strategic coupling is Bair and Werner’s (2011) 
‘disarticulations project’, which seeks to broaden our understanding of how global networks of 
production and trade are historically and geographically formed/reformed/deformed as expressions of an 
ongoing interaction between places, subjects, processes and the production of goods. Briefly stated, Bair 
and Werner reject the inclusionary bias of chain analysis and the linearity of development and upgrading 
via participation in value chains. Rather, they draw attention to the reproduction of uneven geographies of 
capitalist development, considering the fact that a historically and geographically particular set of social 
relations leads to processes of incorporation, exclusion and expulsion from global commodity circuits. 
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chain/network analysis and truly brings the state and social classes into the matter of 
governance and economic/social upgrading. Going beyond the analytical focus on the 
inter-firm or network dynamics in chain/network analyses, this framework seeks a more 
comprehensive analysis of value relations, one that pays special attention to the socio-
economic and socio-political dynamics of the diverse developmental trajectories of 
national economies. 
In this direction, the framework puts emphasis on the potential role of the state as a 
nexus of economic and social transformation which, under certain circumstances, has 
the capacity and will to renegotiate and redefine the terms of value creation, 
enhancement and capture within a particular socio-spatial locality. As the above 
discussion suggests, the countries that have more successfully joined GVCs are those 
that have the respective institutional capacity to frame the process of incorporation into 
global production. This requires complementary development projects and institutional 
innovations, not only to face multiple collective action problems (here conceptualised as 
Gerschenkronian and Kaldorian), but also to renegotiate the terms of local accumulation 
and control vis-à-vis leading TNCs. States exercise such functionality in a wide range of 
policy arenas, such as tariffs, taxes (and tax concessions), infrastructure provision, 
wage-setting, incentives, education, training and research, and build up respective 
institutional settings and innovations to conduct these policies. 
Nevertheless, importantly for the subject at hand, the realisation of these functions of 
the state cannot be taken for granted, but must be analysed in relation to historically 
given class-configurations, state-society relations within a particular locality and their 
interaction with the changing international context. In other words, the absence, as 
much as the presence, of a state’s developmental strategy and institutional capacity 
inherently comprises contradictions that include intrinsic class relations, ongoing power 
struggles among various economic fractions and interests, and their respective relations 
to the external world. It is therefore propounded that upgrading along value chains is in 
a sense the process of resolving these conflicts and contested exchanges, and building 
up the required societal support and institutional capacity to ensure the long-term 
interests of the domestic economy. Nevertheless, given the diverse nature of economic, 
social and political conditions, the resolution of these conflicts, at the same time, 
involves a broad package of class compromises, concessions or sheer repression. Thus, 
by its very nature, it excludes some groups at the expense of favouring others, and leads 
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to varying developmental outcomes and types of articulations into GVCs in the 
changing geographies of the global south. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has revisited the notion of dependency under the new dynamics of today’s 
global capitalism. In contrast to commonly-held presumptions in current development 
research, this chapter has revealed that dependency relations have not faded away with 
the rise of contemporary globalisation, but rather have taken new forms and become 
more of an issue that needs to be addressed. Instead of offering a fully worked-out 
theory of dependency, the chapter has originally moved from a particular variant of 
dependency approach called historical-structural dependency analysis that conceives 
dependency as a concrete situation which varies over time and from country to country, 
from industry to industry. As a contribution to the current literature on the international 
political economy of development, the chapter has offered an up-to-date and 
analytically applicable framework of dependency analysis by drawing on a set of 
conceptual tools and insights from Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, Global 
Commodity Chain/Global Value Chain analyses and the class-relational articulation of 
the developmental state. 
The proposed framework has first argued that core-like and periphery-like activities 
have clustered in time and space, leading to polarisation in the world economy and a 
socio-spatial reconfiguration of the core-periphery model even in today’s globalised 
world. The framework has also demonstrated how the current process of global 
stratification and re-configuration of the core-periphery model has given rise to new 
forms of dependency relations along hierarchically-structured global value chains. In so 
doing, the framework has operationalised the notion of dependency situations via the 
chain metaphor and related analyses. However, despite the utility of value chain 
analysis, this framework approaches the incorporation of value chain analysis 
cautiously, as the direct adoption of the GVCs perspective is likely to end up with a 
firm-centric, techno-industrial, market-based conception of dependency and global 
production. Thus, the framework has instead put the issues of dependency and 
upgrading along value chains into a wider socio-political, institutional and class-
relational context of political economy. Deriving insights from a class-relational 
articulation of the developmental state, the framework has offered an explanation of 
why and how economic and social upgrading in value chains takes place within 
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particular socio-spatial entities or national economies, and what roles state-society 
complexes, class relations and institutional settings play in this respect. 
The proposed framework has also sought to address an important lacuna in current 
chain/network research. It has furthered the multi-actor, multi-scaler approach in the 
literature, and brought the state and social classes into the discussion of dependency, 
governance and economic/social upgrading in value chains. Consequently, this chapter, 
as a whole, has developed an up-to-date and comprehensive analytical framework 
within which to study dependency and development within today’s global periphery. 
Utilising the proposed analytical framework, the following chapters examine how and 
in what ways dependency relations have emerged and developed within the Turkish 
national context as the main testing ground of this research project. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Retrospective Analysis of Dependency Relations in the Turkish 
National Context 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the next two chapters, the ideas and analytical framework presented so far is 
concretized, developed and refined by confrontation with the political economic context 
of Turkish capitalist development. The historical origins and development of 
dependency relations in Turkey are critically examined and periodized via the utilisation 
of Cardosian method of historical-structuralism that constitutes the basilar approach of 
the proposed analytical framework. As a dialectical perspective, historical-structuralism 
lets us explore changes and continuities in the evolution of dependency relations not 
only through the systemic and structural dynamics of world capitalism, but also through 
the transformation of class configurations and state-society relations within Turkey. The 
succeeding chapters, in a sense, employ an articulation of the historical materialist 
methodology to reveal how the uneven and dependent nature of Turkey’s development 
has evolved through underlying inter/intra-class relations and their manifold 
relationship to the state and foreign capital. In this regard, one of the principle concerns 
herein is to move from economistic, structural and mechanico-formal formulations to an 
analysis that grasps the changing nature of dependency relations, given the richness of 
concrete historical situations. As the analytical core of the research, such an 
examination provides a retrospective analysis of dependent development by attaching 
particular importance to shifting strategies of capital accumulation, varying modes of 
integration with the world economy, and changing configurations of class forces and 
state-society relations in Turkey.  
In doing so, these two complementary chapters pursue three main objectives. First, the 
historical periodization of dependency relations shows how the uneven and dependent 
nature of Turkish capitalist development has been perpetuated and taken new forms 
throughout class structures and state-society complexes that are in flux, but carrying 
with them the legacies of earlier periods. Second, tracing the evolution of dependency 
86 
 
 
 
relations also enables us to pinpoint the historical and social conditions under which 
different type of industrial strategies and trade relations have emerged over time. Such 
analysis more importantly lets us understand how asymmetrical and hierarchically-
structured global value relations have taken root and become embedded in the broader 
institutional, regulatory and class-relational context of Turkish capitalism, in which 
rates of capital accumulation and prospects for economic and social upgrading are 
conditioned both externally and internally. 
In accordance with these purposes, this chapter explores the historical origins and 
development of dependency relations in Turkey, with occasional references to the 
insights derived from the Latin American and East Asian experiences. Complementing 
our earlier discussion on the diverse responses and paths of development in the global 
south, the chapter begins by placing Turkey’s capitalist development into the historical 
and comparative context of dependency relations within the global periphery. This first 
section provides a three-fold periodisation of dependency relations which corresponds 
to different phases of the internationalisation of capital as well as accompanying shifts 
in the international division of labour and forms of dependence relations. The section 
reiterates the diverse responses and paths of industrialisation in the Latin American and 
East Asian cases, in order to make further inferences with regard to Turkey’s respective 
position within the wider periphery. In so doing, this section presents a general but 
elucidative roadmap to trace and examine the changing nature of dependency relations 
from the early years of modern Turkey to the present. 
Based on the above-cited three-fold periodisation, the second section discusses the 
incorporation of the Turkish economy into the European-centred capitalist world system 
in the late Otttoman Empire and during the early years of modern Turkey. This section 
explores the epiphanies of classic dependency, paying special attention to the legacies 
of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of state and society in the early decades of 
modern Turkey. The third section then scrutinizes how the nature of dependency 
relations gradually shifted from its classical form to a model of dependent development 
with the rise and consolidation of the triple alliance in post-war Turkey. This section 
propounds that international productive capital was no longer an external force whose 
interests were largely represented by merchant bourgeoisies and primary product 
exporters, but rather allying with emerging industrial capital and the Turkish state, 
began to share an interest in the development of domestic industry. The section puts 
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special emphasis on corresponding factors such as the changing modes of integration 
with the world capitalist context and the shifting configurations of class forces and 
state-society complexes over the period in question. It ultimately argues that given the 
uneasy nature of class conflicts and state-society relations, Turkey lacked the respective 
class-relational and institutional capacities to overcome the contradictions of capitalist 
development and thus to redefine the terms of dependency in favour of its long-term 
interests. Finally, the last section briefly surveys the reasons behind the crisis of 
decades-long capital accumulation in Turkey and discusses the step-wise transition to a 
new form of dependent development, which is examined in detail in the following 
chapter. 
4.2 Internationalization of Capital, Forms of Dependence and the Position of 
Turkey within the Global Periphery  
At the most general level, historical-structural dependency studies seek to examine how 
changes in the world capitalist economy lead to diverse situations of dependency in the 
global periphery. Therefore our examination starts with the presumption that what 
happens internally in Turkey cannot be apprehended without considering changes in the 
world capitalist context and their implications for the wider periphery. In this respect, 
the periodization of the world capitalist context in conjunction with the 
internationalisation of circuits of capital offers complementary insights allowing us to 
analyse subsequent changes in international division of labour and forms of 
dependence, and their reflections on Turkey within the wider periphery.  
In retrospect, since its inception in sixteenth-century Europe, the capitalist world 
economy has been disposed to find new ways to expand internationally and unite the 
world into a single world market by transcending the confinements of national borders. 
Even before the recent phase of contemporary globalisation, the internationalisation of 
capital was well under way and capitalism was in an insatiable drive to eliminate spatial 
barriers.40 As popularly cited, Marx and Engels (1998, p.39) emphasised in the 
Communist Manifesto that capitalist production and modern industry not only gave birth 
to the world market, but “the need for a constantly expanding market chases the 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe” so that it “must nestle everywhere, 
                                                          
40 The internationalisation of capital and the geographical expansion of capitalism were well articulated in 
the writings of Marx, such as the Communist Manifesto, Grundrisse and the first volume of Capital. 
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settle everywhere and establish connections everywhere”. In this sense, as Harvey 
(2001) puts it, since its very inception the capitalist world economy has always been 
under the impulsion of geographical and spatial expansion in order to overcome the 
contradictions of capital accumulation through “spatial fixes” by seeking out new 
markets, fresh labour powers, unexplored resources, or fresh opportunities for 
investment and production. 
Thus, it is fair to say that it is the long-standing dynamic of expansion built into 
capitalism that has driven the internationalisation of capital and subsequent changes in 
patterns of geographical specialisation or division of labour over a period of 500 years 
or so. In arriving at its current moment of what is popularly called global capitalism, the 
world capitalist context has historically gone through three main phases, each of which 
can be distinguished by the changing nature of the internationalization of capital and 
corresponding shifts in the international division of labour and forms of dependence for 
the global periphery (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4. 1 Internationalization of Capital, Types of Divisions of Labour and Changing 
Patterns of Dependency in the World Capitalist Context 
Time Dimension 
(with very broad 
strokes) 
16th century to early 
20th century 
Early 20th century 
to late 1970s 
Late 1970s to present 
Internationalization 
of Circuits of 
Capital 
Internationalization 
of commodity trade 
and the circuit of 
commodity-capital 
The limited stage of 
internationalization 
of the circuits of 
money- and 
productive capital  
The acceleration of 
the mobility of all 
circuits of capital and 
the development of a 
truly global circuit of 
capital accumulation 
and a global market 
Type of Division of 
Labour 
Colonial Division of 
Labour  
International 
Division of Labour  
Global Division of 
Labour 
Form of 
Dependence 
Classic Dependency 
(see Evans, 1976, 
1979) 
Associated-
dependent 
Development (see, 
Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979: Evans, 1979) 
New form of 
Dependent 
Development in the 
age of globalization 
(see the related 
section in the theory 
chapter) 
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Source: Derived by the author from the works of Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Evans (1976, 
1979), Gereffi (1994), Jenkins (1974, 1984, 2013), Bina and Yaghmaian (1988, 1991), 
Yaghmaian (1998), Dickens (2011).  
The first phase, which spans the centuries roughly from the early sixteenth century to 
the first half of the twentieth century, began with a trade-based division of labour in 
Europe, premised on mercantile imperialism and control of an expanding worldwide 
trade in commodities. Starting from the early sixteenth century, emerging European 
powers, first Spain and Portugal, later followed by Britain, France and the Netherlands, 
gradually expanded their worldwide commercial interests and came to dominate much 
of the world, mostly through a diverse mechanism of military control, coercion and 
brute force (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Evans, 1979). This early stage of the 
internationalisation process was closely intertwined with the primitive accumulation of 
capital and marked by the spatial expansion of capitalism into peripheral social 
formations, primarily through the internationalization of commodity trade and the 
circuit of commodity capital (Yaghmainan, 1998; Jenkins, 2013). As European 
colonisation gained ground, state-sponsored trading companies such as the English, 
Dutch and Danish East India companies, the Royal African Company, the Hudson’s 
Bay Company, and many others, were bestowed with monopoly trading rights and 
ventured overseas with the intention of pursuing the economic and strategic interests of 
their respective governments (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
Particularly with the rise of industrialisation in the nineteenth century, the relations 
between European colonisers and the rest of the world underwent further changes. As 
industrialisation got underway in the late eighteenth century, the newly industrialised 
countries of Europe began to seek raw materials for their industries, new markets for 
their products and new sources of foodstuffs for their expanding populations. This also 
led to a massive cross-border movement of commodities, capital and people, and led to 
the first webs of the global economy. From the early 1820s through the rest of the 
century, international trade grew around 3.5 per cent per annum, which was 
accompanied by a rapid increase in the cross-border flow of market- and resource-
seeking capital (Jones, 2005, p.18). Nevertheless, as Dickens (2011, p.7) puts it, this 
earlier phase of modern globalisation was “essentially shallow integration, manifested 
largely through arm’s-length trade in goods and services between independent firms and 
through international movements of portfolio capital and relatively simple direct 
investment”. 
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During these early stages of globalisation, the internationalisation of economic activities 
was mostly predicated on competitive capitalism and the market- and resource-seeking 
investments of Western capital (first notably by Britain, some Western European 
countries, and later by the US). Market- and resource-seeking Western multinationals 
were prompted to invest abroad to acquire minerals, raw materials and markets for their 
home industries, and to protect or widen their indigenous markets. From the standpoint 
of dependency relations, this period coincided with what Evans (1976, 1979) called the 
model of classic dependency, of which colonial and semi-colonial trade relations were 
the main feature. Standing at the apex of international division of labour, the 
industrialised core traded manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials and 
unprocessed foods from peripheral economies. 
Over a long period of time until the early twentieth century, such geographical 
specialisation and the division of labour between the industrialised core and the non-
industrialised periphery formed the underlying basis of much of world trade. Until the 
post-Second World War period, multinational manufacturing was overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the industrialised core economies of North America and Western 
Europe: 71 per cent of world manufacturing production was located in only four 
countries, whereas almost 90 per cent was in 11 industrialised nations (Dickens, 2011, 
p.14). Particularly throughout the late nineteeth and early twentieth centuries, there was 
an increasing flow of money and productive capital across the world, but much of it was 
in the form of portfolio, whereas the remainder was largely concentrated in extractive 
industries and public utilities, and never truly brought a qualitative transformation of 
industrial sectors in the periphery (Bina and Yagmaian, 1991; Jenkins, 2013).41 As the 
internationalisation of productive capital remained relatively limited, dependency 
relations were mainly confined to the sphere of circulation and commodity exchange 
through, which the industrialised economies of the West became increasingly dominant 
in the core-periphery configuration.  
This long-established geographical specialisation and division of labour was shattered 
by the Second World War. After the brief interruption of the interwar period, the overall 
productive capacity of the world economy began to re-expand and the degree of 
                                                          
41 Between the late nineteenth century and 1914, there was a voluminous amount of foreign investment, 
but it is believed that the majority of total capital flow was portfolio. According to Dunning’s (1983; 1992 
cited in Jones, 2005, p.20) historical estimates, around one-third of total foreign investment was in the 
form of FDI, whereas possibly one third of this was in extractive industries and a further one third was in 
services, particularly in finance, insurance and transportation of commodities. 
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economic integration was accelerated by increases in the movement of goods, services, 
capital and information across national borders. The quarter-century after the Second 
World War marked a movement to a new phase, characterised by the political and 
economic hegemony of the United States, the renewed growth of world trade, the 
internationalisation of productive capital and the expansion of the activity of TNCs. The 
expansion and integration of the post-war world economy was facilitated by a variety of 
political and technological factors such as the reconstruction of the international 
monetary system through Bretton Woods agreements, the gradual return to convertible 
currencies, the liberalisation of international trade, and the development of jet aircraft, 
containerised shipping and international telephone and telex links (Dickens, 2011).    
Concomitant with these developments, the integration and expansion of the post-war 
world economy brought about the internationalisation of industrial production and the 
breakdown of the longstanding colonial division of labour in which the peripheral 
economies supplied primary commodities in exchange for manufactured ones. 
Particularly driven by the phenomenal growth in the internationalisation of productive 
capital and the expansion of TNC activities led first by US capital and later by European 
and Japanese corporations, a growing proportion of world manufacturing began to be 
carried out in the peripheral economies of East Asia and Latin America (Jenkins, 1984). 
This gradually disrupted the old geographies of industrial production and changed the 
pattern of geographical specialisation between the core and the periphery. Compared to 
the broad division of labour of colonial times, the peripheral economies shifted away 
from dependence on imported manufactured goods and caught up with the core 
countries in their degree of industrialisation (Gereffi, 1994).  
For much of the global south, the internationalisation of productive capital and the 
relocation of industrial production beyond the boundaries of core economies mostly 
coincided with the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies of the peripheral 
economies (Jenkins, 1984; Bina and Yaghmaian, 1988). Despite being seen as a 
nationalistic policy of self-sufficiency, ISI was conducive to the importation of all form 
of foreign capital and led to the gradual integration of the peripheral countries into the 
networks of global production. At this early stage of peripheral industrialisation, 
manufacturing industries were spatially transferred to new sites in quest of further 
profit, and both the creation and the realisation of value started to take place within the 
peripheral economies. From the standpoint of dependency relations, this limited form of 
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internationalisation of production brought the evolution of the periphery from classic 
dependence to a new stage called associated-dependent development (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979; Evans, 1979). For a number of peripheral social formations, this stage 
triggered the transformation of a certain segment of domestic bourgeoisies from 
commercial to industrial in collaboration with foreign capital, diversified the 
composition of industrial production, and eventually brought along a more complex 
division of labour, beyond primary-products. 
By the 1970s and the 1980s, the world economy has entered a qualitatively new phase 
of global capitalism through which the economic, social, political and technological 
constituents of world capitalism were substantially redefined. Given a combination of 
new political, economic and technological developments, the internationalisation of all 
circuits of capital has further intensified and achieved a truly global character, starting 
from the 1970s (Yaghmaian, 1998). The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates, together with the deregulation of markets and adoption of export-
led growth strategies, swept away the restrictions on cross-border capital and trade 
flows and led to an increasing dispersion and integration of economic activities across 
borders (Dickens, 2011; Yaghmaian, 1998). Likewise, concomitant developments, 
particularly the communications and information revolution, as well as advances in 
transportation, marketing, automation, robotisation and so forth, reduced the barriers of 
space and time, allowing the reconfiguration of production and economic activity on a 
global scale (Gereffi, 1994; Jenkins, 2013). 
What all these developments brought along is the emergence of a new global division of 
labour which signifies a far more complex, integrated and coordinated structure, 
subsuming the disaggregation and dispersion of many production processes and their 
geographical relocation on a global scale (Dickens, 2011). This newer form of 
international division of labour qualitatively differs from its predecessors and offers 
alternative potential outcomes for the developing countries that managed to be 
incorporated into it. Although the internationalisation of productive capital and the 
spread of manufacturing activities to the global south is nothing new, the world 
economy of the 1950s and 1960s was still an aggregation of distinct national economies 
and the production process tended to be primarily organised within national boundaries 
(Gereffi, 1994). Today, the pervasive internationalisation of capital and the growing 
globalisation of production has not only organised the production of goods and services 
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as cross-border value adding activities, but has also incorporated developing countries 
and regions in more complex ways than were seen a few decades ago. Because of this, 
the current international division of labour is no longer predicated on the core-periphery 
model of the post-war period, in which capital- and technology-intensive tasks were 
performed by developed (or core) economies and labour-intensive and low-skilled jobs 
were carried out in developing countries (the periphery). Today, the periphery can no 
longer be characterised as a low-skill hinterland; rather a growing number of developing 
countries have been incorporated into production tasks of varying technical complexity 
and sophistication. Thus, under the new dynamics of today’s world capitalist context, a 
new form of dependent development has emerged out of the hierarchically structured 
global value chains, along which different situations of dependency have been 
concretised based on the asymmetrical nature of underlying power relations (see the 
related discussion in the theory chapter).  
In very broad strokes, the historical trajectory of capitalist development both in Turkey 
and many other developing countries conforms to the stages outlined above. 
Nevertheless, given the diverse paths of industrialization and development strategies, 
the contours of the capitalist world economy presented here have generated 
differentiating patterns of capitalist development and dependency relations across the 
wider periphery. To a certain level of abstraction, a cross-regional look to Latin 
America and East Asia lets us sketch the general lines of the divergent pathways and 
strategies that typify the paradigmatic and deviant cases of dependent development. As 
a caveat at the outset, it should be noted that the endeavour herein is not to provide 
anything close to a comprehensive analysis of these two regions, given their enormous 
diversity with respect to population size, resource endowments, geopolitical dynamics, 
cultural legacies, political regimes and class structures. However, complementing our 
earlier discussion with the case study, the modest intention is instead to make inferences 
with regard to Turkey based on solid comparative generalizations derived from these 
two regions. Although Latin America and East Asia by no means cover the entire 
spectrum of differentiating patterns of capitalist development in the wider global 
periphery, they provide fertile ground from which to confront Turkish capitalist 
development with the paradigmatic and deviant cases they offer. 
From a comparative perspective, the development trajectory of Turkish capitalism has 
been much more in conformity with the paradigmatic examples of Latin America than 
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the deviant case of East Asia. Particularly with respect to the divergent paths of 
industrialization followed within the global periphery, Turkey has gone through a 
similar path of industrialization to Latin American countries such as Mexico and Brazil 
(Table 4.2). Despite the relative time lag in the movement from one phase to another, 
there is a rough correspondence with regard to changes in their respective positions 
within the capitalist world economy, and emergence of the different forms of 
dependence over time. Following Gereffi (1990) and Dicken (2011), the paths of 
industrialization experienced by Latin American and East Asian NIEs can be identified 
under five stages (Table 4.2). While three of these stages are outwardly oriented, 
namely a commodity export phase, and primary and secondary export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI), the other two are inward oriented by definition: primary import-
substituting industrialization (ISI) and secondary ISI.  
Table 4. 1 Turkey’s Respective Position within  the Divergent Paths of Industrialization 
in Latin America and East Asia 
 
Source: Derived and built on by the author from Gereffi (1990) and Dicken (2011). 
Turkey, like the two regional pairs of NICs, passed through the early stages of 
industrialization-commodity exports and primary ISI, although the duration and timing 
of these stages varied for each country. In practical terms, primary ISI commenced 
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earlier, lasted longer and was more populist in Latin American NICs and Turkey than 
East Asian ones. The subsequent divergence in industrialization paths stemmed from 
the ways in which each country responded to issues related to the continuation of 
primary ISI. While East Asian NICs moved to primary Export-Oriented 
Industrialization upon mastering the technologies needed for primary ISI, Turkey, like 
Latin American economies, moved to secondary ISI in the hope of achieving economies 
of scale, relying on its relatively large domestic market. The East Asian economies 
enjoyed export-led manufacturing during a period of extraordinary dynamism in the 
world economy. As time passed, however, the favourable conditions in the world 
economy began to deteriorate. East Asian countries first shifted to secondary ISI and 
then to secondary EOI. Latin American NICs and Turkey, on the other hand, moved to a 
diversified export phase with a certain degree of export-led manufacturing, as well as 
continuation of the secondary ISI some more time. 
It is clear that rather than being mutually exclusive, both the ISI and EOI strategies have 
been implemented by the two pairs of NICs in a divergent manner. At this point, what 
really matters is not the sequence or the pace at which the stages move from one to 
another, but the capacity and nature of the state in governing the underlying dependency 
relations and overcoming the challenges of capitalist development, particularly in the 
secondary sub-phases of each strategy. Complementing our earlier discussion of the 
paths of industrialization, the sub-phases of secondary ISI and secondary EOI require 
certain tasks and institutional innovations that are challenging in difficulty. Each sub-
phase within outward- and inward-oriented development policies is distinguished by a 
more variegated array of technology- and skill-intensive goods and manufacturing 
capabilities. While the secondary ISI entails utilising domestic production capabilities to 
provide a substitute for imports of an array of capital- and technology-intensive goods, 
ranging from automobiles and electronics to petrochemicals and heavy machinery, the 
secondary EIO includes exportation of these more skill- and technology-intensive 
products at a considerable level of competitiveness, efficiency and local value-added. 
Thus, as each of these sub-phases involves certain types of Kaldorian collective action 
problems, such as increasing returns to scale, technological assimilation, learning by 
doing, innovation, and moving along the product cycle and value chains, it requires 
productivity- and innovation-enhancing development policies and institutional 
arrangements. 
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As discussed in the theory chapter, at the heart of this matter lies the state’s role and 
capacity in shaping local accumulation processes, and overcoming negative 
consequences stemming from the incorporation of a local economy into the capitalist 
world economy. The relative success of the deviant cases of East Asia in the secondary 
ISI and EOI strategies, on the other hand, is largely associated with the nature of class 
configuration, state-society relations and the type of institutional settings in managing 
developmental challenges. Allying with local bourgeoisies, East Asian states, as critical 
actors within the triple alliance, have the capacity and will to redefine the terms of local 
capital accumulation vis-a-vis TNCs, and to coerce or cajole TNCs when the matter of 
local accumulation is at stake. Having been able to overcome collective action 
problems, East Asian NICs, contrary to Turkey and its Latin American counterparts, 
experienced greater progress in levels of industrialization and capitalist development, 
despite being formerly dependent upon foreign markets, capital and technology. Thus, 
today, East Asian countries, as the deviant cases of dependent development, occupy a 
distinctive structural position in the global division of labour as exporters of capital 
goods and technology-intensive products, with far greater capability in original design 
manufacturing and original brand manufacturing. 
Given its lower-road of developmental and institutional capacity, Turkey has mostly 
remained stuck at the downstream segments of the global division of labour, such as 
export-processing (or in-bond) assembly manufacturing, component-supply 
subcontracting and original equipment manufacturering. Thus, it is argued that, based 
on an array of factors such as the nature of class relations, state-society complexes and 
modes of interaction with the external world, Turkey has been incorporated into the 
capitalist world economy on highly asymmetrical and dependent terms. Moreover, 
unlike its conformity with paradigmatic cases of dependent development, capitalist 
development in Turkey has its own historical specificities as well. Building on these 
comparative generalizations, the following sections lay emphasis on these specificities, 
and elucidate how the uneven and dependent nature of Turkish capitalism has 
developed, been perpetuated and taken new forms through historically given class 
configurations, state-society complexes and types of capital accumulation over time. 
4.3 The Legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the Formation of Modern Turkish 
Capitalism and Epiphanies of Classic Dependency in the Late Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries 
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In its long and turbulent history, Turkey, or the Ottoman Empire as it was at that time, 
never became a formal colony of the imperialist European powers, but was highly 
vulnerable to the external pressures of the European-centred capitalist world economy 
in many respects. The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world 
economy initially occurred on the basis of its engagement as an international player, 
since it was a ‘world empire’ controlling a wide range of economic activities and an 
extensive division of labour within its territories (Özveren, 2000). In this sense, the 
early incorporation of the Ottoman Empire constituted a certain degree of parity with its 
European counterparts in respect to power relations as well as on economic terms. 
However, the original parity was later undermined in favour of its European 
counterparts leading to the full-fledged peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire within 
the European-centred world economy.  
The incorporation of the Empire into the world economy was deepened and 
institutionalized by the 1838-1841 free trade treaties with European powers which 
abolished protective measures and extended extra-territorial privileges to all foreign 
traders (Pamuk, 1987). With this stream of treaties, it was no longer possible for the 
central authority to exert any political control over trade relations. Moreover, as 
European merchants’ capital had the right to be taxed less vis-a-vis the natives, they 
also enjoyed highly favourable trade relations in their free operations across Ottoman 
territory (Keyder, 1981). Taking full advantage of the favourable terms provided by the 
Capitulations, European commodity-capital overwhelmed Ottoman markets, bringing 
about a complete reversal in trade relations at the expense of small-scale Ottoman 
industry.42 As a result, Ottoman industry entered a period of rapid decline43 through 
competition with the mass-production of European manufacturing (Pamuk, 1987). 
These developments led to the end of industrialization in Ottoman Turkey, and made it 
more dependent on the European-dominated world economy (Berberoğlu, 1982). As 
Pamuk (1981) states, instead of utilising its agricultural sector as a basis for the 
development of domestic industry, which to some extent had been the case in the 
                                                          
42 Whereas almost all Britain’s cotton fabric had been imported from the Ottoman Empire in 1825 
(30,533kg), by 1855 it declined to 1,506kg. In turn, Britain’s exports to Turkey expanded between the 
years 1835-1855: cotton fabric imports by the Empire escalated from 15,846,678m to 121,254,439m; silk 
fabric imports rose from 20,898kg to 81,286kg; linen imports increased from 33,807kg to 599,148kg 
(Berberoğlu, 1982, p.3). 
43 According to a report issued by the Industrial Improvement Commission in 1868, the number of cloth-
producing looms in Istanbul in the preceding thirty years had waned from 2,750 to 25; the number of 
brocade looms from 350 to 4; the number of upholstery silk looms from 60 to 8 (Berberoğlu, 1982, p.3) 
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nineteenth century, the Empire was relegated to exporter of primary products. Thus, 
from the standpoint of dependency relations, the structure of the late Ottoman Empire 
economy corresponded to what Evans (1976, 1979) called the model of classic 
dependency, characterized by colonial or semi-colonial trade relations. Standing at the 
periphery of the European-centred division of labour, the Ottoman Empire became a de 
facto semi-colony which specialized in the production of raw materials and primary 
products geared to the needs of European markets, in exchange for manufactured ones. 
Following these developments, the social and class structure of the late Ottoman Empire 
also went through a transformation. For centuries, the Asiatic mode of production had 
been in effect as the dominant mode of production.44 With the loss of central authority 
in the countryside, the old rural military/administrative system (tımar) was replaced by 
feudal forms of agriculture (iltizam) which over time led to large-scale private property 
rights in land (Çavdar, 2003; Tezel, 2005). While the class power of big landowners 
(Ayans, Derebeys and Ağas) was gradually strengthened, integration with the world 
economy in the meantime stimulated the rise of comprador capitalists, mainly in major 
urban centres (Türkay, 2009). Being relatively exempt from high taxation and 
hampering jurisdictions, merchants of minority groups (Greeks, Armenians, Jews, 
Levantens) became middlemen who engaged in intermediation between the local 
economy and the capitalist world system (Keyder, 1987). Benefiting from the 
asymmetrical power relations within the European-dominated division of labour, the 
Empire’s comprador bourgeoisie held sway over local accumulation on behalf of both 
their class interests and the overall representation of international capital (Türkay, 
2009).  
As a result of these developments, the dependence of the late Ottoman economy mainly 
materialised through the internationalization of commodity trade and the circuit of 
commodity capital. Overall, the weight of European manufacturing industries in 
Ottoman Turkey remained quantitatively insignificant (Pamuk, 1987). Nevertheless, 
despite the low penetration of productive capital, foreign investments took place in 
railways networks and urban infrastructure with the purpose of facilitating the role of 
                                                          
44 Here the term Asiatic Mode of Production is loosely used to refer to the political control of the Ottoman 
ruling class over the means of production and appropriation of surplus. Exercising control over the rural 
economy and trade routes, the Ottoman ruling class appropriated the surplus in the form of taxes and 
tributes based on strong local representation and disciplinary power. As the Empire lost control over the 
countryside and trade routes, the power of local authorities vis-à-vis the central bureaucracy increased, 
driving a tendency towards feudalization. This eventually led to increasing private ownership of land and 
appropriation of agricultural and commercial surplus independent of the central bureaucracy.  
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the Empire as a raw materials-supplying semi-colony.45 Only a modest fraction of the 
bourgeoisie engaged in the processing and manufacturing industries, but they never 
became a full-blown class of industrialists resembling to national industrial bourgeoisie 
of Europe. These small-scale enterprises, more than 90% of which belonged to non-
Moslems, were mostly concentrated in big urban centres such as Istanbul, Salonika and 
Izmir (Keyder, 1987, p.45). Moreover, considering their size and rudimentary nature, 
the number of workers employed in these enterprises also remained limited, counting 
13,485 in total as of 1915 (Berberoğlu, 1982, p.8). Consequently, the mode of 
integration with the world economy stimulated the formation of a comprador 
commercial bourgeoisie and a local accumulation process linked with the commercial 
circuit of European capital. However, given its destructive effects on local industry, it 
posed an obstacle to the progression of capitalist relations of production along 
nationalistic lines (Öztürk, 2010).     
The economic and social structure inherited from the late Ottoman Empire constituted 
the backbone of the urban and rural setting that modern Turkey confronted at its 
formation. The young Turkish state had the mammoth task of recovering the economy 
which had been devastated after a long period of wars and economic decay. The 
economic policy of modern Turkey in the 1920s was officially drawn up in the Izmir 
Economic Congress, representing a broad spectrum of diverse class forces. However, 
the congress was to a large extent dominated by representatives of Turkish merchant 
capital and the big landowners of Anatolia (Günalp, 1985). The corollary of the 
congress was to build up and modernize the Turkish economy through the 
encouragement of capital accumulation by a ‘national bourgeoisie’. As the motto of the 
congress was liberalism, Turkey’s economy was to remain open, but development 
discourse was overtly nationalistic, which over time culminated in the further 
replacement of the compradors of minority merchant capital with those of Turkish 
origin.  
During this period, considerable economic growth occurred, largely based on the 
recovery and expansion of agricultural output, bringing with it a recuperation in 
Turkey’s trade relations with world markets (Keyder, 1981). However, the development 
policies of the 1920s changed neither the inherited class structure of society, nor the 
                                                          
45 Excluding financial placements, 62% of French investments in 1885 were in railways construction, 
16% in ports, and 18% in municipal services. Likewise, 86% of German investments in 1914 were in 
railways, 5% in ports and 8% in municipal services (Keyder, 1987, p.44) 
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country’s respective position within international divisions of labour (Berberoğlu, 
1982). In developmental terms, a greater change rather took place during the 1930s after 
the Great Depression. To counteract the adverse impacts of the world economic crisis, 
the Turkish state took defensive and interventionist measures towards the domestic 
economy, widely known as ‘étatism’ in Turkish historiography. Considering the dire 
effects of the depression, state-led industrialization and the ‘closing’ of the economy 
emerged as necessary policy options for the young Turkish state to follow (Günalp, 
1985).  
The statist policies of the 1930s did not really contradict the foundational mentality of 
capital accumulation in the early years of Turkish capitalism, as the main motive herein 
was not to substitute the private sector but to make it competent in every sense (Türkay, 
2009). Since there was no potential domestic or foreign industrial bourgeoisie to take 
charge, the state itself stepped in as an entrepreneur, producing basic consumer goods 
with the aim of saving foreign exchange in the face of shrinking export earnings. 
Following five-year development programmes, the state built up the required 
infrastructure and transportation facilities, and took the first steps into industrialization, 
which would later be the backbone of Turkish industry (Aydın, 2005). 
Despite the hectic endeavours of the young state, capitalist development in Turkey 
failed to fulfil the expectations of the Kemalist regime, i.e. to elevate Turkey to a fully-
fledged capitalist nation with a competitive edge in world divisions of labour. In fact, 
since the beginning, the Turkish state was in an unenviable position in having to please 
diverse and often competing demands of various classes, and redefining the relationship 
of the Turkish economy to the world economy (Aydın, 2005). As social and class 
structures in the countryside and urban centres remained more or less intact, this 
generated a set of contradictions to the nationalistic industrialization project of the 
Kemalist regime. The coalition of landlords-merchants-clergy (the Esraf), as one of the 
most decisive forces, posed a major challenge to the reconstruction of the Turkish 
economy along capitalist lines. The alliance of the state elites with dominant classes 
relied on a tacit compromise: they were willing to support the bureaucratic elite and its 
modernization policies as long as it did not threaten the existing social and economic 
structure.  
One major conflict between the state and the Esraf centred on the agricultural policies 
and land reform. Despite several attempts of the Kemalist state towards the land reform 
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in the 1930s and 1940s, socio-economic relations in the countryside remained largely 
untouched. The last decisive move against landlords in a five-month-long parliamentary 
debate led to a political split within the single-party government. Unlike the deviant 
cases of East Asia, implementation of land reforms were left half-finished; Turkey’s 
industrialization without comprehensive agrarian reform would present something 
closer to Latin American experiences.46 Likewise, the relationship between the state and 
the comprador bourgeoisie was also contradictory. Merchant capital was reluctant to 
transform into industrial capitalists (Berberoğlu, 1982). The class interests of the 
commercial bourgeoisie were shaped around the export of agricultural products and the 
import of manufacturing goods as the primary channel of integration into the world 
economy. Moreover, the increasing control of the state over foreign trade and its overt 
intention to incorporate the merchant class into the nationalistic industrialization project 
was decidedly antagonistic to the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie.  
Thus, the formation of modern Turkish capitalism brought neither an overall 
transformation of existing class configurations nor a fundamental change in its 
respective place within the world division of labour (Günalp, 1985). Turkey remained at 
the periphery of the capitalist world economy as a supplier of raw materials and 
agricultural products, with a relative increase in inward-oriented industrial capacity, 
particularly with regards to basic consumer goods. The ‘statist’ economic policy of the 
Kemalist regime also began losing momentum with the outbreak of the Second World 
War. The process of industrialization was interrupted due to the de facto 
implementation of a war economy which was eventually followed by the opening of the 
Turkish economy under the Democratic Party government, representing a cross-class 
coalition of alienated classes, particularly the landowners and commercial bourgeoisie. 
4.4 From Classic Dependence to Dependent Development: The Formation of the 
Triple Alliance in Turkey 
The post-war period represents a watershed in the historiography of Turkey’s capitalist 
development, witnessing a deepening of the economy’s integration into the emerging 
capitalist order under American hegemony. In the aftermath of the Second World War, 
                                                          
46 As East Asianist dependentistas (Lim, 1985; Gold, 1986) revealed, the disconnection of the state 
apparatus from the rural interests of landlords was a general characteristic of the deviant cases of Taiwan 
and South Korea. In this respect, Turkey’s industrialization experience without comprehensive agrarian 
reform presents something closer to the examples of Latin American. 
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the Kemalist state elites faced the dilemma of reconciling a nationalistic development 
programme with the pressures of the post-war world economic order (Aydın, 2005). 
The state was not in a strong position to pursue an organically integrated national 
economy owing to geopolitical concerns and the pressures of alienated social classes. 
As the world entered a process of post-war reconstruction, Turkey needed to take sides 
with the Western powers for geopolitical reasons, particularly given the allegedly 
expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union towards Turkey. Therefore, in the 
immediate post-war period, Turkey shifted to a multi-party system, and began to 
‘liberalise’ its economy, both strategies concurrently compatible with the interests of a 
broad coalition of alienated classes of landowners, merchant capital and clergy (Günalp, 
1985). 
In line with the emerging creeds of the new international economic order, Turkey 
gradually moved away from étatist, protectionist economic policies to a more liberal, 
open economy. Initial steps were taken in the last years of the rule of the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP). Taking sides with the West, Turkey became a member of the IMF 
and the World Bank, and was involved in the military and economic aid programmes of 
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, respectively. Due to its re-engagement with 
the West, Turkey fell in with the US and the World Bank, dismantling its étatist 
industrial structure on behalf of luring foreign capital and giving priority to agriculture 
to take advantage of its comparative advantage (Pamuk, 1981). This was nothing less 
than a restructuring of the Turkish economy in line with recommendations spelled out 
by the World Bank and the officers who led the American economic mission to Turkey 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s ( US State Department, 1948; Thornburg et al., 
1949; World Bank, 1951).47 
Shortly after the Democratic Party (DP) took office in 1950 as a cross-class coalition of 
alienated classes, the re-engagement of Turkey with the post-war economic order was 
further concretised through a series of developments. The economic policies of the DP 
during the 1950s were well-matched with the standpoints of the World Bank and the US 
experts. During the period in question, the étatist industrialization project was laid 
                                                          
47 Among others, the report of Thornburg et al. (1949) was a prominent example in which Turkey’s 
endeavours in industrialization were outspokenly denounced on behalf of agricultural-based development. 
It was recommended that Turkey should dismantle its steel and iron industries, and give up its forward-
looking ventures in aeroplane, power engine and machine industries since the development of industry 
should/would be gradually attained with increasing productivity in agriculture and inflow of the foreign 
capital. 
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aside, and special priority was given to agricultural development and modernisation, 
with the financial backing of foreign credits, primarily from the US (Aydın, 2005). A 
series of measures were also taken to stimulate the inflow of foreign capital and its 
operations within the country, which would lead to the formation of the triple alliance 
and to ascendance of dependent development in the Turkish national context.  
In this respect, the initial step had been taken immediately before the rule of DP with 
the introduction of precursor legislations on the FDI regime and the establishment of the 
Turkish Industrial Development Bank (TIDB) in 1950.48 The founding charter of the 
TIDB was prepared by the World Bank expert Harold Johnson. Its main motivation was 
to stimulate the formation of the Turkish industrial bourgeoisie in collaboration with 
international productive capital. This was spelled out in the charter’s main objectives as 
follows: 
(1) to found, support and build-up new private industrial enterprises;  
(2) to facilitate the mutual participation of Turkish and foreign capital in the 
establishment of new industries within the country; 
(3) to facilitate and develop all forms of ownership concordantly. (Sönmez, 1988, 
p.71)  
The foundation of the TIDB provided an institutional mechanism that facilitated the 
formation of local industrial bourgeoisies in collaboration with leading multinational 
corporations (Öztürk, 2010). The state also took a direct role in this initiative via the 
Central Bank of Turkey, purchasing all the bonds of the TIDB at the outset. Meanwhile, 
the World Bank also granted a preliminary $9 million loan (Sönmez, 1988, p.71). The 
main partners of the Bank were eighteen domestic and foreign banks, seven Turkish 
businessmen (almost all of whom would be the well-known industrialists of Turkey), 
three Turkish corporations, and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(Sönmez, 1998, p.71). The TIDB’s funds were predominantly supplied by the World 
Bank and Marshall Plan Counterpart Funds. In the meanwhile, various hectic efforts 
were also made to liberalise the FDI’s regime through a series of laws in 1950, 1951 
and 1954. Law No. 6224 in 1954 brought ultra-liberal provisions which remained in 
force for quite a long time.49 Under this law, all areas of the economy were opened to 
                                                          
48 Namely the by-law No. 13 and Law No. 5583. 
49 Law No. 6224 was then among the most liberal FDI laws in the world, considering that foreign capital 
enjoyed all the rights granted to local capital; see Karluk (1983). 
104 
 
 
 
foreign investment without restriction, and foreign corporations were given the right to 
repatriate their profits to their home countries or to reinvest them as and where they 
preferred (Dumludağ, 2002). 
Owing to these developments, certain segments of the local bourgeoisie, mostly 
comprador merchant capital and a small section of landowners, began to transform into 
industrial capitalists in collaboration with international productive capital. Thanks to the 
favourable loans of the TIDB and the liberal FDI regime, local bourgeoisies established 
several industrial enterprises, flirting with leading multinational corporations. For 
example, the TIDB credits granted to Nejat Ezacıbaşı gave birth to one of the biggest 
pharmaceutical factories in Turkey, which since then has been producing drugs with 
foreign partners under license agreements (Sönmez, 1988). Likewise, as one of the 
biggest conglomerates of today’s Turkey, the Sabancı Group, also established one of its 
largest industrial ventures, the BOSSA textile factory, with credits granted by the TIDB 
(Öztürk, 2010).50  
Following the measures taken under the FDI regime, the penetration of foreign capital 
in the Turkish economy and its collaboration with local bourgeoisies became evident 
from the mid-1950s. As Berberoğlu (1982) stated, this process brought the gradual 
integration of the newly emerging industrial capitalists into the “worldwide production 
process” and increasingly subjected them to the dictates of expanding monopolist 
multinationals. Leading multinationals such as General-Electric, Pfizer, AEG, Sandoz, 
Pirelli, Unilever, Mobil, BP and Shell invested in Turkey, mainly forming joint venture 
companies with local partners (Aydın, 2005). However, despite the liberal FDI regime, 
the annual inflow of FDI remained limited compared to other developing countries, 
particularly cases like Mexico and Brazil (See Appendix 11). Although the annual 
inflow of foreign investment was relatively limited compared to other developing 
countries, the role of foreign capital was decisive in the transformation of local 
bourgeoisies into industrial capitalists through a series of joint ventures, licensing and 
know-how agreements. In that vein, the nature of dependence was still evident, given 
the multifaceted and asymmetrical relationships between the emergent industrial 
bourgeoisie and the leading post-war multinationals.  
                                                          
50 To give more examples, the Koç Group’s Türk Demirdöküm in the heating sectors, Yaşar Group’s 
DYO in the paint industry, Kale Group’s Çanakkale Seramik in the ceramic industry, Çukurova Group’s 
Çukurova Sanayi İşletmeleri in textiles, Akkök Group’s Aksu Iplik in the yarn industry were all founded 
by TIDB credits. See Sonmez (1988) and Öztürk (2010). 
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On the domestic front, this transformation in the Turkish economy gained more clarity 
in the early 1960s and 1970s, when a process of import-substituting-industrialisation 
(ISI) was officially ratified as a choice of capital accumulation. Whereas the late 1940s 
and mid-1950s were a period of “opening up” of the economy, the rest of the 1950s 
were marked by high inflation rates, balance-of-payment crises and a gradual transition 
to ISI. The shift to the ISI model of accumulation was also compatible with the changes 
in the world capitalist context. As discussed earlier, starting from the mid-1950s, 
international productive capital begun to increasingly invest in peripheral social 
formations. Particularly this became more functional through ISI policies, which 
enabled the creation and realization of the value of commodity capital within the Third 
World. With respect to Turkey, such a shift in the pattern of accumulation mainly 
concretised through the movement of the emergent industrial bourgeoisie into domestic 
markets in collaboration with metropolitan capital, for whom this was a means of 
recapturing the potentials of domestic markets (Öztürk, 2010). The transition to ISI 
facilitated the transformation of the commercial bourgeoisie into industrial capitalists, 
through direct and indirect ways of co-operation with foreign capital.  
The initial steps in that direction had been taken in the late 1950s when the burden of 
high inflation combined with the constraints of over-valued exchange rates and a 
foreign exchange crisis led Turkey to conclude the first stand-by agreement with the 
IMF. This involved not only standard stabilizing measures such as devaluation of the 
Turkish lira, but also two important items that foreshadowed the shift in the pattern of 
accumulation. One was the installation of the basic mechanisms of the ISI model, 
putting restrictions on domestically produced (or yet to be produced) goods while 
enabling the importation of capital and intermediate goods. The other was the 
foundation of an organization for rationalizing ISI policies in Turkey (Günalp, 1985). 
However, the DP government was slow to realise these measures, and its policies, 
sticking to the earlier mode of accumulation, became increasingly problematic for the 
emergent industrial bourgeoisie. Moreover, the late 1950s was marked by increasing 
resentments on the part of urban intellectuals and students, due to the DP’s overtly 
repressive measures and anti-secular policies (Oğuz, 2008). Therefore, with the support 
of the emergent industrial bourgeoisie and urban intellectuals, on May 27, 1960 a 
military coup was staged against the DP government, which institutionalized the new 
pattern of accumulation, and rapidly handed rule over to an elected parliament in 1961.  
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The early 1960s and late 1970s were a period of ISI-based capital accumulation during 
which Turkish industrial capitalism was rapidly consolidated under the framework of 
dependent development. Emergent industrial capitalists found common ground with 
international productive capital around the matter of capital accumulation behind the 
protectionist barriers erected by the state (Eralp, 1981). As a complementary partner of 
the alliance, the Turkish state provided not only the institutional mechanism for this 
pattern of accumulation, but was actively involved in the process, providing cheap 
intermediate products for the flourishing private industry, and entering partnerships with 
both domestic and foreign capital (Sönmez, 1988; Öztürk, 2010). In this sense, the 
constituents of ISI-based accumulation process were primarily composed of the 
emerging big industrial capitalists, evolved from the former commercial bourgeoisie, 
the internationalizing productive capital of the metropolitan economies, and the state 
which ensured the economic and institutional framework for this process (Ercan, 
2002a). The nature of the relationship between these constituent forces signified the 
formation of the triple alliance, which gave way to the full blossoming of dependent 
development up to the late 1970s. 
During this period, industrial capitalism in Turkey rapidly developed, representing a 
typical feature of the accumulation process under dependent development. As 
experienced in the cases of Latin America, this started with primary phase of the 
“horizontal ISI”, which focused on local production of consumer nondurables and the 
local assembly of consumer durables. This was superseded by “vertical ISI”, during 
which progressive but partial measures were taken to internalize all phases of the 
production of consumer goods and develop backwards in the direction of intermediate 
products and capital goods. In the 1962-1977 period, while GDP grew at average annual 
rates exceeding 7%, growth rates in Turkish manufacturing industry averaged over 10% 
per year, (Pamuk, 1981). In line with relatively high rates of industrial growth, the 
sectoral composition of the economy also experienced further transformation. While the 
share of the agricultural sector of GDP saw a decline from 37.5% to 23.1% between the 
years 1960-1978, it was partially offset by a considerable rise in the shares of 
manufacturing sectors from 15.7% to 21.7% in the same period (Turkstat, 2016).  
As the industrialization effort was predominantly inward-oriented, the source of growth 
in the Turkish manufacturing sector was heavily based on the domestic demand 
(Celasun, 1994). Put another way, the manufacturing sector did not generate the foreign 
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exchange that it consumed. In fact, the share of consumer goods in the total import bill 
dramatically declined to 5% by the beginning of the 1970s (Günalp, 1985). Moreover, 
the average share of manufacturing sector in total export earnings rose from 16.7% in 
1963-1967 period to 34.2% in 1973-1977 period (Ekodialog, 2014). However, foreign 
exchange earnings were to a greater extent based on the traditional export structure, and 
manufacturing export earnings were heavily concentrated in light industries such as 
food processing and textiles. This is why such a pattern of industrialization was only 
made possible by ballooning foreign debt up to the late 1970s (Aydın, 2005). 
Despite the paradoxical nature of the industrial growth, the local industrial bourgeoisie 
achieved capital adequacy to a certain extent, and became increasingly influential within 
the class configuration of society. They gradually enhanced their control over 
commercial- and money-capital, particularly through establishing their own banks and 
restructuring themselves as finance capital on a national scale (Öztürk, 2010). 
Analogous to the grupos economicos in Latin American, this was concretised through 
the formation of Turkish conglomerates known as holding companies. With the 
acceleration of foreign penetration in the economy during this period, these holding 
companies deepened their relations with American, European and Japanese partners, 
mainly in the form of joint ventures and licence agreements (Öztürk, 2010; Sönmez, 
1988). For example, Koç Holding, the biggest conglomerate in the Turkish economy, 
made joint ventures with Ford and Fiat in the automotive sector; with Siemens in 
consumer electronics; and with American Express in the banking sector. Another big 
conglomerate, Sabancı Holding, entered partnership with several multinational 
corporations, such as Uniroyal, Shell, Mitsubishi, DuPont, Philips and Goodyear 
(Sönmez, 1988). Backing up the multifold relationships between holding companies and 
foreign capital, the Turkish state also took part in this process, providing cheap inputs 
for the flourishing holding-led industries and having shares in newly established joint 
ventures (Sönmez, 1988). 
Hence, it is clear that the multifold relationship between foreign capital, local 
bourgeoisies and the state marked the blossoming of the triple alliance in Turkey. As the 
penetration of foreign capital accelerated through joint ventures with local bourgeoisies 
and state enterprises, certain sections of the traditional comprador bourgeoisie gradually 
transformed into dependent industrialists. As major nexus of such an economic 
transformation, the Turkish state not only set the ground for the mutually accepted 
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pattern of accumulation in the ISI regime, but also turned into a supportive partner of 
both the emergent dependent industrialists and internationalizing productive capital.  
Despite the uneasy and conflictual nature of these relations, all partners of the triple 
alliance found common ground around the pattern of capital accumulation under the 
protective and inward-looking strategies of the ISI model. However, by the very nature 
of the triple alliance, the state lacked the class-relational and institutional capacity to 
renegotiate and redefine the terms of domestic capital accumulation in favour of the 
long-term interests of the Turkish economy. Unlike the cases of East Asia, the class 
configuration in Turkey did not allow the state to pursue a coherent development policy 
with the intention of managing the state of dependency when the matter of local 
accumulation was at stake.  
Since the beginning of the ISI period, the Turkish state had been in the unpleasant 
position of reconciling the diverse interests of classes with the long-term project of ISI-
based industrialization. In this respect, the first contradiction arose when the newly 
established State Planning Organization devised a plan for industrial expansion inspired 
by the Japanese and French examples of MITI and commissariat, respectively (Milor, 
1989). In technocratic terms, the first planners were enthusiastic to launch a 
development-oriented industrialization programme along capitalist lines. British 
economist Nicholas Kaldor was invited to Turkey to report on Turkey’s development 
strategy. Based on Kaldor’s report, the first planners prescribed a comprehensive reform 
package which included the rationalization of State Economic Enterprises, agricultural 
reforms and the mobilization of domestic financing sources by rising taxes in the 
agricultural sector, which remained almost untaxed (Akçay, 2007). This reform package 
of the first planners led to a crisis in the political scene, since almost 158 deputies in the 
parliament were big land-owners who fiercely opposed land reforms, taxation on 
agriculture and the increasing autonomy of the planning organ. Since the planners could 
not put their reform package into practice they opted to collectively resign, leaving the 
ground open for highly politicized planning practice (Akçay, 2007, p.88). 
Beyond doubt, this would not mean the end of either planning or industrialization in 
Turkey as industrialization took place based on five-year development plans throughout 
the whole period. However, due to the configuration of class forces, the Turkish state, 
since the early 1960s, lacked the institutional capacity to overcome the diverse 
collective actions dilemmas that are inherent in the process of late capitalist 
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development (Waldner, 1999).51 As long-term industrialization policies were sacrificed 
to please various class interests, the ISI-based industrialization policies brought 
structural change, industrial diversification to a certain extent, but not upgrading, 
increasing the returns to scale and moving up along the product cycle. Put it another 
way, this meant the industrialization of Turkish economy at the expense of exacerbating 
the state of its dependency, particularly in technological and financial terms.  
As the state refrained from threatening the existing order, the five-year development 
plans mainly aimed to consolidate and expand domestic markets through populist-
developmentalist policies (see Günalp, 1985; Aydın, 2005). In its populist sense, 
developmentalism in Turkey not only provided support for certain classes, but also 
ensured the penetration of international productive capital, given rapidly expanding 
domestic markets, through the inefficient use of state resources. At first glance, the ISI-
based accumulation strategies seemingly did not bring about inter- or intra-class 
conflicts, as they relied on the populist-developmentalist set of class alliances, pleasing 
the common interests of the diverse sections of Turkish society. However, such a 
pattern of accumulation contained numerous economic and social contradictions that 
would become increasingly evident over an extended period. 
These contradictions essentially manifested themselves in two forms: one related to 
overcoming domestic market limitations and the others regarding the foreign exchange 
crisis. The fact that emergent industries predominantly served the domestic market 
meant industrial growth without a market crisis could be sustained by unthrifty populist 
policies, which eventually led to rent-seeking struggles between diverse classes (Aydın, 
2005). Despite the growing importance of industrial capitalists within the class 
configuration, the industrial bourgeoisie could not truly establish its hegemony over 
commercial and agricultural capital (Pamuk, 1981). Since, they rather relied on a broad 
alliance with other fractions of capital, the underlying segmentation among them 
eventually revealed itself as rent-seeking struggle aiming to increase their respective 
shares, captured by the state.  
                                                          
51 For an analysis of collective action problems in Turkey in the ISI period and 1980s see Waldner’s 
(1999) institutional perspective to analyse the cross-regional variance in economic development by 
centring on levels of elite conflict and state formation. As mentioned in the theory chapter, this study 
selectively adopts the notions of Gerschenkronian and Kaldorian collective action problems from the 
works of Waldner (1999), Doner, (2009) and Schwartz, 2010, but brings them into the class-relational 
analyses of developmental state and its further implications with respect to dependency relations.  
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This became particularly evident in agricultural pricing policy, and the distribution of 
bank credits and import quotas between different fractions of private capital. Although 
the long-term objective was to transfer resources from agriculture to industry, short term 
political considerations resulted in low taxation of agriculture and high floor pricing for 
certain crops whose operation was unproductively financed by the Central Bank 
(Waldner, 1999). Beside this, the rent-seeking struggles also centred around the 
distribution of bank credits and import quotas between the holding-led big industrial 
capitalists and the small- and medium-scale capital groups of Anatolian towns (Oğuz, 
2008). The conflict between these capital groups was eventually reflected in the 
political scene with the reorganization of big industrial groups under the umbrella of the 
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD).52 As a corollary of the cleavage 
of interests between the different factions of capital, political parties proliferated in the 
1960s and 1970s, being at each other’s throats for a better share of economic rents for 
their own supporters. Thus, the uneasy nature of the relationship between the state and 
the different fractions of rent-seeking capital led to paralysis on the side of state and 
constrained them from following long-reaching development policies to improve 
Turkey’s economic performance (Barkey, 1990).     
4.5 Crisis of Accumulation, Push for Economic Reforms and Transition to a New 
Form of Dependent Development 
No matter how far-reaching the populist accumulation regime of the 1960s and 1970s, 
making drastic changes in Turkish industry and transforming the economic structure 
concordantly, it could not avoid the limitations and contradictions of ISI strategies. The 
decades-long ISI model gradually lost momentum and entered a severe structural crisis 
towards the late 1970s. Looking into the very nature of the ISI policies in Turkey, a 
range of factors accounted for this. First, despite the move towards the production of 
more sophisticated industrial products, the local bourgeoisie had weak competitive 
power because they remained technologically and financially dependent upon 
                                                          
52 As the big industrial capital groups gained economic strength, they became underrepresented within the 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). Necmettin Erbakan, who spoke to 
the interests of small- and medium-scale capital groups as the majority, was elected chair of TOBB in 
1968.  However, the election was declared void by the leader of the Justice Party, as the representative of 
big capital groups. Erbakan founded a new political party named MNP (National Order Party) in 1970 
which stood for breaking ties with American and European capital, and advocated the support for the 
small and medium capital groups of Anatolia, with an islamic rhetoric oriented to the Middle East. Since 
they were underrepresented, the big holding-led industrial capitalists formed the TÜSİAD (the Turkish 
Industrialist and Businessmen Association) in 1971 to pursue their class interests under a new 
organizational structure. 
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international capital, and heavily relied on the pampering of the state in their favour 
(Pamuk, 1981). Once ISI took root, the domestic market was opened to the penetration 
of international productive capital to exploit the potentials of protected markets in 
collaboration with the local industrial bourgeoisie. Thus, by its nature, the ISI model in 
Turkey was not a ‘national’ phase of development, but the industrialization of the 
economy took place under the global rationality of international capital (Keyder, 1987).  
Therefore, to keep industrial production going, the economy was in need of the 
importation of capital, technology, and intermediate and capital goods. In practice, ISI 
policies in Turkey did not truly break the state of dependency in these repects. Rather, 
the ISI model was far from well-devised, as it lacked the respective class-relational and 
institutional basis to build backward linkages, to increase factor productivity and to 
achieve incremental gains through learning-by-doing, shop-floor practices and 
technological assimilation. In this sense, the Turkish industrial bourgeoisie never 
achieved the status of what Schwartz (1989) called a “national” bourgeoisie that would 
gradually secure control over the entire accumulation process and achieve a degree of 
productivity and competitiveness in international terms (see the theory chapter). Thus, 
given its low level of productivity and competitiveness, Turkish industry was oriented 
towards production of non-durable and durable goods, largely serving domestic markets 
in collaboration with foreign capital. 
Although the decades-long accumulation model enabled a rapid process of 
industrialisation and economic growth, it contained structural limitations, particularly 
with respect to domestic market constraints and foreign exchange shortages. Given the 
fact that the industrial sector largely served the internal market, it could to a certain 
extent be expanded by redistributionist policies and domestic demand (Günalp, 1985). 
Besides, as industrial production was mainly assembly-based and structurally deprived 
of entering international markets, it did not produce the foreign exchange that it 
consumed (Ercan, 2002b, 2006). Thus the process of industrialisation, that requires the 
expansion of foreign exchange expenditure, was necessarily sustained with balance-of-
payment difficulties and growing foreign debt.   
The first signs of these limitations surfaced in the early 1970s, when Turkey signed a 
new austerity agreement with the IMF, in the face of a growing balance-of-payment 
crisis and difficulties meeting debt obligations. The agreement involved standard 
stabilisation and devaluation precautions, as well as a range of export promotions to the 
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industry sector. Besides, in the search to overcome non-competitive industrial 
production, wages that had enjoyed a continuous rise under the decade-long populist 
development policies suffered a decline in relative terms (Berberoğlu, 1982). Following 
a military memorandum, the rule of the care-taker government of 1971-1973 sought to 
implement these measures to find a way out of the emergent foreign exchange crisis. 
Nevertheless, the measures of the early 1970s remained abortive, as they did not bring 
forth an overall restructuring of capital accumulation process along export-promotion 
lines.  
Initially, these temporal measures were relatively successful in stepping up foreign 
exchange earnings. They promoted industrial exports to certain extent, particularly in 
agriculture-based industries and textiles. Furthermore, the abandonment of over-valued 
exchange rates provided temporary relief since it attracted huge amounts of remittances 
from Turkish workers abroad (Günalp, 1985). However, towards the end of the 1970s, 
the contradictions of the ISI-based accumulation model entered a full-scale crisis, in the 
form of high inflation, balance-of-payment difficulties and decline in capacity 
utilisation (Keyder, 1987, Ercan, 2002a). The overall economic and political conditions 
in Turkey enmeshed in a state ungovernability. Owing to the combined effects of both 
the world-wide crises of the mid-1970s, triggered by the skyrocketing oil prices, and the 
internal contradictions of the ISI strategy, Turkey found itself in a desperate liquidity 
crunch and a classic debt crisis. To a lesser but still severe degree compared to the 
crises-ridden countries of Latin America, the indebtedness and the sorry state of the 
economy in the late 1970s once again made Turkey in need of the backup of the IMF 
and the World Bank. The economic crisis also extended into the political and social 
spheres, with the rise of country-wide tensions in the form of severe political 
polarization and civil strife, particularly thanks to the heightened militancy of the 
labouring classes and the revolutionary left (Önder, 1998). 
Thus, at the turn of decade, it became evident that the ISI-based accumulation regime 
was no longer sustainable and needed to be replaced.  In this sense, the periodic 
macroeconomic and financial crises of the 1970s had played a role in dissolving the 
broad-based domestic coalition of the ISI era that to a certain extent brought the 
labouring classes around to the decades-long industrialization project, mainly geared 
towards domestic markets (see Günalp, 1985; Önder, 1998). When it came to the late 
1970s, a new domestic coalition and a triple alliance among local industrial bourgeoisie, 
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global capital and state bureaucracy began to form around an export-oriented model of 
accumulation in line with the emergent dynamics of the global economy. On that note, 
once again, a combination of external and domestic factors accounted for this shift in 
the accumulation regime. 
As discussed earlier, the late 1970s and early 1980s marked the beginning of a new era 
in the world economy. Thanks to the full-blown internationalisation of all forms of 
capital, the current contours of the international division of labour started to take shape 
in a genuinely global manner, with considerable effects on the global periphery. The 
former mode of international divisions of labour that had been mainly shaped along 
well-protected national markets, was gradually replaced with a less regulated and more 
integrated one, due to which the production and realization of value began to take place 
on a truly global scale. In line with the emerging dynamics of new division of labour, 
international financial institutions (IFIs) like the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD 
collectively began to denounce ISI-based strategies and placed growing emphasis on 
export-oriented industrialization policies. In conjunction with these emerging global 
dynamics, a number of former peripheral countries (like Turkey) were incorporated into 
the global economy as export-led manufacturing hubs, and became increasingly 
specialized in different branches of manufacturing and in different stages of production, 
given their economic and institutional capacities. 
All these external dynamics and actors played a crucial role in accounting for the policy 
shift in Turkey in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but they are not sufficient to address 
such a major change in the accumulation regime per se. On the domestic front, external 
factors also intersected with the emergence of supportive domestic coalitions and class 
dynamics which rendered the policy shift possible. In fact, the change in economic 
policy was not brought about ‘outside-in’, as the direct result of imposition of 
international institutions and TNCs, but domestically demanded by local bourgeoisies, 
particularly by holding-led big capital groups (Ercan, 2002b, 2006). Towards the late 
1970s, industrial bourgeoisie had achieved a certain degree of control over domestic 
markets and had consumed the potentials of the domestic accumulation process 
(Günalp, 1985). As the inward-oriented accumulation process reached a certain level 
and domestic markets saturated, especially for consumer durables, re-integration with 
global markets through an export-oriented model of accumulation became a favoured 
policy option for the capital bloc, led by big business groups (Oğuz, 2008). 
114 
 
 
 
The reform demands of big capital groups particularly found expression in TÜSİAD’s 
long campaign to change economic policy through a series of talks, reports and public 
statements (see Önder, 1998; Şahin, 2009). Throughout the period in question, 
TÜSİAD, as the interest organization of big capital groups, pushed for the adaptation of 
policies encouraging industrial exports, opening the economy to world markets and 
removing barriers to private initiatives (Yalman, 1997). From the viewpoint of the 
capital bloc, spearheaded by TÜSİAD, the overall shift of economic policy towards an 
open and export-oriented model was believed to solve the long-standing structural crisis 
of the economy and restore the capital accumulation process in Turkey. TÜSİAD’s 
policy demands, to a considerable extent, fell in line with the policy prescriptions of the 
IMF and the World Bank. TÜSİAD’s authorities held a series of meetings with senior 
officials of the IMF, the World Bank, the Federal Reserve, Carter administration and 
top executives of commercial banks (Oğuz, 2008).  
For TÜSİAD, to revitalise the overall economy, Turkey would have to liberalise the 
trade regime, encourage industrial exports, particularly in labour-intensive sectors, curb 
domestic demand, decrease agricultural subsidies, follow a strategy of austerity and 
adopt restrictive measures against the labouring classes as a policy of first resort, to 
increase the productivity and competitiveness of domestic industry (Oğuz, 2008).  
Restructuring the Turkish economy along these lines would restore the credibility of 
Turkey in the eyes of foreign investors, and secure new sources of capital and 
investment opportunities with TNCs (Önder, 1998). Thus, on the domestic front, a new 
alliance had been formed between Turkish big capital groups and international financial 
centres, around the neoliberal creeds of the global economy.  
In political-economic terms, this meant the break-up of the broad-based coalition behind 
the ISI regime and its gradual replacement with an export-oriented one. Along with 
global capital, the outward-oriented domestic bourgeoisie, mainly spearheaded by big 
business groups, were the key in the ensuing policy coalition and the carriers of the 
transition to the new accumulation regime. Around the same time, they also found a 
certain degree of political backing on the state level, particularly among neoliberally-
minded segments of the bureaucracy (Şenalp, 2012). The recurrent balance of payment 
difficulties and the inability of Turkey to pay its foreign debts put strong pressure on the 
government to comply with the IMF-prescribed reform programme that would launch 
the economy on a new course towards an export-oriented model of growth (Bekmen, 
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2014). Thus, after coming to power in the late 1970s, the centre-right minority 
government of the Justice Party prepared a comprehensive reform package under the 
guidance of Undersecretary, Turgut Özal, commonly known as the January 24 
Decisions.  
Although the immediate intention of the reform package included quintessential 
stabilization measures, it was more than this, as it aimed to install a free market 
economy and an accumulation strategy, which would be later seen as a milestone in the 
transition of the Turkish economy to neo-liberalism (Aydın, 2005). The reform efforts 
were received with favour both by holding-led big business groups and international 
centres of capital. Turkey signed a four-year standby agreement with the IMF and 
agreed to receive new structural adjustment loans from the World Bank. However, 
despite the government’s willingness for reform, the implementation of the reform 
programme was by no means clear, since the new growth strategy did not initially enjoy 
consensus either in society or in the state apparatus itself.  
On the part of society, there was strong opposition, centred on the labouring classes and 
trade unions (Önder, 1998; Bekmen, 2014).  Particularly, the second half of the 1970s 
was a period when underrepresented demands of labouring classes began to turn into 
political conflicts and radicalisation (Günalp, 1985). There was also a rift within the 
business community with respect to the outward-oriented model of growth, which was 
particularly pronounced among the inward-looking industrial bourgeoisie (Öztürk, 
2010). In political terms, although it was incapable of formulating a viable alternative, a 
significant section of parliament, particularly the left-wing opposition, frustrated the 
implementation of the reform programme (Önder, 1998). Moreover, the minority 
government itself was constrained by Erbakan’s National Salvation Party, which 
occasionally threatened to withdraw its support from the government. Given all these 
factors, the social and political basis for the implementation and enforcement of the new 
economic policy was to a considerable extent lacking, leading to a crisis of political 
representation on the part of reform-demanding segments of society. 
It was at this juncture of representation crisis and power vacuum that the military 
overthrew the civilian regime and took power on September 12, 1980, in order to 
‘defeat terrorism’ and restore the social and political stability which had been in a phase 
of decay. In fact, the prime objective of the coup d’état was not to promote the new 
economic policies, but the military regime in fact secured the political-institutional 
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conditions for the transition to an export-oriented form of accumulation. Soon after, the 
military junta declared its adherence to the IMF-prescribed reform programme and the 
economic management was given to a team of neoliberal technocrats, headed by Turgut 
Özal, who had been the main architect of the January 24 Decisions (Günalp, 1985). 
Around the same time, a series of repressive measures such as suppression of labour 
movements, closing of trade unions and all political parties, and dismantling of channels 
of representation were adopted, cracking down on potential opposition to the new 
course of action in the economy (Aydın, 2005). This, in a sense, meant that the military 
rule was not in fact isolated from the undergoing class relations and political struggles. 
By following anti-labour and pro-capital measures, the military rule set itself to reframe 
state-society relations and restructure the socio-political context of the country in 
accordance with the mentality of the new accumulation model. As will be discussed in 
the following chapter, the military coup, in other words, set the stage for the emergence 
of a new form of dependent development which would bring with it the overall 
restructuring of the accumulation regime, as well as underlying class relations in 
Turkey. 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has traced and examined the historical origins and development of 
dependency relations in Turkey from the earlier years of the Turkish Republic to the late 
1970s. In so doing, it has inquired about the ways in which the incorporation of the 
Turkish economy into the world capitalist system, through a shifting configuration of 
class and state-society complexes, created uneven and asymmetrically dependent forms 
of development. On that note, the chapter has shown that standing at the edge of 
international divisions of labour, the late Ottoman Empire and the young Turkish 
Republic, at the outset, relied on the export of primary products in exchange for 
manufactured ones from the core. In the long historiography of Turkish capitalism, this 
period coincided with the classic model of dependency, in which dependency relations 
were mainly confined to the realm of trade. Despite the measures taken to bolster 
industrialisation and create a modern bourgeois society, the Kemalist Revolution did not 
bring overall change either in the inherited class structure of socety or in the position of 
Turkey within international divisions of labour.  
Particularly, along with the new developments in the post-war era and the 
internationalisation of productive capital across the world, Turkey underwent a far-
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reaching transformation in economic and social terms, during which certain segments of 
commercial capital gradually transformed into industrial bourgeoisie, in collaboration 
with international productive capital. This period was marked by the formation of the 
triple alliance in Turkish national context and the ascendance of a model of dependent 
development. As discussed throughout the chapter, under protective and inward-looking 
growth strategies, Turkey experienced an accelerated process of accumulation and 
industrialisation, constituting the backbone of industrial structure for the recent period. 
However, given underlying inter- and intra-class conflicts and the uneasy nature of 
state-society relations, Turkey, since these earlier periods, lacked the respective class-
relational and institutional capacities to overcome the contradictions of late capitalist 
development, and thus to redefine and reverse the terms of dependency in favour of its 
long-term interests. Consequently, when the industrial bourgeoisie, along with foreign 
capital, reached a certain degree of maturity and consumed the potentials of inward-
oriented growth in the late 1970s, Turkey headed towards a new form of dependent 
development, which is to be thoroughly discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Changing Contours of the Triple Alliance and the Rise of a New Form 
of Dependent Development: Global Capital, Social Classes and State in 
post-1980 Turkey 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, towards the late 1970s, it had become more 
evident that the decades-long inward-oriented model of accumulation was no longer 
sustainable. Thus, when it came to the early 1980s, a new domestic coalition and a triple 
alliance had already formed around the recently emerging strategy of export-oriented 
accumulation. In that sense, the early 1980s ushered a new era in the long 
historiography of Turkish political economy with respect to the pattern of capital 
accumulation and mode of integration with the capitalist world economy, and the 
configuration of class forces and dynamics of dependency relations. Therefore, 
furthering our country-level analysis, this complementary chapter scrutinises how such 
a multifaceted transformation has given rise to emergence and consolidation of a new 
form of dependent development from the early 1980s to the present. 
To that end, this chapter’s first section critically examines how the shift to export-led 
model of accumulation altered the configuration of class forces and state–society 
relations in post-1980 Turkey, particularly focusing on far-reaching transformation of 
society and state structure in Turkey with the launch and institutionalisation of the first 
wave of structural reforms during the 1980s. On that note, the section explores how 
long-standing inter- and intra-class cleavages and the uneasy nature of state–society 
relations were reproduced under the export-led accumulation model, and how the 
reform-demanding industrialists of the ISI era started to be incorporated into the dense 
network of global trade and production on asymmetrical and dependent terms, leading 
to the slowing down of the export-led accumulation process and financialization of the 
economy in the 1990s. Particularly looking into the lost decade of 1990s, the second 
section explores further transformation of economy and state–society relations in 
Turkey along with the liberalisation of financial markets which simultaneously provided 
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a temporal relief in terms of the accumulation process and intensified the underlying 
intra-class cleavages both in institutional and political terms.   
As the potential of export-oriented-cum-financial-led accumulation had been exhausted, 
the first generation reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were later followed by a new wave 
of structural and institutional reforms post-2001, marked by increasing competitiveness 
and productive capacity of the economy based on a deepened form of 
internationalisation and collaboration with the global capital. The chapter’s third section 
focuses on this recent phase, which institutionally crystallised the captive nature of the 
Turkish triple alliance and consolidated the new form of dependent development that 
outcropped in its preliminary form in the 1980s. To that end, the section discusses and 
enquires about the ways in which Turkish economy and state structure has been 
increasingly incorporated into global capitalism’s governing mentality through a series 
of legal and institutional arrangements in economic governance and state structure.  
Furthering our country-level discussion, the last section critically examines the 
increasing productivity and competitiveness under the reign of global capital and 
explores different shades of dependent development during the period in question. The 
section propounds that in conformity with Latin America’s paradigmatic cases, the 
Turkish economy and manufacturing industry have gone through a far-reaching 
transformation when total export earnings and export-led manufacturing has 
considerably increased, accompanied by far-flung convergence in the industrialisation 
level as well as manufacturing output diversification in terms of sectoral and 
technological composition. However, despite the recent rise of the economy, the section 
further argues that given the inter- and intra-state cleavages and the state–society 
relations, Turkey’s capitalist development has remained stuck in structural limitations, 
economic and social contradictions and developmental challenges, which manifest as 
corollaries of a new form of dependent development. 
5.2 Reconfiguration of State–Society Relations and Collective Action Dilemmas in 
the First Phase of Structural Reforms (1980-1989) 
Starting with the coup, the 1980s represents a watershed moment in Turkey’s 
integration into the globalizing world economy, marked by increasing export-led 
manufacturing and export earnings in the foreign trade (Taymaz and Voyvoda, 2012). 
Like its Latin America counterparts, Turkey implemented a drastic reform package 
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aimed at the export promotion, foreign trade liberalization and institutionalisation of 
market-based economy. Like Mexico’s tecnoburócratas, Chile’s Chicago boys or 
Domingo Cavallo’s technocratic elites in Argentina, Turgut Özal, Mother Land Party’s 
newly elected PM and a former World Bank employee, formed a reform-friendly 
managerial cadre to follow an export-oriented growth strategy based on economic-cum-
political repression of labouring classes (Yalman, 1997). Under the decade-long reform 
programme, a series of export promotions, such as tax rebates, export credits, and 
preferential loans were provided, and cost-reducing and demand-restrained policies, 
such as wage repression and devaluation, were adopted to promote export-oriented 
manufacturing (Aydin, 2005). 
As a result of these changes in economy policy, Turkey went through a far-reaching 
transformation, whereas the overall export earnings almost quintupled between 1980 
and 1990, from 2.9 billion dollars to 12.9 billion dollars; manufacturing’s share in 
exports increased from 36% to 80% (Turkstat, 2015). Thus, with the rise in export 
manufacturing, the ISI era’s reform-demanding dependent industrialists started to be 
gradually incorporated into global accumulation circuits though a dense network of 
trade and production relations (Önder, 1998). In a sense, the transition to export-
oriented model of accumulation gradually dissolved the ISI era’s mostly domestic-
oriented industrial structure and value relations, replacing it with one more compatible 
with the global economy’s emerging dynamics.  
Such a transformation in the economic sphere was simultaneously accompanied by 
changes in class dynamics and state structure in post-1980 Turkey. With respect to class 
relations, the shift to the EOI model of accumulation shifted the balance of class power 
in favour of globally-oriented segments of domestic bourgeoisie, marginalizing the 
interests of labouring classes, the mass population and the nationally-oriented 
bourgeoisie (Özekin, 2014). Having cross-border strategic alliances with TNCs, the 
reform-demanding big industrial bourgeoisie – their class interests institutionally 
represented by TÜSİAD – largely benefited from the new model of accumulation 
(Yalman, 1997). Along with them, Anatolian-based business classes, who had mostly 
shied away from industrial endeavours, also gained a stronger foothold in industrial 
terms (Buğra, 1994). On the other hand, the export-led growth model narrowed down 
the ISI era’s broad-based class coalition and so curtailed the class power of organised 
labour and agricultural classes. To increase export capacity, domestic demand was 
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tightened by strict wage and agricultural prices policy. Thus, the gains made in wages 
and agricultural incomes during the pre-1980 period were gradually eroded (Aydin, 
2005). In this regard, the new accumulation model’s major distributional burden fell on 
the salaried and wage-earners. Starting from 1980, the export-led growth policy 
alienated the working classes’ interests and smashed organised labour’s class power 
(Boratav et.al, 2001). 
Under class dynamics’ changing context, the role and function of the state and its 
relation to classes were also restructured. As one of the major nexus of economic 
transformation, the state set the political and institutional context to secure the rights of 
capital and reorient the society towards an export-led accumulation model. As alluded 
earlier, this came from socio-political and institutional changes marked by the 
ascendance of neoliberal authoritarian statism (Oğuz, 2008; Özekin, 2014). During this 
period, the political and economic spheres were narrowed down on behalf of certain 
segments of the society. While the representative channels of mass population were 
fiercely cut off, the globally-oriented capitalist classes’ interests remained and were 
even enhanced institutionally. Following the 1980 coup d’état, 600,000 people were 
taken into custody, 200,000 were prosecuted and almost all democratic means for the 
representation of social classes were curtailed with the shutdown of 23,657 associations 
(Bekmen, 2014, p. 51). However, TÜSİAD, the globally-oriented capital groups’ class 
organisation, remained untouched and became increasingly operative during the reform 
process. Besides, interests of global capital started to be institutionally represented with 
the establishment of the Foreign Capital Association (YASED).53 In this sense, the post-
1980 reform process, which was itself a product of class politics, aspired to build a 
“depoliticized society” and a “strong state” that marginalized the interests of wider 
society at the expense of the alliance of global capital, local bourgeoisie and the state 
around the new growth strategy.  
In line with this direction, the Turkish state concomitantly restructured itself in order to 
accommodate the new dynamics of class configuration and economic 
internationalization into its organizational structure and internal hierarchy. This was 
materialized through institutional arrangements which brought along an increasingly 
                                                          
53Starting from mid-1980s, YASED became an influential capital organisation which directly participated 
in restructuring Turkey’s economy and state. YASED launched discussions and issued policy 
recommendations for economic governance. It compared notes with the state authorities, including the 
PM, and became a member of The Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) in 1987. 
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centralized and concentrated economic governance designed to secure the implantation 
of export-led growth policies (see inter alia, Önder, 1998; Oğuz, 2008; Bekmen, 2014). 
In a sense, the state mediated and internalized class interests of the global capital and 
the local bourgeoisie’s globally-oriented segments through a series of institutional 
arrangements (Özekin, 2014). To that end, the institutional structure of the state, 
installed along the lines of the interventionist and inwardly-oriented growth model of 
the 1960s and 70s was dissolved or relegated to an uninfluential position (Güzelsarı, 
2007). The developmental role of traditional institutions such as the State Planning 
Organization and the Ministry of Finance was almost reduced to economic forecasting 
and revenue collection respectively, whereas economic governance was handed over to 
outwardly-oriented and highly-centralized institutions, directly attached to the PM’s 
office (Önder, 1998). 
Directly attached to the prime ministry, two new institutions – the ‘Coordination Board’ 
and the ‘Money and Credit Board’ – were established in the early 1980s for policy areas 
of foreign trade and monetary policy respectively. These two institutions functioned as 
special economic apparatuses, endowed with the rights of coordination, consultation 
and even decision-making on economic internationalization issues (Oğuz, 2008). 
Likewise, the formerly held responsibilities of the Ministries of Finance, Trade and 
Industrialization, and State Planning Organization were concentrated in the hands of a 
newly-established Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade (Oğuz, 2008). Again, 
directly attached to the prime ministry, the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign 
Trade functioned as another specialised economic apparatus that sidelined and 
monopolised the aforesaid institutions’ traditional roles for the sake of the economy’s 
global integration. In short, these specialised structures’ centralisation of economic 
governance excluded the former bureaucracies and institutions from economic decision-
making and restructured the executive branch’s internal hierarchy to smoothen 
economic internationalisation (Özekin, 2014). Besides, a set of legal arrangements also 
strengthened the executive branch’s overall position vis-à-vis legislative organ. In 
constitutional terms, the Council of Ministers was empowered to issue law decrees 
under certain conditions. Mostly relying on such constitutional empowerment post-1980 
governments were able to bypass the parliamentary process and the popular pressure 
with regard to the reform process’ critical legislation (Önder, 1998). In fiscal terms, they 
also enjoyed a certain degree of financial independence in implementing the reforms as 
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they were entitled to extra-budgetary funds, freed from the legislative branch’s approval 
(Güzelsarı, 2007). 
As such, the state’s function and internal hierarchy were overall restructured in line with 
the reconfiguration of class forces and state–society relations in the 1980s. In a sense, 
this can be seen as internationalization of the state structure in accordance with the 
economy’s and so the class structure’s re-articulation into global capitalism (Özekin, 
2014). Such an overall change relied on mediation and securing of rights of both global 
capital and globally-oriented segments of domestic bourgeoisie. On that note, the 
centralization of economic governance was believed to insulate the reform process and 
economic decision-making from the oppositions of a wider society and class forces’ 
clashing interests. Thus, the so-called policy insulation would ideally secure export-led 
growth and promote the export-oriented capitalist classes’ competitiveness through a 
wide range of incentives, such as tax rebates, low-interest credits, and priority in 
imported inputs procurement (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2004). 
In this sense, one of state restructuring’s expected outcomes was an institutionally 
strong and insulated state structure and thus an end to long-standing distributive 
conflicts, rent-seeking mentality and collective action problems in the economy. 
Nevertheless, the restructuring of Turkish economy and state structure was itself a class 
strategy par excellence that contained inter- and intra-class cleavages. On that note, the 
export-led accumulation policies lacked either a strategic perspective or an effective 
class-based institutional setting, given the state–society relations’ contradictory nature. 
In capitalist developmental terms, the export-led growth strategies were implemented 
through a weak institutional framework suffering from a coherent reform alliance, 
particularly capitalist classes. As discussed earlier, the Istanbul-based and holding-led 
first generation industrial bourgeoisie constituted the principle class actor in the post-
1980 economic setting (Ercan, 2002a; Oğuz, 2008; Öztürk, 2010). However, although 
gaining precedence as the export-oriented growth strategies’ main beneficiaries, they 
never became a genuinely hegemonic class fraction as they shared the transformative 
project with global capital and the growing industrial bourgeoisie of the Anatolian 
towns. 
In fact, the period following the launch of outward- and export-oriented growth policies 
was simultaneously accompanied by industrial capital diversification and increasing 
fragmentation of the domestic capital blocs. The export-led growth stimulated the rise 
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of industrial towns out of Istanbul and Eastern Marmara and the growth of mostly small 
and medium scale industrial enterprises as the second-generation industrial 
bourgeoisie.54 During this period, Turkey witnessed Anatolisation of industrial capital 
and increased transformation of the Islamic commercial capital into industrial 
bourgeoise, altering the outlook of class dynamics in Turkey (Özcan and Turunç, 2011). 
Mostly energized by a lower-road of manufacturing role in global division of labour, the 
Anatolian heartland’s industrial bourgeoisie took advantage of the low wages and 
limited worker rights to produce for the export markets (Bekmen, 2014; Savran, 2015). 
Employing non-unionised workers with little or no social security and health benefits, 
they gained a foothold in the low-tech and labour-intensive industries, such as textile, 
food processing, and wood products (Pamuk, 2008a). Performing mostly as subcontract 
manufacturers in these sectors, this new generation of industrial bourgeoisie also relied 
on informal workers who were employed and paid lower than the legal minimum, and 
women and even child labour as an integral part of their accumulation process (Köse 
and Öncü, 2000; Ercan, 2002b). Moreover, mostly benefitting from different 
accumulation strategies and modes of internationalization through Islamic financial and 
trade networks, they rose as a capital fraction more capable of settling accounts with the 
first generation of industrial bourgeoisie for domination over economic policy making, 
international orientation of the economy and accumulation pattern (Kaya, 2011; Savran, 
2015).     
Thus, the capitalist classes’ and subsequently the state elites’ increasing fragmentation 
paralysed the state’s institutional capacity to design, steer and implement productivity- 
and competition-enhancing export-oriented industrialisation strategies to a considerable 
extent. At first glance, there seemed to be a certain degree of cohesiveness between 
different capital fractions with respect to export-led accumulation based on the 
labouring classes’ political-cum-economic repression (Aydin, 2005). However, the 
long-standing cleavages between different fractions of capital surfaced shortly after the 
implementation of export-oriented strategies and incentives. Under the capitalist 
classes’ increased fragmentation as self-conscious fractions seeking their own interests, 
the relations between state and different fractions of capital were based on a shaky and 
                                                          
54 For the liberal and mainstream accounts on the rise of Anatolian capital groups, see, Filiztekin and 
Tunali (1999); Önis, (2002); Özcan and Cokgezen (2003); Pamuk (2008a) and Bugra, 1994, Bugra and 
Savaskan (2012). For some critical discussions see inter alia, Ercan (2002); Oguz (2008); Kaya (2011); 
Özekin (2014) and Savran (2015). 
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noninstitutionalised alliance due to which export-oriented industrialisation strategies 
were implemented in a politicised and uneven fashion (Özel, 2015). 
Thus, conforming more with Latin American cases than the East Asia ones, the uneasy 
relations between the state and domestic capital complicated the ways of developing 
information exchange and reciprocal relations channels, and using strategically designed 
sector- and firm-specific measures to restructure the export-oriented industries along 
nationally capitalistic lines. Rather, having been in intense rivalry, different fractions of 
capital engaged in particularistic relations and bargaining with the political and state 
elites (Özel, 2015). In Turkey where the ratio of domestic savings remained historically 
low, subjecting capital investment to financial inflows, public resources and mediation, 
the bureaucratic and political scene easily became a focal point of conflict for the intra-
capitalist cleavages (Bekmen, 2014). This manifested in the earlier stages of export-led 
growth strategy when the underlying intra-class cleavages centred around public 
incentive and export subsidy distribution. On that note, the post-1980 period did not 
bring a rupture but a change in the rent-seeking mechanism as the state was actively 
involved in rent creation and promotion of a rent-seeking mentality in several new ways 
(Aydın, 2005; Bekmen, 2014; Önis and Webb, 1992).55 Although one of the export-
promoting reforms’ expected objectives had been eliminating the rent-seeking 
mechanism through transforming the bureaucracy’s skeleton, the new managerial team 
and the political layer of state itself became a centre of rent creation (Aydın, 2005).  
As the coordination between different capital groups and the state had been in ad hoc 
and never taken a collectively institutionalized format, the discriminatory attitudes and 
clientele relations remained pervasive for the state–capital relations. Thus, long-term 
export-oriented growth strategies were mostly sacrificed to the short-term interests of 
different fractions of capital. Given the export-oriented policies’ rent-seeking nature and 
the increasing intra-capital cleavages, a coordination-inducing and cohesive alliance 
between the capital fractions and the state could not be secured to design and implement 
a systematic and innovation-enhancing industrialization strategy. Overall, the alliance 
lacked reciprocal relations and efficient institutional setting to solve the collective 
action dilemmas, particularly the Kaldorian ones that would mobilize the scarce 
                                                          
55 The new ways of rent creation involved tax rebates and funds for export-led businesses, import 
surcharges, preferential credits and debt postponement for those close to power holders, and amnesties for 
‘economic crimes’, among other things.  
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resources towards productivity- and innovation-enhancing industrial development, 
leading the industry towards the higher value-added segments of global value relations. 
Thus, the development strategy which had prioritised export-oriented industrialization 
bolstered the export capacity and foreign trade volume. However, given the nature of 
state–capital relations and the lack of a strategic and long-term vision in outward-
looking policies, the quantitative changes in the total export were not accompanied by 
genuinely qualitative developments in productivity- and technology-enhancing 
investments in manufactured exports. Rather, the export and public incentives granted 
in a non-selective and clientele fashion either revitalized the unutilised industrial 
capacity of the pre-1980 era or energized the lower-road of manufacturing activities, 
particularly in labour-intensive sectors (see inter alia Aydın, 1997, 2005; Pamuk, 2008b; 
Taymaz and Voyvoda, 2012). Against expectations, neither holding-led big industrial 
groups nor the second generation of Anatolian or Islamic SMEs invested in globally 
leading sectors or competitive segments of the existing sectors that would result in 
industrial upgrading along value chains (Bekmen, 2014: Özekin, 2014).  
Because these capital groups had been in a captive alliance with international capital, 
they adjusted to the new export-led growth strategy and integrated into global 
production in a more conservative and dependent manner. Instead of adopting a more 
aggressive stance that would increase the control over the entire circuit of accumulation 
and enhance global competitiveness, they exploited cheap labour and used non-selective 
export incentives. In this sense, the labour power’s economic and political repression 
also best served the market-follower industrial bourgeoisie’ lower-road accumulation 
strategy in Turkey since they remained stuck at routinized technologies and production 
methods, which characteristically required absolute value extraction and immiseration 
to secure export competitiveness. Thus, the export-led growth strategy did not enhance 
industrial productivity and upgrading, which could have been converted into a high-
level sophistication in manufactured exports and economic competitiveness. Rather, the 
Turkish economy’s reintegration into the world capitalist system and the global value 
relations actualised alongside increasing dependency in terms of technology, market and 
manufacturing inputs (Aydin, 2005). Overall, despite the growth in export capacity, no 
significant change occurred in the sectoral and technological composition of export as it 
consisted of the low- and mid-low technology sectors, such as textile, food processing, 
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glass and metal products, and mostly remained in the lower segments of global value 
chains (Taymaz, Voyvoda and Yilmaz, 2011). 
5.3 Crisis of Capital Accumulation, Financialization of Economy and Lost Decade 
of the 1990s 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the export-led accumulation strategy mainly based on 
wage suppression, depreciation of domestic currency and the rent-seeking mentality 
reached its political and economic limits (Boratav et al., 2001; Ercan, 2002b). In fact, 
the post-1980 growth strategy had never secured a wider social base as a development 
project mutually shared by the lower segments of society. First, this became more 
apparent with the proliferation of a number of political parties, both left and right, as the 
channels of wider social resentment upon the lifting of political bans in 1987 (Bekmen, 
2014). Besides, the growing social unease also manifested itself in the Spring Actions of 
1989 when the labouring classes were remobilized as the first wave of mass actions, 
leading to relative recovery in wages (Oğuz, 2008). Second, the shaky alliance between 
state and capitalist classes also started eroding, given the increasing fragmentation 
between different capitalist groups and the discriminatory/clientelistic relations. 
Particularly, the state authorities’ favourable attitude towards the new generation of 
industrial bourgeoisie caused resentment within big capital groups (Özel, 2015). And 
last, negative signals also came from the economic realm as the export-led growth had 
lost its momentum given the lack of industrial upgrading and the low level of 
productivity-enhancing investments.  
Thus, both the large-scale capital groups and the state saw the financial liberalisation of 
the economy as a way out of the accumulation impasse (Ercan, 2002b). Basically, it was 
expected to finance both the domestic bourgeoisie’s increasing capital needs and the 
state’s budgetary deficit due to the offsetting of the non-productive public and export 
incentives. Therefore, the capital account liberalization and the full convertibility of 
Turkish lira in 1989 furthered the first-generation reforms, after which the accumulation 
process gained a temporal momentum and relief from the financialization of the 
economy (Yentürk, 2005). On one hand, such a shift in economic policy helped to 
overcome the accumulation crisis of the late 1980s as it attracted short-term capital 
inflows, or hot money, to finance the budgetary deficits and the local bourgeoisie’s 
capital needs. On the other hand, it was costly in the longer term as the hot money flows 
generated a vicious circle of increasing capital volatility, heightening debt levels and 
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consequently macroeconomic instabilities. Thus, commonly referred to as ‘the lost 
decade’ or ‘the decade to forget’, the 1990s were marked by the Latin Americanization 
of Turkish economy, in that the growing dependence on and vulnerability to foreign 
financial inflows and global financial cycles led to high interest rates, loss of overall 
macro-economic sovereignty and debt and inflation, leading to short-term cycles of 
economic crises (Bekmen, 2014). 
In this sense, what gradually characterized the 1990s’ economic situation was a pattern 
of speculatively-led capital accumulation in which the financial sector gained a greater 
degree of leverage over the industry and real economy (Yeldan, 2006). Overall, this 
succeeding phase saw the prevalence of arbitrage-seeking capital flows and short-term 
alliances built between the different capital groups and the political elites, manifesting 
on the political scene with the formation of seven different coalition governments 
within a decade (Özel, 2015). Lured by the easy source of hot money, governments of 
the 1990s used financial inflows to sustain their expansionary fiscal policies for 
electoral survival and finance the resulting indebtedness. This engendered a spiral-like 
process as the bank-owning big capital groups – which could borrow from abroad at 
lower interest rates – brought large numbers of government bonds at high interest rates. 
Particularly, the Istanbul-based, holding-led big capital groups became the main 
accomplices of this process as the holding’s banks functioned as intermediaries for the 
state’s external borrowing (Oğuz, 2008; Yentürk, 2005). Taking advantage of a poorly 
regulated banking system, these capital groups promoted the state’s indebtedness further 
as the major clients of government bonds and hosts of short-term foreign capital. As the 
financialization of the economy came to the fore, the underlying intra-capitalist 
cleavages also intensified. In fact, the easy profits of arbitrage created a new rent-
seeking realm for different capital fractions in which the second-generation bourgeoisie 
of the Anatolian heartland was mostly pushed aside as late comers (Oğuz, 2008). 
Therefore, the capital groups, which mostly organized around Islamic social networks 
and shared a sense of marginalization within the economy’s ruling alliance began to 
mobilize to take some power from the earlier generation of bourgeoisie. Such a shift in 
intra-capitalist conflicts visibly manifested both in restructuring of the 
Anatolian/Islamic bourgeoisie in organizational terms and the rise of political parties 
that translated their intra-class interests into the political arena.  
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As discussed earlier, the rise of export manufacturing since the early 1980s had given 
way to the spatial expansion of industrial activity and the Anatolianisation of industrial 
capital. During the 1990s, various Anatolian provinces underwent further socio-
economic transformation in this direction. Particularly encouraged by the rising number 
of the Organised Industrial Districts (OSBs), a new array of industrial towns across the 
Anatolian heartland emerged as centres of global production and local clusters of global 
value relations. Furthering the outward-orientation of the Turkish economy, the number 
and geographical distribution of the OSBs considerably increased during this period, 
from 39 in 1989 to 138 in 1999 (see Appendices 12 and 13 respectively). Given their 
globalized nature and outward orientation, the newly established OSBs of the 1990s 
became new hubs of export-oriented industrial production, which in turn altered the 
intra-class dynamics in Turkey (Öngel, 2013).  
The pronounced manifestation of economic and political power of the pious or so-called 
'Islamic' bourgeoisie of Anatolian towns56 as a self-conscious capital fraction came to 
light along with the rise of the OSBs (Dogan and Durak, 2014). As these capital groups 
gained a certain degree of ascendency, they positioned themselves against the mainly 
Istanbul-based big capital groups under TÜSİAD. Defining themselves as Turkey’s 
marginalized and ‘authentic bourgeoisie’, the pious bourgeoisie established their own 
business organizations, such as the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s 
Association (MÜSİAD, founded in 1990), the Business Life Cooperation Association 
(IŞHAD, founded in 1993), and the Anatolian Business Association (ASKON, founded 
in 1998). Thus, the 1990s were marked by the proliferation of business organizations. 
As of 1997, 29 out of 35 business associations listed in the National Institutions Guide 
were founded after 1990 (Çokgezen, 2000). The foundation of such business 
associations unearthed the intra-class cleavages, reflecting the increasingly polarised 
nature of the intra-capitalist relations in Turkey during the 1990s (Savran, 2015). 
Institutionalising and transmitting the interests of pious capitalists, the newly flourishing 
business associations of the 1990s concretised the lack of cohesion and common 
perspective between Turkish capitalist classes, namely, the Islamic bourgeoisie and the 
westernised-secularist big capital groups (Kaya, 2011; Savran, 2015). Concordantly, the 
                                                          
56 Despite the generalizations in the literature, the pious or Islamic bourgeoisie is not a uniform capital 
fraction in terms of economic scale and geographical distribution. In fact, the business organizations of 
the pious capital were more than a coalition of SMEs in the Anatolian heartland. Certain members of 
these associations were also composed of big capital groups (Islamic Holdings) and the Istanbul-based 
bourgeoisie, reflecting the class heterogeneity.  
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concretised incoherence between these two major poles of capital also reverberated 
throughout the political sphere as different capital fractions formed short-lived alliances 
with political parties to influence economic policy-making and enhance their respective 
gains from the state and the local authorities. Thus, the political scene of the 1990s was 
increasingly marked by the rule of the shaky coalition governments having clientelistic 
ties with different capital groups (Bekmen, 2014). In socio-political terms, such a 
situation was the symptom of political hegemonic crisis of 1990s Turkey as no coalition 
government managed to construct a successful hegemonic project to unify the dominant 
class fractions and obtain the consent of the wider society (Akça, 2014).  
Coupled with the intra-class cleavages, the crisis of political hegemony provided the 
vacuum through which political Islamism rose as a multi-class political movement, 
bringing together the pious capitalist classes organized under their own business 
associations, the upwardly-mobile conservative middle classes and the subaltern 
segments of the society (Akça, 2014). Erbakan’s National Outlook Movement, 
contesting under the banner of the Welfare Party, first achieved electoral success in 
medium-sized and big municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. Then, in the 
second half of the 1990s, it emerged as the leading party in the parliament, forming a 
coalition government with the centre-right DYP. Articulating discourse based on a 
moralist and culturalist critique of Westernism, monopolist capitalism, and the state’s 
Kemalist ideology, the Welfare Party found a foothold among an alliance of the 
marginalized segments of the society, the pious bourgeoisie and conservative middle 
classes opposing the traditional power bloc of Turkey, allegedly comprising laicist and 
estranged civil-military bureaucracy, big capital groups and urban middle classes.   
All in all, given the society’s increasing fragmentation and deepening political 
hegemony crisis, the Turkish state’s institutional capacity to design, coordinate, and 
implement long-term and productivity-enhancing development policies declined. 
Starting in the 1980’s, the export-led growth strategy had been built upon the uneasy 
nature of state-society complex that never truly reconciled the intra-class cleavages and 
secured consent of the wider society around a successful capitalist development project. 
Mostly suffering from Kaldorian collective action problems, neither Istanbul-based big 
capital groups nor the pious Anatolian bourgeoisie could achieve a genuine industrial 
upgrading for an increased level of local control over the entire production and 
accumulation process. Rather, the financialization of economy during the 1990s became 
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increasingly detrimental in terms of the real economy, as the manufacturing investment 
level gradually decreased due to both the big capital groups’ arbitrage-seeking activities 
and the high interest rates-cum-inflation that made further investments increasingly 
unfavourable for SMEs (Ercan, 2002b). Even though the mechanism of financialization 
increased the profitability of capital to a certain extent, it was accompanied by constant 
drops in the creation of surplus value, high rates of inflation, budgetary deficits, and 
debt burden. Since the economy’s productive capacity could not endure the ever-
increasing debt burden, the sudden drops and reversals in financial inflows manifested 
in financial crises in 1998, 2000 and 2001, leading to a new wave of structural reforms 
in the 2000s (Bekmen, 2014; Oğuz, 2009).  
5.4 Second Wave of Structural Reforms and Increasing Submission to Governing 
Mentality of Global Capitalism 
The ‘twin crises’ in 2000 and 2001 clearly highlighted the Turkish economy’s structural 
weaknesses that could no longer be overcome by taking additional measures and 
pumping extra liquidity, but by long-term structural and institutional reforms in the 
economy’s productive capacity. In fact, initial steps in this direction had been taken in 
1998, when the East Asian economic crisis arrived in Turkey, which was suffering from 
high levels of debt and chronic inflation. As the export-oriented-cum-financial-led 
accumulation’s potential had reached its limits, the 1999 IMF-led economic recovery 
program emphasised the need for increasing the economy’s productive capacity in 
collaboration with global capital (Ercan, 2006). Such a move in the economic policy 
was not simply imposed in an outside-in manner by World Bank- and IMF-originated 
directives, but concurrently articulated and embraced by globally-oriented segments of 
Turkish bourgeoisie in policy reports and press releases57, as it was believed to have 
solved the 1990s’ capital accumulation crisis (Özekin, 2014). Therefore, the external 
impetus for policy change once again coincided with the domestic bourgeoisie’s reform 
demands to restructure the economic productivity (Oğuz, 2008).  
On that note, the critical juncture of the post-2001 era prepared the ground for new 
structural reforms in Turkey, which laid out the economic policy’s general contours up 
to the present. The reform process embodied a ‘new thinking’ associated with the 
emerging creeds of the Post-Washington Consensus. Therefore, in terms of 
developmental policy, such a move represented neither a real rupture from the post-
                                                          
57 See TUSİAD reports, 1991, 1997a, 1997b 
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1980 developmental agenda nor a genuine attempt to overcome handicaps of Turkey’s 
late capitalist development. Rather, it reflected a seemingly different but complementary 
process in which the first generation of neoliberal reforms post-1980 was accompanied 
by further institutional arrangements aiming to increase the domestic production 
capacity in harmony with global capitalism’s governing mentality (Ercan, 2006). Put 
another way, this signified the Turkish bourgeoisie’s increasing integration into global 
value relations on the basis of an international competitiveness agenda with globalist- 
and market-oriented overtones. As per Karakaş (2007), this means that the export-
oriented capital groups, which had previously rested upon absolute value extraction or 
immiseration as forms of capital valorisation, now started to reorient themselves 
towards extraction of relative surplus value through reorganization of industrial 
structure and labour productivity. 
Such a structural transformation in the economy materialized through a series of legal 
and organizational regulations in economic governance and concomitant legislations in 
the labour regime, all of which would lead to a metamorphosis in the Turkish political 
economy. The assignment of World Bank expert Kemal Derviş as the Minister of 
Economic Affairs in 2001 literally launched the reform process when Ecevit’s coalition 
government was struggling with the economic downturn’s devastating impacts. Derviş’ 
economic recovery programme, called Transition to the Strong Economy, encompassed 
a series of structural reforms, such as securing the independence of Central Bank, 
consolidation of Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, re-regulation of public 
financing and debt, and formation of Independent Regulatory Institutions into almost 
every facet of economic governance.  
Among these, the transformation of the banking sector was one of the key steps to 
achieve a productive capital-based accumulation. To end rent transfer through state 
borrowing and re-orient funds from state debts to fixed capital investments, the banking 
system was restructured through the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA). Operating along with the international standards of the Basel II accords and 
equipped with a centralised and independent regulatory mechanism, the BRSA was 
authorised to function on the global level without any direct interference from domestic 
actors (Bekmen, 2014). Given its independent structure, the BRSA reconfigured 
relations between the banking sector and industry in accordance with the requirements 
of internationalized economy (Oğuz, 2008). The banks which restructured themselves in 
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line with international banking standards were allowed to exist, whereas those which 
continued to finance state debt and operate as easy-profit mechanisms for holding 
companies underwent confiscations. Besides, to ensure price stability, the Central Bank 
of Turkey was endowed with an independent institutional form, which freed the 
monetary policy from politics and executive interference. Coordinating with the BRSA, 
Central Bank played a functional role in pursuing macro-economic management based 
on price stability and anti-inflationary measures to secure business confidence and 
investment climate both for global productive capital and its local partners. 
Additionally, a series of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were also founded to 
stimulate productivity growth through the ‘depoliticisation of the economic governance’ 
and the establishment of a competition state. As the main pillar of the post-2001 reform 
process, the status and role of IRAs in the overall economic governance was 
increasingly consolidated. While in some sectors, the pre-established IRAs were 
strengthened and highly operationalized (as in the Capital Market Board, Competition 
Agency and the BRSA), in many other new ones (such as Telecommunations Agency, 
Energy Market Regulation Agency, Sugar Agency, and Public Procurement Agency) 
were built in the system of economic governance (Sönmez, 2011). Thus, the IRAs 
became key institutional bodies of economic restructuring, synchronising economic 
management in line with global capitalism’s governing rationality. Put bluntly, these 
institutional bodies functioned as ‘the local connection points of global regulatory 
neoliberalism’ by which the domestic economy’s strategically significant sectors were 
restructured and regulated according to global rules and procedures (Bekmen, 2014, p. 
57).  
The IRAs’ proliferation as specialized economic apparatuses signified a complementary 
stage during which the first-generation reforms of the post-1980 period were further 
consolidated within the Turkish state’s institutional and legal structure. Whereas the 
first-generation reforms had dissolved the state’s pre-existing institutional structure and 
narrowed the political and public sphere in favour of market-oriented 
internationalisation, the second-generation reforms installed global capitalism’s 
economic institutions into the state structure. On that note, the IRAs’ installation 
implied a process of depoliticisation by which the social forces’ and executive branch’s 
role and impact in economic governance were curtailed and transferred to the so-called 
independent agencies that were tied to the governing rationality of global capital and its 
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local partners (Özekin, 2014). Since IRAs only held representatives of certain segments 
of state, business organisations of globally-oriented bourgeoisie and TNCs, but not the 
counteractive layers of the state, the popular classes or certain segments of domestic 
bourgeoisie in their executive boards, they functioned as representative channels 
through which the interests of global capital and its local partners have been 
incorporated into economic management (Bayramoğlu, 2009). In this sense, the IRAs 
have played a vital role in creating a milieu of accumulation in which the TNCs’ and 
their local partners’ class interests have been secured both in institutional and regulatory 
terms.58 The central motivation behind the reforms of the early 2000s was to secure and 
strengthen the TNCs’ bargaining position nationally by subjugating the domestic 
economic and social forces to the global capital’s interests. In short, the control over the 
political and public domains under re-regulation were taken away from the domestic 
actors, particularly from the popular classes, and given to the powerfully-equipped and 
ultra-centralist regulatory mechanism, bound to the global capital’s operating rules (see 
inter alia, Güler, 2003, 2005 and Bayramoğlu, 2005). 
Again, behind the reforms of the early 2000s was the interplay between transnational 
networks of global capital, globalized segments of domestic bourgeoisie, and the 
outward-oriented layers of state apparatus as the pillars of the triple alliance in Turkey. 
At the international level, the IMF-WB nexus was instrumental since the regulatory 
agencies’ incorporation into the economic governance mechanism constituted the main 
conditions for loan credits. In collaborating with the IMF-WB nexus, the OECD also 
actively followed up the reform process and provided consolatory service through its 
non-obligatory ‘Volunteer Country Program’ (Bayramoğlu, 2005). Besides, Turkey’s 
regional engagement with the EU was another anchor, as the acquis communautaire of 
EU-accession process required institutional and regulatory arrangements that largely 
coincided with the conditionalities that the IMF-WB nexus required (Güler, 2003; 
Sönmez, 2011). 
On the domestic front, the IMF-WB-EU triangle’s efforts also mustered appreciable 
support among certain segments of the Turkish bourgeoisie and political circles. 
Increasing cohesion emerged both within the local bourgeoisie and the political circles 
that facilitated the reform process’ enactment and implementation. As the stakes became 
                                                          
58 For further accounts on the IRAs, see inter alia Güler, 2005; Güzelsarı, 2007; Bayramoglu-Ozgurlu, 
2005, 2009; Ozekin, 2014. 
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higher with deteriorating economic conditions, the veto players’ resistance was 
diminished and marginalized, which in turn generated an alliance of reform demanders, 
particularly those led by the local bourgeoisie’s transnationalised segments, such as 
TÜSİAD, the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), and the International Investors 
Association (YASED), which were domestic actors in the Turkish state apparatus’ 
restructuring/rescaling process.59 Allied with the reform-demanding domestic groups, 
globally-minded political elites also backed the reform process of the early 2000s in a 
highly technocratic manner. Under the motto of ‘15 laws within 15 days,’ the relevant 
legal arrangements concerning the reform process had been enacted without even a 
decent parliamentary discussion or an inner-cabinet debate, provoking occasional 
defiance of the coalition government’s members. Led by Kemal Derviş, a team of 
bureaucrats launched the reform process, even under occasional splits within the 
government, and ensured the coordination between state institutions and secured the 
mediation between domestic and transnational policy circles. Therefore, despite the 
reform process’ fast pace, the question of a political actor had been left unanswered, at 
least till the 2002 elections, which had swept away all the former political parties 
responsible for the economic downturn and given way to the rise of the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) as the political agent of change. Just as the military coup had 
wiped out the political arena and set the ground for rise of the neo-liberal-minded 
ANAP, an ‘economic coup’ once more reshuffled the political scene, leading to the rise 
of a new political actor, which effectively implemented and furthered the reform 
programme, spanning over one and a half decades to the present. (Bekmen, 2014). 
5.4.1 Rise of the JDP as Political Agent of Transformation  
The 2002 general election made it crystal clear that almost all former parties had been 
discredited in the general public’s eyes as malefactors of the crises of the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s. Founded in 2001 by young Islamic liberals split from Erbakan’s 
National Outlook Movement60, the JDP entered the political scene in an environment of 
                                                          
59 Through reports, policy documents and forums, TÜSİAD closely worked with the IMF-OECD-EU 
nexus and pressurised for the state apparatus’ restructuring as an institution-building project of good 
governance. For more details, see TÜSİAD’s Annual reports in 2000 and 2001. 
60 The split of young Islamic liberals from the Virtue Party (successor of Erbakan’s Welfare Party) 
reflects the class differentiation within Islamic capital groups. As a certain segment of Islamic capitalists 
that had moved up to the rank of big capital groups in the globalization process, they redefined their class 
interests in conformity with the credos of global capitalism and opted to distinguish themselves from the 
other traditional petit-bourgeoisie who supported the Felicity Party (SP). For detail, see inter alia Uzgel, 
2009; Tugal, 2009. 
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widespread public resentment, which would facilitate its decisive success in the 
upcoming elections (Atasoy, 2009). In the 2002 elections, the JDP won with 34.2% of 
the popular votes and 65% of parliamentary seats, which let it form a single-party 
majority rule for the first time since 1991. In fact, the 2002 elections ushered in a new 
era in Turkish political history, which would be marked by the JDP’s electoral victories 
as Turkey’s one-party government up until recently. Well in advance, the JDP distanced 
itself from the anti-western, anti-American, statist and developmentalist discourse of 
Erbakan’s Islamist movement and self-identified as a ‘conservative democratic party’, 
combining ‘universal’ principles of political liberalism and free-market economy with 
‘authentic Muslim and local values’ (Uzgel, 2009). Adopting such a political stance, the 
JDP represented the Islamic movement’ coupling with the globally-spread credos of 
neoliberalism (Atasoy, 2009). As a politically concretised form of such a 
transformation, the JDP’s emergence can be viewed both as outcome and prompter of a 
passive revolution, which would ensure Islamic capital groups’ and conservative 
masses’ incorporation into neoliberalism’s social project (Tugal, 2009). 
To this end, the JDP eagerly adopted the economic and institutional reform programme 
that had been introduced in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. Since its first term, the JDP 
has recursively taken concrete steps in deepening the structural reform programme of 
the IMF-WB nexus and furthering the EU-accession process by accelerating the pace of 
the reforms accordingly. Thus, Turkey’s firm commitment to the reform process has 
been secured and socialised with the JDP’s rise as a single-party rule that managed to 
rely on a broad electoral base and build a cross-class coalition around the transformative 
project of the 2000s. In this regard, the JDP’s salient features include its skilfulness at 
building a certain degree of unity among the different fractions of capital and ensuring 
the consent of dominated classes on the changing dynamics of accumulation process 
(Oğuz, 2008; Bekmen, 2014). Particularly in its first two terms, the JDP seemed to 
mediate the historical cleavages between the two major poles of domestic capital 
organized under TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD respectively. The JDP managed to resolve the 
conflicting demands of these two poles of domestic bourgeoisie with the discourse of 
achieving international competitiveness through the reform programme. In this sense, 
the JDP’s rule can be viewed as politically concretised form of a consolidated power 
bloc, which united the different fractions of capital around the globally-designed and 
neoliberally-minded project of the 2000s. 
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Besides, the JDP has also been successful in manufacturing the consent of the wider 
segments of society and incorporating them into the transformative project of the 2000s 
(Atasoy, 2009). Restructuring of the Turkish economy and the state structure during the 
JDP’s rule was manifested through a broad cross-class coalition, including unorganized 
sections of labouring classes, the rural poor, upwardly-mobile middle classes and the 
globally-oriented capital groups of all sizes. In building such a broad cross-class 
coalition, the JDP introduced a neoliberal social policy regime combining the WB’s and 
the UNDP’s poverty alleviation strategies with Islamic philanthropy and solidarity 
(Atasoy, 2009). This blend of neoliberal social policy regime comprised social 
assistance and workfare programmes, the empowerment of hitherto excluded segments 
of society and the extensive use of religious charity organisations. Employing such a 
blend of strategies towards economically disadvantaged segments of society, the JDP 
has managed to co-opt, assimilate, and appropriate potential opposition and threats to 
the reform process. 
Benefitting from this set of electoral and class-relational dynamics, the JDP has 
decisively and effectively implemented and furthered the reform process. The economy 
and state structure have undergone a phase of restructuring in which the domestic 
bourgeoisie’s competitiveness and productive capacity have increased relatively through 
the flexibilisation of labour markets and the internationalisation of production on the 
basis of the FDI. In this sense, the triple alliance’s emerging will for internationalising 
the Turkish economy on the basis of increased productivity and competitiveness has 
been literally materialised under the JDP government’s decisive policies. Within this 
context, concurrent and complementary reforms were introduced to reframe the labour 
market and investment environment in line with the changing dynamics of 
accumulation.  
The shift in the accumulation dynamics brought along the adoption of new production 
organizations and techniques, which required concomitant legal arrangements for labour 
classes. In light of the 2001 crisis, capital groups had increasingly articulated the need 
for new arrangements in the labour market on the grounds of global competitiveness. 
Coupled with the demands of capital, the severity of the 2001 crisis had in fact paved 
the way for labour power’s increasing oppression in the form of a de facto flexible 
working order. Later in 2003, such a shift in industrial relations gained a legal base 
under the JDP rule with the new Labour Law No. 4857. The Labour Act of 2003 
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brought in flexible, irregular and non-typical labouring forms, which would create a 
workforce that could easily be hired, fired, and subjected to intense work discipline for 
the sake of global competitiveness (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006). Briefly 
stated, under the pretext of the economic recovery after the 2001 crisis, the rigidities in 
the labour market were eliminated on behalf of the capitalist classes who sought to 
overcome the crisis of accumulation through economic internationalization based on 
increased labour productivity.   
Along with the changes in the labour market, a series of reforms were also put into 
practice with regard to the FDI regime and Turkey’s investment environment. The most 
important reform introduced in this respect was the ‘Reform Program for the 
Improvement of the Investment Climate’, which aimed to reframe the investment 
environment to increase the FDI’s inward-flow and the productivity of firms operating 
in Turkey. The discourse of ‘improving the investment climate’ had been brought to the 
agenda in the conjuncture of the post-crisis recovery when the global capitalism’s 
regulatory mechanism was placed into the national context upon the triple alliance’s 
tripartite request. Along with this process, steps towards improving the investment 
climate were taken by actors at the national, transnational, public, and private levels 
(Cebeci, 2012). At the domestic level, particularly TÜSİAD61, as the domestic 
bourgeoisie’s globally-minded segment, and YASED, as the global capital’s interest 
organisation, actively participated in the institutionalisation of the relevant arrangements 
in this respect. Upon the invitation of YASED, James Wolfensohn, chairman of the WB 
to Turkey, demanded the Foreign Investment Advisory Service62 (FIAS) to write up a 
diagnostic report on Turkey’s investment climate. 63 In line with the findings and 
recommendation of the report, a policy coordination platform, the Coordination Council 
for the Improvement of Investment Environment (YOİKK), was established by an 
executive decree in the midst of the 2001 crisis (Cebeci, 2012).  
                                                          
61 In several policy reports and press releases, TUSİAD eagerly pressed for an overall reform programme 
for improving the investment environment and competitiveness of Turkish economy (see inter alia, 
TUSİAD, 1997a, 1997b, 2002, 2004). 
62 Working as a joint facility of the WB, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, FIAS assists governments of developing countries and transition 
economies in improving the investment climate. 
63 It should also be noted that the TOBB has played a particular role in the institutionalisation of YOİKK 
by conducting a fieldwork for the FIAS’ report. The TOBB set up a Board on Foreign Direct Investment 
in 2004, which brought together 28 senior executives of multinational corporations with Turkey’s 
globally-oriented capital groups.  
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Established under the FIAS’ close surveillance as a joint establishment of the WB, the 
International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 
the YOİKK began to operate, in 2002, as an institutional channel through which the 
TNCs’ class interest has been internalised within the state’s economic policy and has 
been presented as a normalcy with the close cooperation of globally-minded local 
bourgeoisie (Özekin, 2014). This is apparent from the YOİKK’s institutional 
configuration and working mechanism, which has performed such a type of 
coordination between ministries and respective state institutions on one hand and global 
capital’s business representatives and local bourgeoisie’s internationalized segments on 
the other (see, Appendix 14). Adopting a dismissive stance towards certain segments of 
local capital and labouring classes, the YOİKK has incorporated the representatives of 
capital groups, such as TÜSİAD, YASED, TOBB and TIM, alongside respective state 
authorities (Cebeci, 2012). On a monthly basis, the YOİKK has held issue-based 
meetings in coordination with the technical committees formed in ten different areas of 
expertise, such as corporate governance, taxes and incentive, FDI legislations, and many 
others (see, Appendix 14). 
Incorporating a broad range of policy areas, the YOİKK has functioned as a quasi-
parliament, suggesting primary and secondary legislation to the Council of Ministers 
based on the drafts prepared by the technical committees. Several laws intersecting in 
some way with the business climate have been enacted in line with the YOİKK’s 
suggestions [such as the Labour Law, the Turkish Employment Agency Law, and the 
Land Acquisition and Site Development Law, as listed in EU (2006: 63)]. Among them, 
the amended FDI Law No. 4875 of 2003 was framed in accordance with changing 
dynamics of accumulation in the post-2001 period. Complementing the Labour Act of 
2003, the FDI law created a highly favourable setting on behalf of the global capital by 
abolishing the approval, screening, and minimum capital requirements for TNCs and 
ending the system of ex ante-control and regulation on the FDI’s inflow. With the new 
FDI law’s enactment, the TNCs have been treated equally just like domestic companies 
regardless of factors such as the nature of capital formation, the strategic orientation and 
interest of the company and the capital ownership. 
Thus, the YOİKK has ensured internalisation and accommodation of the TNCs’ global 
mentality through extra-parliamentary channels of economic governance and law-
making. In this sense, the YOİKK’s working mechanism and institutional configuration 
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has created a new domain of the state in which representatives of globally-minded 
capital groups participate in legislative and executive processes concerning capital 
accumulation (Özekin, 2014). As of 2004, this characteristic of the YOİKK was further 
expanded with the establishment of the Investment Advisory Council (IAC) as an 
advisory body providing inputs in the overall YOİKK process, and advising the 
governments with respect to investment climate. The IAC exemplifies how interests and 
demands of leading multinational firms and international financial institutions such as 
the IMF, WB, and European Investment Bank have been directly incorporated into the 
YOİKK’s action plans and transmitted to Turkey’s legislative and executive processes 
(Cebeci, 2014). Meeting regularly since 2004, the IAC has brought together top 
government representatives (the PM, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Finance, 
and other relevant ministers) with the leading TNCs’ executives (including those from 
American Int., Arcelor, Benetton, BNP Paribas, and Cisco Systems, Daimler Chrysler, 
Danone,  Fiat, Ford, Hyundai, Siemens, Nestle, Unilever, among others) heads of 
international financial institutions and chairs of selected business organizations to 
consult on reform priorities and adopt a course of action (see Appendix 15). 
5.5 Increasing Productivity and Competitiveness under the Reign of Global 
Capital and Shades of New Form of Dependent Development in post-2001 Turkey 
Starting from the early 2000s, the overall reform process in Turkey has institutionally 
crystallised the Turkish triple alliance’s captive nature and consolidated the new forms 
of dependent development that had outcropped in its preliminary form in the 1980s. 
Thus, it should be noted beforehand that the economic and political transformation post-
2001 can be seen as a change in the continuity of Turkey’s capitalist development. 
Despite far-reaching changes in class configuration and relative cohesion within 
capitalist classes, particularly with respect to the reform process, the uneasy and 
contradictory nature of state–society relations and the state’s non-developmental role 
have remained intact. Nonetheless, what distinguishes the post-2001 period from the 
preceding two decades is the economy’s increasing competitiveness and productive 
capacity based on deepened internationalisation and collaboration with global capital. 
Put bluntly, the recent shift in the Turkish economy has been basically a corollary of the 
change in accumulation dynamics. The main motivation behind the post-2001 
accumulation strategy was to enhance domestic bourgeoisie’s competitiveness and 
productive capacity based on the foreign capital’s inflow and direct partnership. On the 
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discursive level, reorientation of the accumulation dynamics along this line was 
ideologically based on legitimising competitiveness through regulatory state institutions 
and improving the overall investment climate.  
With the change in accumulation dynamics, the Turkish economy has consequentially 
experienced improvements in growth and productivity levels, industrial production and 
the composition of manufactured exports. In this sense, the Turkish economy’s 
performance in the post-2001 period signified a relatively remarkable rupture from the 
preceding two decades, which had been marked by short-term cycles of economic 
crises, high inflation rates and poor economic growth records. In macro-economic 
terms, the country’s economic performance was considered to be positive for the most 
part over the past one and a half decades. After the devastating impact of the 2001 
crisis, the country’s economic growth resumed and continued at an annual rate of 7.2% 
between 2002 and 2007 (see Appendix 16). The economy also performed relatively well 
throughout the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 as the economic growth rate first slowed 
down and dropped to 0.7% and −4.7% in 2008 and 2009, but later rebounded to 9% and 
8.5% in 2010 and 2011 respectively (Appendix 16). Accompanied with this, as 
commonly used indicators of economic development, both the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and GDP per capita have grown more than threefold at current prices (Appendix 
16). Again, compared to the preceding decades with their high inflation rates and large 
fiscal deficits, the overall economic environment was far better with a prudent fiscal 
discipline and inflation rates of less than 10% per annum in general (Appendix 16). 
Parallel developments have also taken place with respect to foreign trade and the 
manufactured exports’ sectoral/technological composition. During the period in 
question, Turkey transformed into a ‘trading state’ through participation in cross-border 
production and trade networks of global value chains. Over one and a half decades, the 
country’s trade volume has more than quadrupled, coupled with structural changes in 
the composition of both exports and imports (Turkstat, 2015). Particularly, parallel to 
the transformation of the production front, Turkey has performed relatively well in 
achieving a certain degree of structural change in manufactured exports. Throughout the 
period, the composition of manufactured exports has evolved from traditional and low-
technology sectors to medium-low and medium-high ones such as technology-intensive 
sectors, namely, ‘electrical machinery and apparatus’, ‘motor vehicles’ and ‘machinery 
and equipment’, whose export/production ratios have increased remarkably (Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5. 1 Structural and Technological Shift in the Composition of Turkish 
Manufactured Exports since 1980 (%) 
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Source: Turkstat (2015). The author’s calculation according to the ISIC Rev 3’s technology 
intensity definition. For further information, see Appendix 17.   
As a result, positive developments in economic growth rates, productivity levels and the 
manufactured exports’ structural/technological composition have brought Turkey into 
the range of countries popularly classified as newly industrialised economies or 
emerging markets. However, despite the rise of the economy, Turkey’s capitalist 
development has remained stuck in structural limitations, economic and social 
contradictions, and developmental challenges, all of which manifest as corollaries of the 
consolidation of new forms of dependent development in the last one and half decades. 
First, the recent macro-economic stability and economic growth have been closely 
linked to foreign capital inflows as Turkey has benefited exceptionally from a 
benevolent global capital market, especially for developing countries, since the early 
2000s (Taymaz and Voyvoda, 2012). Following the launch of the reform programme, 
the FDI inflows reached record levels of $20 and $22 billion in 2006 and 2007 
respectively, and the FDI’s cumulative inflow was more than $149 billion between 2002 
and 2014 (see Appendix 18). As savings fell short of investments, high doses of FDI 
definitely facilitated economic growth at rates much higher than the domestic savings 
would have allowed (see Appendix 16). In this sense, the post-2001 economic 
performance appears to have traits of a new form of dependent development in which 
143 
 
 
 
global capital’s inward flows have driven and conditioned the rate and direction of 
capital accumulation. Thus, exhibiting the characteristics of a capital-dependent 
economy, Turkey’s export-led growth strategy during the period have been significantly 
induced by and framed under the favourable environment of long-term FDI inflows. In 
the form of greenfield investments, joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and 
privatizations, leading TNCs have increasingly penetrated into the domestic economy 
and have become an important capital bloc within Turkey. Between 2002 and 2012, the 
total number of foreign-invested companies operating in Turkey increased almost 
sevenfold from 4,949 to 33,439, accompanied by more than tenfold rise in the overall 
FDI inflows (see Appendix, 18). Launching new ventures and building partnerships, 
foreign capital took part in the production front. As a result, foreign-invested firms 
within Turkey’s top 500 industrial companies held 31.3% of the total sales value of 
production and 45.4% of the overall export by 2011 (ISO, 2011, p. 26). 
As another aspect of the new form of dependent development, the economy’s recent 
performance under the FDI inflows has led to the industry’s structural transformation. 
With increasing penetration of leading TNCs through partnerships, mergers and 
acquisitions, the industrial output’s structure has evolved towards more technology-
intensive products, marked by the rise of medium-low and medium-high sectors. 
However, despite the change in the manufacture products’ range and composition, the 
industry’s structural transformation has never elevated Turkey into the ranks of 
developed countries since the manufacturing outputs, exports, and technologies have 
evolved towards the ones that had been mostly faded away in developed economies. 
Analogous to paradigmatic cases of new forms of dependent development, the overall 
restructuring of the economy and manufacturing industry has led to greater 
diversification in manufactured exports and industrial convergence between Turkey and 
the developed world, but in comparative terms, it has not generated an overall change in 
Turkey’s mode of articulation with the global economy.  
On the contrary, the reintegration with the global economy through the recent shifts in 
the accumulation dynamics have re-secured the country’s respective position within the 
global capitalist system. In fact, the series of economic and institutional reforms carried 
out to achieve higher levels of productivity and global competitiveness have been far 
from being a genuine developmentalist turn that would overcome Turkey’s long-lasting 
structural deficiencies and collective action dilemmas. First of all, the overall reform 
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process was at heart designed in compliance with the development agenda of the IMF-
WB-EU triangle through which Turkey has been subjected to a form of neoliberal self-
discipline. Adopted arrangements like independent regulatory agencies and new 
coordination bodies for better investment climate have in fact reframed the policy space 
at the expense of the overall interest of domestic, economic, and social forces. Rather, 
given their organizational and functional design, these institutional bodies are unlikely 
to offer a real leap forward both for the local capital and the national economy. 
Designed as transnationalised governance mechanisms, they institutionally strengthened 
global capital’s bargaining position nationally by limiting the state’s ability to intervene 
in the asymmetrical power relations between global capital and domestic classes. 
To achieve international competitiveness, the state has taken part in a ‘beauty contest’ in 
which it competes with its rivals, offering the global capital a more favourable 
investment environment and incentives. Rather than insulating the key aspects of 
economic governance and industrial policy from global market forces, the state has 
embraced FDI-oriented marketization for capturing global capital’s potential benefits, 
not only for domestic capital groups but also for the wider society. In this sense, the 
state has not sought possibilities of policy and developmental space to restrain and 
coerce globalization’s uneven forces when the matter of local accumulation is at stake, 
but has rather followed a more submissive stance by simply promoting an overall 
investment environment and letting market forces – global or domestic – to decide the 
pace and prospects of development. Such a passive attitude in development policy 
found its laconic expression in PM Erdoğan’s speech at Chatham House:  
Some people say we are selling the country. People cannot see the reality. This 
is not our perspective – quite the contrary. We say that whatever you call it – 
money or capital or labour – it does not have a religion, does not have a 
country and does not have a nationality. Money is like mercury: whenever it 
finds the proper environment, a good environment for itself, it immediately 
flows there. That is a reality. If you prepare that environment it will flow to 
you, and if you fail to do that, then it will turn its direction and go somewhere 
else. This is why we were determined to provide the right environment. 
(Independent, 2009) 
The mantra of achieving international competitiveness has constituted the backbone of 
the development discourse, being widely embraced in the five-year development plans 
and industrial policy documents (see SPO, 2003, 2006, 2007; Sanayi ve Ticaret 
Bakanlığı, 2010; Kalkinma Bakanlığı, 2013). These documents have been more or less 
formulated as replicas of the WB’s and IMF’s policy recommendations rather than as 
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genuine action plans for building indigenous technology and research capabilities and 
cumulative learning processes for domestic capital.64 Supposedly, these policy 
documents’ main goal was to increase the industry’s competitiveness and productivity 
and upgrade the Turkish enterprises’ positions in value chains. However, such an 
ambitious goal is doomed to remain as an unapproachable rhetoric as it has never been 
complemented by long-term and development-oriented industrial strategies undergirded 
by respective institutional arrangements.  
Rather, the scope of industrial policy has been confined to a narrow range of 
instruments, such as improving investment climate, building required infrastructure, 
providing the workforce vocational training and higher education, and enhancing the 
public services’ quality. Thus, the emphasis has been more on the state’s regulatory role 
rather than its developmental capacity. The limits of the regulatory role in turn have not 
allowed proactive and selective industrial policy through which the terms of 
accumulation would be renegotiated and redefined in favour of the domestic economy’s 
long-term interest. Therefore, the industrial policy has been built on the false premise 
that the deepening integration with transnational trade and production networks would 
automatically bring along efficiency, competitiveness and upgrading for the domestic 
capital and the overall economy.  
Thus, the dynamics of asymmetric power relations in value chains have been widely 
overlooked, and the prospects and sustainability of economic development has been left 
to the mercy of global market forces, which distribute the benefits and costs of 
globalization unevenly and asymmetrically over time and space. Consistent with the 
demands of global actors, the reform programme and institutional arrangements have 
constrained policy space and the state’s alternative instruments and institutionally 
crystallized the triple alliance’s captive nature in Turkey. Despite some policy design 
improvements, a systematic and long-term industrial and technology policy has never 
been incorporated into the economic governance mechanism (Eser, 2014; Şenses and 
Taymaz 2003). Rather, the industrial policy has lacked strategically-defined incentive 
structure armed with well-functioning selection, monitoring, and sanctioning 
mechanisms for effectively securing the distribution of incentives and state resources. 
                                                          
64 The national development plans have been implemented in liaison with the WB. As per the WB group 
on Turkey’s recent report (2015, p.13) the most recent five-year development plans, the Ninth (2007-
2013) and the 10th Development Plan (2014-2018), largely overlap with the WB’s Country Partnership 
Programme.  
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In fact, a certain degree of cohesion and coordination between the state and domestic 
capital groups marked the early 2000s, particularly with respect to the reform 
programme’s implementation. In its first term, various fractions of capital, either 
affiliated with TÜSİAD or MÜSİAD, willingly supported the JDP government and 
allied with it in its commitment to the overall reform programme (Akça, 2014). 
However, such an alliance between different capital fractions and the state never gave 
way to the eradication of the long-standing intra-class cleavages and uneasy nature of 
state–capital relations in Turkey. Particularly starting from the JDP government’s 
second term, these historical legacies once again surfaced with the increasingly 
polarised nature of intra-class relations between so-called secular and Islamic poles, 
clouding the effective institutional coordination between the state and domestic capital 
groups. 
In this respect, the period in question showed intensification of the domestic 
bourgeoisie’s fragmentation, followed by the emergence of two pluralist peak 
organizations, the Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation (TÜRKONFED) in 
2004 and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) in 
2005, representing the secular and the Islamic pole of capital respectively. With the 
establishment of new business organizations, the intra-class cleavages between the two 
poles of capital prevailed between MÜSİAD and TUSKON on one hand and TÜSİAD 
and TÜRKONFED on the other (Özel, 2015). The unveiled polarization of the intra-
capitalist relations has also reverberated into their representation in public and semi-
public organizations, and led to the selective provision of incentives and state resources 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). Over time, the selective inclusion of domestic capital 
groups and the concessionary access to state resources, such as subsidies, loans from 
public banks, public bids, and policy platforms, became a common drawback of 
economic governance. As the broad-based capital alliance that had emerged in the JDP 
government’s earlier stages dismantled, the JDP has increasingly sided with the Islamic 
capital groups and been confronted by capital groups affiliated with TÜSİAD and 
TÜRKONFED. Given the symbiotic relationship between the state and the capital, the 
central state and municipalities have allocated state resources to create and expend 
wealth in the hands of selected business actors close to the JDP government (Buğra and 
Savaşkan, 2014).  
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To sum up, as the state-capital relations have been traditionally fragmented, 
antagonistic, and conducted ad hoc, the cohesion and cooperation between the state and 
domestic bourgeoisie have remained weak. Therefore, the long-standing intra-capitalist 
cleavages and its repercussions within the state-capital relations have led to suboptimal 
developmental outcomes and not to institutional innovations that can offer alternative 
paths of development beyond the new form of dependent development. Rather, both the 
state and domestic capital groups have opted to accommodate themselves with global 
capitalism’s governing rationality, which was believed to distribute favourable 
outcomes automatically. Therefore, policy measures such as deepening the integration 
with the global trade and production networks, establishing a sound regulatory 
framework, improving the overall business environment and disciplining the labour 
markets have remained as only options to achieve international competitiveness in 
favour of global capital’s increased penetration.  
Thus, within these boundaries of adopted policy instruments and institutional 
arrangements, Turkey has managed to overcome a range of Gershenkronian collective 
action problems, but failed to do so with respect to Kaldorian ones. Under the banner of 
achieving international competitiveness, the adopted policy reforms and institutional 
innovations have enhanced the capacity to solve Gershenkronian dilemmas that are 
mainly related to capital accumulation problems. In other words, the adopted 
arrangements have led to the mobilization of resources for the provision of social 
overhead capital, which includes services such as basic infrastructure, transportation, 
communication, and energy facilities required for production and industrial activities.65 
Likewise, they have also encouraged both global and domestic capitalists to make new 
investments in the industrial sector, leading to an overall growth in industrial production 
and diversification of a range of manufactured goods. However, the policy instruments’ 
and institutional arrangement’ capacities have failed to effectively solve Kaldorian 
collective action problems, such as increasing the returns to scale and the overall 
competitiveness of domestic firms vis-à-vis the leading TNCs, stimulating learning by 
doing, and moving up the product cycle with efficiency and local inputs. 
                                                          
65 Over the period, transport, telecommunication and energy infrastructure have thrived: the network of 
double lane inter-city roads grew more than trifold to 22,200 km; as one of the fast growing airlines in the 
world, the Turkish Airlines ranked as the best airline of the Europe between the years 2009 and 2011; 
Turkey’s airports and seaports were upgraded to the global standards; and the energy capacity 
substantially increased to almost 60,000 MW in 2012 (WB, 2014, p.10). 
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As the class-relational and institutional setting has not offered a leap towards 
renegotiating and reframing the terms of local accumulation and overcoming all sorts of 
collective action problems, Turkey has no alternative but to comply with what its 
position within the global division of labour and the new form of dependent 
development offers. Thus, given the asymmetrical and uneven nature of power relations 
in global capitalism, Turkey is doomed to follow a ‘lower-road’ of capitalist 
development, characterised by increasing industrial output and productivity at a 
respectable but not extraordinary rate and structural transformation, albeit with 
limitations in achieving increasing returns to scale, developing endogenous capacity in 
high-technology and high-value added niches of industrial production. That’s why 
domestic bourgeoisie are mostly specialized in the lower value-added (periphery-like) 
segments of global value chains, typically characterised by routinized technologies and 
production methods and deprived of what we call Schumpeterian entrepreneur profits or 
Marxian super profits. Mostly stuck at the subordinated stages of subcontracting and 
component manufacturing, domestic bourgeoisie display limited achievement in 
expanding their control over the entire circuits of accumulation along the value chains 
and remain dependent on the leading TNCs with respect to accessibility to cutting edge 
technologies, patents, capital goods and markets. In compliance with their subordinated 
position in the global value relations, they mostly adopted downstream stages of export 
roles, such as primary commodity exports, export-processing assembly operations, 
component-supply subcontracting and original equipment manufacturing rather than 
moving to the upperstream stages, such as original design manufacturing and original 
brand manufacturing. All in all, Turkey’s lower-road of articulation in the post-2001 
period exhibits characteristics of a new form of dependent development as it generates 
an expanded share of global manufacturing exports but a disproportionally low share of 
globally created value added.  
The articulation of the Turkish economy along this line has been also accompanied by a 
series of auxiliary symptoms of dependent development, manifesting themselves in 
various forms. First, the increasing integration with the global networks of production 
and trade has deepened the disarticulation of domestic economy as the manufacturing 
industry has mainly failed to create traditional multiplier effect and intra- /inter-industry 
linkages. A series of studies (Özmen 2014; Sönmez, 2015) show that the export growth, 
particularly in the mid-low tech and mid-high tech products, has been considerably 
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import-dependent, entailing high proportions of imported intermediates as well as 
capital goods. Therefore, given the disarticulated nature of economy, the surge in the 
output of export industries has not only fed back into the domestic economy 
insufficiently, but fostered the chronic problem of foreign trade deficit which has 
averagely cruised at the alarming level of 9.6 % in the period 2002-2014 (Turkstat, 
2015).   
This occurs as a result of the assembly-like character of domestic industrialists which 
mainly specialise in the downstream labour intensive segments of global value chains as 
subsidiaries, subcontractors and exporters of the leading TNCs. The formation of 
domestic industry along these lines, which symbolises Turkey’s lower-road of 
articulation with the global production, has been accompanied by another auxiliary 
symptom of dependent development with respect to the salaried and labouring classes. 
As domestic industrialists mostly entered the global production at the lower end of the 
value relations, they have been subjected to the fierce cost-down pressure of leading 
TNCs on the one hand and cut-throat competition with dozens of counterparts on the 
other. Operating under these conditions, the industrialists have been mostly endowed 
with low profit volumes and very modest, if not, entrepreneurial rents which ultimately 
translated into a ruinous regime of control over the salaried and labouring classes. 
In this sense, the increasing integration into the transnational networks of trade and 
production in the post-2001 period signifies a new wave of hostility against working 
classes in terms of labour rights and wage policy. The discourse of achieving 
international competitiveness has had important implications in this connection, as it 
required a new regime of control over labouring classes through which not only the 
domestic bourgeoisie but also the working classes have been densely incorporated into 
global value relations. As Turkey has taken part in a sort of ‘beauty contest’ of pleasing 
FDI, reframing the labour force in conformity with the demands of global capital 
occupied a central concern both for the allying domestic bourgeoisie and the state. The 
increasing articulation of domestic economy into the global production either directly 
by the penetration of TNCs or indirectly by subcontract agreements and arm’s-length 
outsourcing required both reductions in production costs and increased flexibility of 
labour force. 
The related measures in this direction were concurrently undertaken both in the areas of 
investment and employment. Under the broad scheme of improving investment climate, 
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capitalist classes, whether global or domestic, have been largely exempted from burdens 
of taxes, customs, duties and endowed with several incentives (such as land allocation, 
interest expenditure support and payment of employer's social security interest 
premiums by the Treasury), all of which were put into effect to reduce the cost of doing 
business in Turkey. Thus, the reduction in cost has been, in a sense, procured by 
indirectly socializing the burdens of capital to wider social classes through capital-
friendly arrangements in investment and fiscal regime. While the share of indirect taxes 
in overall tax revenues has surged from 37% in 1980 to 58% in 1995 and to 73% in 
2007, the share of corporate income tax dropped from 9.5% in 1995 to less than 1% in 
2007 (Demir and Erdem, 2010).  
Besides, more pivotal measures were also undertaken with the introduction of the new 
regime of control over labour by which intensified repression and exploitation of 
working classes has become an essential channel of reducing the cost of production and 
enhancing the international competitiveness of the economy. As several studies 
(Yeldan, 2007; Oğuz, 2011; Öngel and  Tanyılmaz, 2013) reveal, the transformation of 
economy post-2001 has largely put the burdens of economic growth, productivity and 
competitiveness on the shoulders of salaried and labouring classes. In this respect, the 
post-2001 period represents both continuity and change in terms of the nature of labour 
exploitation. In the preceding two decades, the control over labour had been 
predominantly established in the domain of distribution as cutting down wages and 
social expenditures via de-unionisation and anti-labour policies was the most frequently 
used strategy to reduce the labour cost. Starting from the early 2000s, the control over 
labour has been to a certain extent shifted to the domain of production with the 
introduction of a new competitiveness agenda by which increased efficiency became 
another way of reducing labour costs along with the traditional cost-cutting strategies 
(Ercan and Oğuz, 2007; Oğuz, 2011).   
Thus, the consolidation of a new form of dependent development in 2001 had important 
implications for labouring classes as it brought with it a new combination of relative 
and absolute surplus value extraction, blending low-wages and long working hours with 
productivity-enhancing measures at workplace. Particularly, the shift from the 
traditional and low-tech products to the mid-low and mid-high tech ones meant 
increasing share of relative surplus value extraction since it required higher levels of 
mechanisation in the production and reorganisation of the production process. However, 
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this did not bring the downright replacement of absolute surplus value with the relative 
surplus value extraction as discussed in the theory chapter with respect to the central 
economies where the relative surplus value extraction mostly prevails as a dominant 
form of labour exploitation. Rather, given its lower-road of articulation with the global 
economy, Turkey, a non-innovative and market follower economy, mostly relies on the 
absolute value extraction (lengthening the working hours) and immiseration (cutting 
down wages) as analogous to paradigmatic cases of a new form of dependent 
development. 
Thereby, the country’s re-articulation with global capitalism has only brought about an 
impoverishing economic growth that led to intensified social and economic exclusion of 
masses from the economic growth process. Probing into the empirical evidence reveals 
that the burdens of economic growth and productivity increase fell disproportionately 
on the labouring classes as the surplus transfer from the wage-labour to capitalist classes 
has intensified through squeezing real wages. As Öngel and Tanyılmaz (2013, p.39) put, 
whereas the labour productivity in Turkish manufacturing industry increased by 75 per 
cent over the period 1999 to 2011, the wage earnings per employee declined by 5 per 
cent in real terms. Looking into the post-2001 growth pattern, it can be argued that two 
factors stand behind the widening gap between the labour productivity and the real 
wage earnings. The first one is the extremely long working hours and increased work 
intensity with the flexibilization of labour market; the second one is the relative increase 
in the productivity of labour due to the adaptation of capital intensive and skill-requiring 
production techniques. 
In this respect, the adaptation of the new Labour Law in 2003 was instrumental in 
changing both the terms of labour’s subordination and the conditions of work in a 
number of ways. As Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir (2006, p.322) have put forth, the 
introduction of new terms for labour’s subordination and the conditions of work further 
empowered employers to increase the levels of extracted surplus value from the 
labouring classes in general and the collective workers in particular. Under the new 
labour law, employers were endowed the flexibility to regulate the weekly working 
hours at his or her discretion, to a maximum of 11 hours a day. Besides this, the new 
labour law provided the employers with flexibility not only in the regulation of the 
working hours, but also in the regulation of the slippage in the duration of work (start 
and end of work) as well as non-working hours (break times). 
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Thus, working time flexibility has legally enhanced the capacity of employers to 
increase the levels of absolute surplus value extraction in a more disciplined way. This 
has particularly become more evident given very long weekly working hours in Turkey. 
With more than 50 hours for dependent, full-time employees and almost 48 hours for 
total employees, Turkey has the longest average weekly working hours among the 35 
OECD members and two more countries, followed by these countries such Mexico and 
Chile (OECD.stat, 2015a). Likewise, with close to 41%, Turkey is by far the first 
country with the highest share of employees working 50 hours or more per week, again 
followed by Mexico with almost 29%, whereas the share is around 1% or 2% in 
Netherlands and Denmark (OECD.stat, 2015b). Indeed, an overall look at the average 
annual hours worked per person for the last one and half decade does not put Turkey at 
the top of the list, but a Turkish employee has worked up to 141 hours more than the 
OECD average with a whopping 1,905 hours per year average (OECD.stat, 2015c).  
Under the new labour regime, another characteristic of the labour market was the 
increasing wage flexibility given the enhanced capacity of employers in diverging from 
collective agreements, lowering labour costs by switching to fixed term contracts and 
employing subcontracted and short-term workers. In this respect, the new labour law 
abolished or modified many pro-labour practices and institutions and replaced them 
with a more flexible, unprotected and multi-layered labour regime through which 
precarious and nonstandard working conditions have prevailed (Çelik, 2015). As recent 
data reveals, the number of subcontracted employees has increased almost fourfold from 
387,000 in 2002 to almost one and half million in 2015 (Zaman, 2015). In the form of 
subcontracted, short-term and fixed term employment forms, the precarious working 
practice has been commonly used as a cost-reducing strategy given the fact that the 
workers under these employment forms are subjected to low wages and limited 
employment and social benefits. 
As Öngel (2014) argues, considering that almost half the employees had been informal 
and so extremely flexible, the growing flexibility and precariousness in labour markets 
meant further loss of rights for the registered and even unionised workers. Since the 
permanent job needs can be filled by precarious and non-unionised workers, the 
institutionalisation of the new labour regime has undermined the bargaining power of 
the labouring classes and created a buffer zone for labour militancy. Therefore, the 
growing flexibility and precariousness over the one and half decade has been 
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concurrently accompanied by deunionization and symbiotic syndicalism in collective 
labour relations. As Çelik (2015) argues, the new regime of control over the last one and 
half decade has not only been the most unprotected phase in terms of individual labour 
rights but also the weakest period in the last 50 years with respect to collective labour 
relations and unionisation. Therefore, the institutionalisation of the new labour control 
regime has, on the one hand, brought along highly intensified exploitation of work force 
thanks to a number of cost-reducing flexibilities in labour markets. On the other, it has 
also created unsecured and de-unionised work forces that can be easily hired, fired and 
subjected to changing dire conditions of work given the limited employment rights, lack 
of bargaining power, and security benefits.  
Starting from the early 2000s, the coverage of employment protection has significantly 
reduced as the job security has been applied to enterprises employing 30 or more 
workers, which in turn meant that more than half the employees in Turkey have been 
excluded from the scope of job security (Çelik, 2015, p.9). Moreover, the past one and 
half decades also corresponded to a significant erosion in collective labour relations and 
a drive of deunionization. Under the threat of unemployment and replaceability of 
labour force, the employees have been forced to accept disadvantageous working 
conditions and even give up certain concessions and rights obtained through the terms 
of formerly signed collective agreements. Overall, the period in question has witnessed 
a considerable meltdown in terms of labour activism, level of unionization and 
collective bargaining coverage.  
Starting from the second half of the 1990s, whereas the total number of workers 
significantly increased from approximately 8.5 million to more than 13.5 million, the 
trade union density had fallen drastically from 15% to 5.7 % by the end of 2010 
(Appendix 19). Parallel to the dramatic decrease in the rate of unionization, the number 
of employees covered by collective bargaining schemes, which stood at almost 1.3 
million in the mid-1990s, has been declining ever since to 786,000 in 2010 (Appendix 
19). A similar trend is also evident with respect to labour activism. The total number of 
workers involved in strikes has dropped from almost 200,000 in the mid-1990s to less 
than 19,000 and 9,000 in 2000 and 2010 respectively, accompanied by a sharp decline 
in striking severity rates to its lowest level at 2.6 (Appendix 19). Overall, it would not 
be an exaggeration to argue that the post-2001 period has been the most unprotected era 
in the Turkish labour history given the falling rate of unionization, weakening collective 
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bargaining power of labour and the precarisation of the work force. In stark contrast to 
the widening material and demographic bases of the trade unionism, Turkey is currently 
the least unionised country among 34 OECD countries at a rate of 4.57 in 2012 
(Appendix 20). Furthermore, Turkey not only holds the last place in terms of trade 
union density, but it is also the champion of deunionization as the levels of unionization 
has fallen by almost 55 per cent between the years 2000 and 2012 (Appendix 20).   
All in all, the consolidation of the new form of dependent development over the period 
has translated into a wave of new regime of control over the labouring classes. Thus, the 
new regime of control over labour has brought about increasing flexibilation and 
precarisation of the labour market coupled with the dramatic decline in unionization 
rates and so the collective bargaining power of labour force. In this sense, the 
transformation of labour relations along these line has mostly formed a basis for 
furthering extraction of absolute surplus value and immiseration, given the increasing 
flexibility in working/break hours and further reductions in real wages and non-wage 
labour costs. Besides, the re-articulation of domestic economy under the mantra of 
achieving international competitiveness has also forced capital groups to blend the low-
wages and long working hours with productivity-enhancing measures at workplace that 
meant the utilization of relative surplus value extraction to a certain extent.  
This became increasingly evident with the sectoral and technological shift of industrial 
production, which in turn required re-skilling of the labour force through vocational 
training and reorganization of labour processes and factory floor through the measures 
broadly named as process upgrading in value chain lexicon. Again, the increasing 
flexibilation of labour and production processes under the new labour regime has been 
instrumental in this respect. The new regime of control created a work force that is more 
subservient to productivity-enhancing measures in workplace as the employer has been 
legally empowered to altered the material and organizational conditions of work, and 
subject the labour force to changing work conditions by notifying in written that the 
change is compulsory and based on valid reasons. Moreover, the new labour regime has 
also aimed to intensify the extraction of relative surplus value through re-skilling labour 
force in compliance with the productivity-enhancing whims of capital. Particularly, this 
found its expression in the growing emphasis on the improvement of vocational and 
technical training as a strategic field that is reframed by a series of laws and regulations 
(Oğuz, 2011).  
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As a result, over the period in question, the intensifying exploitation of the labour force 
and increasing transfer of surplus from labour to capital was accompanied by relatively 
higher economic growth rates and productivity levels but at the expense of increasing 
inequality, falling labour income share and deteriorating wealth distribution. Probing 
into the empirical evidence reveals that as a corollary of the new form of dependent 
development, the wider segments of society were increasingly excluded from and 
deprived of the benefits of economic growth and productivity rise in Turkey. Thus, 
during the period in question, the labour income shares in Turkey saw a secular 
downward trend from 46.5% in 2000 to 33.1% in 2014 (AMECO 2015). Looking at 39 
countries covered by the AMECO (2015) database, Turkey has not only had the lowest 
labour income share but also, after Romania, experienced the second steepest decline in 
labour income share, followed by Mexico and Poland. Parallel to this, the wealth 
inequality in Turkey has also deepened dramatically. According to the data extracted 
from Suisse Global Wealth Databook (2014, pp.124-126), the wealth share of the top 
decile had increased from 66.7% to 77.7% between the years 2000-2014, placing 
Turkey among the few countries with “very high inequality”, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Malaysia and Thailand. Even more strikingly, whereas the share of the remained 
90% of the society decreased one third from 33.3 to 22.3% in the meanwhile, the top 
percentile of the Turkish society increased their wealth share from 38.1 to 54.3% 
(Appendix 21). Thus, as discussed so far, the consolidation of the new form of 
dependent development not only generated a lower road of articulation with the global 
economy for the local bourgeoisie, but most importantly an impoverishing growth 
pattern at the expense of the wider society in Turkey. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this and the preceding chapter, the evolution and changing dynamics of dependency 
relations in the Turkish national context have been critically examined and scrutinized 
under a three-fold periodization through the utilization of the conceptual framework 
presented earlier. In its broad form, such an examination has provided a retrospective 
and political economic analysis of Turkey’s late capitalist development by particularly 
exploring linkages and interplay between the local capital, state and the multinational 
corporations. Again, complementing the modest comparative perspective presented in 
the very same chapter, the historical trajectory of Turkish capitalist development has 
also been loosely confronted with the paradigmatic and deviant cases of dependent 
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development to situate the case of Turkey in the differentiating patterns of capitalist 
development within the global periphery. 
At the country-level analysis, it has been broadly discussed that a closer study of the 
political economy of industrialisation strategies, institutional settings and development 
projects offers valuable insights in understanding why the capitalist development did 
not occur equally among late industrialisers but was instead limited to a few, and why 
Turkey, along with the paradigmatic cases of Latin America, has made limited progress 
in increasing the returns to scale, moving up the product cycle and integrating its local 
firms into the global value chains in a quest to occupy high value-added niches. In 
pursuing such an endeavour, a special emphasis has been laid on factors such as the 
shifting configuration of class forces, inter- and intra-class dynamics, and state-society 
relations to better understand the limited institutional capacity of the Turkish state in 
overcoming the collective action problems and so the challenges of changing 
dependency relations over time. In this sense, the late capitalist development of Turkey 
has been examined as an uneasy and abortive process of resolving the long-standing 
inter- and intra-class cleavages, balancing the changing interests and power struggles 
among various class fractions and mobilizing enough support for formulating and 
implementing long-term industrialisation strategies and development projects to move 
up to the level that enables the local firms to compete with the first movers in the global 
economy.  
Therefore, given such a lower-road of developmental and institutional capacity, the 
local capital in Turkey has been incorporated into global economy on highly 
asymmetrical and dependent terms and mostly remained stuck at downstream segments 
of the global division of labour and value relations. Briefly stated, much more in 
conformity with the Latin America cases, the Turkish industrialists have mainly 
remained stuck at the lower stages of export roles, such as export-processing assembly 
operations, component-supply subcontracting and original equipment manufacturing 
and have displayed a limited success in shifting to the higher stages of export roles, 
such as original design manufacturing and original brand manufacturing. Thus, 
domestic manufactures have not expended their control over the entire circuit of 
accumulation and have never achieved the state of what Schwartz called “national” 
bourgeoisie. In this sense, as it was discussed in Chapter three, the local accumulation 
of industrial bourgeoisie in Turkey has mainly been conditioned by the broader cycle of 
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leading TNCs. The domestic bourgeoisie, as non-innovative or market follower firms, 
has been largely deprived of what we call Schumpeterian entrepreneurial profits or 
Marxian super profit and so the highly repressive labour regime has remained as the 
only option to continuously compensate their cost disadvantages, leading to 
impoverishing economic growth marked by intensified social and economic exclusion 
of masses from the growth process. As broadly discussed so far, such a lower road of 
integration with the global networks of production and trade is, more or less, evident all 
across the manufacturing sectors in Turkey, but as flagged up in the introductory 
Chapter it is best documented in the automotive industry in particular. As the major 
driver behind Turkey’s structural transformation and the top sector of the country’s 
export, the automotive industry indeed offers a valuable case to study the limits and 
prospects of development at the lower level of analysis. Thus, in the subsequent two 
chapters, the study shifts the focus of analysis from the generality and abstractness of 
country study to demonstrativeness and concreteness of sectoral analyses in order to 
provide deeper insights to the matter of dependency and development in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Multinational Auto-makers, State, Classes and a Retrospective 
Analysis of Dependency Relations in the Turkish Automotive Industry  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Concretising our discussion at an empirical level, this and the following chapter 
combine the merits of the country study presented above with the demonstrativeness of 
industry analysis, taking the Turkish automotive sector as a representative case, which 
is believed to add empirical rigor, deeper insight and further validation to our analytical 
framework. The formation and development of the auto industry poses an excellent case 
study for the changing dynamics of dependency and development in Turkey as a late 
industrialising country. First, ranking 15th largest in the world with an annual 
production over 1.3 million vehicles, employing more than 400,000 people and having 
been the export champion of the last ten years, the automotive sector is the main driver 
behind the export-led manufacturing and structural transformation of the Turkish 
economy (OSD, 2016; ISPAT, 2015). Given its considerable share in production, export 
and employment, no other sector better reflects the accomplishments and weaknesses of 
Turkey’s overall development performance and its integration with the global economy. 
Second, as one of the most internationalised sectors in terms of capital, production and 
R&D activity, the automotive sector is an industry of leading TNCs, which increasingly 
organise their operations on a global scale. With an annual production of over 90 
million units in more than 50 countries, the automotive industry has not only become 
one of the most important agents of economic growth in the developing world, but also 
one of the major industries in the development strategies of latecomer countries, due to 
the substantial linkages it forges with other sectors (OICA, 2016). Therefore, another 
justification for choosing the auto industry lies in its highly globalised nature in 
organisational terms, as well as the vast spin-off effects it generates given its linkages 
with other sectors such as steel, plastics, textile, electronics, rubber, metal, etc. 
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Last but not least, the automotive industry, more than any other sector, typifies the 
changing limits and prospects of late capitalist development, given the ever-increasing 
entry barriers, characterized by rising economies of scale, skyrocketing capital 
requirements, rapidly changing product and process technologies, and intensifying 
competition in global markets. Although the auto industry historically played a 
spearheading role in the capitalist development of West European and East Asian 
countries in the twentieth century, and has in some sense matured, it has also undergone 
constant renewal. Earlier expectation that the auto industry would go through a similar 
life cycle to textiles and footwear, and be entirely transferred to low labour cost 
countries, appears misplaced. In fact, the advent of front-wheel-drive cars has been 
followed by the introduction and advancement of new technologies in engines, 
transmission and total powertrain systems. Furthermore, the application of assembly-
line robots and innovations in new products and assembly processes has also made 
economies of scale and scope ever more important, and generated further advancement 
in automotive technologies, which is difficult for late comers to attain. Even today 
developing countries face intricate technological challenges and compete on a 
substantially imbalanced playing field, in which formal and informal barriers restrain 
the entry of new firms from the less developed world. Faced with these barriers, 
developing economies, in technological, managerial and commercial terms, rely on 
leading TNCs to gain a foothold in global automotive production, increasing returns to 
scale, mastering existing technologies and moving into the higher value-added segments 
of auto value relations. 
Considering its significance as an ideal case to study, the following chapters examine 
the origins and development of the Turkish automotive sector, which has greatly 
conditioned and evolved within the context of the global restructuring of the automotive 
industry. Such an in-depth industry analysis avoids the generality and abstraction of 
country-level study, providing closer and more concrete insights into how the process 
and problems of late industrialization in Turkey have changed in conjunction with the 
shifting dynamics of dependency relations over time. Drawing on the three-fold 
periodization of dependency relations in the historiography of Turkey’s capitalist 
development, the first section of this chapter starts with an account of the historical 
origins and earlier developments of the Turkish automotive industry between the mid-
1950s and the early 1980s. This section scrutinises the historical setting for the 
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transition from classic dependence to dependent development and explores the 
formation of a triple alliance and domestic value chains in the Turkish automotive 
industry. The objective here is to understand how and under what conditions the earlier 
forms of dependency relations in the Turkish automotive industry arose and were 
concretised throughout the interrelationship between foreign capital, the state and 
domestic classes. 
The second section then discusses the success and failure of auto-led industrialisation in 
pre-1980s Turkey, with occasional references to the insights derived from the Latin 
American and East Asian experiences. Special attention is given to shifting 
configurations of class forces, state-society complexes and institutional settings in 
Turkey, and their peculiar interaction with the world auto industry. The aim here is to 
reveal how the prospects and constraints generated by the world auto industry were 
dealt with in the national context of Turkey in these early stages. Such a historical 
account of the Turkish automotive industry provides a basis for understanding how 
changing forms of dependency relations and the uneasy nature of state-society relations 
conditioned the strategies of leading transnational corporations in the Turkish auto 
industry and provided preconditions for the present state of the sector. 
Building on this retrospective analysis, the final section turns attention to recent 
transformations in the Turkish auto industry from the 1980s onwards. This section 
provides a detailed understanding of the changing dynamics of the industry and the 
ways through which it has become part of the value relations and strategies of leading 
transnational auto companies. This section propounds that the Turkish motor vehicle 
industry has undergone a series of transformations since the early 1980s, which marked 
the beginning of new era that would end up with full integration of the industry into 
global strategies and the asymmetrical value relations of leading auto multinationals in 
the 2000s and 2010s. Then, completing our industry-level analysis, the subsequent 
chapter focuses on this recent process by exploring how the re-integration of the 
Turkish auto industry through a particular type of accumulation pattern and a 
configuration of class forces and state-society relations generates a new form of 
exploitative and dependent auto-led development in Turkey. 
6.2 From Classic Dependence to Dependent Development: Formation of the Triple 
Alliance and Domestic Value Chains in the Turkish Automotive Industry 
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While automotive production had already started in the US and some European 
countries as early as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the origins of the 
auto industry in Turkey date back to the mid-1950s. The geopolitical role and 
development policy that Turkey assumed in the post-war period provided the historical 
setting for the formation of the industry. Shortly after the Democratic Party took office 
in 1950, the decades-old railway transportation policy of the young republic was 
abandoned and replaced with a nine-year highway construction programme which came 
into force with the financial backing of Marshall Aid (Ansal, 1988). The new 
transportation policy of the DP was well-matched with the standpoints of World Bank 
experts, who outspokenly recommended dismantling the inward-looking étatist 
industrialisation and giving priority to agricultural and commercial-led capital 
accumulation energised by foreign investments.  Therefore, it was essential to connect 
regions of blossoming agricultural production with major export centres, and to open up 
domestic markets to a wide array of consumer products. Under the guidance of such 
policy shifts, the total length of the highway network increased by 30.7% during the 
1950s, whereas the network of railways was largely neglected, with a slight change of 
2.9% (Aksoy, 1990, p.40).  
Coupled with mass migration to urban areas as a consequence of rapid mechanisation in 
the agricultural sector, triggered by the Marshall Plan and increasing income per capita 
thanks to favourable agricultural export earnings, the growth of intra- and inter-city 
networks stimulated domestic demand for motor vehicles in Turkey (Ansal, 1988). In 
the first half of the 1950-1960 period, increasing demand for motor-vehicles was met by 
the importation of completely built-up (CBU) vehicles in the partnership with local 
commercial bourgeoisies as local dealers or distributers (see Figure 6.1). As discussed 
in Chapter 4, this earlier stage in the automotive sector coincided with the final phases 
of classic dependency in Turkey’s economic history. Standing at the edge of 
international divisions of labour, Turkey relied heavily on the export of primary and 
agricultural products in exchange for manufactured ones from core countries. It was 
also in this period that commercial-based capital accumulation reached maturity, 
allowing certain segments of the local bourgeoisie to transform into industrial capitalists 
in collaboration with international productive capital. Under these conditions of classic 
dependence, the number of motor vehicles more doubled, supplied by importation. The 
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number of passenger cars increased by 124%, while buses/minibuses and trucks grew 
by 124% and 127%, respectively (Aksoy, 1990, p.43). 
 Figure 6. 1 Classic Dependency and the Basic Mechanism of Value Relations  
in the Turkish Automotive Sector (Prior to the Mid-1950s) 
 
 
 
Source: Drawn by the author 
However, in the second half of the 1950s, the importation of motor-vehicles became 
increasingly difficult due to interruptions in Marshall Aids and rising foreign exchange 
bottlenecks, given deteriorating terms of trade in Turkey (Okur, 1994). It was thus in the 
midst of the foreign exchange shortages and balance of payment difficulties of the late 
1950s that the Turkish state, similar to Brazil and Mexico,66 placed the establishment of 
an indigenous automotive industry on its economic agenda in order to save foreign 
exchange. In his autobiography, Bernar Nahum (1988), a pioneer of the Turkish 
automotive industry, stated this point on behalf of the Koç group which had started as a 
Ford dealer in 1928 and later became the largest auto producer and conglomerate in 
Turkey: 
The starting point of the Koç group was domestic trade, then a trade started 
based on imports under names such as agency, distributorship and public 
dealership. The foreign exchange problems were felt for a long time in our 
country, and trade regimes and tariffs put in place as a result of this led to the 
belief throughout the Koç group, especially on the part of Vehbi Koç, that our 
country should industrialize (Nahum, 1988, p.253).  
In fact, the establishment of the auto industry in Turkey was not only in the interests of 
the state and local bourgeoisies; it also coincided with the international strategies of 
multinational auto-makers. As discussed in preceding chapters, the post-war era, 
particularly the mid-1950s, saw the beginnings of structural transformation in the world 
capitalist context, characterised by the internationalization of productive capital and the 
expansion and relocation of manufacturing industry into the developing world. The 
                                                          
66 Although the origins of the Latin American auto industry, particularly in Brazil and Mexico can be 
traced back to the early twentieth century, the establishment and promotion of an auto industry became a 
major element of the development strategies of host governments in the 1950s after they faced serious 
balance of payment difficulties. For detailed discussion of the Latin American auto industry, see Jenkins 
(1977 and 1984). 
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world automotive industry in the late 1950s and early 1960s was increasingly 
characterised by intensified concentration and competition among automakers, and by 
the worldwide dispersion of auto production,67 particularly assembly operations, in a 
continuous search for economies of scale and new markets (see, Jerkins, 1977, 1984; 
Bennett and Sharpe, 1985; Sturgeon and Florida, 2000).  
It was with such a convergence of the international strategies of multinational auto-
makers with the domestic economic interests of the state and local bourgeoisies that the 
foundations of assembly operations were laid in Turkey. The first enterprise was that of 
Turk-Willys-Overland, which started assembling pick-up trucks and jeeps for Turkey’s 
military under license from and with a 25% equity share for Kaiser Jeeps in 1954 
(Ansal, 1988). In the following five years, particularly with the protectionist measures 
taken by the state in 1958, the number of auto assembly firms raised to five, all of which 
started assembly operations mostly as joint ventures or under licensing agreements with 
foreign auto-makers, manufacturing low volume of completely knocked-down (CKD) 
commercial vehicles for the domestic market (see Appendix 24).  
Starting from the late 1950s, therefore, the Turkish automotive industry was 
incorporated into the worldwide production strategies of multinational auto-makers and 
gradually developed under the framework of associated-dependent development. The 
interplay of multinationals, state and local capital, and the formation of a triple alliance 
are crucial in understanding such a transition in the Turkish automotive industry. 
Particularly with the penetration of international productive capital, multinational auto-
makers were no longer external factors whose interests had been internally conveyed by 
domestic commercial bourgeoisie. Instead, multinational auto-makers were now 
operating locally and sharing an interest with both local capital and the state in the 
formation and development of the auto industry. During this process, specific sections 
of domestic bourgeoisie, particularly those who had reached a certain level of 
commercial accumulation, conveyed their desires to transform themselves into 
industrial capitalists by setting up direct and/or indirect partnerships (joint ventures, 
licensing agreements) with foreign auto-makers. As a complementary agent of this 
process, the Turkish state provided the economic and institutional framework for the 
                                                          
67 Starting in the 1950s, international investment by auto-makers grew rapidly as both assembly and 
manufacturing operations dispersed to developing countries that were previously supplied by vehicle 
exports (see, Appendices 22 and 23). Between the years 1955-1969, auto production in developing 
countries rose by 18.9 % per year as compared to only 5.7% for developed countries (Jenkins, 1977, 
p.38). 
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emerging pattern of industry-based accumulation by taking protectionist measures and 
allotting grants to make assembly operations appealing, and by directly or indirectly 
supporting partnerships between multinational auto firms and the domestic 
bourgeoisie68.  
As Jan Nahum, son of Bernar Nahum and a leading figure in the Turkish auto industry, 
explained in our interview, the Turkish auto industry had no option but to be set up 
under joint ventures and licencing agreements, given the initial state of the industry, 
characterised by limited capital formation and lack of the required technology and 
know-how on the side of domestic capital (Interview No.4, 2016). During the 10-year 
period following its inception in the mid-1950s, the automotive industry in Turkey was 
highly labour-intensive and assembly-oriented, remaining mostly limited to the 
assembly of commercial vehicles with low-volume domestic content (Azcanlı, 1995). 
Given its labour intensive, routinized and technically matured nature, the dispersion of 
auto production in this initial period can be seen as the formation of domestically-
oriented primitive value chains under the emerging dynamics of associated-dependent 
dependent development in the Turkish auto industry (see Figure 6.2). Auto production 
in this period did not embody international links, except for the importation of vehicle 
components and the adaptation of technology and assembly plants from abroad. In this 
sense, the technological, organizational and managerial dependence of Turkish auto 
industry was pronounced as only some ready parts such as batteries, rubber and paint 
could be supplied domestically, and almost all other components were imported from 
multinational partners. 
Figure 6. 2 Transition to Associated-Dependent Development and Formation of 
Domestically-Oriented  Primitive Value Chains in the Turkish Auto Industry  (Late 
1950s to the Mid-1960s) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 As Aksoy, (1990) and many others (Azcanlı, 1995; Okur, 1994) suggest, the state deliberately 
encouraged the assembly of motor vehicles in Turkey by adopting quota system, allotting grants and 
increasing the local content of assembled vehicles. The state also supported the formation of the auto 
industry by other means. For example, Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes wrote a letter of support to 
Henry Ford II to encourage partnership between Koç’s Otosan and the Ford Motor Company (Azcanlı, 
1995). 
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Source: Drawn by the author 
The structure of the auto industry in this early period was marked by a lack of domestic 
demand, low volumes of production, the absence of a network of suppliers and high 
dependence of local auto firms on multinational partners. With the exception of the 
Ford-Otosan partnership, firms which had been established before the 1960s were not 
able to reach production targets and never succeeded in assembling more than a few 
hundred vehicles per year (Ansal, 1988). Therefore, the Turkish auto market was not 
attractive to multinational auto-makers in terms of establishing large-scale production 
facilities. It was not until import-substituting industrialization was firmly entrenched in 
Turkish development policy, with its necessary protectionist measures and 
encouragements that the auto industry really flourished under the consolidating 
dynamics of associated-dependent development.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, with the 1960s military coup and the subsequent changes in 
economic policy, greater emphasis was placed on industrial development under an 
officially controlled import-substitution policy, based on five-year development plans. 
When long-term state planning started to set policies for the domestic production of 
durable consumer goods, the automotive industry was chosen as one of the major 
sectors that needed to be developed (Okur, 1994). As a reaction to the assembly-
oriented nature of the industry, the primary objective was to shift from assembly 
operations to a more integrated domestic auto industry (Interviews No.46-51, 2016). A 
first, premature step was taken shortly after the coup. Regarding it as a matter of 
prestige, the new military government ordered the launch of a domestic car, fully 
designed and produced in Turkey. After 130 days of hasty labour at the Railway 
Workshop in Eskisehir, an almost 100% domestic car, called Devrim (Revolution), was 
manufactured based totally on labour-intensive craft principles. As Nahum explained, 
although the launch of the Devrim proved that Turkey was indeed capable of producing 
cars, it was not ready for cost-effective mass production given the lack of competencies, 
a qualified workforce, supplier networks and domestic demand at that time (Interview 
No.4, 2016). 
Therefore, when the first five-year development plan, which covered the 1963-67 
period, went into effect, the establishment of passenger-car production was excluded 
due to its infeasibility, but strategies of protectionism and encouragement schemes were 
adopted to increase capacity and local content utilization in vehicle production (Aksoy, 
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1990). The regulations adopted ensured the closure of the domestic market to the 
importation of vehicles, with the exception of light and cheap automobiles, due to the 
projection of low domestic demand. With the enforcement of “Assembly Industry 
regulations” in 1964, minimum local content ratios were also set for buses, trucks and 
cars, along with other durable consumer products such as radios, record players, 
refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and so forth.69 The main objective herein was to reduce 
foreign exchange expenditures by minimising the industry’s dependency on imported 
parts and encouraging as much domestic production as possible. This was levied 
through the annual renewal of import-allowed lists and the allocation of foreign 
currency to firms which met the envisaged local content requirements (Azcanlı, 1995).  
However, despite the measures adopted to control and regulate the industry, the 
regulations did not encourage the development of a truly integrated industry structure 
with increasing local content (Okur, 1994). Rather, as Jenkins (1977, 1984) and others 
(Bennett and Sharpe, 1985) argued for the paradigmatic case of Latin America, 
regulations gave rise to investment in a number of new assemblers and further 
fragmentation of market structure in which none of these firms were capable of 
exploiting effective capacity utilisation and economies of scale. In fact, as in the Latin 
American cases, the Turkish auto industry in the 1960s and early 1970s developed with 
oligopolistic competition at the international level. The lack of local demand, and excess 
capacity in the local market did not mean that new investments in developing markets 
were not profitable. Rather, under the conditions of concentration and competitive 
struggle among multinational auto-makers, not to invest in markets with future potential 
would mean letting rivals pre-empt local markets, protected under the import-
substituting policies (Jenkins, 1977) 
This was the situation that the Turkish auto industry experienced in the 1960s. As there 
were no effective measures taken for limiting the number of firms entering the sector, 
the response of many new multinationals to the government’s local content 
requirements was to rush into the Turkish market in quest of exploiting market 
potentials and assembly rents offered by the protected domestic market (Azcanlı, 1995). 
Although the government cancelled the assembly permits of four commercial vehicles 
producers that could not meet domestic content requirements, ten new commercial 
vehicle assemblers had been established as joint ventures and under licence agreements 
                                                          
69 For local content requirements in automotive sector, see Appendix 25. 
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by the late 1960s (Appendix 26). Moreover, even though the assembly of passenger cars 
was not foreseen for about a decade, increasing demand for imported cars due to fast 
economic growth up to 12% per annum and expansion in highway networks triggered 
the domestic assembly of passenger cars (Okur, 1994). The first mass-produced 
automotive production began in 1966 with the Anadol. Produced within existing 
facilities of Otosan, the Anadol was designed for the domestic market by adopting the 
production techniques of the English Reliant Company and utilizing Ford engines and 
transmissions. Since it was not possible to establish a fully-equipped plant, the less-
capital intensive technique of fiberglass production was adopted in a highly labour-
intensive manner (Küçükerman, 2008), The Anadol was produced until 1982 when the 
project was abandoned since it could not compete against more advanced production 
techniques adopted by newly founded car assemblers (Nahum, 1988).  
Supplies of the Anadol accounted for only 2% of domestic demand in 1967 whereas 
98% of demand for cars was met through imports (DPT, 2006). Thus, given the rising 
demand, the government put domestic passenger-car production on its agenda for the 
second five-year plan period (1968-1972). Taking lessons from the abortive experience 
of the “Revolution”, the state this time resorted to support from multinationals to ensure 
success. Two major automobile companies were founded on paper in 1968 and 1969 
respectively:  TOFAŞ (Turk Otomobil Fabrikasi AS), with a 41.5% equity share for the 
Italian FIAT, and OYAK-Renault, with 44% of its equity share owned by the French 
Renault (see, Appendix, 27). With the establishment of both factories by late 1971, the 
auto industry in Turkey gradually gained momentum to a certain extent. As Okur (1994) 
suggests, these two factories not only surpassed all other firms in terms of production 
volumes, they also became role models for the rest of industry as they encouraged 
further developments in auto part supply chains in Turkey. The newly established 
passenger-car factories were bound by explicit targets and provisions, which imposed 
minimum production capacity of 20.000 units per annum and a 67% domestic content 
requirement within 18 months following the start of production.  
Indeed, the supplier industry had experienced a certain degree of development before 
the establishment of passenger-car factories, given that the assemblers had already 
worked with numerous small-scale, low quality and cheap local suppliers. However, 
starting from the late 1960s and triggered by the foundation of passenger-car factories, 
the Turkish government took more decisive steps by setting new local content 
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requirements for the period 1971-1978 (see Appendix, 28). As many of the auto 
component manufacturers that were interviewed during fieldwork suggested, the 
foundations of today’s auto supply chains in Turkey were shaped in the 1970s thanks to 
the decisive ISI strategies of the state and the efforts of auto assemblers to develop their 
own supply base (Interviews No. 13-20-29-30, 2016). Thus, by the late 1970s, the 
number of auto component firms that supplied domestic input to the industry rose to 
900, with the establishment of SME-oriented domestic supplier networks and the 
emergence of large-scale suppliers having partnerships and licensing agreements with 
multinational component manufacturers (Aksoy, 1990, p.65). 
Hence, it can be argued that from the late 1960s and early 1980s, domestic value chains 
in the Turkish automotive industry blossomed given the existence of a large number of 
firms producing commercial vehicles and passenger-cars with increasingly locally-made 
content (see, Figure 6.3), This development can be taken as a maturation in the local 
accumulation of industrial capital through the decades-long interplay between 
multinational auto-makers, the state and local capital. With the ongoing penetration of 
multinationals in the auto industry through joint ventures and licensing agreements with 
local capital and state enterprises, domestic production in the sector was established, 
certain segments of local capital transformed into auto industrialists, and the domestic 
auto supplier network developed and diversified concomitantly.  
Figure 6. 3 Consolidation of Domestic-Oriented Auto Value Chains in Turkey by the 
late 1970s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Drawn by the author 
As the Turkish state, allying with multinationals and local capital, created a set of 
conditions for furthering investment in the industry, both commercial vehicle and 
passenger-car production gradually increased, as indicated in Appendix 29. It can be 
argued that Turkey, during this period, was able to confront a set of Gershenkronian 
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collective action problems in the auto industry, such as encouraging local bourgeoisies 
to aggregate capital and invest in new industrial plants, even though it was in part 
dependent on the favourable conditions facilitated by the internationalisation of 
productive capital.  
However, despite relative success in auto-led industrialisation, Turkey did not 
successfully confront Kaldorian collective action problems, as the automotive industry 
remained limited in its capacity to create and capture higher value, by world standards. 
Much similar to Latin American cases, the entry of so many assemblers during these 
initial periods had a disastrous impacts on economies of scale, capacity utilisation ratios 
and the enhancement of technological capacity on an industrial level. As many studies 
(Ansal, 1988; Aksoy, 1990; Okur, 1994) reveal, under the highly fragmented market 
structure and low domestic demand, the industry suffered from low volumes of 
production, diseconomies of scale, and low capacity utilisation ratios, which in turn 
resulted in high costs and inefficient industry structure, and restricted the 
incorporation/enhancement of advanced technologies.  
Suffering from diseconomies of scale and lack of technological capacity, more capital-
intensive and technically-sophisticated components such as engines and transmissions 
were beyond the capacity of domestic companies (Okur, 1994). Furthermore, the 
establishment of wider domestic supply chains did not result in technological 
assimilation by local suppliers, but generated a highly segmented sub-industry structure 
(Interviews 19-34-13, 2016). On one hand, the sub-industry consisted of a large number 
of small- and medium-sized manufacturers that utilized backward techniques, with 
limited bargaining power on component prices. On the other, it also involved small 
numbers of large and technologically more capable enterprises that were founded as 
foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures following the investment of assemblers. Taking all 
these deficiencies into consideration, the features of an internationally uncompetitive 
and dependent industry structure were already established in these early stages. Given 
the fact that Turkey has not managed to develop a technically efficient and truly 
indigenous automotive industry, generating its own linkages with the upstream and 
downstream sectors, the issue of technological and managerial dependence of local 
assemblers on foreign partners was deeply rooted within the industry, coupled with sub-
industry dominance by supplier firms that were reliant on the technology and 
collaborative agreements of multinationals. 
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6.3 Multinationals, State, Classes and the Failure of Auto-led Industrialisation in 
the ISI Period  
All these disappointing outcomes during the initial stages of the automotive industry 
provide a well-exposed image of the failure of import-substitution-led industrialization 
in Turkey. As discussed in the theory chapters, the successful and long-term 
implementation of an industrialisation project is contingent on the ability of the state to 
build the necessary societal consensus and institutional settings to secure the required 
support in overcoming collective action problems, inherited in late industrialisation 
process. This was not the case neither in the cases of Latin America nor in Turkey, 
where ISI strategies were implemented in a haphazard fashion, rather than as part of a 
long-running capitalist development project. From the early 1960s until the late 1970s, 
the Turkish state was in the unpleasant position of reconciling the clashing interests of 
different classes and class fractions with the long-term project of auto-led 
industrialisation.  
The first contradiction, in this respect, was laid in a presence of powerful nonindustrial 
and agricultural elite which in part precluded the implementation of a full-scale import-
substitution policy. Similar to Brazil and other Latin American cases, and in sharp 
contrast to Korea, no Turkish governments dared to confront the formidable power of 
the agricultural elite by implementing modern agrarian reform or financing ISI through 
squeezing agriculture. This limitation in agricultural policy affected auto-led 
industrialisation adversely in two repects. First, as the class-nature of the Turkish state 
did not allow for an agrarian reform, the economic potential in the agricultural sector 
remained far from fully exploited, which in turn kept agricultural productivity and 
exports lower than their potential, and kept the domestic demand narrower than it 
should be. Second, as successive governments in the Turkish multi-party democracy 
competed for the favour of agricultural classes by keeping agricultural taxation below 
1% and offering high agricultural price support, the low rate of appropriation of 
agricultural surplus for the industry remained as feature of the ISI period (Ansal, 1988).    
Along with the contradictions emerging from the intact nature of the agricultural sector, 
formidable intra-capitalist cleavages in the private sector and the uneasy nature of state-
capital relations culminated in the paralysis of state capacity and precluded the follow-
up of a successful auto-led industrialisation project. Rapid industrialisation through 
import substitution policies led to conflicts within the private sector over issues such as 
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protectionism, foreign exchange allocation, credits and wage increases. Under ISI 
policies, as emerging industrialists diversified their production, they asked the state to 
add more and more locally-made items to the list of prohibited imports. Given the fact 
that the economic interests of commercial classes lay in the importation of 
manufactured goods, the prohibition of imports pitted industrialists against traders. As 
discussed earlier, although the 1960 coup had in a sense found a forcible solution to the 
contradiction between the new emerging industrialists and the commercial classes, the 
industrial bourgeoisie could not truly establish their hegemony over commercial capital.  
Until the mid-1970s, auto-industrialists were deprived of a formal and steady channel of 
information exchange with the state (Interview, No.49, 2016). They were represented 
along with other industrialists and large numbers of commercial bourgeoisie under the 
umbrella of the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges 
(TOBB). The TOBB, which was the prime private sector organisation and was largely 
dominated by commercial interests, inevitably became a centre of intra-class cleavages 
within the capitalist classes (Barkey, 1988). As the newly emerging industrialists were 
increasingly in need of imported capital and intermediate goods, they required a large 
share of the country’s foreign exchange. Given foreign exchange bottlenecks, the import 
requirement of the industrial sector therefore turned the industrial bourgeoisie against 
the commercial classes. Owing to the fact that the automotive sector along with other 
industries suffered from production cuts due to delays in foreign exchange allocations, 
they increasingly became critical of the TOBB which was in charge of allocating import 
licences and foreign exchange (Interviews, No.7-49-50, 2016). Hence, one of the major 
contradictions for auto industrialists was the decades-old underrepresentation of their 
interests within the TOBB, which limited the auto-led industrialisation by giving 
priority to the interests of commercial capital.  
The cleavages within private capital further intensified when the frustrated petit 
bourgeoisies of Anatolia raised their voices under the tenure of Necmettin Erbakan as 
president of the TOBB. Erbakan’s tenure was reflection of the growing alienation of 
emerging small-scale industrial capital allied with traders, shopkeeper and artisans 
(Barkey, 1988). As discussed in Chapter 4, the tenure of Erbakan induced the secession 
of big industrialists from the TOBB and led to the formation of TÜSİAD as their own 
representative organization. Yet this did not settled the underlying cleavages within the 
private sector. After the pro-big business ruling Justice Party transferred the TOBB’s 
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power over import quotas to the Ministry of Trade and removed Erbakan from office, 
Erbakan and his followers formed the National Salvation Party (NSP). With the 
establishment of the NSP, the cleavages within private capital increasingly expanded 
into the political arena. During the three coalition governments between 1973 and 1978, 
the NSP, as a coalition partner, took the Ministry of Industry and Technology and had a 
hand in ministries of commerce, agriculture and justice, allowing it to have a stake in 
the distribution of economic benefits (Bianchi, 1984). 
Considering all these dynamics, the early stages of the Turkish auto industry lacked 
well-established institutional channels of communication and reciprocal relations 
between auto firms and responsible state agencies. The extreme politicisation of ISI 
strategies in Turkey and Latin American cases like Brazil and Mexico help explain why 
import substituting auto industrialisation did not generate the same outcomes as it did, 
say in Korea. For much of the 1960s and 1970s, underlying inter- and intra-class 
cleavages and the intense lobbying of the private sector for economic rents delimited the 
institutional capacity of the state and prevented it from pursuing a well-designed auto-
led industrialisation policy.  
Therefore, the state, which itself became the object of inter- and intra-class cleavages, 
had no significant leverage over local industrialists nor multinational auto firms. 
Deprived of the technological and managerial skills needed for the industry, local 
bourgeoisies co-operated with multinational auto-makers in order to make full use of 
their capital and domestic connections, and get a foothold in auto manufacturing. In the 
absence of reciprocal relations and a formal channel of information exchange, the state 
was deprived of an appropriate milieu for taking strategically-designed, sector-specific 
measures with respect to the auto industry. During this period, one of the main failures, 
as many interviewees pointed out, was the state’s indiscriminate encouragement of 
industrial development without pursuing a strategic choice towards either sectors or 
firms within each sector (Interviews, No.4-7-19-43-51, 2016). Mr. Nahum laconically 
recapitulated this point as follows:  
The planned economy bore its fruits, but on the other hand the democratic 
order in Turkey led to the evanescence of national focusing in economic 
terms. Under the pressure of meeting the demands of all segments, the state 
rulers in Turkey, with the idea of not favouring one sector or firm over 
another, could not develop strategically-designed policies with respect to 
industrial sectors. (Interview, No.4, 2016) 
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This unregulated manner of entering business helped local bourgeoisies quickly 
establish themselves in auto manufacturing as joint ventures or under license 
agreements. However, at the same time it led to a sort of bandwagon behaviour, in 
which the establishment of one assembly plant was followed by that of a rival company, 
despite the limited size of the domestic market (Azcanlı, 1995). As the basic motivation 
behind the state’s unstrategically-designed policy was to set ground for the assembly 
industries, rather than developing a truly national industry by prioritising one firm over 
another, none of the auto companies were discriminated against on the basis of factors 
such as capacity utilisation, technology acquisition or nationality. There was no real 
concern to restrict the number of assemblers in order to pursue an industry-wide 
rationalisation to exploit the economies of scale and foster the technology development 
on the shop floor level.   
A quick comparison of the Turkish auto industry with Latin American and East Asian 
cases might help us understand the initial factors leading to different industrial 
trajectories and less promising auto-led industrialisation in the subsequent periods. In 
sharp contrast to Turkey and the Latin American cases, rationalisation and specific 
targeting of the auto industry in Korea was much more prevalent during the 1970s, the 
critical decade of the Korean auto industry. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, unlike 
Turkey and the Latin American cases, the Korean state enjoyed significant leverage 
against multinationals and domestic firms thanks to manageable internal class dynamics 
and unique ties between the state and chaebols. Reciprocal relations, strong institutional 
linkages, and ongoing communication between state and domestic capital made it easier 
for the Korean state to shape the industry, impose market order, limit foreign 
penetration and regulate the terms of competition among domestic auto-makers (Lew, 
1992).  
The earlier stages of the auto industry in Korea were not so promising, as it did not 
avoid the problems of absence of insufficient capital formation, low demand and 
productivity, and fragmented markets. However, in terms of industrial structure Korea 
had advantages over both Latin America and Turkey. The symbiotic relations between 
the state and auto-chaebols were instrumental in regulating auto-led industrialisation 
and developing an indigenous auto industry. As part of the famous Heavy and Chemical 
Industries Plan, proclaimed in the early 1970s, the auto industry was designated as a 
strategic sector, targeted to realise economies of scale and prepare for future export 
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expansion (Lew, 1992). Although the initial number of assembly plants in Korea was 
high considering its market potential, they never reached the number of assembly firms 
in Latin America and Turkey, which in turn meant less market fragmentation, higher 
prospects for exploiting economies of scale and greater efficiency in cost terms.70 
Moreover, the pattern and role of foreign investment during the period in question was 
another factor that helps us understand the divergent trajectory of auto-led 
industrialisation in the following decades. As Jenkins (1977) pointed out, starting from 
the 1960s, major multinational auto-makers extended their hold over the Latin 
American auto industry by taking over licenses, buying off domestically-owned auto-
makers and driving out domestic competitors. By the late 1970s, the Latin American 
auto industry was largely taken over by multinationals, as majority equity sharing or 
fully-owned subsidiaries dominated the entire auto industry in Latin America (see 
Appendix 31). The high degree of foreign ownership and low domestic control over the 
industry reduced the bargaining power of local bourgeoisies and the state with regard to 
formulating and implementing policies independent of the pressures of multinationals 
(Jenkins, 1977; Bennett and Sharpe, 1985). The heavy dependence of subsidiaries on 
the technological know-how, managerial expertise and strategies of parent companies 
was much more prevalent in the headquarters-subsidiary relations of the Latin American 
auto industry.   
In stark contrast to the Latin American case, the Korean auto industry developed mostly 
through domestic capital, and licensing or minority equity sharing remained a prevalent 
ownership pattern in the early stages. Allying with auto-chaebols, the Korean state set 
majority domestic ownership as a prerequisite for assembly operations and was actively 
involved in bargaining with multinationals over the terms of technology transfer, 
managerial control, production capacity and exportation (Lew, 1992). Maintaining 
ownership and managerial control in the auto industry ensured that subsidiaries in 
Korea would not be sacrificed to the international rationality of parent or licencing 
companies. Given such a pattern of ownership in Korea, the interests of domestic auto 
firms were widely represented within a state-sponsored auto industry association that 
functioned as an intermediary between auto-chaebols and responsible state agencies. 
Thanks to this strong institutional linkage, local bourgeoisies provided insider 
                                                          
70 For the number of assembly firms and market fragmentation, see Appendix 30 and Jenkins (1984) 
respectively. For more limited number of assembly operations (4-5 producers by the 1970s) and less 
market fragmentation, see Lew (1992). 
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knowledge of the industry that was essential in playing one firm off against another and 
bargaining with multinationals. Thus, a featured strategy of the Korean auto industry, as 
in the cases of Hyundai and Kia, was to adopt more aggressive and diversified licensing 
strategies in order to develop an indigenous auto industry based on more up-to-date 
technologies, rather than mature ones dumped on the developing world through 
multinationals.      
In terms of ownership structure, the auto industry in Turkey lay somewhere between 
Latin America and Korea. Given a relatively small but still promising market in Turkey, 
multinational-auto makers were more willing to have a minority share in assembly 
operations in order to share the risks of the market with the domestic bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, unlike in Latin American cases, the amount of foreign ownership within the 
industry never reached majority levels but remained below 50%, with the exception of 
Chrysler, founded with 60% foreign equity ownership in 1964 (Appendices 26 and 27). 
However, despite this, operation and management characteristics in Turkish auto 
industry was more similar to the Latin American cases than their Korean counterparts. 
The weak exchange relationship between the state and auto firms, and disunity amongst 
the agencies shaping the auto industry, weakened the bargaining power of the Turkish 
state vis-a-vis multinationals and delimited the government’s role in promoting 
indigenous auto-led industrialisation. 
From early on, multinational auto-makers had been mostly operating on their own 
terms, dominating the industry. In sharp contrast to Korea, which actively bargained 
over every aspect of production capacity, management, technology transfer and equity 
ownership, etc., the bargaining matters of the Turkish state were limited to localisation 
rates, royalty payments, equity ownership and a minimum level of production capacity 
(Aksoy, 1990).71 This did not necessarily mean that the Turkish state was subservient to 
the demands of multinationals all the time. However, as many interviews (No.3-4-7-8-
12-18-20-34-45-50, 2016) reveal, in the absence of strong institutional ties facilitating 
ongoing communication between state and local capital, the state could not successfully 
identify required areas of intervention and bargaining that would result in concrete 
measures on behalf of national interests.  
                                                          
71 The requirements in Assembly Industry Regulations for assembly operations were set extremely low. 
To give an example, a minimum investment of 5 million Turkish Lira, a minimum personnel of 2 
engineers and 50 workers, and 500 square meters of manufacturing area were enough for the 
establishment of an assembly factory in bus manufacturing (see Appendix 1 in Aksoy, 1990). 
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The earlier structure of the Turkish auto industry, which involved a lack of 
institutionalised policy channels and heavy dependence on multinationals, started to 
change relatively by the early 1970s. As discussed earlier, the growing feeling of 
dependency on multinationals and increasing trade deficits in assembly operations led to 
more decisive implementation of local content requirements and the establishment of 
the TOFAŞ-Fiat and OYAK-Renault partnerships under the auspices of the Turkish 
state. The foundation of an automotive manufacturers association and the association of 
auto parts and components manufacturers in 1974 and 1978, respectively enhanced the 
level of information exchange between the state and auto firms to a certain extent 
(Interviews, No. 19-43-46, 2016). However, this did not put an end to the industry’s 
excessive dependence on multinationals. The auto firms in assembly operations were 
not a genuinely local and organisationally cohesive group, ranking from majority-
owned firms to those operating under license agreements. However, as a diversified 
group, the assembly industry was widely represented by the sole interest of foreign-
partnered joint ventures, which were founded almost like branch factories of their parent 
firms abroad (Interviews, No.3-7-35-45, 2016).  
Similar to Latin American cases, the auto assembly industry heavily depended on 
parents companies in almost every aspect of production. Even when one considers the 
more recent and relatively more successful examples of foreign-partnered joint ventures 
like TOFAŞ and Oyak-Renault, the headquarter-subsidiary relations in the assembly 
industry, as Okur argues (1994, pp.78-79) exhibited “the characteristics of a relationship 
between domineering centre and a subordinate periphery, leaving little scope of 
autonomy for the latter to pursue a genuine line of development”. For example, almost 
all specifications related to products were provided by parent companies, and 
subsidiaries had very restricted authorisation as only in minor changes according to 
local conditions (Interviews, No.3-7-45, 2016).72 Furthermore, in managerial terms, 
parent companies were heavily involved in many functions of subsidiaries, such as 
designing production lines and factory lay-out, technology transfer and development 
and procurement of parts (Azcanli, 1995). Equally important, in taking strategic 
decisions related to export activities, the assembly industry, including TOFAŞ and 
Oyak-Renault as well as other foreign-partnered commercial vehicle producers, relied 
heavily on their parent companies in compliance with licensing agreements (Okur, 
                                                          
72 Even today, this is one of the main characteristics in headquarter-subsidiary relations in foreign-
partnered joint ventures such as Oyak-Renault and Hyundai-Assan (Interviews, No.6-7, 2016) 
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1994). This method of functioning helped local bourgeoisies establish themselves as 
industrialists, gradually gaining greater experience and know-how in auto 
manufacturing. However, at the same time it prevented the assembly industry from 
organising and expressing the concerns of industry regarding local interests, making it 
difficult to upgrade domestic firms to genuinely indigenous auto-makers. 
In many respects, the situation of the auto supplier industry was not much different from 
the assembly sector. As local content requirements were tightened, the number of 
supplier firms considerably increased during the period in question. The growth in local 
supplier firms strengthened ties between local firms and the state, leading to the 
establishment of an association of auto parts and components manufacturers in the late 
1970s. However, as mentioned earlier, the auto supplier industry was not a cohesive 
group, as it had been segmented between locally owned small- and medium-sized 
producers and foreign-affiliated large-scale firms. As Aksoy (1990) rightly argued, no 
concrete measures were taken to enhance the technological capabilities of the domestic 
supplier sector, since governments concentrated too much on the assembly industry and 
its domestic content requirement. Foreign-affiliated parts manufacturers thus took the 
stage as first-tier suppliers with relatively few technology-capable domestic firms, 
leaving the manufacturing of highly competitive, low value-added components to the 
bulk of domestic suppliers (Interviews, No.8-29-34-46-50, 2016). 
It is possible to conclude that before 1980, the overall development of the Turkish 
motor vehicle industry exhibited the characteristics of dependent industrialisation in 
ways more similar to Latin American cases, particularly countries like Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina, in which auto-led industrialisation was more integrated.  Although the 
alliance of multinational auto firms, the state and local capital brought with it well-
developed, domestic auto value chains, local control over the creation, realization and 
capturing of value remained restricted given the excessive dependence of industry on 
multinationals in technological, organizational and managerial terms.  
Given its overall nature, the motor industry, as in other manufacturing sectors in 
Turkey, represented a noteworthy drain on the balance of payment (Ansal, 1988). After 
initial stages in which there had been a net flow of foreign capital, the prevailing pattern 
for capital was to flow out of the country in the form of royalties, profits, technical 
assistance payments, costs of supplying capital equipment and components to 
subsidiaries. Furthermore, although local content levels reached 70-75% by the late 
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1970s, auto makers’ export remained below the 5% as required target set earlier (Okur, 
1994, p.84). As an overall characteristic of the ISI period, one of the major problems of 
auto-led industrialisation was its inability to utilise import-substituting strategies as a 
step towards creating the surplus value and foreign exchange required for further 
expansion. Therefore, when the world recession and oil crisis of the early 1970s finally 
hit the Turkish economy in the form of large trade deficits, foreign exchange shortages, 
falling real income and huge external debts in 1977, the production and sales of motor 
vehicles plunged dramatically, along with other industrial sectors, and eventually meant 
the replacement of ISI strategies with export-oriented ones after 1980. 
6.4 Changing Contours of the Triple Alliance and the Formation of Global Auto 
Value Chains in post-1980 Turkey.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the pace of capital accumulation under ISI policies reached 
its limits by the end of the 1970s, as economic and political conditions in Turkey were 
enmeshed in a state of ungovernability. The manufacturing sector in the meantime 
found itself in a desperate situation of liquidity crunch, decline of industrial production 
and debt crisis, owing to the combined effects of both the internal contradictions of ISI 
strategies and the world-wide crises of the mid-1970s, accelerated by skyrocketing oil 
prices. Towards the early 1980s a well-marked reconciliation had already formed 
between international capital, state and local bourgeoisies around the installation of an 
export-oriented model of accumulation in the Turkish economy in general and the auto 
industry in particular. Such a transition to an export-oriented accumulation strategy in 
the auto industry came into being as a consequence of changing contours of the triple 
alliance under the emerging dynamic of global capitalism.    
As set forth in the theory chapter, during the mid-1970s and early 1980s, 
internationalisation of all circuits of capital started to accelerate and gained qualitatively 
new dimensions, due to which both the creation and realization of surplus value began 
to occur on a truly global scale. The situation in the world automotive industry in this 
respect was not different from this trend. The period since the 1970s has been a time of 
ongoing reorganisation in the world motor industry, mainly driven by changing 
strategies of multinationals in response to pressures such as increasing competition, 
saturation of demand in triad countries and problems of overcapacity (Jenkins, 1987; 
Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003). The most significant change was the emergence of 
an increasingly global auto industry. The pursuit of increasing profit and sustaining 
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competitiveness made consolidation and internationalisation of capital in the world 
motor industry a prevailing feature over this period. Since the 1970s, the industry has 
been gradually consolidated through mergers and alliances among auto multinationals, 
and the number of vehicle assemblers has declined concomitantly (Appendix 32). In the 
same breath, the consolidation of the industry played an important role in the 
reorganisation of production operations on global basis, accessing particular regions and 
the design of vehicles for world markets. Eventually, the increasingly global nature of 
vehicle production intensified the significance of developing markets and forced the 
number of semi-industrialised and low-cost countries to emerge as export centres of 
vehicles and auto parts within the global operations of auto multinationals.73 
It was the convergence of these strategies of auto multinationals with the changing 
interests of local capital and the state that made export-oriented auto industrialisation 
possible in the Turkish context. The late 1970s and early 1980s at the same time was a 
period of crisis and change with regards to local bourgeoisies in Turkey, particularly for 
big industrial capital and business classes. Under the decades-long ISI strategies, certain 
segments of the industrial bourgeoisie, spearheaded by the holdings-led big capital 
groups of TÜSİAD, had reached a certain degree of accumulation and maturity in 
industrial terms for further restructuring and integration into emerging of global 
economy. From the viewpoint of holdings-led big capital groups, which mostly owned 
large enterprises in both assembly and supplier auto industries, a shift towards an 
outward-oriented and export-led growth model appeared to be a viable option for 
reactivating the process of capital accumulation. Likewise, on the part of the state, the 
ungovernability of the economy due to recurrent crises of foreign exchange bottlenecks 
and ascending foreign indebtedness was believed to be the result of ISI policies. As 
governments relied heavily on foreign debt to pursue ISI-led accumulation policies, 
overall debt climbed from $1,960 million in 1970 to $11,419 million in the late 1970s 
(Krueger and Aktan, 1992). Thus, as the overall economy reached the limits of its 
borrowing capacity, there was no other way for the state than changing the overall 
accumulation strategy.  
As a new convergence of interests within the triple alliance in Turkey, a series of new 
measures were gradually introduced from the early 1980s, adopting an export-oriented 
                                                          
73 Since the 1970s, the share of non-triad countries in world motor production has gradually expanded 
since the motor industry has been increasingly globalised in a way to include developing countries as 
production hubs (see Appendix 33). 
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industrialisation strategy. As discussed in Chapter 5, the installation of an export-led 
industrialisation strategy gradually shifted the balance of class power in favour of 
international capital and export-oriented segments of local bourgeoisies, and fiercely 
marginalized the interests of labouring classes, the mass population as well as 
domestically-oriented capital groups. The basic motivation behind such a policy shift 
was to restructure the overall industry in such a way that it would become more 
integrated with global production and would be competitive in world markets, 
benefiting from a cheap and docile labour force (Interviews, No. 3-7-17-46, 2016). In 
line with this economic policy framework, the motor industry in Turkey has undergone 
a series of transformations since the early 1980s, which marked the beginning of a new 
era that would end up with full integration of the industry into the global strategies and 
asymmetrical value relations of leading auto multinationals in the 2000s.  
Early steps in this direction were taken in the first half of the 1980s under Özal’s 
government, mainly composed of neoliberally-minded cadres who were keen on 
launching a drastic export-oriented industrialisation model based on economic-cum-
political repression. In 1983, the government abrogated the decades-long Assembly 
Industry Decree, and replaced it with Manufacturing Industry Regulations, by which 
some of the protective delimitations imposed on the automotive industry, along with 
many other sectors, were substantially relaxed (Azcanli, 1995). The basic rationale for 
the new regulation was to expose local manufacturing firms to foreign competition and 
encourage them to produce for global markets, which in turn would ensure currency 
saving and maximise foreign currency profits. The government at the same time 
adopted measures towards trade liberalisation in automotive products, including both 
CBU vehicles and motor-vehicle parts.  
By the mid-1980s, the local content requirements fell into disuse and the list of non-
importable motor vehicle parts was shortened (Ansal, 1988). Likewise, as of 1984, trade 
liberalisation in new and used motor vehicles was actualised, spurring an increase in 
imports, particularly in commercial vehicles (Okur, 1994). However, to protect 
domestic final-assemblers and suppliers from fierce competition for a while, the 
government also imposed provisional tariffs and surcharges and increased fund taxes, 
warning domestic firms that full-fledged foreign competition would soon be put in to 
practice (Azcanli, 1995). Thus, the overall policies of liberalisation, which were 
accompanied by incentives and export promotions, had the explicit goal of increasing 
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integration with the world auto industry through a dense network of trade and 
production relations (Interviews, No.8-19-21-43, 2016).  
The introduction of new pattern of accumulation and a new industrialisation strategy 
throughout the 1980s was reflected in a number of significant changes in the Turkish 
motor industry. One of the most notable changes was growing modernisation and 
investment, leading to capacity increases and the development of new models. The 
leading firms in this respect were again two passenger-car assemblers: OYAK-Renault 
and TOFAŞ-Fiat. Starting from the mid-1980s, OYAK-Renault adopted a new 
investment and modernisation programme, by which the company’s product range was 
expanded, including two recent models of Renault 9 and Renault 11, both of which had 
achieved notable success in Europe and North American markets (Interview, No.7, 
2016). The outdated Renault 12 underwent renewal in order to be marketable at least in 
domestic markets, under increasing foreign competition. Along with the new-model 
related investments, annual production capacity was increased from 35.000 to 60.000 
units by the late 1980s (Okur, 1994, p.142). Likewise, the TOFAŞ-Fiat partnership 
adjusted itself according to foreign competition by substantially upgrading its current 
models, modernizing its production technology and increasing its annual production 
from 30.000 to 75.000 units (Okur, 1994, p.143). Following the pattern in passenger-car 
firms, capacity expansion, and improvements in product spectrum and quality also 
gained momentum in the commercial vehicle sector (Ansal, 1990).  
Thus, under the challenge of foreign competition, and benefiting from domestic 
economic revitalisation and new export incentives, the assembly industry was 
compelled to gradually modernise production, improve product quality and develop 
more up-to-date models. This in turn had implications for the industry overall, ranging 
from labour processes and shop-floor control techniques to relations with supplier 
industry. As the industry was directed towards foreign competition and outward-
orientation, the issues of reducing costs, enhancing productivity and improving quality 
gained increasing importance (Interviews, No.4-7, 2016). Under the suppressive labour 
regime, the cost of labour systematically decreased, as an easy way of reducing costs. 
While the average daily wage in the organised sector had been 8.41 dollar, it dropped to 
3.28 dollar by 1986. As of 1987, the real minimum wage was only 45% of 1963 levels 
(Ulugay, 1987, p.249). Likewise, new shop-floor practices such as job rotation, quality 
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circles and empowerment of multi-skilled workers were adopted by auto assemblers 
throughout the period (Okur, 1994).    
Given the spectacle of growing cost reductions and quality improvement, this period 
also witnessed increasingly asymmetrical but much closer relations between assemblers 
and suppliers. Throughout the 1980s, technical assistance to suppliers intensified, and 
assembly firms started to launch strict supplier-auditing systems, demanding lower 
costs, higher quality and precision delivery (Azcanli, 1995). The abolition of local 
content requirements and the relaxation of auto part import, gradually strengthened the 
hands of assembler in negotiating terms of trade with suppler firms and enabled them to 
pass on the costs of new pattern of accumulation to supplier industry. As Okur (1994, 
p.154) discusses, relations between the assembly and supply sectors became more 
Janus-faced and eclectic in nature; while suppliers benefited from increased technical 
support and quality improving assistance, they were at the same time subjected to price 
cuts, delayed payments and intensified competition due to the possibility of multiple 
sourcing. 
As a result, with the transformations of 1980s, the Turkish auto industry was revitalised 
and started to integrate into the global auto industry and the strategies of leading 
multinationals. In line with the modernisation of the industry, the production capacity of 
the assembly industry more than doubled while overall production in the industry 
quadrupled between the years 1980-1990 (OSD, 2015a, p.8). In line with the new model 
of accumulation and encouraged by export incentives, the auto industry began to adjust 
itself towards export-orientation by considering production for world markets as an 
indispensable option for the industry. Though still low by international standards, 
exports of vehicles almost doubled by the late 1980s (see, Appendix 34). The Oyak-
Renault partnership in particular gained notable success in export markets, having 
clienteles in ex-colonies of France and extending its export outreach to Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria and Portugal, accompanied by exports of components to Spain and Argentina 
(Interview, No.7, 2016).  Furthermore, export value of auto components reached $121 
million in 1987, from its level of $15 million in 1981 (OSD, 1991). As a result, despite 
being largely oriented to the domestic market, the auto industry in Turkey started to 
integrate into global automotive value chains, given the changing structure of value 
relations with the exportation of CBU vehicles as well as auto parts and components 
(see Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6. 4 Export-Orientation and Changing Structure of Auto Value Relations in 
Turkey by the Late 1980s 
 
Source: Drawn by the author relying on the works of Okur (1994), Azcanli (1995), Ansal 
(1990) and Dinçer (2007) 
The early liberalisation and global integration initiatives of the 1980s gained momentum 
in the 1990s, when the auto industry experienced a visible shift towards productivity, 
quality and technology improvements in the context of higher foreign competition and 
increasing penetration of foreign capital (Ansal, 1999; Duruiz, 2004). At the turn of the 
decade, restrictions on all capital circuits were further relaxed, with the introduction of 
financial liberalisation and a reduction in import tariffs and duties on foreign trade 
(Duruiz, 2004). Added to these measures was a new incentive package for both new and 
existing foreign assemblers for furthering investments and launching new models into 
production. New foreign assemblers which produced new models with a minimum 
annual capacity of 100.000 units and existing manufacturers with new models of a 
minimum annual capacity of 50.000 units would be offered tariff exemption from CKD 
kids for five years, and received 100% exemption from the resource utilization tax, as 
well as 35% support premium on annual expenses (Ansal, 1999, p.207).    
Thus, starting from the first half of the 1990s, a new wave of restructuring in the 
Turkish automotive industry came into the picture, given the increasingly attractive 
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investment and capital valorisation environment in auto production. As the low-cost 
workforce in production was accompanied by new investment incentives and the 
abolition of restrictions on foreign trade, leading transnational auto-makers increasingly 
considered Turkey as a production base for motor vehicles, serving European, Middle 
Eastern and North African markets. In particular, as the countdown towards the final 
stage of Turkey’s integration with European markets came into effect with the signing 
of the Custom Union agreement with the EU in the mid-1990s, transnational auto-
makers more than ever viewed Turkey as an important production location for the 
global sourcing of their models (Duruiz, 2004). 
Under these conditions, the assembly industry witnessed a surge of new motor vehicle 
investments by third-party firms like Japanese and South Korean auto-makers, along 
with the rebuilding of manufacturing facilities of European and US auto-makers that 
existed in Turkey for some time. The first venture in this respect was established in 
1990 by GM Opel, a fully foreign-owned plant with a maximum capacity of 25.000 
units (Küçükerman, 2008, p.234). In the following years, three new investments took 
place as joint ventures with local partners: Toyota with Sabanci Holding, Honda with 
the Anadolu Group and Hyundai with Assan (Kibar Holding), all of which launched the 
production of their new models in the second half of the 1990s (Ansal, 1999).  
Likewise, building on long-established links and inherited competencies, existing firms 
also reinvested in their manufacturing facilities in order to develop production 
capacities and launch up-to-date models for European and world markets. In line with 
Fiat’s globalisation strategy, the TOFAŞ-Fiat partnership was rebuilt as one of the 
major poles for the production of Fiat’s Global 178 car project, designed for the needs 
of Eastern European, Asian and African markets (Küçükerman, 2008). The production 
of new models like the Palio and Siena began as part of Fiat’s strategy of creating a 
network of integrated operations within Europe. Another long-established automaker, 
OYAK-Renault, also became a production location within the global sourcing strategy 
of Renault’s models, as in the case of the Megan Project, launched to serve European, 
North African and Latin American markets (Interview, No.7, 2016). Similarly, the 
assembly of light commercial vehicles for Ford was transferred from its Belgium plant 
to the Ford-Otosan partnership in Turkey, in line with Ford’s global sourcing strategy 
(Interview, No.2, 2016).  
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As new entrants started production in Turkey and existing firms rebuilt their facilities as 
part of their global strategies, the integration of the motor vehicle industry into global 
value chains considerably accelerated particularly starting from the mid-1990s. As 
discussed in the theory chapter, such a structural change in the Turkish auto industry 
came about as part of an overall shift of world industrial production to low-cost, semi-
industrialised peripheral locations under the rise of global capitalism. Thus it is fair to 
argue that the case of Turkey, as an important low-cost production location in Europe’s 
backyard, increasingly fell within what Sturgeon and Florida (2000) calls Peripheral to 
Large Existing Market Areas (PLEMA).  Similar to other PLEMAs, such as Mexico, 
Spain, Poland and Hungary, the principle role of the Turkish auto industry was to 
function as a proximate low-cost production milieu from which to supply large existing 
markets, particularly within continental-scale EU trade arrangements. 
In line with the restructuring of the assembly sector, the auto supply industry also 
underwent a series of transformations that further incorporated domestic supply 
networks into global auto value relations. Encountering higher levels of foreign 
competition and product standardisation, component suppliers were forced to meet the 
increasing requirements of cost-efficiency, quality, delivery and flexibility as aspects of 
the global outsourcing strategies of transnational auto-makers (Eskiyenentürk, 2006). In 
the context of the outsourcing strategy of leading auto-makers, a series of structural 
changes came into existence within the auto supply industry to serve the needs of 
vehicle assemblers. As investments in up-to-date models meant outsourcing new and 
globally uniform components and parts that did not have a local supplier base, vehicles 
assemblers encouraged global suppliers to follow their investment decisions by building 
up component manufacturing plants in Turkey (Özatağan, 2009). Thus, similar to the 
trend of follow source process that was widely observed by Humphrey and Memedovic 
(2003) in certain other developing countries such as Brazil, Argentina, India, Malaysia 
and Thailand, the increasing cost-efficiency, quality, delivery and flexibility 
requirements of vehicle assemblers in Turkey were to a large extent met by the 
subsequent investments of global suppliers.    
As mentioned earlier, the following source strategy of global supplier firms was not a 
completely new phenomenon, since it had been partly employed in the 1970s after the 
establishment of the TOFAŞ-Fiat and OYAK-Renault partnerships. However, under the 
increasing integration of the industry into global value relations since the 1990s 
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onwards, it became a prevalent trend of the supplier industry that profoundly remoulded 
hierarchical relations within local supplier networks. As Humphrey and Memedovic 
(2003) argue with respect to other developing countries, the growing preference of 
vehicle assemblers for outsourcing components from global suppliers as newly 
established first-tier manufacturers increasingly limited the possibility of sourcing from 
local producers in Turkey. Thus, some of long-established local suppliers needed to 
establish JVs and equity partnerships with global suppliers, as in the cases of Matay, 
Döktaş, Teknik Malzeme, Beycelik-Gestamp and BPO B-Plas (Interviews, No.14-17-
50, 2016). Other suppliers which did not engage in partnerships either improved their 
production facilities to serve the changing needs of vehicle assemblers as first-tier 
manufacturers, or disappeared, changed sector, or moved to second-tier status along 
local supplier networks (Eskiyenentürk, 2006). 
The 1990s thus marked a period of overall transformation not only for the auto 
assembly sector but also for the supplier industry, which brought with it larger, 
modernised manufacturing capabilities, increased automation, improved product quality 
and an increasing focus on exports.  Particularly starting from the mid-1990s, the auto 
assembly sector was increasingly incorporated into the globalisation strategies of 
leading transnational auto-makers and thus was transformed into the production poles of 
world models for export markets. Faced with the increasing requirements of the 
assembly sector, supplier firms transformed themselves in the fields of cost-efficiency, 
quality and delivery under the active involvement of assembly firms, through training 
programmes and quality systems (Özatağan, 2009). Since new investments by global 
suppliers constrained the possibility of sourcing from existing local firms, local 
suppliers were forced to invest in capacity and quality development and attain 
international certification to get a foothold in export markets and global supplier 
networks (Eskiyenentürk, 2006). As a result of these dynamics, the industry overall 
became much more integrated into global auto value relations, which was directly 
reflected in the growth of exports and imports of both vehicles and auto parts (see 
Appendix 35). However, despite all these developments, it was still early to suggest that 
the motor vehicle industry was fully integrated into global production and distribution 
networks of value relations, since a real turn in this respect would appear under the 
series of arrangements starting from the early 2000s. 
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As discussed in Chapter 5,  the ‘twin crises’ in November 2000 and February 2001 
clearly revealed structural weaknesses in the Turkish economy in creating and capturing 
the surplus value required for long-term and stable capitalist growth.   Under the critical 
juncture of the post-2001 period, a new wave of structural reforms were enacted in 
order to realign an export-led industrialisation strategy on the basis of increased 
competitiveness and productivity in collaboration with global capital (Ercan, 2006; 
Oğuz, 2008). As argued earlier, such a move in the Turkish political economy was in 
fact not a complete rupture from the decades-long outward-oriented development 
policy, but rather represented a complementary process in which terms of capital 
valorisation were secured and tied to the rationality of global capitalism through a wide 
range of legal, regulatory and institutional reforms. 
In this respect, a series of independent regulatory agencies was established in almost 
every facet of economic governance from the financial sector to agriculture, from 
energy to telecommunications in order to secure the confidence of global capital and 
stimulate productive capital-based accumulation. The enactment of new FDI laws in 
2003 eliminated previous restrictions on foreign investment, offered a highly favourable 
environment for repatriation of capital and profits, and acknowledged foreign investors’ 
right to international arbitration. With the launch of the ‘Reform Program for the 
Improvement of the Investment Climate’ and the establishment of a coordination 
council, the global rationality and class interest of TNCs were internalised, and the 
overall investment climate was reframed in close coordination with transnational 
corporations. Furthermore, rigidities in the labour market were eliminated on behalf of 
globally-oriented capitalists who sought to realign export-led accumulation strategies on 
the basis of increased productivity and international competitiveness.  
Thus, starting from the early 2000s, the overall economy has considerably revitalised, as 
structural reforms stimulated the creation of higher surplus value on the basis of a 
global competitiveness agenda with outward-oriented overtones. The overall 
composition of manufacturing and exports has evolved from traditional and low-tech 
sectors such as textiles to medium-low and medium-high sectors under the increasing 
penetration of foreign capital (see, Chapter 5). Along with this overall transformation in 
the Turkish economy, the motor vehicle industry has made a promising transformation 
that resulted in full integration of the industry into global value chains, as an ideal 
production location at the crossroads of many developed and developing markets. 
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Through full-scale integration in global value relations, the assembly industry witnessed 
a further increase in investments, and adjusted itself to the changing conditions of the 
global market by improving production processes, quality standards and product 
development capabilities. Evidence from fieldwork reveals that, since the early 2000s, 
six out of seven assembly firms interviewed have invested in new assembly lines, 
production technologies and product-development capabilities, through which they 
gained increasing competence in process standards, quality and design (Interviews, 
No.1-2-3-4-5-6-7, 2016). Likewise, parallel changes occurred in the supplier industry, 
where the diffusion of production capabilities, design and product-development 
competencies has increased to a greater extent. The survey of component suppliers (see 
Figure 6.5) shows that, since the early 2000s, supplier firms have developed further 
capabilities not only in production processes and quality standards, but also in product 
development and design capabilities to a certain extent.  
 Figure 6. 5 Full-scale Integration of the Turkish Auto Industry and the Involvement of 
Supplier Firms in Production, Design and Branding Capabilities since the Early 2000s   
 
Source: Questionnaire Surveys (2016). 
As a result of these changes in both assembly and supplier industries, motor vehicle 
production in Turkey increased from 468,381 in 2000 to over 1,410,034 units in 2015, 
representing a structural change of historical significance (see Appendix 36). Between 
the years 2000-2014, vehicle manufacturers invested more than $12 billion in their 
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operations in Turkey, by which the annual production capacity of the assembly industry 
reached 1.7 million vehicles by late 2015 (ISPAT, 2015). Coupled with reforms of post-
2001 period, the penetration and further investment of foreign capital has accelerated in 
both assembly and supplier sectors, leading to increases in capacity and product quality, 
as well as the development of new models and components in Turkey (Interviews, 
No.3-6-7-11-14-22-43-51, 2016). Meanwhile, the total number of foreign-invested 
firms in the motor vehicle sector increased more than two and a half times from 105 in 
1999 to 278 in 2014, these mostly exhibited the follow-source investments of global 
supplier firms (Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2005, p.24; 2010, p.29; 2015, p.21). Thus, 
the motor vehicle industry has witnessed increased international competitiveness and 
productivity thanks to the full-scale integration of the industry into the global strategies 
of transnational auto vehicle and component firms.  
The full integration of the auto industry not only means more efficient utilisation of 
production capabilities, it has also brought with it an overall opening of vehicle 
production to trade networks of global value relations. An evaluation of Turkish trade 
figures indicates that the total volume of foreign trade in the motor-vehicle sector 
approached more than $46 billion in 2013, from $11 billion in 2000 (Appendix 37). As 
of 2015, more than 70% of total motor vehicle production ended up in overseas 
markets, creating almost $13 billion value, while the total value of vehicle exports was 
slightly over $1 billion in 2000, with a respective share of almost 22% of overall 
production (Appendix 37). The auto supplier industry, which has grown concurrently 
with the assembly sector, has also achieved higher performance in export volumes. 
Since the early 2000s, the total value of exported parts and components has increased 
almost fourfold, creating almost $9 billion value annually (Appendix, 37).  
The increased penetration of foreign capital during this period, and the 
merger&acquisitions of domestic suppliers with/by global firms, has further linked the 
domestic supplier base to the global sourcing strategies of auto-makers and world 
markets, making the supplier industry in Turkey capable of exporting to more than 150 
countries (Interviews, No.43, 2016). At present, there are up to 4,000 auto supplier 
firms in Turkey, almost 1,200 of which directly serve as first-tier manufacturers of 
OEMs, and more than 250 of them are foreign-owned or foreign-affiliated global 
suppliers using Turkey as production and export base (TCEB, 2012, p.5; ISPAT, 2016). 
Alongside increased export-orientation, the total value of imported components and 
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parts has also grown two and a half times, as a corollary of the fully-fledged integration 
of the auto industry into trade networks of global value relations (Appendix, 37).  
The overall evaluation of trade figures implies that as of today both the assembly and 
supplier auto sectors in Turkey present a fully integrated industrial structure in global 
auto value relations (see Figure 6.6). Given a mix of country-specific factors such as 
low-cost production, a friendly business environment, docile and skilled labour power, 
decades-long experience and know-how in auto production, and geographical proximity 
to global markets, the Turkish motor vehicle industry has become a global automotive 
location that offers attractive value creation and valorisation potential, particularly for 
vehicle and component manufacturers targeting European markets. By the end of 2015, 
with almost its 80% of auto exports and 85% of auto imports going to European 
countries, the motor vehicle industry in Turkey has become the fifteenth largest 
producer in the world and the fifth largest in Europe (ISPAT, 2016). Thus, the Turkish 
motor vehicle industry presents a globally integrated structure and has completed its 
decades-long transformation into being one of the important production hubs within 
global auto value chains. Furthermore, particularly since the mid-2000s, the industry 
has been on its way to becoming more than just a manufacturing hub and auto exporter, 
as it has gained design and product-development competences both in vehicle projects 
and component production (see, Özatağan, 2011a, 2011b; Pamukçu and Sönmez, 2011; 
Karabağ et al., 2011 Bürken, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 6 Full Integration to Global Auto Production and Structure of Auto Value 
Relations in Turkey by late 2015 
 
Source: Drawn by the author relying on Dinçer (2007), Özatağan (2009), ISPAT (2016), 
TCEB (2012) and OSD (2015a, 2016) 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a retrospective analysis of the origins and development of the 
Turkish automotive industry from the mid-1950s to the recent past. As argued here, it 
was the convergence of the international strategies of multinational auto-makers with 
the economic interests of the state and local bourgeoisies that laid the foundation of 
assembly operations in Turkey. Staring from the mid-1950s, certain sections of 
domestic bourgeoisies, allying with the state and foreign companies, conveyed their 
desire to transform themselves into auto industrialists by building direct and/or indirect 
partnerships (joint ventures, licensing agreements) with multinational auto-makers. This 
gave birth to the rise and consolidation of triple alliance and mostly domestic-oriented 
value chains in the Turkish auto industry under the dynamics of associated-dependent 
development.  
More similar to Latin American cases of Brazil and Mexico, and in sharp contrast to 
Korea, the Turkish state was in the unpleasant position of reconciling the clashing 
interests of different classes and class fractions with a successful long-term project of 
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auto-led industrialisation. Lacking the necessary societal consensus and well-established 
institutional channels of communication and reciprocity, auto-led industrialisation 
strategies were implemented in a haphazard fashion, leading to industry fragmentation, 
diseconomies of scale, high costs, inefficient industry structure and restricted 
incorporation/enhancement of advanced technologies. Thus, when it comes to the post-
1980 period, Turkey had already missed its historical opportunity to develop a 
genuinely indigenous industrial structure capable of exerting local control over the 
creation, realization and capture of value. Built on this relatively weak industrial 
structure, the auto industry experienced further restructuring along with the changing 
contours of the triple alliance under the new dynamics of global capitalism. Starting 
from the early 1980s, the auto industry gradually integrated into the global strategies 
and asymmetrical value relations of leading auto multinationals, as one of the most 
important hubs in global auto production. Eventually, this brought an overall 
transformation not only for the assembly sector but also the supplier industry, marked 
by the modernisation of the industry, higher capacity and automation, improved product 
quality, and increased export earnings and competitiveness. Particularly in the last one 
and half decades, the auto industry has become more than just a manufacturing, hub as 
it has developed a degree of design and product development capabilities both in 
vehicle projects and component production. However, whether and to what extent the 
current success of Turkey’s motor vehicle industry within global value chains has 
brought a less-dependent and genuinely high-value-added auto-led development is still 
a matter of debate that will be scrutinised in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Wheels of a New Form of Dependent Development: State, Social 
Classes and Global Value Relations in the Turkish Automotive 
Industry 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As seen in the preceding chapter, since the early 1980s the motor vehicle industry in 
Turkey has undergone a series of transformations which marked a beginning of new era, 
ending up with the full integration of the industry into the global strategies and 
asymmetrical value relations of transnational automakers. Through decades-long 
transformation, the motor vehicle industry has not only emerged as an export-oriented 
auto-production hub with largely modernised manufacturing capabilities, higher 
automation, improved product quality and cost-efficiency, but also has developed a 
certain degree of design and product development capabilities both in vehicle projects 
and component production. However, despite the overall improvements, the industry 
still faces a series of limitations in structural, organisational, managerial, technological 
and market-related terms, exhibiting the main characteristics of what we call a new form 
of dependent development. 
Completing the industry-level analysis, this chapter explores how the asymmetrical 
integration of the Turkish auto industry with global auto value chains – through a 
particular pattern of accumulation, and a configuration of class forces and state-society 
relations – generated a new form of dependent and exploitative auto-led development 
from the early 1980s onwards. To that end, the first section examines how and to what 
extent the evolving class dynamics and the make-up of ruling coalitions have secured 
the necessary social consensus and institutional settings for overcoming collective 
action problems in the auto industry. On that note, this section explores the impact of 
inter- and intra-class cleavages and state-capital relations on the motor vehicle industry 
in terms of industry structure, the role of foreign capital, and management and business 
strategies of auto firms. This first section also comparatively discusses the recent 
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success of auto-led industrialisation in Turkey with occasional reference to the insights 
derived from the Latin American and East Asian experiences. 
Furthering our analysis, the second section elucidates how a new form of dependent 
development in the auto industry has been concretised along asymmetrical and 
hierarchically-structured auto-value chains which are largely dominated by leading auto 
TNCs, but at the same time conditioned in socio-spatial terms by the ongoing interplay 
between leading TNCs, the state and auto industrialists in Turkey. This section sheds 
light on the issues of managerial, organisational, technological and market dependencies 
by taking into account firm-specific factors such as ownership structure, the nature of 
intra- and inter-firm relations between local partners and parent/licencing companies, as 
well as the overall global strategies of auto transnationals. Lastly, the final section shifts 
the focus to the question of labour and the matter of social upgrading, exploring the 
implications of the new form of dependent development for the labouring classes. More 
particularly, this section scrutinises how the rise and consolidation of a new form of 
dependent development has translated into a ruinous regime of labour control and 
exploitation in the Turkish auto industry. 
7.2 Multinationals, State, Classes and the Nature of Auto-led Industrialisation in 
post-1980 Turkey 
Since the early 1980s, the motor vehicle industry in Turkey has undergone a far-
reaching transformation within global value chains, based on the decades-long interplay 
between transnational automakers, the state and local capital. Export-oriented policy 
reforms, the FDI-friendly business environment, and a series of complementary 
institutional and legal arrangements have led to the mobilisation of resources for the 
provision of social overhead capital, which includes the infrastructural and regulatory 
preconditions required for furthering auto-led industrialisation in Turkey. More 
precisely, the changing legal, institutional and regulatory setting has cleared the way for 
inducing both global and domestic capital to make new investments in capacity 
development and product quality, as well as to a certain extent in research and 
development, leading to the launch of new models for export markets.  
It is fair to say that Turkey has been quite successful in confronting Gershenkronian 
collective action problems in auto-led development, which basically meant aggregation 
and investment of capital in auto production. However, despite its strong production 
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capabilities and recent export success, Turkey has remained limited in solving 
Kaldorian collective action problems, which mainly refers to increasing returns to scale, 
learning-by-doing, investing in design, conception, innovation, and thus creating and 
capturing higher value-added along global value chains. Overall, the vehicle industry in 
Turkey has largely specialised in offshoring and outsourcing segments of global auto 
value chains, due to which Turkey’s competitive advantage mostly lies in the assembly 
of vehicles and production of parts and components with the required cost-efficiency, 
quality and flexibility, but shows relatively limited achievements in areas such as 
design, product conception, marketing and branding (Interviews, No.2-3-4-6-7-9-10 
etc.). More in conformity with Latin American cases such as Mexico and Brazil, the 
Turkish motor vehicle industry has adopted a lower-road of articulation with global auto 
production (for Latin American cases see Lee and Cason, 1994; Kuwayama, 2009; 
ECLAC, 2009).  
In compliance with its manner of integrations into global auto value relations, the 
Turkish motor vehicle industry has mostly taken part in downstream stages of export 
roles such as export-processing (or in-bond) assembly operations, component-supply 
subcontracting and original equipment manufacturing, rather than moving to upper-
stream stages such as original design manufacturing and original brand manufacturing. 
Evidence of this has been observed in questionnaires and interviews (2016) with board 
members and managers of assembly and supplier firms. Since the early 2000s, the auto 
assembly and supplier industries have, to a certain extent, been able to develop product 
development, design and branding competencies, but this is not commonly observed in 
the industry overall (see Figure, 7.1). As for the assembly sector, manufacturing roles 
such as original design manufacturing and original brand manufacturing are confined to 
bus body builders (for reasons discussed later), while the rest of the assembly firms 
have gained only limited capabilities in terms of design and product conception (Figure 
7.1, Interviews, No.1-2-3-4-5-6-7). For the auto supplier industry, although component 
and part manufacturers have increased their involvement in co-design and product 
development competencies, this has remained relatively limited and most importantly 
cutting-edge innovation activities such as own-design production, marketing and 
branding have mostly remained in the grip of leading transnational firms (Figure 7.1, 
Interviews, No.13-14-18-20-22-24-30-46-50, 2016). 
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Figure 7. 1 Manufacturing Roles of Automotive Assembly and Suppler Firms in Turkey 
since the Early 2000s 
 
Source: Questionnaire Surveys (2016) 
In fact, this manner of integration in Turkey’s motor vehicle industry reflects a 
combination of failed strategies of auto-led industrialisation on the part of both the state 
and local capital since 1980 onwards. As discussed earlier, successful implementation 
of industrialisation project on the basis of a long-term project is likely to be achieved as 
long as class dynamics and the make-up of ruling coalitions within a country secure the 
necessary social consensus and institutional settings for overcoming collective action 
problems, inherited in the late industrialisation process. In this respect, the auto-led 
industrialisation in the last couple of decades cannot be seen as a successful 
developmental turn, but rather as a change in the continuity of its transformation in 
company with the restructuring of the world auto industry.  
Starting from the early 1980’s, the outward-oriented and export-led industrialisation 
strategies have been built upon increasingly uneasy nature of state-society relations that 
never enabled the Turkish state to truly reconcile intra-class cleavages and secure the 
wider consent of social classes round a productivity- and technology-enhancing 
industrialisation project, neither in the auto industry nor any other sector. As far as 
state-society relations are concerned, long-standing legacies of inter- and intra-class 
cleavages inherited from earlier periods escalated with the pronounced manifestation of 
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economic and political power of new generations of industrial and commercial 
capitalists. The period following the launch of outward-oriented growth policies was 
accompanied by the balkanisation of the Turkish political economy, marked by the 
proliferation of business associations and federations as self-conscious fractions seeking 
their own interests, even at the expense of others. In one interview, a high-ranking 
professional, among many others, straightforwardly complained about this situation as 
follows: 
From the perspective of state-business relations, it is apparent that the 
business world is highly divided. Koç Holding is a world on its own, and so 
are several other groups such as TÜSİAD [Turkish Industry and Business 
Association], TUSKON [Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists], MÜSİAD [Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's 
Association], ASKON [Anatolian Business Association]. Excuse my 
language, but the relations within the business world are in a pissing contest 
and a conflict of interests due to such grouping (Interview No.7, 2016). 
In fact, the increasing balkanisation of Turkish political economy has further 
implications for the development of both the industrial sector in general and the motor 
vehicle industry in particular. Firstly, in a country like Turkey where domestic saving is 
historically low and so the need for capital is high, the political and bureaucratic scene 
always becomes a focal point of conflict between different fractions of capital that seek 
rents and favourable access to incentives, subsidies and financial funds (Bekmen, 2014). 
In this way, the sharpened fragmentation within the local bourgeoisie in the 1980s and 
1990s translated into extreme politicisation of export-led industrialisation strategies and 
incentives (Önis and Webb, 1992; Aydın 2005). As Biddle and Milor’s study (1997) 
found, this a situation also manifested itself in the auto industry, where firms generated 
particularistic and rent-oriented formal and informal networks with state and political 
elites.  
The nature of state-capital relations in the auto industry crippled expected outcomes of 
investment-, export- and R&D-incentive regimes, as business lobbying failed to 
contribute to the conceptualisation and implementation of a competitive- and 
innovation-enhancing incentive mechanism, but rather re-produced the pursuit of 
particular benefits and rents at the formation and implementation stages of industry 
policy. This is not to say that there are no favourable outcomes concerning the incentive 
regime structure. In fact, interviews (No.2-8-9-13-15-21-43, 2016) on policy 
effectiveness and business performance in the incentive regime revealed that incentives, 
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particularly R&D funding schemes, have positive effects on auto firms, particularly in 
building their capacities, remaining competitive in global production, and taking 
projects from foreign customers and affiliates. Nevertheless, despite its contributions, 
the incentive regime has remained limited in a number of aspects. On the surface, access 
to subsidies and incentives seems to be regulated in a formal and transparent manner as 
the assessment criteria and contractual obligations clearly spell out. Yet in practice, the 
transparency and canvassing of business opinion has led to more particularistic 
relations, rent seeking, policy inefficiency and misuse, as stated by numerous 
interviewees (Interviews, No.3-7-8-12-19-35-45-48-51, 2016). 
Moreover, given the milieu of increasing fragmentation within local capital and thus 
political elites, the institutional capacity of the state to design, steer and implement a 
successful, long-term industrialisation policy has been paralysed as well. Since the turn 
to market-oriented economic policy, relations between the state and different fractions 
of capital have been based on a shaky and non-institutionalised alliance due to which 
export-oriented industrialisation strategies have come until today in a zigzagging 
fashion (Özel, 2015). In interviews with managers of firms and business representatives, 
this form of industrialisation policy was widely stressed, referring to the lack of 
coherence and long-term strategic vision due to the existence of private-sector cleavages 
and the absence of coordination between state and industry (Interviews, No. 2-7-8-12-
18-34-35-50-51, 2006). Two interviewees in particular bluntly overemphasised this 
point as follows: 
In Turkey, there has never been a well-coordinated atmosphere and 
organisational structure that relied upon common sense between state and 
business world. As the governments changed, the approach the auto industry 
has changes as well. At every turn, as a rule, fragmentation of business 
world has been observed based, on being proponents of and opponents to 
governments. As we are already aware, TÜSİAD, the top organisation 
representing the industry, and the government have been explicitly arguing 
with each other up until yesterday. Thus, a well-coordinated and mutual 
atmosphere between state and industry has never fully-developed (Interview, 
No.20, 2016).   
The most fundamental issue with regard to relations between the state and 
the business world in Turkey is the lack of an organisational structure and 
mentality which is robustly grounded, sustainable and visionary. The 
collaboration and institutional relations between state and business progress 
as more of a jigsaw puzzle. Whereas there is an adopted approach to industry 
for this period, a different approach emerges in another one. Within the 
business world, organisational activity, which is more based on federations 
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and intermediary institutions, has gained more importance in the last 10-15 
years. Yet, unfortunately, this is not sustainable or visionary either, but 
rather considerably politicised. I mean the influence of the politics on the 
private sector is ever so much as the business world is always segregated 
based on proximity to the government in every single period (Interview, 
No.8, 2016). 
Under this context of increased fragmentation, state-capital policy networks in the 
Turkish auto industry has never developed the reciprocal relations or channels of 
information exchange that would allow information to pass among state elites and 
domestic capital, encouraging sector-related inputs in industrial policy formation and 
generating wider consensus around adopted policy direction. Rather, in the absence of 
reciprocity and collaboration, the state has been deprived of an appropriate milieu to 
take strategically-designed sector- and firm-specific measures to restructure and 
rationalise the auto industry along nationally capitalistic lines. On that sense, from a 
comparative political economy perspective, the development trajectory of the Turkish 
auto industry thus exhibits some characteristics similar to those of Latin American cases 
such as Mexico and Brazil. Based on a comparative analysis of East Asia and Latin 
America, Hira (2007) also finds that the fragmentation of Latin American societies and 
fragile relations between states and local capital has led to rent-seeking and political-
infighting, which in turn inhibited the formation of functional state-business alliances 
that could move industries into higher value-added segments of global value relations. 
Despite their sub-country variations, the development of auto industries in Mexico, 
Brazil and Turkey show similarities in their patterns of participation in global value 
chains, sharply contrasting with the South Korean model of auto-led industrialisation. 
First of all, in the former, organisational characteristics of assembly firms differs from 
Korean counterparts, as do organisation and relations of production in assembly sector. 
While the assembly sectors in Brazil, Mexico and Turkey have typically restructured 
themselves into export-oriented manufacturing hubs and entered global value relations 
by relying on subsidiaries of transnational automakers, Korea’s assembly sector has 
opted to go it alone by establishing itself from the late 1980s onwards as a major 
exporter under its own brand names. 
In sharp contrast to Mexico, Brazil and Turkey, the reciprocal consent, symbiotic ties 
and ongoing communication between the Korean state and domestic auto firms have 
given significant leverage against transnational automakers, and led to the 
implementation of sector- and firm-specific industrial restructurings. Thanks to the 
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tightly-coupled relationship between the state and automakers, the Korean auto industry 
has advanced to its current prominence through a series of industrial restructurings that 
constrained entry into domestic markets, weeded out unfit players and advanced firm-
level competitiveness (Lee, 2011). In accordance with the state’s rationalization policy, 
the restructuring of the auto industry during the 1980s assigned production and sales 
territories to specific auto firms- passenger cars to Hyundai and Daewoo and 
commercial vehicles to Kia (Lee, 2011). The industrial restructuring in Korea (see 
Appendix 38), which limited the number of firms to no more than four and assigned 
specific tasks to specific firms, allowed domestically-controlled auto firms to achieve 
economies of scale and subsequent international competitiveness in global markets (Lee 
and Cason, 1994; Lautier, 2004).  
As Lee (2011) argues, under the context of industrial restructuring and proactive 
incentive regime, the dominance of business conglomerates, namely chaebols (i.e. 
Hyundai and Daewoo), was further fortified, and locally-controlled automakers were 
supported in building manufacturing capacities to be able to export overseas markets 
under their own brands. As soon as the required technical capabilities ware built 
through multiple channels of licencing and effective bargaining of technology transfer 
with multinational automakers, the Korean auto industry expanded abroad, firstly by 
exports and later by overseas investments strategies, backed by the state (Lautier, 2004). 
Combined with state-controlled financing, the aggressive export and investment 
strategies of Korean automakers led to a rapid capacity-push. Auto production increased 
23-fold from the 1980s to 1996, reaching over four million units by 1997 (Lautier, 
2004, p.221; Lee, 2011, p.142). The big three of the industry, Hyundai, Kia and 
Daewoo, adopted a ‘Global Top-10’strategy involving productive investments in 
overseas plants in the mid-1990s (Lee, 2011).  
By the late 1990s, Korean automakers were confronted with the serious problem of 
over-expansion and crippling debt due to which the industry entered a second wave of 
industrial restructuring which further consolidated industry structure through mergers 
and accusations (Lee, 2011). The Kia Group was acquired by the Hyundai Motor 
through a state-sponsored action plan. Whereas the Hyundai-Kia group upgraded its 
presence as the country’s dominant player with 71.3% of overall production, other small 
players like Daewoo and SsangYong Motors became M&A targets of foreign partners 
as part of the global restructuring of the auto industry (Lee, 2011, p.141-144). Overall, 
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based on these two waves of restructuring, the Korean auto industry made successful 
inroads into global value chains under its own brands and marketing networks (Lee and 
Cason, 1994; Lautier, 2004). Thus, as discussed in the theory chapter, the Korean auto 
industry, which has developed as a genuinely national industry, enjoyed Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur profits or Marxian super profits, since it secured greater control over the 
entire circuits of accumulation along auto value chains, ranging from supplier networks 
to production, from product development and branding to marketing networks. 
In contrast to Korea, the auto industries in Brazil, Mexico and Turkey have been largely 
tied to the global strategies of transnational automakers and supplier firms whose 
interests have been combined with the efforts of the state and domestic capital. The lack 
of reciprocal relations, symbiotic ties and co-operative arrangements between states and 
local capital in Latin American cases and Turkey posed a stark contrast to Korea, where 
state and auto industry shared the view that the country should develop a globally 
competitive industry under its own brands and marketing networks (for Latin American 
cases see Jenkins 1995; Hira, 2007). These three countries’ success in auto production 
and export has rather been driven and conditioned by the investments of global 
automakers and suppliers which have remained the pioneering capital bloc behind auto-
led industrialisation (for Latin America see, Lee and Cason, 1994; ECLAC, 2009; 
Wójtowicz and Rachwał, 2014). 
As discussed earlier with respect to the ISI era, the industry structure in Latin American 
cases and Turkey was historically fragmented, given the presence of too many 
transnational auto firms enjoying too much control over the industry. This was further 
consolidated with the shift of development policies to capital-friendly, export-oriented 
industrialisation strategies, through which these countries emerged as export platforms 
of motor vehicles and components for regional and global markets. In the case of Brazil, 
the auto industry witnessed a far-reaching transformation since the early 1990s, marked 
by the modernisation of existing manufacturing facilities and establishment of new 
plants by European, Japanese and Korean automakers (Shapiro 1994; ECLAC, 2009).74 
During the period 1990-2012, more than $71.1 billion were invested in the Brazilian 
                                                          
74 New entrants such as Honda (1997), Toyota (1998), Mercedes-Benz (1999), Renault (1999) and 
Peugeot-Citroen (2001) invested in the Brazilian auto industry as part of their strategies to globalise their 
production and marketing networks. The arrival of new entrants forced existing assemblers such as Ford, 
GM and Volkswagen to modernise their manufacturing facilities and re-connect with the global system of 
production.     
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auto industry; of which 61.3% was invested in assembly industry, 38.7% in supplier 
sector (Wójtowicz and Rachwał, 2014, p.87).  
Much like its Brazilian counterpart, the Mexican auto industry took a similar path of 
integration with global auto production. Increase in Mexican auto production and export 
would not have been possible without the establishment of new plants and 
modernisation of existing facilities, both of which have been driven by new investments 
from transnational auto corporations (ECLAC, 2009). From 1990 to 2012, the Mexican 
auto industry received more than $36 billion in FDI: of which 28.9% invested in 
assembly industry, 71.1% in supplier sector (Wójtowicz and Rachwał, 2014, p.93). 75 
Thus, as in Brazil, the investments of transnational automakers and suppliers have been 
the main driving force behind Mexican auto-led development. Nevertheless, despite 
these common features, these two outstanding cases also exhibit certain dissimilarities 
with respect to their participation in global auto production. While Mexico, combining 
its low-cost workforce with extensive FDI inflows from the US, Europe and Japan, has 
become an export platform for the world’s leading auto firms targeted to NAFTA 
region, Brazil, which has trade ties mostly with sub-regional markets through 
MERCOSUR, and Europe via bilateral trade agreements, has emerged as a 
manufacturing hub of global auto firms, serving sub-regional as well as European 
markets (Gereffi, 2015).76 
Thus, in terms of industry structure, management style and business strategies, the 
participation of the Turkish motor vehicle industry in global auto production has been 
more similar to cases of Brazil and Mexico than South Korea. In this respect, one of the 
most visible characteristics of the Turkish motor vehicle industry since the early 1990s 
has been the increasing penetration of foreign capital. As discussed earlier, increasing 
FDI during this period occurred as a combination of both greenfield investments in 
manufacturing plants by new entrants and brownfield investments, mostly in the form of 
modernisation of existing facilities. Meanwhile, the equity share of foreign capital in 
auto firms also increased particularly after the Custom Union agreement with the EU 
and in the aftermath of the twin crisis in the early 2000s, which can be regarded as the 
                                                          
75 The investment profiles of Mexico and Brazil suggests that these two countries have been treated 
differently by global auto corporations. Whereas. Mexico, despite the considerable number of assemblers, 
mostly functions as a hub for auto components and parts, Brazil hosts both assembly firms and follow-
source global suppliers. 
76 While the US Big Three, General Motors, Ford and Fiat Chrysler are historically the main exporters in 
the Mexican auto industry, European auto firms are dominant in Brazil.  
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Latin Americanisation of the Turkish auto industry. One of the first signs of increasing 
foreign penetration came from the Ford-Otosan partnership, where the Ford Motor 
Company’s minority share in Otosan was replaced with the equally-owned 41% shares 
of Koç Holding and Ford in 1997 (Interview No.2, 2016). A similar development also 
rose in TOFAŞ-Fiat partnership, in which equity shares of both partners equalised, and 
the TOFAŞ plant became a “die producing factory” while Fiat took the upper hand in 
the responsibility for exporting the vehicles (Interview No.3, 2016). 
A visible shift from minority to majority share also took place in heavy commercial 
vehicle producers such as MAN and Otomarsan, and passenger car producers such as 
Toyota-SA, Honda-Anadolu and Hyundai-Assan. The 33.3% share of MAN 
Nutzfahrzeuge in MAN A.S. increased to 81% in 1997 and to 99.9 % in 2002 
(TEKELMAN, 2016). A similar development occurred in Otomarsan, where Mercedes-
Benz increased its equity share from 36% in the early 1980s to 52% in 1989, and to 
67% in the 2000s, leaving only a 15% equity share for three local partners. The 
increasing presence of foreign capital also manifested itself in third-party firms from 
Japan and Korea. In the Toyota-SA partnership, Sabancı Holding’s 50% share in 
production was sold to its foreign partner Toyota in 2001, while its share and rights in 
imports and domestic distribution were later transferred to Toyota’s partner ALJ Group 
in 2009 (Hürriyet, 2009). In the Honda-Anadolu partnership, Anadolu Holding sold off 
its shares to Honda in 2002 (Interview No.6, 2016). Likewise, the equal split of shares 
between Hyundai and Kibar Holding at the outset of the Hyundai-Assan partnership in 
the late 1990s gave way to the majority ownership of Hyundai with shares of 85% and 
70% in 2010 and 2014, respectively (Interview No.6, 2016). 
In this respect, the automotive industry in Turkey has made its way into global auto 
production by relying on the inflows of FDI and further penetration of transnationals 
into the industry structure. However, under the prevalence of FDI and the penetration of 
foreign capital, the structure of the industry, much in conformity with Brazil and 
Mexico, has been further denationalised and fragmented by too many leading 
transnationals. Given the uneasy relationship and lack of well-established channels 
between the state and local capital, an effective mechanism of coordination and 
cooperation between governments and auto industrialists has never been secured to 
balance the power of transnationals and promote a national-based development of the 
industry, as was the case in Korea.  
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Over the decades-long liberalisation process cemented by a series of financial crises and 
succeeding structural adjustments, transnational auto firms have increased their control 
not only over the industry but also over business associations. It has become difficult for 
business associations like the Automotive Manufacturers Association (OSD) to organise 
and voice the concerns of domestic industry vis-à-vis leading transnationals. The OSD 
was crippled by a rivalry between new entrants and some of old members who lobbied 
for regulating and limiting the issuance of licences to transnationals that manufacture 
vehicles domestically (Interviews, No.3-4-51, 2016). However, this has neither 
generated balance against transnationals nor given way to effective intervention of the 
state in the industrial structure to prevent the free play of TNCs by their own terms. 
Particularly, given the lack of selective targeting towards industry and firms, the state 
has not been able to restructure and rationalise the auto industry on the basis of 
ownership structure, number, size and performance of firms (Interviews, No.3-4-7, 
2016). 
7.3 Value Chains, New Form of Dependent Development and the Matter of 
Upgrading in the Turkish Auto industry 
Given the lack of strategic and sector-specific auto-led industrialisation policies, the 
industry has faced a series of limitations in increasing returns to economies of scale and 
scope as well as developing its own endogenous capacity in high-technology and high-
value added niches of global auto production (see Duruiz, 2004; Ölmezoğulları, 2011; 
Bürken, 2014). For two and a half decades, until the mid-2000s, diseconomies of scale 
were the normal state as overall the industry mostly worked at under 50% capacity 
utilisation (see Appendix 39). The failure of the state to regulate the over-crowded and -
fragmented industry structure led to chronic problems of access capacity and limited the 
benefits of economies of scale. This in turn hindered the efficient and cost-reducing 
utilisation of available capacity, and delimited the possibility of technological upgrading 
for decades (Okur, 1994; Duruiz, 2004). Only in the last decade since the mid-2000 
have assembly firms achieved ideal rates of capacity utilisation and scale economies at 
international standards, thanks to full integration of the industry into the global 
strategies and marketing networks of auto TNCs.  
However, this has not automatically brought a process of increasing returns to 
economies of scale and learning-by-doing by local auto firms, and has not given way to 
the development of indigenous capacity in high-technology and high-value added 
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niches of global auto production. Rather, more in conformity with Latin American 
cases, the motor vehicle industry in Turkey has adopted a lower road of integration with 
global auto value chains, exhibiting the main characteristics of what we call new form 
of dependent development. Turkish auto assemblers have not truly developed 
capabilities in design and conceptualisation of products under their own brand names 
and marketing networks, which would allow them to emerge as leading automakers in 
their own right. As discussed in the theory chapter, Turkish auto assemblers have 
displayed limited achievements in expanding control over the entire circuits of 
accumulation along auto value chains, which in turn keeps them dependent on 
transnational auto firms in several respects ranging from having cutting-edge production 
technologies to developing product designs and concepts, from owning patents to 
accessibility to export markets. Hence, in compliance with their subordinated position, 
they have mostly specialised in lower value-added segments of global value chains, 
typically characterised by globally dispersed, routinized and relatively more competitive 
activities, mostly destitute of Schumpeterian entrepreneur rents or Marxian super 
profits. 
Questionnaires and interviews (No.1-2-3-4-5-6-7, 2016) conducted with assembly firms 
revealed how this form of dependent development has been concretised through 
asymmetrical and hierarchically-structured value relations between local industrialists 
and leading TNCs. One of the most salient findings that should be noted in this respect 
is that the assembly industry in Turkey is indeed a heterogeneous mixture of firms, 
hence the nature of dependency relations should be explained by taking into account 
firm-specific factors such as ownership structure, nature of intra- and inter-firm 
relations between local partners and parent/licencing companies, as well as the global 
strategy of auto transnationals. As of today, there are 15 motor vehicle producers in 
Turkey (Appendix 40). Two of them (Türk Traktör and Hattat Tarım) are tractor 
manufacturers, and therefore beyond the scope of this study. Four of the remaining 13 
manufacturers, namely Honda Türkiye, Toyota, Mercedes Benz Türk and Man Türkiye, 
operate as affiliates of transnationals in which parent companies exert single-handed 
control over decision-making and capital accumulation processes (Interviews, No-4-5, 
2016). In this sense, as conceptualised in the theory chapter, these four manufacturers 
exhibit the characteristics of an enclave situation in which almost all the capital comes 
from outside the domestic production site, and the parent companies largely dominate 
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the realization of value by controlling M, C, and most of the P steps of the cycle of 
accumulation (see a in Figure 7.2).  
Figure 7. 2 Enclave and Local Economy Situations in the Turkish Assembly Industry 
 
 
 
Key: Bold is a locally controlled part; the boxed areas take place domestically. M 
is money capital; C is commodity capital; P is production (mp: means of 
production and l: labour); C+c is new or transformed commodity with added value 
and M+m is money capital with new increment of value. 
Source: Drawn by the author. 
As discussed in the theory chapter, here in these manufacturers, the issue of managerial, 
organisational, technological and market dependency is prominent since all steps along 
the cycle are controlled externally, and therefore core business areas spanning from 
procurement, production planning, pricing to R&D, branding and marketing are 
conducted by parent companies. Since the involvement of local capital has very 
miniscule, if any, parent companies easily siphon away surplus value and externally 
condition potentials of accumulation processes within each producer.  
In contrast to the enclave economy situation, in five assembly manufacturers (Ford-
Otosan, TOFAŞ, OYAK-Renault, Anadolu-Isuzu and Hyundai-Assan) where the 
domestic bourgeoisie have a say on areas such as procurement, production planning, 
R&D and marketing, there is greater potential to expand local control over the entire 
circuits of accumulation and extract higher surplus or profit along value chains. 
Although the Turkish bourgeoisie as local partners of joint ventures enjoy a certain 
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degree of involvement in this situation, the issue of dependency still arises, since overall 
accumulation processes are externally conditioned by leading auto transnationals, given 
their control either over capital goods, management and technology or market, sales and 
branding (b and c in Figure 7.2). More specifically, the situation of dependency also 
exhibits firm-specific variations within this group of auto manufacturers, related both to 
the global strategies of leading transnationals, the scale of manufacturing operations and 
the bargaining power of local partners.  
The questionnaires and interviews (No.6-7, 2016) reveal that the heavy dependence of 
local partner on the products, technology, brand names, patents and marketing skills of 
parent companies characterises the headquarter-subsidiary relations in the cases of 
Oyak-Renault and Hyundai Assan. In almost all business areas such as production line 
design, procurement, R&D, product pricing and marketing, parent companies hold 
strong decision-making authority over subsidiary operations compared to local partners 
(Interviews, No.6-7, 2016). In both cases, where local partners (Armed Forces Pension 
Fund in OYAK-Renault and Kibar Holding in Hyundai-Assan) have been weak and less 
effective, the possibility of moving into the high value-added (core-like) nodes of value 
chains seems restricted. In this regard, parent firms seem set on securing control over 
high profit margins along value chains by enforcing high entry barriers particularly 
through design, branding, patenting and marketing (Interviews, No.6-7, 2016).  
Locked into the position of low-cost manufacturer at the backyard of Europe, Oyak-
Renault and Hyundai-Assan partnerships have therefore achieved limited success in 
upgrading the activities of joint ventures beyond production. Interviews with high-
ranking technical and managerial staff of these two firms confirmed this point. As the 
leading passenger car producer in terms of volume, Oyak-Renault has its own in-house 
R&D centre, but it is only tasked with upgrading production processes which involves 
improvements in quality, flexibility and cost performance. Thus, as the interviewee 
(No.7, 2016) confirmed, it does not generate as much profit or value-added as product 
(conception, design and product development) and functioning (branding, marketing) 
upgrading, as long as related competences are kept under the sway of the parent 
company. Likewise, the Hyundai-Assan partnership is even more limited to production 
operations, as its parent company has so far not allowed any local R&D activities 
although the local partner has many times asked to establish an in-house development 
centre (Interview, No.6, 2016). 
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On the other hand, the development of the TOFAŞ-Fiat, Ford-Otosan and Anadolu-
Isuzu partnerships exhibit different characteristics vis-a-vis the above-cited cases given 
the stepwise upgrading of production and development capabilities to a certain extent.  
Particularly as the leading figure in the economy, Koç Holding seems to have actively 
developed more collaborative partnerships both with Fiat (TOFAŞ) and Ford (Otosan). 
As interviews (No.3-4, 2016) revealed, for many years, Fiat’s main strategy was based 
on exploiting the advantages of low-cost production in Turkey through centralised 
decision-making and headquarter-subsidiary relations. Fiat initially showed little 
interest in establishing an in-house R&D department in Turkey. However, as Mr 
Nahum, former deputy chairman of TOFAŞ, stated in our interview (No.4, 2016), the 
local partner had to take this decision alone beyond Fiat’s knowledge, outside of the 
joint venture. Later on, the local efforts of TOFAŞ received attention from the parent 
company especially when the Fiat Group adopted a sweeping internationalisation of its 
production and development capabilities in the aftermath of the very severe financial 
crisis it experienced in the early 2000s. Thus, the TOFAŞ-Fiat partnership has been 
involved in new development projects through its low-cost development centre in 
Bursa. Under the tight control of Fiat’s R&D centre in Torino, TOFAŞ has been given 
increased though still bounded responsibility in new development projects such as the 
New Doblo project in 2009 and the New Tipo (Fiat Aegea) project in 2015.  
Likewise, Otosan, Koç Holding’s other partnership with Ford, was established as an 
important low-cost manufacturing base particularly for Ford’s European operations. In 
early periods, Ford only authorised an in-house product development department, 
mainly tasked with problem-solving in production processes. However, as Koç Holding 
pressed ahead to increase the R&D capabilities of the joint venture benefiting from 
government R&D incentives, the parent company increasingly incorporated Ford-
Otosan into its global R&D activities. As Mr Şenyener, R&D manager of Otosan, 
expressed in our interview (No.2, 2016), supported by state incentives, Koç Holding’s 
local efforts coincided with Ford’s global strategy to share risks and costs of product 
development with local partners As a result, the Ford-Otosan partnership has increased 
its participation even in the intellectual property rights of new vehicles and products, as 
in the Ecotorq project since 2003 or in Transit-van project in 2007 (Interview, No.2, 
2016). 
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Thus, overall findings show that among joint ventures Koç Holding’s partnerships with 
Fiat and Ford have more effectively taken advantage of the localisation strategies of 
their parent companies. Particularly, employing more than 1350 people, Ford-Otosan 
helds Turkey’s biggest R&D organisation which stands as the biggest patent filler in the 
automotive industry, and the third biggest in any sector (Interview, No.2, 2016). 
Following Koç Holding’s partnerships, another relatively successful joint venture is the 
Anadolu-Isuzu Group in which the local partner has a long history of involvement 
beyond production activities. In contrast to other East Asian automakers in Turkey 
(Toyota, Honda and Hyundai) which adopts a more centralised approach in decision-
making and headquarter-subsidiary relations, the Anadolu-Isuzu partnership was given 
far greater responsibility not only in production processes, but also in activities such as 
product development, research and marketing (Interview, No.1, 2016). 
Thus, as discussed in the theory chapter, having a degree of control over production and 
accumulation processes has enabled local automakers to have greater capabilities to 
upgrade beyond production and so expand their share in created value-added. 
Particularly, the presence of active local partners and government support played an 
important role in this respect, as stronger local partners have developed partnerships 
beyond production. However, this has not brought either unmediated access to high 
value-added activities or the end of dependency relations on the side of local 
bourgeoisie. As questionnaires and interviews (No.2-3-6-7, 2016) have revealed, with 
respect to strategic business areas such as patenting, branding and marketing, parents 
companies seem to have equal if not stronger influence on decision making vis-a-vis 
their local partners. Thus, despite the localisation of research and development activities 
to a certain extent, the parent companies continue to hold sway over the pace of 
technology transfer (Interviews, No.2-3-6-7, 2016). Particularly, this was bluntly 
pointed out by the R&D manager of the Ford-Otosan partnership as follows:  
When we develop our own engine, even if, say, the cargo label reads ‘Ford’, 
we own its property rights. But who are we anyway? We are a 50% 
partnered company, I mean. We are not an independent company named 
Otosan. Ford shares the intellectual property rights with us as long as it does 
not perceive this as giving it away to another competitor. This does not 
change the overall result anyway (Interview, No.2, 2016). 
A similar tendency has also been observed in the field of marketing and export 
activities. Despite increasing involvement of local management in sales targets and 
policies regarding export markets, local partners still rely on marketing networks of 
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transnational automakers as joint ventures are bounded to their parent companies when 
they are to market their products. As confirmed by questionnaires and interviews (No, 
2-3-6-7, 2016), parent companies are keen to have their voices heard in decisions 
regarding the number of vehicles that are to be produced and exported outside the 
country. In this sense, parent companies coordinate the marketing activities of each joint 
venture in favour of their group-wide performance on a global scale.  
As a result, by holding sway over strategic business areas such as patenting, branding 
and marketing, parent companies secure their control over high-profit niches along auto 
value chains. In a sense, occupying the apex of value relations, they seek to take 
advantage of the involvement of local partners not only as low-cost producers but also 
as risk and cost sharers in R&D activities to a certain extent. On that note, we can safely 
state that local automakers have indeed reached a level of maturity in production, and 
moved into the position of co-designers to a certain extent. However, the nature of 
headquarters-subsidiary relations has, at the same time, re-produced a restricted and 
dependent sort of development, since the decision-making in core business areas is not 
free from the influence of leading transnationals.77 In this sense, the deep-seated 
presence of auto transnationals has left limited room for further development of 
nationally-owned automobile manufacturers in Turkey. As interviews (No, 1-2-3-6-7., 
2016) reveal, it seems difficult for local automakers to take over the decision-making 
authority in the highest value-adding activities in their own right and under their own 
brand name. Nor are state policies towards local automakers seem conducive to bring 
such an overall and stepwise upgrading into original design and brand manufacturing.  
When it comes to state policies towards the industry, there is widespread dissatisfaction 
and mistrust on the part of auto industrialists in Turkey. Among 41 firms who 
responded to the questionnaire, 20 firms (almost 49%) were dissatisfied with 
government policies towards the industry. Only 5 out of 41 firms were satisfied or 
highly satisfied whereas the remaining 16 companies or 39% responded as partially 
satisfied. Looking closely into the reasons behind the widespread discontent, the 
surveyed firms particularly rated the role of the state as limited and less instrumental in 
areas such as providing sector-specific subsidies, investing in human capital, fostering 
cutting-edge innovations through R&D subsidization, and developing effective 
                                                          
77 The findings in this study complement the contentions of earlier studies which claim that the joint 
venture-dominated structure of assembly industry has impeded the development of a full-blown auto 
industry in technological terms. See Ölmezoğulları (2011), Pamukçu and Sönmez (2011), Bürken (2014). 
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networks among firms and the state. Particularly, given the distrust and uneasy nature of 
relations between state and capital, the state has been unable to build a strong exchange 
relationship and R&D context with the sector and thus shape the auto industry along 
lines of domestic interests.  
Indeed, there have been notable initiatives since the government introduced a new R&D 
incentives law in 2008, and has more recently appealed to local automakers to produce a 
domestic car under a national brand name. Most of the interviewees (No.1-2-3-4-7-13-
14-15-18 etc.) confirmed that the new incentives have been beneficial to the private 
R&D efforts of local industrialists as well as attracting international R&D activities of 
leading transnationals. Benefiting from these incentives, several firms have established 
in-house R&D centres with the aim of acquiring the competencies required for higher 
value-added activities. However, even though some of these firms, mostly involving 
joint-ventures and a few domestic suppliers, have developed R&D capabilities in co-
designing and product development, most R&D activities have been confined to areas 
such as achieving higher cost performance, and improving production processes or 
product quality, with relatively limited achievements in design and product 
development capabilities (Interviews, No.3-6-7-9-13-18-20-24, 2016).  
This confirms the contention that the Turkish auto industry has remained stuck in what 
Bürken (2014) calls the “middle-technology trap” – that it has reached a level of 
maturity in manufacturing and in co-designing to some extent, but that it lacks the 
required policy space and technological sophistication to become a leading actor in its 
own right. This is also related to the recently heated debate that the absence of a 
national automobile brand has delimited policy space for moving into sophisticated 
R&D activities. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the government has 
called on representatives of the industry to manufacture a national brand car. However, 
given the uneasy nature of state-capital relations and the infeasibility of the proposed 
model of national car, the government’s initiative has not been embraced by any 
domestic automaker, and led to a collective project between the state and the business 
sector. Many interviewees were highly critical of the fact that the project has been 
conducted single-handedly by the TUBITAK (Turkey’s national R&D agency) behind 
closed doors with no involvement from either domestic automakers or supplier firms.78 
                                                          
78 Turkey bought the intellectual property rights of Sweden’s troubled Saab 9-3 model and signed a 
license agreement with China’s National Electric Vehicle Sweden (NEVS) to convert the model into an 
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One interviewee (No.7, 2016) who had participated in the earlier stages of the project 
articulated his concerns as follows; 
The state has not developed a shared and efficient platform with the 
automotive sector in the framework of the domestic car project. The state 
rather carries out the project behind closed doors working on a debatable 
model in terms of scale economies. I am of the opinion that a crucial mistake 
is done in this respect. Because the most important priority for car 
manufacturing is competence. If this project is not carried out with key 
industry firms that have long years of experience, and the personnel thereof, 
it will be difficult to develop a low-cost vehicle that could become a global 
brand. 
Overall, the auto industry in Turkey has remained locked in a lower-road of auto-led 
development in which the industry has extended its share in global production by 
building up its competencies in the fields of manufacturing, cost performance, 
production quality and co-designing. Yet, it lacks the indigenous dynamics to shift from 
production and co-designing activities to core competences such as overall product 
conception, branding and marketing. In this sense, the Turkish auto industry is placed at 
the periphery of global auto value relations, relying on its low cost advantage in 
production as well as R&D which leaves little room for national-owned market leaders. 
Thus, nationally-owned firms have only managed to grow in specific segments, left by 
leading automakers.  
A typical example in this respect is bus bodywork manufacturing, which offers greater 
chance for own-brand production. As manufacturers I interviewed indicate, the lower 
technology and scale requirements and higher labour intensity of bus body 
manufacturing have left greater room for the presence of local brands in emerging 
countries like Turkey (Interview, No.1-4-5, 2016). In comparison to other vehicle types, 
bus production is the most mature sector, combining the lowest technology/automation 
levels and smallest volume of production with the highest level of labour intensity. In 
bus manufacturing, conveyor belt and robot technology are out of question and 
production is mostly carried out by hand-power using multifunctional or single function 
machines. Thus, bus manufacturing does not require high volumes of production or 
mass production techniques as other vehicles types. Rather, it relies on labour power, as 
it is 70 and 20 times more labour intensive than passenger car and truck production, 
respectively (Interview, No.5, 2016).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
extended-range electrical car. However, the long-awaited national car of Turkey has not yet been unveiled 
and seems to be years away from reaching the markets. 
213 
 
 
 
The lower entry barriers and lack of interest of auto transnationals in this segment has 
let domestically-owned firms such as TEMSA, OTOKAR, Karsan and Guleryuz 
establish a market presence beyond Turkey. Particularly since the late 2000s, these 
locally-owned bus assemblers have got into markets outside Turkey under their own 
brand names (Interviews, No.4-5, 2016). As our interviews with bus manufacturers 
revealed, this has enabled them to build their own value chains, albeit modest in scale, 
and therefore has meant higher value-added on the account of local industrialists 
(Interviews, No.4-5, 2016). However, despite this relative success, volume of 
production for each bus assembler is still far behind the output level needed to be 
among leading bus and truck manufacturers on a global scale. More importantly, these 
local firms are indirectly dependent on transnational bus and truck producers such as 
Daimler-Benz, Scania Volvo and MAN, since core and high value-added parts such as 
engine chassis and axis are imported from them.  
In a sense, as one interviewee indicated (No.4, 2016), the leading bus and truck 
transnationals act as indirect partners of local bus bodywork manufacturers and provide 
engines, chassis and axis, as long as local bus manufacturers in emerging countries do 
not run against their global interests. Put another way, while the field of bus bodywork 
manufacturing has been left to dozens of local producers in emerging countries, the 
leading transnationals produce complete buses as well as core sub-systems such as 
engines, chassis and axis as formerly established high-volume producers.79 Thus, 
occupying a relatively neglected niche, locally-owned bus manufacturers operate in pre-
determined profit margins and lower-value added segments which involve less R&D 
and more labour intensity. According to the findings gathered from interviews (No.4-5, 
2016), locally-owned bus manufacturers are confined to interior and trailer 
manufacturing, whereas production of core parts such as engines, chassis, axis and 
transmissions, which accounts for 60 to 70% of the total cost, is procured from leading 
transnationals. Indeed, this signifies the assembly-like and dependent character of local 
bus production and its weak capacity in terms of value creation. Today, none of these 
locally-owned manufacturers has reached the output volumes suitable to venturing into 
these core segments of bus production, which require large production scales and high 
R&D capability. Thus, as in other types of vehicle production, the lower-road of 
                                                          
79 Likewise, Brazil has many locally-owned bus bodywork manufacturers such as Marcapolo,  
Caio/Induscar, Neobus,  Comil, Mascarello, Busscar, Irizar and Metalbus most of which cluster in the 
Souther part of the country. For more info see Cavalcante and Arujo (2013). 
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integration of the bus assembly sector with the global auto industry exhibits the 
characteristics of a new form of dependent development, as it generates an expanded 
share of manufacturing exports but a disproportionally lower share of globally created 
value-added. 
The formation of the assembly industry along these lines has also been accompanied by 
a series of auxiliary symptoms of dependent development with respect to the supplier 
industry. The development and performance of locally-owned auto suppliers is strongly 
tied to the strategies of the assembly industry operating within Turkey. Interviews 
(No.3-7-14-18-20-25-29-35, 2016) with numerous assembly and supplier firms 
confirmed that the lack of genuinely indigenous automakers has in turn delimited the 
room for local control over decision-making in the area of procurement. As discussed 
earlier, the full integration of the Turkish auto industry into the global strategies and 
asymmetrical value relations of leading automakers has led to shuffling and 
segmentation of the supplier sector since the late 1990s. One of the most notable feature 
of this segmented industry structure has been the rise of follow-up investments of global 
supplier firms in the form of foreign-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures and acquisition 
of domestic firms.  
As interviews (No.12-15-17-18-19-21-22-30-35, 2016) revealed, occupying the apex of 
the auto parts/components industry, these firms are mostly treated as preferred suppliers 
and potential co-designers, given their financial and technological capabilities and their 
close relations with transnational automakers on the global scale. Mostly functioning as 
full-service suppliers, these firms tend to carry out designing and co-designing of 
modules and systems preferably in their own countries, and supply them to leading 
transnationals through globally dispersed production facilities (Interviews, No.10-12-
14-17-19). Since local vehicle design in Turkey is rare, apart from some cases of 
commercial vehicles, the diffusion of co-designing and product-development 
capabilities to the local suppliers seems to remain relatively limited compared to global 
auto components/parts firms. Nevertheless, this is not to say that local suppliers are 
excluded from designing and product development stages, but among the first-tier 
suppliers, the success stories of majority domestic-owned companies are limited in 
number for overall upgrading in global auto supply chains. 
As revealed by the fieldwork (Interviews, No.8-9-16-18-20-43-46, 2016) and earlier 
studies (Eskiyenentürk, 2006; Özatağan, 2011a and 2011b), some of these success 
215 
 
 
 
stories include Aktas in air suspension systems, Ege Endustri in axles, Farba in 
automotive lighting, CMS in wheels, Tırsan in trailer manufacturing, Teknorot in ball 
joints and steering tie rods, Coşkunöz in metal forming, Orhan in gearshift mechanism, 
Cevher and Erkunt in cast engine parts, and Ortadoğu in ball bearings. These suppliers 
have gained a foothold in co-designing and product development competences to a 
certain extent, given the willingness of transnational automakers to relinquish some of 
these functions to develop their core competencies. However, despite the diffusion of 
competencies to locally-owned suppliers, few of them have truly established less 
asymmetrical and dependent relations with automakers, since their upgrading paths 
have not yet moved into stages which would allow them to emerge as leading global 
suppliers.80  
Putting the limited number of success stories aside, the domestic supplier industry in 
Turkey presents a less promising picture when one counts in lower tiers of suppliers. 
The vast majority of domestic suppliers have been even deprived of the above-cited 
competencies required for co-designing and product-development tasks. The findings 
gathered from the fieldwork (Interviews, No.15-20-22-24-29-31-32-39-50, 2016) rather 
demonstrated that the vast majority of supplier have been locked into low-end 
production and cut-throat competition which by its nature involves highly asymmetrical 
and captive value relations. Having limited financial and technical capabilities, these 
suppliers mainly carry out specific tasks such as following detailed blueprints and 
instructions imposed by their customers and meeting the cost, flexibility and quality of 
required parts. Although some of them conduct in-house R&D activities, most of these 
activities have remained in process optimization, elimination of technical problems and 
reverse engineering of competitor products. Instances of upgrading beyond production 
have been rare among these suppliers, dooming the majority of them to downstream and 
low value-added segments of production such as component-supply and original 
equipment manufacturing. 
Thus, all these observations imply an auxiliary symptom of dependent development that 
the development of the auto industry along the above lines generated a disarticulated 
industry structure that fails to create fully-developed intra-/inter-industry linkages or the 
traditional multiplier effect with respect to the domestic economy. Rather, interviews 
                                                          
80 According to PwC’s (Automotive News, 2015) study, no majority domestic-owned auto component 
firm in Turkey has managed to rank in the top 100 global auto suppliers whereas Brazil and Mexico have 
only one firm each, ranking 77 and 51 respectively.  
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(No.3-7-20-44-49, 2016) and earlier studies (Eskiyenentürk, 2006; Gülşen, 2007) 
indicate that export growth in the auto industry has not only insufficiently fed back into 
the domestic economy, but also fostered the chronic problem of low value-added 
creation and a trade deficit, particularly in intermediate auto parts. Largely benefiting 
from low labour and production costs, domestic suppliers have specialised not only in 
low value-added segments of global value relations, but also in the production of certain 
products which involve more labour-intensive manufacturing processes such as cast 
engine parts, plastic parts, aluminium and steel wheels, seats, pistons, liners and tires 
(Interviews, No.13-24-30-43-45-51, 2016). Hence, this raises the question of value 
capturing in Turkish auto industry as a significant portion of high value-added 
components such as complex electrical systems, safety components, transmissions, gear 
boxes and engines are mostly procured from leading global suppliers. 
7.4 Value Chains, Dependency and the Question of Labour in the Turkish Auto 
Industry  
Last but not least, the formation of the motor vehicle industry along these lines has 
further implications with respect to the salaried and labouring classes. As firms in auto 
industry have mostly integrated with global production at the lower end of value 
relations, mainly as subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers of leading transnationals, 
the industry is subjected to fierce cost-down pressure and cut-throat completion, which 
means low profit volumes and modest, if any, entrepreneurial rents or super-profits. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, this has in turn translated into a ruinous regime of labour 
control, marked by a combination of high rates of absolute value extraction (low-wages 
and long working hours) with increased, albeit limited, productivity and relative surplus 
value in industrial relations. 
Indeed, this form of labour exploitation started to emerge during the 1980s and 1990s, 
when the industry underwent a process of restructuring of export-oriented production, 
but it has increasingly concretised in the post-2001 period with the full integration of 
the Turkish motor industry into transnational networks of global trade and production. 
Early steps in this direction were taken in the post-1980 period with harsh repression of 
the social economic and political rights of labour. Prior to the 1980s, Maden-Is, a 
member trade union of DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions) had been 
historically well-organised in the auto industry, defending workers’ rights against 
MESS (the Turkish Employers’ Association of Metal Industries) on the basis of 
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effective class unionism (Taştan, 2015). Following the military coup of 1980, the labour 
activism of DİSK and its member trade unions was banned for about one and half 
decade until the mid-1990s. Throughout this period, workers in the metal and auto 
industries were either deunionised or forced to become members of Türk Metal, a right-
wing, pro-employer union which would become the major and most influential labour 
association in the metal and automotive industries with the support of MESS and the 
state (Taştan, 2015). 
Under the guidance of the state, MESS and Türk Metal have pursued a 35-year-old 
system of iron discipline on auto workers, marked by a ‘tamed’ unionism and a 
caricature of social dialogue. Since then, the established model of industrial relations 
has significantly weakened the power of organised labour and replaced it with pseudo-
trade unionism. Accordingly, overall union density has dropped from 20-25% in the late 
1980s and early 1990s to 11% in 2015, yet the de facto situation is even worse, around 
6% (see, Chapter 5). As for the automotive industry, there is no exact data, but in the 
metal industry overall where the auto sector has the overwhelming share, union density 
is around 16% (Çelik, 2015, p.25). However, despite the relatively high union density, 
an ineffective centralised and oligarchical unionism has predominated the industry up 
until today.  
In this respect, the requirements for 50% of workers at the work-place and the 10% 
sectoral threshold have particularly placed serious restrictions on the impact of unions 
and undermined union democracy (Interviews, No.53-55-58-65, 2016).81 Many 
independent unions that could not pass the threshold have not been entitled to take part 
in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the MESS. As of late 2015, there are 
roughly 230.000 unionised workers in the metal industry, but almost 30% of them are 
out of the coverage of CBAs due to the complexity of the CBAs competency system 
(Çelik, 2015, p.26). Within the industry, only three trade unions, namely Türk Metal, 
Birleşik Metal and Çelik-İş, have been part of CBAs, but these trade unions never share 
a common perspective or voice. Accounting for almost 73% of unionised workers, Türk 
                                                          
81 On the company level, one of the main handicaps of industrial relations is the 50% threshold for 
collective bargaining. Since more pro-labour unions such as Birleşik-Metal-Is and TOMIS do not meet 
the 50% threshold in many workplaces, employers mostly ignore or block the efforts and demands of 
their members. During fieldwork, this was particularly expressed by members of these unions 
(Interviews, No.53-55-65, 2016). I also had the chance to speak with the labour union leaders of Birleşik-
Metal-is and TOMIS. They stated that the 50% threshold makes it difficult to organise at the company 
level, as there is a clear benefit for workers of being a member of the dominant union, despite its pro-
employer stance.     
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Metal concludes CBAs with MESS without getting the consent or active involvement of 
the other unions, particularly Birleşik Metal which adopts a more pro-labour stance as a 
successor of the decades-long banned Maden-İş (Interviews, No.53-66-67, 2016). Being 
reluctant to cooperate with other unions, Türk Metal concludes CBAs with MESS on 
the basis of pro-employer, bread-and-butter unionism, and then MESS imposes it on 
unionised workers. 
In this sense, auto workers have been victimised under the anti-democratic and pro-
employer labour relations model, spanning over three-and-a-half decades up to the 
present. As Çelik (2015) argues, instead of defending and improving workers’ rights, 
trade unions have served as a “panopticon” prison that provides additional control 
mechanisms on labour. Likewise, the findings gleaned from our own labour-level 
interviews (2016) suggested that there is disconnection and weak ties between trade 
unions and labourers in auto industry. Our quantitative data shows that among auto 
workers who responded to the questionnaires (2016), only 21% of respondents see trade 
unions as favourable (3%) or somewhat favourable (18%), whereas the remaining 79% 
see trade unions as neutral (14%), unfavourable (37%) or very unfavourable (28%). 
Particularly, many auto workers that we interviewed complained about a lack of shop 
steward election systems, the symbolic election of delegates, pro-employer and passive 
unionism, and disregard of the voice of labour during CBA processes (Interviews, 
No.53-56-58-60-62-65-66, etc., 2016). Again, the overwhelming majority of workers 
interviewed see trade unions as largely ineffective as their role and power has greatly 
decreased, particularly in the areas of bargaining with employers for better salaries, 
improving job security and contractual status of workers, and limiting the length and 
intensity of work (Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7. 3 Change in the Role and Power of Trade Unions in the Turkish Automotive 
Sector since the Early 2000s 
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Source: Questionnaire Surveys (2016) 
Thus, this decades-long labour relations model has in a sense created a buffer zone for 
labour militancy and significantly undermined the bargaining power of workers in the 
automotive industry. Ongoing de-unionisation and symbolic syndicalism has been 
accompanied by intensified repression and exploitation of the labouring classes as an 
easy way to achieve cost advantages and competitiveness in global markets. As 
confirmed by some of the assembly and supplier firms interviewed, cheap and docile 
labour constitutes the main basis of international competitiveness in the Turkish auto 
industry, and thus has been mostly used as an excuse against workers’ demands for 
wage increases (Interviews, No.3-7-12-20-23-29, 2016). Over the two decades 
preceding the early 2000s, achieving cost-advantages through absolute surplus value 
extraction (by cutting down wages and lengthening the working hours) was the main 
characteristic of auto-led development in Turkey. As numerous studies (Boratav, 
Yeldan and Köse, 2001; Yeldan, 2007) demonstrate, in contrast to the ISI-period, a 
trend of massive decline in real wages in the auto sector along with other manufacturing 
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industries, had been the essential strategy to reduce the production costs. Thus, the 
control over labour was predominantly established in domain of distribution. 
However, since the early 2000s, the nature of exploitation in the auto industry started to 
change, as control over labour has not only remained in the domain of distribution but 
also shifted to the domain of production/reproduction to a certain degree. With the 
consolidation of this new form of dependent development, the extraction of relative 
surplus value has gradually come to co-exist with absolute surplus value and traditional 
forms of labour exploitation. This has become particularly evident in the last fifteen 
years, during which the auto industry has increased its industrialisation coefficient and 
undergone a process of restructuring in productive terms to align itself with global 
dynamics of production and trade. The full integration of the auto industry into global 
value relations also meant an increasing share of relative surplus extraction, as it has 
required high levels of mechanisation and technicalization in production, reorganisation 
of production processes, and reduction in the socially necessary amount of labour. 
Nevertheless, this has not brought a downright replacement of absolute surplus value 
and archaic forms of labour exploitation, as mainly observed in core-like economies 
where extraction of relative surplus value overpowers as a dominant form of 
exploitation. Rather, it has brought a monstrous and impoverishing economic 
development which intensified the social and economic exclusion of auto workers from 
the overall growth process.  
The evidence reveals that the burdens of auto-led industrialisation and productivity 
growth fell disproportionately on the labouring classes, as surplus transfer from wage-
labour to capitalist classes intensified over the period in question. As many studies 
(Taymaz and Yilmaz, 2008; Yükseler and Türkan, 2008) demonstrate, contrary to 
preceding decades, the fluctuating course of labour productivity in the auto industry has 
been replaced with a stable upward trend since 2001, thanks to the dynamic of 
technology deployment and increasingly flexible management of labour. Until the late 
2000s, whereas labour productivity in the auto industry increased by 10.5% on average 
per year, wages per hour declined by 2.8% in real terms (Yükseler and Türkan, 2008). 
To put it more explicitly, this suggests what we call the low road phenomenon, defined 
by technological progress in production and improvement of productivity at the expense 
of wages and overall working conditions. 
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Thus, the post-2001 period represents both continuity and change in terms of the nature 
of labour exploitation. Built on a productive structure that is already based on extending 
working hours and reducing labour costs, technological progress has sparked capitalist 
intensification of the rhythm of the worker’s labour and thus productivity, but 
simultaneously sustained the tendency to remunerate labour at a lower rate than its real 
value. Likewise, our labour-level fieldwork confirms that auto workers have not 
received respective improvements in their wages and working conditions along with 
process upgrading and productivity increases over the last one-and-a-half decades.  
Poor wages, along with long working hours, job insecurity, pace and intensity of work, 
and lack of collective bargaining come to the fore as most pressing problems for the 
Turkish auto workers. As our questionnaires (2016) revealed, over the last one-and-half 
decades, auto workers have been subjected to increasing workloads (81.5%), higher 
work pace (89.9%) and tighter deadlines (89.9%) along with stronger shop floor control 
and work organisation (67.4%) and new machines and higher automation (77.8%). This 
has meant increasing labour productivity and thus the creation and appropriation of 
relative surplus value. However, the improvements in productivity are not reflected in 
wages and working conditions, given the widespread discontent with overall changes in 
working conditions over the period in question.  
The low-wage policy and cutting of labour costs in particular has included widespread 
dissatisfaction (81.5%) among auto workers that we interviewed. Despite its cost-
disadvantages vis-à-vis other developing countries such as India, China and Mexico, 
Turkey has come to the forefront as a low-wage heaven and excellent auto-export port 
for marketing and sales in European countries. With average net monthly wages of less 
than 550 euros, wages in the auto industry are not only far below European standards; 
they also rank 30% lower than other sectors in Turkey such as glass, petro-chemicals 
and medicine (Çelik, 2015, p.32; Korkmaz, 2015, p.4). This shows that remunerating 
labour power below its value through wage freezing and squeezing (in real terms) has 
continued to co-exist with increasing labour productivity and the rise of relative surplus 
value to the extent that the later never managed to negate the former.  
Moreover, our fieldwork (Interviews, No.60-65-66-72, 2016) also revealed that surplus 
extraction not only materialises through formal labour relations, but also through 
extraction of value from informal underpaid/unpaid labour force. Particularly in 
medium- and small-scale workshops, I found anecdotal evidence that underpaid 
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informal and refugee (mostly Syrians) workers have also involved in auto production, 
providing cheaper inputs and thus hidden surplus value to auto firms higher in value 
chains. These workers are a free source of input for auto capitalists, since they are 
externalised from calculations of production costs. Thus, auto capitalists are able to 
drain hidden surplus from them since they are mainly paid below subsistence wages and 
are not covered by social security benefits. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that apart 
from employing underpaid informal and migrant workers, particularly medium- and 
small-scale employers in auto industry sometimes do not make overtime payments, due 
to a lack of clear-cut contractual status defining work relationships and overtime 
payments on the shop floor.   
Along with wage squeezing and wage cutting practices, long working hours have 
continued to be one of the main pillars of surplus value extraction in the Turkish auto 
industry. As the earlier study of Yükseler and Türkan (2008) revealed, the index of 
hours worked in auto production increased by 12.7% on average per year between 2001 
and 2008. According to our questionnaires (2016), long working hours are the main 
source of complaint among auto worker, having around 73% of respondents. Again, as 
the questionnaires (2016) reveal, since the early 2000s, only 22.2% of respondents 
received a decrease or slight decrease in average weekly working time, while the rest 
experienced no change or an increase in varying levels. Particularly, the upward trend in 
working hours became more evident after the new labour regulations in 2003 which 
gave employers the flexibility to regulate working hours and slippage at their discretion, 
to a maximum of 11 hours a day (see Chapter 5). Hence Turkey has become the country 
with the longest average weekly working hours among OECD countries, followed by 
Mexico. 
Consequently, the consolidation of this new form of dependent development in the 
Turkish auto industry over the last one-and-a-half decades has translated into a new 
wave of hostility against labouring classes that manifested itself as extraction of 
absolute surplus value in a more disciplined way along with productivity increases. At 
the very bottom of value chains, such a form of labour exploitation has, in turn, found 
its expression in long and extraordinary working hours, falling real wages, 
underpaid/unpaid labour, and thus the growing exclusion of labourers from the auto-led 
growth and productivity rises in Turkey. Nevertheless, as discussed in the theory 
chapter, workers are not a passive source of surplus drain and victims of labour process, 
223 
 
 
 
but a critical agency of change and social and economic upgrading along value chains. 
In this respect, unexpected, spontaneous wave of “wildcat” strikes and protests in May 
and June 2015, just 20 days before the general election, can be seen as the beginning of 
the end of this monstrous model of labour relations in the Turkish auto industry. Over 
20.000 auto workers initiated spontaneous strikes and protests directly targeting the 
employers’ association (MESS) and the labour union (Türk Metal) as the architects of 
formal mechanisms of industrial relations (Korkmaz, 2015, p.3). Allying with auto 
industrialists, the government prohibited strikes and protests on the ground of national 
security. Some workers achieved partial gains in the form of annual pay bonuses and 
premiums, which does not mean overall social and economic upgrading along auto 
value chains. However, it is fair to say that despite its relatively limited achievements, 
the wave of strikes has already shaken the foundations of the mode of labour process in 
the Turkish auto industry, foreshadowing its unsustainability over the long term.   
7.5 Conclusion 
Complementing our industry-level analysis, this chapter has explored and discussed the 
far-reaching transformation that Turkish automotive industry has undergone since the 
early 1980s onwards. In so doing, the chapter has inquired about the ways in which the 
asymmetrical integration of the Turkish auto industry with global value chains – 
through a particular pattern of accumulation, and a configuration of class forces and 
state-society relations – generated a new form of dependent and exploitative auto-led 
development. On that note, the chapter has argued that much more in conformity with 
Latin American cases of Brazil and Mexico, the class dynamics and make-up of ruling 
coalitions in post-1980 Turkey have not allowed to the secure necessary social 
consensus and institutional setting to design and implement successful, long-term auto-
led industrialisation. Rather, given the milieu of increasing fragmentation, particularly 
within domestic capital and the absence of coordination between state and industry, 
Turkey has remained limited in successfully solving Kaldorian collective action 
problems, which mainly refers to increasing the returns to scale, learning-by-doing, 
investing in design, conception, innovation and thus creating and capturing higher 
value-added along auto value chains. 
It has been further suggested that given a series of factors such as the structure of the 
industry, the role of foreign capital, and the management style and business strategies of 
auto firms, the motor vehicle industry in Turkey has adopted a lower-road of integration 
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with global auto production, exhibiting the main characteristics of the new era of 
dependent development. Much like its Latin American counterparts, despite recent 
success in production, cost-efficiency and a certain degree of R&D competencies, the 
motor vehicle industry in Turkey has not developed truly indigenous capabilities in 
design, conceptualisation and manufacture of products under their own brand names and 
marketing networks, which would allow them to emerge as leading automakers in their 
own right. As discussed throughout the chapter, auto firms in Turkey have displayed 
relatively limited achievements in these respects and in terms of expanding their control 
over the entire circuits of accumulation along global value chains, which in turn keep 
them dependent on transnational auto firms in a number respects, ranging from having 
cutting-edge production technologies to developing product designs and concepts, from 
owning patents, to accessibility to export markets.  
In compliance with its subordinated position, the Turkish motor vehicle industry has 
mostly specialised in lower value-added (periphery-like) segments of global value 
chains and remained limited in generating higher profits or value-added through product 
(conception, design and product development) and functioning (branding, marketing) 
upgrading. Hence motor vehicle production is characterised by globally dispersed, 
routinized and relatively more competitive activities, destitute of what we call 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur profits or Marxian super profits. Last but not least, the 
transformation of the motor vehicle industry along these lines has further implications 
with respect to the salaried and labouring classes in Turkey. The rise and consolidation 
of a new form of dependent development in the industry has translated into 
impoverishing auto-led industrialisation and a ruinous regime of labour control, 
characterised by a combination of high rates of absolute value extraction with increased, 
albeit relatively limited, productivity and relative surplus value in industrial relations. 
At the very bottom of value chains, this monstrous regime of labour control has found 
its expression in deunionization, lack of collective bargaining, long and extraordinary 
working hours, falling real wages, underpaid/unpaid labour, and thus the growing 
exclusion of labourers from the auto-led growth and productivity rises. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion: Globalisation, Dependency and the Limits of Capitalist 
Development in the Global South  
 
In the last thirty to thirty-five years of the recent wave of globalisation, the world 
political-economic scene has undergone a far-reaching transformation, associated with 
expanding networks of global production and the rise of new economic powers and 
‘catch-up states’ in the global south. There is broad agreement that the economic centre 
of gravity has been moving from the erstwhile advanced economies of North America 
and Europe to the emerging countries of the east and south. Along with the increasing 
share of higher value-added manufacturing now taking place in emerging countries, the 
recent shifts in economic power once again gives weight to arguments that we currently 
live in a world of convergence, which has already made ideas of dependency and 
peripherality irrelevant as conceptual foundations of development studies. The notions 
of subordination, dependency and peripherality have been superseded by a dominating 
discourse of globalisation, convergence and interdependencies as the overarching 
explanatory framework, commonly parroted on both sides of the political spectrum. 
Thus, in the fields of development studies and IPE, it is now commonplace to claim that 
the world economic hierarchy has long been in a process of flattening, making analyses 
of dependency old-fashioned and ill-suited to addressing the current dynamics and 
contradictions of development in the global south. 
This study has challenged these arguments in a number of ways, by seeking 
clarifications of these new processes, and by rethinking what dependency and 
development means in the contemporary era of globalisation. Chapter two, on the 
theoretical level, charted a critical review of the dependency school, not only to tease 
out the complex roots and variety of analyses it involves, but also to explore its 
contemporary relevance and analytical value. What emerged from this chapter was that 
the dependency approach is indeed gravely flawed, particularly by virtue of the attempts 
of some of its practitioners who convert it into an ahistorical, fully-fledged and formal 
theory, which conceives underdevelopment as a permanent situation, since peripheral 
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countries remain structurally subordinate and dependent in the capitalist world 
economy. The reactions to and criticisms of such a conception of dependency and 
development are understandably severe and devastating, as it largely contradicts the 
current dynamics of today’s global economy and the development that has taken place 
in a wide range of countries in the global south. 
It has been suggested that, as inherently lodged with the ontological and epistemological 
limitedness of neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and world system research, 
the conventional theorisation of dependency tends to be dismissive of the dynamics of 
today’s global economy and the possibilities of capitalist development in the south. On 
the other hand, it has also been argued that many of the criticisms levelled against the 
dependency tradition are sweeping and overgeneralised, and have ignored its more 
erudite versions, contemporary relevance and employable analytical values. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical flaws and explanatory weaknesses surrounding 
orthodox dependency theory, not all strands of the dependency tradition contradict the 
workings of today’s world economy or the recent developments that have taken place in 
the global south. Conceptualisation of dependency and development as elaborated by 
historical-structural dependency analyses still maintains validity, and when wisely 
applied to the new conditions of today’s world, offers a basilar IPE framework in which 
to address the limits and prospects of capitalist development in today’s global south.  
In contrast to the stagnationist, totalising and mechanico-formal assumptions of 
conventional dependency thinking, historical-structural dependency analyses recognise 
that being contingent on a set of factors, namely configurations of domestic class forces, 
the capacity of state institutions and distinct modes of integration with the global 
economy, capitalist development has occurred and is likely to continue occur even 
within contexts of overall dependency. In this regard, the historical-structural 
methodology conceives dependency less as a universal, static and ahistorical 
phenomenon producing automatic backwardness in the periphery, and more as a 
concept drawn on to address the changing prospects and limits of late capitalist 
development, predicated upon a close interplay of foreign capital, states and domestic 
classes over time. Thus, the real value of historical-structural dependency analysis 
comes from its potential to generate plausible new propositions regarding the changing 
situations of dependency and development in today’s global world.  
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If historical-structural dependency analyses maintain a degree of validity and heuristic 
value, then, how has the current order of global economic relations shaped the prospects 
and limits of capitalist development in today’s global south, and created new forms of 
subordination, hierarchy and dependent development? In Chapter Three, this study 
addressed this widely neglected question and offered a response by critically drawing on 
a set of conceptual insights derived from the Schumpeterian theory of innovation, 
Global Value Chain analyses and a class-relational articulation of the developmental 
state.  
The general impression derived from the discussions throughout Chapter Three is that 
the emergence of global production networks and the meteoric growth of manufacturing 
in the global south has in many ways reordered the world economic hierarchy, and 
rendered the territorially-bounded and structurally-determined rationale of core-
periphery relations less relevant, at least in terms of its traditional formulation based on 
the locations of manufacturing capabilities. Today, via the dissemination of 
technological and industrial development, a handful of emerging economies in the south 
have made huge progress in diversifying and upgrading their manufacturing exports, to 
the extent that they have become major producers of complex manufacturing goods at 
considerable levels of sophistication. The complex nature of global manufacturing has 
transformed peripheral spaces in the south (whether scaled as nation-state, region or 
city), so that they have now become fully integrated into the global economy and appear 
to operate like new growth centres in their own right. 
Seen in this way, it could be argued that the recent transformation in the global south 
undermines arguments associated with ideas of lagging, subordination and dependency. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Three, this is not necessarily the case. The current 
constellation of economic power has not lead to a real convergence with the developed 
world nor the disappearance of dependency relations, as many have been keen to argue, 
but has given rise to new forms of subordination, hierarchy and dependency along 
global networks of production and trade. In many ways, current debates over global 
convergence and the end of dependency hinge on the story of the rise of manufacturing 
in parts of today’s south. Those who suggest that the rising south is closing the gap with 
the developed world implicitly or explicitly conflate industrialisation and economic 
growth with development, and give insubstantial attention to the question of industrial 
sophistication and the value created by countries in the global south. 
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By critically engaging with Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, this study has rather 
argued that while we can talk about a widespread convergence in levels of 
industrialisation between the developed world and developing countries, this has not 
overcome the spatial unevenness of capital accumulation, particularly in dimensions 
such as technology, innovation and type of value creation. Rather, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, the current constellation of the world economic order is driven by a 
process of creative destruction, in which high-profit and low-profit manufacturing 
activities have clustered not only in time but also in space, leading to reproduction of 
spatial disparities and reconfiguration of core-periphery relations. Driven by capitalist 
competition and the ongoing search for above-average surplus profit, leading TNCs 
consistently revolutionise the global economic structure through the introduction of 
innovations, whether in the form of new products, new production methods, new forms 
of organisation, or new routes of trade and marketing. Technological and industrial 
innovations generate a wave of cutting-edge sectors and manufacturing activities 
clustered in time, rewarding leading firms with exorbitant rates of profits.  
However, as a spatially structured process, the introduction of profit-oriented 
innovations also tends to come into being in certain zones of predominating prosperity, 
mostly in developed economies, due to a number of factors, e.g.: higher incomes 
generate greater demand and larger market potentials; higher production costs put 
pressures on entrepreneurs for technical innovation; greater credit capabilities facilitates 
the financing of innovations; and innovations are difficult to copy. Thus, when it comes 
to assessing the rise of industrialisation in the global south, the question be asked is to 
what extent the rising economies of the south have been able to generate the 
Schumpeterian type of entrepreneurial economic rents or above average surplus profits. 
Contemporary evidence from today’s global south rather reveals that only a few NICs 
have succeeded in generating this type of economic rents or becoming ‘central’ in 
introducing profit-oriented innovations and reaching per capita incomes close to those 
of developed countries. This is the case of the first generation of NICs in East Asia, 
particularly the most conspicuous examples of South Korea and Taiwan. Nevertheless, 
despite the upward mobility of these countries, there is a larger group of emerging 
economies which remain behind the curve in these respects. Seen in this way, despite 
the monumental changes and variation, the polarising tendency of the capitalist world 
229 
 
 
 
economy is still at work and continues to reproduce socio-spatial disparities. This is one 
of the premier issues informing the notion of peripherality today. 
If peripherality remains relevant in this precise understanding of the transmutation of 
socio-spatial disparities and lagging, then how and in what ways has this altered the 
dynamics of subordination and dependency in today’s global south? An examination of 
the qualitative nature of industrialisation and the export profiles of emerging countries 
in the global south provides an illustrative pathway to capture the changing dynamics of 
subordination and dependency. As discussed in Chapter Three, the expansion of 
manufacturing exports in the global south has been mainly driven by the global 
strategies of leading TNCs and heavily based on integration into global chains of 
production. A close examination of foreign-led industrialisation demonstrates that, 
compared to the erstwhile advanced economies, the production sector in emerging 
countries has usually developed in less sophisticated forms, characteristically lacking 
full control over accumulation and value creation processes along hierarchically 
structured global value chains. Since the process of capital accumulation in local 
industries is in one way or another embedded into the broader circuits of capital 
accumulation of leading TNCs, production structures in most emerging countries are 
locked in relatively subordinate and dependent positions.  
This is particularly reflected in the type of goods manufactured and the value-added 
nature of manufacturing activities in these countries. Having relatively limited control 
over the downstream and upstream activities of the value chains, such as product 
conception, design, marketing and network retailing, the majority of emerging countries 
have heavily relied on leading transnationals in terms of accessibility to cutting-edge 
technologies, patents, markets and global entrepreneur skills, and have mainly remained 
stuck at lower value-added export activities such as in-bond assembly operations, 
component-supply subcontracting and original equipment manufacturing. Thus, even if 
much of the south has increased the volume of manufactured exports and diversified the 
range of goods they produce, leading transnationals still exert control over the entire 
accumulation process, and reserve for themselves the key dimensions of value chains, 
with high barriers to entry, high start-up and running costs, and high levels of 
technological and entrepreneurial skills. In a world where bargaining power rests on 
who needs whom most, the industries in emerging economies are re-locked in relatively 
subordinate and dependent positions, largely determined by intense competition, low 
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cost prices, high production volumes, and a disproportionally low share of globally 
created value-added, which also means low wages and a ruinous regime of control for 
the labouring classes at the bottom of value relations. 
Nevertheless, saying that many emerging countries are re-locked in a subordinate and 
dependent position within global networks of production and trade does not mean that 
the state of dependency is immutably fixed, generating similar results across the global 
periphery as a whole. Rather, given the simultaneous possibility of both captive alliance 
and robust bargaining, neither the dominance of leading transnationals nor the 
subordination of local industries is taken for granted, but being subject to change over 
time from country to country or from industry to industry. This study’s comparative 
look at Latin American and North-East Asian experiences reveals that significant 
dissimilarities exist in local responses and respective positions of emerging economies 
within global networks of production and trade. In contrast to the paradigmatic cases of 
Latin America, the East Asian NICs, particularly South Korea, have made huge strides 
in sophisticating their industrial structure and securing greater control over the entire 
circuit of accumulation along global value chains. Despite being subordinated and 
dependent in earlier stages, they today occupy a distinctive position within global 
divisions of labour, with greater capabilities in high value-added segments of value 
chains, such as product conception, design, branding, and marketing. 
Comparative analysis of value chains has demonstrated that the global south is no 
longer a homogeneous entity, but has become increasingly differentiated, confirming 
that subordination and dependency might be transitory situations. This raises the 
question of why and how some countries have managed to redefine the terms of capital 
accumulation vis-à-vis leading transnationals and integrate into high value-added 
segments of global value relations on more equal and less dependent terms, while many 
others have failed to do so. As discussed in Chapter Three, the current literature in value 
chain analysis say little, if anything, about the situations of dependency along value 
chains, and offers a limited explanation of the matter of upgrading by attaching it to the 
firm-centric, techno-industrial and market-based analysis of value chain governance. 
Thus, in order to move beyond these limitations, this study has lastly sought to offer a 
due explanation by putting the matter of dependency and upgrading into a broader 
institutional, regulatory and class-based context, upon which hierarchically-structured 
global value relations operate. 
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Deriving insight from earlier studies of dependent development and a class-relational 
articulation of the developmental state, this study has argued that overcoming 
dependency situations and building-up productive/technological/managerial capabilities 
along value chains is not automatic based on firm-based and market-oriented relations, 
but rather is contingent on the mode of integration with global value chains, through a 
configuration of class forces, state-society relations and institutional/regulatory settings 
within a particular socio-spatial entity. Looking into the wider global south, the 
countries which have most successfully managed dependency relations and moved to 
high value-added activities along the value chains are the ones that reconcile and 
reframe the global strategies of leading TNCs with the interests and development 
priorities of their local economy. At the heart of this process lies the transformative role 
and institutional capacity of the state as a major nexus of economic and social 
transformation between domestic social classes and global capital.  
The rising economies of the south integrate into global production on unequal and 
disadvantageous terms, and need to cope with a set of collective action problems in 
addressing the challenges posed by dependency situations and moving upwards in value 
relations. Broadly, this involves two set of collective action problems: those that are 
related to structural change (Gerschenkronian), such as creating opportunities for 
furthering accumulation, reducing the risk of investment, organising labour and 
promoting export markets, and those related to the matter of upgrading (Kaldorian), 
such as increasing the returns to scale, moving up the product cycle, learning by doing 
and investment in innovation. In this context, the state, a major nexus of economic 
transformation, emerge as an effective sponsor in shaping the local accumulation 
process and overcoming collective action problems through a set of institutional 
capacities and innovations. Nevertheless, it is further argued that, given the diverse 
nature of domestic class configurations and differing external dynamics, building up 
such institutional capacities cannot easily be achieved or replicated elsewhere in the 
global south  
Within the rising global south, only a few countries seem to have truly built up the 
respective institutional capacities and innovations to overcome these collective action 
problems. This is particularly the case in the developmental states of East Asia, in 
which underlying class-configurations, state-society relations and their interaction with 
the outer world have given rise to the formation of such institutional innovations. In 
232 
 
 
 
other words, the genesis and development of institutional capacities itself emerges as a 
challenging collective action problem that inherently lies at the bottom of politics and 
class relations, involving a broad package of social mobilisation, class compromise and 
concessions. In contrast, looking into the rest of the global south, the rising economies 
of Latin America, Eastern Europe and South-East Asia have failed to develop such 
institutional capacities, given a plethora of factors such as configurations of domestic class 
forces, the uneasy nature of state-society complexes and diverse modes of integration 
with the global economy. Thus, as demonstrated with respect to the paradigmatic cases 
of Latin America, the prospects of economic upgrading remained limited in most of the 
developing world, making any story of upward mobility or convergence hardly 
generalisable. 
The country-level analysis of Turkey in Chapters Four and Five provided further 
validation and revealing clues for the above, addressing the prospects and limits of 
capitalist development in today’s global south. As one featured economy of the rising 
South, Turkey has transformed itself from a resource-based, agrarian nation to a “New 
Industrialised Country” poised to join the ranks of world-class manufacturing hubs in 
higher value-added products. Similar to most emerging economies, this process has 
been predicated upon a close interplay of leading transnationals, the state and domestic 
social classes over time. Nevertheless, and more in conformity with the cases of Latin 
America than the success stories of East Asia, the Turkish state, as the major nexus of 
economic transformation, has historically lacked the required class-relational and 
institutional capacities to overcome collective actions problems, particularly the 
Kaldorian ones. 
Given long-standing inter- and intra-class cleavages and the uneasy nature of state-
society relations, the Turkish state has remained in an unpleasant position, never truly 
securing the wider consent of social classes, and mobilising resources and society 
around a long-term development project that would bring the country to the ranks of 
advanced economies. Turkey’s capitalist development seems to be an uneasy and 
uncompleted process in which the state has managed to build up institutional 
arrangements to further capital accumulation and structural change, but has displayed 
relatively limited achievements in increasing the return to scale, learning-by-doing, 
investing in design, conception and innovation, and thus moving up value chains. 
Considering its weak class-relational and institutional capacity, Turkey is doomed to 
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follow a lower road of integration with the global economy, which manifests itself in 
the types of goods manufactured and the value-added nature of local industrial 
activities. 
Driven by the launch of export-led manufacturing policies and coupled with increasing 
foreign investment inflows, the Turkish economy has gone through substantial 
structural and industrial transformation in the last few decades, due to which the range 
and technological composition of exports shifted toward the non-traditional and more 
technology-intensive ones, such as automotive, machinery, electronics and chemical 
products. The state has adopted the necessary policy measures and institutional 
arrangements to clear the way for new investments in industrial production, both for 
domestic and global capital. However, when it comes to renegotiating and redefining 
the terms of local capital accumulation and upgrading the technological, managerial and 
market capabilities of domestics capital vis-a-vis leading TNCs, the state has not 
managed to develop the respective capabilities. Hence, despite structural and sectoral 
changes in the economy, the local bourgeoisie have been mostly stuck at the 
downstream stages of export roles, such as export-processing assembly operations, 
component-supply subcontracting and original equipment manufacturing which account 
for relatively low levels of created added-value. 
The way of Turkey’s integration into global networks of production and trade represents 
a less impressive picture in capitalist terms, as it generates an increasing share of global 
manufacturing exports but a disproportionally low share of globally created value-added 
on the side of the domestic bourgeoisie. Mostly stuck at subordinate stages of global 
production, domestic industrialists have displayed limited achievements in expanding 
their control over entire circuits of accumulation along global value chains, and have 
therefore remained largely dependent on leading transnationals in terms of accessibility 
to cutting-edge technologies, patents, design capabilities, and managerial and market 
skills. In fact, the formation of the industrial sector along these lines has endowed the 
domestic bourgeoisie with low profit volumes and modest, if not Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial rents, which has, in turn, translated into a low-wage economy and a 
ruinous regime of control over the salaried and labouring classes. After all, at the very 
bottom of value relations, the integration of Turkish industry with global networks of 
production and trade has brought impoverishing economic growth and intensified the 
social and economic exclusion of the majority of the population in Turkey. 
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At the lower level of analysis, the field-based research into the Turkish auto industry in 
chapters Six and Seven added empirical rigor and deeper insights to the country-level 
discussion. As the 15th largest automotive manufacturer in the world, with an annual 
production of over 1.3 million vehicles, the Turkish automotive industry is the main 
driver behind export-led manufacturing growth and structural change in Turkey. Based 
on the decades-long interplay between transnational automakers, the state and domestic 
classes, Turkey has made great progress in auto-led development, marked by increased 
competitiveness, productivity and integration with global auto value chains. Indeed, this 
signifies the substantial structural change that Turkey has achieved in the composition 
and value-added nature of its exports, and the allocation of labour from low to high 
productivity sectors. Thus, it is fair to suggest that Turkey seems successful in 
confronting Gershenkronian collective action problems in auto-led development, as it 
has furthered the aggregation and investment of capital into auto production to a 
substantial degree, and increased its share of output and competitiveness in the world 
automotive industry.    
However, despite its strong production capabilities and recent export success, the auto-
led development in Turkey does have certain limitations that exhibit the main 
characteristics of what we call a new form of dependent development. Even though auto 
exports have increased and diversified, the degree of sophistication in the industry 
remains relatively low, and lacks the indigenous technological and managerial 
capabilities necessary to develop a fully autonomous sector. Under increasing inter- and 
intra-class cleavages and the intense lobbying of different capital groups, Turkey has 
not developed reciprocal relations and effective channels of information exchange 
between the state and auto industrialists, needed to take strategically-designed sector- 
and firm-specific measures to restructure and rationalise the auto industry along national 
capitalistic lines. Thus, much like its Latin American counterparts, the automotive 
industry in Turkey has not developed truly indigenous capabilities in design, 
conceptualisation and manufacture of products under their own brand names, nor in 
marketing networks that would eventually allow it to capture high value-added along 
global auto chains. 
In this sense, Turkey has been rather limited in solving the Kaldorian collective action 
problems in auto-led development. As surveys and interviews revealed, both assembly 
and supplier firms have mainly specialised in offshoring and outsourcing segments of 
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global auto chains, which are characterised by globally dispersed, routinized and highly 
competitive activities,  and are mostly destitute of Schumpeterian entrepreneur profits or 
Marxian super profits. Although some firms, mostly joint ventures and a limited number 
of locally-owned large-scale suppliers, have developed R&D capabilities in co-
designing and product development, they are mostly confined to areas such as achieving 
higher cost performance, improving production processes or product quality, and have 
not shifted to core competences such as overall product conception, own-brand 
production or marketing. Thus, despite a certain amount of localisation of research and 
development activities, crucial technological and managerial skills remain jealously 
guarded by leading transnationals, producing complex situations of dependency both in 
vehicle and component production. 
Further insights from field-based research also revealed that the integration of the 
Turkish auto industry along these lines was predicated upon a disastrous labour regime, 
characterised by a combination of a high rate of absolute value extraction with 
increased, but limited, relative surplus value in industrial relations. At the bottom of 
value relations, the burdens of increased productivity and competitiveness in the auto 
industry has fallen disproportionately on the labouring classes, as surplus transfer from 
wage-labour to capitalist classes has intensified over the period in question. This has 
particularly found its expression in deunionization, pseudo-trade unionism, job 
insecurity, long and unordinary working hours, diminishing real wages, 
underpaid/unpaid labour and thus the growing exclusion of wage-earners from the auto-
led growth process. Thus, our field-based research not only reveals the limitations of 
auto-led development and the complex situations of dependency it has engendered, but 
also raises important questions about its detrimental implications on labour. 
Consequently, the evidence presented in our industry-level analysis has provided a more 
accurate portrait of how dependency and development works within today’s global 
networks of auto production and trade. It has presented valuable insights to study the 
limits and prospects of capitalist development in the rest of the global south. However, 
despite the utility of the proposed theoretical/conceptual framework, the presented 
empirical evidences should be approached with caution, as situations of dependency 
display complex variations over time, from country to country and from industry to 
industry. Thus, further research on cross-industry analysis of different sectors and or 
cross-country analysis of other emerging economies in Eastern Europe and South East 
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Asia would help not only test the conclusions made in this study, but also help reach a 
more generalisable view of the matter of dependency and development in today’s global 
south.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interviewee List of Auto Assemblers 
Interview Name of Firm 
Size of 
Firm 
Name of 
Interviewee 
Position of 
Interviewee 
Notes on the role and importance of firm/interviewee 
Int. 1 
Anadolu-Isuzu 
Otomotiv 
Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.Ş. 
LARGE Arif Özer R&D Director 
 
The experience of Anadolu Isuzu Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
goes back to the foundation of Çelik Montaj Company in 1965. During 
Çelik Montaj period, the company specialised in the production of 
trucks and motorcycles under the license of Skoda and Jawa 
respectively. After signing a license agreement with Isuzu Motors Ltd 
in 1983, the company gave start to production of Isuzu vehicles one 
year later. With the signature of partnership agreement between Isuzu, 
Itochu and Anadolu Endüstri Holding, the company transformed into 
the first Turkish-Japanese partnership in automotive sector. As an open 
joint stock company founded with the strategic partnership of these 
three shareholders, Anadolu Isuzu today specialised in the production 
and sales of commercial vehicles of Isuzu such as light trucks, trucks, 
buses and pick-up. In 2014, Anadolu Isuzu A.Ş. ranked 150th in 
Turkey's top 500 industry companies. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Arif OZER is a well-educated professional who 
has been working for Anadolu-Isuzu since 1996. Mr. Ozer previously 
worked as Quality Control Manager, Material Supply Manager and 
After-Sales Services Manager at Anadolu-Isuzu Otomotiv A.Ş. 
 
Int. 2 
Ford-Otosan 
A.Ş. 
LARGE Barış Şenyener 
Automotive 
Engineering and 
Product 
Development 
 
Very foundation of the collaboration between Ford and Otosan (Koc 
Holding) can be traced back to 1928, when Vehbi Koç was assigned as 
dealer of Ford in Turkey.  The following year Ford was granted by the 
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Manager Turkish government the right to carry out local assembly operation in a 
free zone at the port of Istanbul. In 1959, the Otosan automotive 
factory was founded by Koç Holding in Istanbul. In 1960 Otosan 
started to produce its first model, the Ford Consul, followed by the 
Thames and the Thames Trader van. Later in 1965, 1966 and 1967, 
Otosan started to produce the D1210 truck, the Anadol and the Ford 
Transit respectively. The current form of Ford-Otosan was established 
in 1977 with the signature of a license agreement between Ford and 
Otosan. Today, with highest production capacity Ford Otosan has 
become leading automotive company in Turkey in which Koç Holding 
and Ford have equal stakes. Currently employing more than 9000 
people in four different facilities throughout Turkey, Ford Otosan is 
commercial vehicle production hub of Ford Europe which ranked 2nd 
in Turkey's top 500 industry companies in 2014. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Barış Şenyener, is a well-experienced and senior 
professional who has been working for Ford-Otosan since 1990 
 
Int. 3 Confidential LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
Confidential 
 
Int. 4  KARSAN A.Ş. LARGE Jan Nahum 
Executive 
Director and 
Board Member 
 
Founded in 1966, Karsan has been operating as Turkey’s only 
independent multi-branded vehicle manufacturer since the early 2000s. 
Owned by 100% Turkish capital, Karsan is designed with the capacity 
and flexibility to produce many types of vehicles, ranging from cars to 
minivans and from busses to trucks.  Particularly aimed at 
manufacturing the commercial vehicle segment from LCV to HCV, 
Karsan is not only working with global brands like Peugeot, Fiat 
Citroen and Hyundai as contractor, licensee or licensor, but also 
developing its own brand image, and offering innovative products and 
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service solutions to private and public transportation. Since 2013, 
Karsan has been producing its own minibus branded Jest. Again within 
its scope of vision, Karsan is also offering solutions to needs of the 
public transport system of cities with its 8m buses branded ATAK and 
STAR since 2014. Employing almost 1600 people within its three 
different partnering structure, namely Karsan plant, Hexagon R&D 
Studio and Karsan Marketing, Karsan ranked 93th in Turkey's top 500 
industry companies in 2013. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Jan Nahum, is one of the most renowned figure 
and doyen of Turkish automotive industry who joined the Koç Group 
in 1973 and took charge in many positions within auto companies of 
Koç Group. Mr Nahum previously served as the general manager of 
Otokar and of TOFAŞ between the years 1984-1994 and 1994-1997 
respectively. As an internationally recognised figure, Mr Nahum also 
worked as the head of International Business Development at FIAT 
S.p.A. between the 2002 and 2004. Before joining Karsan, Mr Nahum 
served as the general manager of Petrol Ofisi. Mr Nahum is now 
serving as executive director of Karsan and the founding partner of 
Hexagon Studio. 
 
Int. 5 
Güleryüz 
Karoseri Otomot
iv Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.Ş. 
LARGE 
Mustafa 
Demirci 
Vice General 
Manager 
 
The roots of Güleryüz Otomotiv A.Ş. traces back to 1967 when it was 
founded as a small workshop which specialised in the reparation of 
crashed and damaged bodies of vehicles. In the following years, 
Güleryüz Otomotiv also converted the wooden bodies of old buses into 
sheet steel made bodies. In 1982, Güleryüz started to produce bus 
bodies on various chassis provided by Mercedes, Man and Renault, and 
in 1992 started manufacture long distance double-decker couches using 
Volvo and DAF chassis. In the early 2000s, by using imported power 
engines, axle shafts and transmission boxes, the company start 
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manufacturing buses and coaches under its brand name, Güleryüz 
Cobra. Early on, Güleryüz produces for local markets, particularly for 
municipalities and districts of big cities such as Istanbul, Adana, 
Mersin and Antalya. Later on the company started export its buses 
even to some European Countries such as Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Hungary and Austria. Having the capacity of producing 500 
units per year in its 35.000 m² closed manufacturing facility, Güleryüz 
Otomotiv is more of a boutique bus manufacturer whose success is 
predicated on craftsmanhip and know-how gained by its 40 years 
experince in body shop industry. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Mustafa Demirci is a senior professional of 
Güleryüz Otomotiv who has 44 years of experience in automotive 
sector. 
 
Int. 6 
Hyundai 
Assan Otomotiv 
Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.Ş. 
LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
Considering Turkey’s market potential and its advantageous 
geographical location to export markets in Europe, Middle East and 
Asia, Hyundai-Assan A.Ş. was founded as a joint venture between 
Hyundai and Kibar Holding in 1995 and started to produce its very first 
Hyundai-licensed private cars two years later. Having 233. 000 m² 
manufacturing facility in Kocaeli, Hyundai-Assan now has a 
production capacity of 215 thousand units per year. To date, having 
manufactured over 1 million vehicles, Hyundai Assan factory has great 
importance for Hyundai Motor Company as it functions as a gateway 
to European continent given the production of model i10 of A segment 
and i20 of B segment. In 2014, Hyundai-Assan ranked 13th in Turkey's 
top 500 industry companies. 
 
Int. 7 
Oyak-
Renault Otomotiv 
LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
Established with the signature of a partnership agreement between 
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Fabrikaları A.Ş. Renault, Oyak and Yapı Kredi Bank in 1969, Oyak-Renault Otomotiv 
A.Ş. today is the biggest production plant of Renault Group out of the 
Western Europe. With more than 5700 people and 534.530 m² 
manufacturing facility, Oyak-Renault’s main field of activity is 
production and sales of Renault-licensed vehicles and engines all over 
the world. Having production capacity of 360 000 vehicles and 450 
000 engines per year, Oyak-Renault has been the leading auto 
manufacturer of Turkey in the last 16 years. In 2014, Oyak-Renault 
ranked 3th in Turkey's top 500 industry companies. 
 
 Appendix 2: Interviewee List of Auto Component Manufacturers 
 
Interview Name of Firm 
Size of 
Firm 
Name of 
Interviewee 
Position of 
Interviewee  
Notes on the role and importance of firm/interviewee 
 
Int. 8 
Aktaş Hava 
Süspansiyon 
Sistemleri A.Ş.  
LARGE Sami Erol 
Member of 
Board- Chief 
Executive 
Officer at Aktaş 
Holding 
 
Founded as a small workshop in 1938, Aktaş Holding has today 
reached a position operating on 6 continents and in more than 90 
countries. Given its expertise in the field of air suspension 
spring and rubber, Aktaş Holding globally offers reputable and high 
quality air suspension spring systems to OEMs.  
 
The interviewee, Mr Sami Erol, is highly experienced professional 
and executive in automotive sector who previously worked as 
general coordinator and general maneger at Smart Automotive and 
Orhan Holding respectively.  
  
 
Int. 9 
Coşkunöz Metal 
Form A.Ş 
LARGE Halil Akgül 
Member of Board 
and Core 
Competence 
Coordinator 
 
Having half century of experience in the automotive sector, 
Coşkunöz Metal Form (CMF) is one of the market leaders in the 
production of sheet metal parts and complete assembles, welding 
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at Coşkunöz 
Holding  
machines and apparatus for the automotive sector. With more than 
1600 employees and 80.000m² closed area, CMF was 163th in the 
top 500 largest industrial companies of Turkey in 2014. 
 
The interviewee, Mr Halil Akgül is a well-experienced expert and 
businessmen who has worked for CMF more than 18 years. Mr 
Akgül is also a prominent figure in Turkish automotive sector as he 
serves as the head of automotive group at the Bursa Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int. 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inci & GS 
Yuasa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LARGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perihan Inci  
 
 
 
 
 
Member of 
Board- 
Shareholder and 
Former 
Chairwoman of 
Board  
 
Exporting to over 80 countries in 4 continents, İnci Akü ranked 
234th in Turkey's top 500 industry companies in 2014. As the 
export leader of its sector and the leading battery producer of 
Turkey, İnci Holding produces under the brand names of  İnci Akü, 
EAS, Hugel and has a strategic  partnership agreement with 
Japanese giant GS Yuasa. 
 
The interviewee, Ms. Perihan İnci is a successful business woman 
who serves as a member of Board in group companies of İnci 
Holding and performed the task of chairwoman previously. As a 
board member of Association of Automotive Parts and Components 
Manufacturers (TAYSAD) Ms İnci is also a prominent business 
figure in Turkish automotive industry.  
 
 
Int. 11 
Maxion &İnci 
Jant Sanayi A.Ş. 
 
LARGE Perihan Inci 
Member of 
Board- 
Shareholder and 
Former 
Chairwoman of 
 
Founded as a joint venture in 1992, Maxion İnci Jant Group holds a 
wheel production capacity of 4 million 700 thousand per year. 
Exporting 60% of its production to Global OEMs, Maxion & Inci 
wheel industry has received the “Best Supplier Award” from global 
brands like Toyota, Hyundai, Jaguar-Landrover, and Honda. 
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Board Maxion İnci Jant Sanayi A.Ş ranked 183th in Turkey's top 500 
industry companies in 2014. 
 
The interviewee, Ms. Perihan İnci is a successful business woman 
who serves as a member of Board in group companies of İnci 
Holding and performed the task of chairwoman previously. As a 
board member of Association of Automotive Parts and Components 
Manufacturers (TAYSAD) Ms İnci is also a prominent business 
figure in Turkish automotive industry.  
 
 
Int. 12 
Delphi 
Automotive 
Systems  
A.Ş. 
LARGE Metin Civlak 
Manager-Chief 
Engineer 
 
Located in the Aegean Free Zone, Delphi Automotive Diesel 
Group’s plant in Izmir produces auto components such as complete 
injectors, injection nozzles, fuel pump components and valves. 
Having 15,000 m² manufacturing facility, Delphi Diesel Group in 
Izmir has been operating as a totally foreign-owned production site 
of DELPHI, a globally-known, high-technology company in 
automotive sector. Delphi ranked 83th in Turkey's top 500 
industry companies in 2014. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Metin Civlak, is a well-educated and 
experienced professional who has been working for Delphi since 
2002. 
 
 
Int. 13 
Ermetal 
Otomotiv A.Ş 
LARGE 
Mehmet 
Gökçedağlıoğlu 
 Research and 
Development 
(R&D) Manager 
 
Established in 1978, the product range Ermetal Otomotiv A.Ş 
involves closure & body parts, roof, chassis and steering columns. 
Employing 800 people in 28.000 m² enclosed area, Ermetal is a 
reputable tier-one supplier of global auto brands such as fiat, 
Renault, Ford and Toyota. Thanks to its modern manufacturing 
facility, Ermetal is capable to stamp 40.000.000 parts per year with 
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60.000 tons sheet metal consumption. Throughout its history, 
Ermetal has also produced hand brake lever, cardan shafts, steering 
shaft systems and various sheet metal parts for TOFAŞ-Fiat. 
Ermetal Otomotiv A.Ş listed 482th in Turkey's top 500 
industry companies in 2014. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Mehmet Gökçedağlıoğlu, is a well-
experienced and senior professional who has been working for 
Ermetal since 1999. Mr Gökçedağlıoğlu also served as technical 
manager of Ermetal for more than 10 years. Before joining Ermetal, 
Mr Gökçedağlıoğlu worked as quality manager and production 
manager in automotive and metal forming sectors respectively. 
 
 
Int. 14 
Beyçelik & 
Gestamp A.Ş. 
LARGE 
İbrahim 
Küçükaslan 
Deputy 
Production 
Manager 
 
Established in 1976 Beyçelik became an industry leader in sheet 
forming, mold and die production. Beyçelik A.Ş signed a 
partnership agreement with Gestamp Automocion in 2007 and 
extended its activities across Europe. Having 5 plants located on 
105.000 m² in Bursa and Kocaeli Beyçelik & Gestamp ranked 156th 
in the top 500 largest industrial companies of Turkey in 2014. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. İbrahim Küçükaslan, is well-experienced and 
dynamic professional in automotive industry who has worked for 
Beyçelik & Gestamp for many years 
 
 
Int. 15 Presmetal A.Ş. LARGE Macide Binici Quality Manager 
 
Having two separate manufacturing facilities with a total covered 
area of 11.000 m², Presmetal specialised in the production of 
stamped sheet metal and assembled sheet metal for main 
automotive firms and tier-one sub-industries. With over 30 years of 
experience in automotive sector, Presmetal is today a reliable 
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partner for main automotive factories given its technical and 
manufacturing capabilities, designing power and high-quality 
standards.  
 
The interviewee, Ms. Macide Binici, is a well experienced 
professional who has been working for Presmetal more than 21 
years. 
 
 
Int. 16 
Tirsan Kardan 
A.Ş. 
LARGE Hakan Cengiz 
Managing 
Director 
 
With more than 60 years of experience in the automotive industry, 
Tirsan Kardan A.Ş is specialised in the design and production of 
steering columns, propeller shafts, and gear box/differential flanges. 
Having two manufacturing plants in Manisa Organised Industrial 
Zone. Tirsan Kadran is favoured supplier for OEM and 
OES companies in Turkey and worldwide. Tirsan Kardan ranked 
646th in the top 1000 largest industrial companies of Turkey in 
2014. 
 
Int. 17 
BPO B-Plast 
A.Ş. 
LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
BPO B-Plast A.Ş was founded in 1992 as a joint-venture between 
B-Plas A.Ş. and French giant Plastic Omnium 
under 50:50 partnership agreement. Having 3 plants located on 
42.000 m² in total, BPO B-Plast produces plastic items such as 
bumpers and fuel tanks, and dispatches more than 4.440.000 
components per year. BPO B-Plast ranked 507th in the top 1000 
largest industrial companies of Turkey in 2014. 
 
 
Int. 18 
Orhan Otomotiv 
Kontrol 
Sistemleri A.Ş. 
LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
In 1996, Orhan Otomotiv Kontrol Sistemleri .A.Ş. was founded as a 
joint venture of Orhan Holding and Sila Group Industriale SpA. 
Orhan Otomotiv Kontrol Sistemleri particularly specialised in 
gearshift mechanism, flexible control cables and plastic 
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components. As a leading member of Orhan Holding’s group of 
companies, Orhan Otomotiv Kontrol Sistemleri is today a global 
supplier in automotive industry 
 
 
Int. 19 Confidential LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
The firm operates as a subsidiary of global giant which produces 
auto components for OEMs in Turkey and worldwide. On global 
scale, its parent company enjoys a major R&D advantage. The firm 
is among the major foreign-owned auto component manufacturers 
in Turkey which listed in Turkey's top 500 industry companies in 
2014. 
 
The interviewee is a well-experinced professional who served as 
the country manager of the firm. 
 
 
Int. 20 Confidential LARGE Confidential Confidential 
 
Employing over 1000 people, the firm is a fully Turkish-owned 
auto component manufacturer which listed in the top 1000 largest 
industrial companies of Turkey in 2014.   
 
The interviewee is a young, dynamic and well-educated 
professional who works as the sales and export manager of the 
firm. 
    
 
Int. 21 
Floteks Plastik 
A.Ş. 
MEDIUM 
Veysel Celal 
Beysel 
Owner and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Floteks produces wide range of products such as fuel tank, 
watertanks, washer fluid tank, Air ducts, mudgards Cabs for driving 
cabins and seat Components. With a laboratory funded by The 
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey 
(TÜBİTAK), Floteks is not only a typical manufacturer for global 
OEMs but also runs strategic joint projects with OEM customers as 
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a co-designer company. Currently, Floteks holds 7 patent 
application, 50 design registrations and 20 petty patent. Employing 
more than 200 persons, Floteks represents a successful example of 
medium size enterprise with R&D capabilities within its premises. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Veysel Celal Beysel, is not only a well-
experienced businessman in automotive sector, but also a key figure 
in Turkish business world. Between 2006 and 2011, Mr. Beysel 
served as the chairman of the Turkish Enterprise and Business 
Confederation (TÜRKONFED), one of Turkey’s largest non-
governmental business organizations, comprising 23 federations 
and 155 associations and more than 30,000 firms, and mostly 
representing the secularist pole of Turkish Business along with 
TÜSİAD. 
  
 
Int. 22 YAMAS A.Ş.  MEDIUM Ümit Okyay 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Established in 1996, YAMAS produced sheet metal forming and 
machining parts until 2002 when the firm shifted its area of 
specialization to bushes (rubber and metal vibration parts). 
Employing more than 200 people today, Yamas has particularly 
come to the fore in this branch of industry. Founded as totally 
domestically-owned business, YAMAS engaged in equity-based 
strategic partnership with its German partner in 2012 thanks to its 
capabilities in production and high quality standards. 
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Int. 23 
Bilgiç Kalip 
Karoser 
Oto.San.Tic.Ltd 
MEDIUM Yaşar Köklü  
Owner and Chief 
Executive of 
Company 
As one of the major firms in its field of operation Bilgiç Kalıp 
produces snacktrays, footrests, armrests, backrests, emergency 
hammers and such sort of plastic products for vans, city buses, 
coaches and trolley buses. Having long years of experience in its 
field of activity, Bilgiç Kalıp produces for Grammer, ISRİ 
HAUSEN, TEMSA, OTOKAR, ISUZU in Turkey and exports its 
products to more than 20 countries all over the world 
 
Int. 24 
YAPA Yedek 
Parça Makina 
San. ve Tic Ltd. 
MEDIUM Yakup Durmuş 
Chief Technology 
Officer and 
Engineer in 
Charge 
 
YAPA was particularly established to support its sister company, 
Yepsan Yedek Parça San. Tic. A.Ş, a giant producer of shaped and 
combined sheet metal parts in automotive industry. YAPA supports 
YEPSAN by designing and manufacturing moulds, apparatus and 
fixtures.  YAPA manufactures large injection moulds and 
aluminium heat shield progressive tandem moulds for Fiat-Tofaş. 
In addition through its sister company, YAPA has made moulds for 
other global brands such as VW, AUDI, VOLVO, GM and 
BENTLEY. 
 
 
Int. 25 
B-TEK Metal 
Imalat San. ve 
Tic Ltd. 
MEDIUM Sinan Çakar  
Production 
Manager  
 
Located at 4000 m² total closed manufacturing facility, B-Tek 
Metal produces sheet metal forming dies and stamping parts to the 
automotive industry. 
 
 
Int. 26 
NAF Metal 
Otomotiv A.Ş. 
 
MEDIUM 
Emin 
Vahapoğlu 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
NAF Metal operates as a sub-industry automotive firm which 
particularly specialised in sheet forming and moulding. NAF has 
been directly produce for key industry firm, KARSAN or 
dispatches its products to Renault and Fiat through tier 1 suppliers 
in Turkey such as Ermetal, Beyçelik & Gestamp, Coşkunöz Metal 
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Form. 
 
 
Int. 27 
PAYEPLAST 
Plastik Vakum 
Kalıp San. ve 
Tic Ltd. 
MEDIUM Orhan Kuş  
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Founded in 1994, PAYEPLAST is a successful medium-size firm 
which produces mudguard arch cover and other thermoforming 
parts for automotive industry. With in-house R&D capabilities 
PAYEPLAST is not only a reliable supplier in its field of operation 
but also a firm equipped with co-designer abilities in 
thermoforming industry. 
 
 
Int. 28 
ÜÇEL Otomotiv 
A.Ş 
MEDIUM Hüseyin Oruç 
Shareholder and 
Chief Executive 
of Company 
 
Established in 1980, ÜÇEL Otomotiv A.Ş specialised in the 
production of rubber and metal component such as crankshaft 
pulleys, axle bellows, gear box ipper bellows, gear box dust 
rubbers, shock absorber kits, torsion bushes and more of the same. 
With closed area of 7500 m², ÜÇEL exports its products to over 40 
countries all around the world. As a leading company in the 
aftermarket sector in Turkey, ÜÇEL has been also developing in-
house R&D and testing facilities, focusing on OEM activities. 
 
 
Int. 29 
Erbab Otomat 
Yedek Parça 
San. ve Tic. Ltd. 
MEDIUM Ufuk Erdoğan 
Owner and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Established in 1978, Erbab specialised in the production of any 
kinds of metal pieces on machining in automotive sub-industry. 
Erbab exports its products to many European countries, mainly to 
Germany. Erbab is a direct supplier of Tofaş-Fiat A.Ş and operates 
as a tier 2 supplier of other global brands such as Renault, Ford, 
Opel, Daimler-Benz, BMW and Porsche. 
 
 
Int. 30 
Boztekin 
Otomotiv A.Ş. 
MEDIUM 
Sami Baha 
Boztekin 
Shareholder and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Founded in 1973, Boztekin Otomotiv specialised in the production 
of pressing and assembled parts for the automotive industry. 
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 Having 18.000 m² total manufacturing facility, Boztekin 
Otomotive is a highly proficient medium scale firm which is 
capable to produce bodywork of any vehicle in compliance with 
quality standards.   
 
 
Int. 31 
ES-BIR Metal 
Plastik Makine 
San. ve Tic. Ltd. 
MEDIUM Ahmet Yeniay 
Production 
Manager 
 
Located at Nilüfer Organized Industrial Zone), Bursa, ES-BIR 
Metal is a typical medium scale firm which is particularly 
specialised in metal cutting for mainly automotive sector. 
 
 
Int. 32 
Ayaz Otomat 
Oto Yan Sanayi 
MEDIUM Recep Ayaz 
Chief Executive 
and Owner of 
company 
 
Established in 1979, Ayaz Otomat specialised in the production of 
metal and plastic components such as plastic injection moulds, air 
feed boxes, metal parts of seat and all sort of sheet moulds.  
Exporting 72% of its production to Global markets, Ayaz Otomat is 
a typical family-owned enterprise with an export-oriented 
production and sale strategy. 
 
 
Int. 33 
Yeni Asmetal 
Rot Rotil San. 
ve Tic Ltd. 
MEDIUM Confidential Confidential 
 
Since founded in 1979, Yeni Asmetal has been manufacturing 
steering and suspension parts, mainly for aftermarket customers. 
With reliable brand image, Yeni Asmetal produces original 
equipment quality parts. 
 
 
Int. 34 Confidential MEDIUM Confidential Confidential 
 
Employing over 200 people, the firm specialised in the production 
of front and rear bumpers, dashboard panel plastics, car cockpit and 
seat plastics.  
 
The interviewee is a senior professional who serves as member of 
board and chief executive officer at the firm. 
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Int. 35 
Atış Makina 
San. ve Tic. Ltd. 
SMALL 
Emrullah 
Gürkan 
Owner and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Founded in 1983, Atış Makina produces, brake pistons, shafts, 
unions, ring nuts and specialised in metal cutting and production of  
fasteners. As a second- and third-tier supplier, Atış Makina works 
with upper tier auto suppliers such as LAS-PAR, BALAP, 
Presmetal and Şahinkul A.Ş. 
 
Int. 36 
AYTEK Alman 
Yay Teknik San. 
ve Tic. Ltd 
SMALL Hanifi Koçer 
Foreign Trade 
Manager and 
Engineer in 
Charge 
 
Established as a joint venture with Federn-Brand KG, a leading 
European spring manufacturer, AYTEK has been operating as a 
wholly Turkish-owned auto component manufacturer since 2002 
which produces high quality springs for automotive, white goods, 
electric, defence and machinery industry. 
 
 
Int. 37 
B.C.E Kauçuk 
Metal San. ve 
Tic. Ltd. Şti. 
SMALL Fuat Aksu R&D Manager 
 
B.C.E Rubber & Metal is specialised in the production of assembly 
elements mainly made of rubber and rubber – metal compositions. 
B.C.E. directly or indirectly exports its products mainly to 
European countries. It produces wide range of rubber products of 
global brands such as MERCEDES, MAN, VOLVO, SCANIA, 
IVECO –MAGIRUS, SETRA, IKARUS and NEOPLAN. 
 
 
Int. 38 
Otocan Yedek 
Parça San. ve 
Tic Ltd. 
SMALL 
Fatih 
Cansabuncu 
Shareholder and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
As a typical small-scale auto sub-industry firm, Otocan especially 
produces safety parts, such as bush, track control arms and 
stabilizer bar tie rod. Otocan dispatches its products as a spare parts 
manufacturer or a tier 2-3 supplier. 
 
 
Int. 39 
Birlik Otomotiv 
Ltd. 
SMALL Tayfun Arpacı 
Owner and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Employing 20 people, Birlik Otomotiv is a small-scale contract 
manufacturer which produces all sort of small metal parts for 
upper-tier auto suppliers such as Yarış Otomotiv and Destek 
 
 
 
 
2
7
8
 
Otomotiv.  
  
 
Int. 40 
Bursa Otomat 
San. ve Tic Ltd. 
SMALL Ertuğrul Demir 
Owner and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Founded in 2007 at Bursa Small Industrial Zone, Bursa Otomat is a 
typical small enterprise which specialised in CNC turning and 
milling services for metal components and parts in automotive 
industry. Given its scale and limited capabilities Bursa Otomat 
operates as second tier or third tier supplier in automotive sector. 
 
Int. 41 
FAMKO 
Makina Metal 
San. ve Tic. Ltd. 
SMALL Gürbüz Avcı 
Shareholder and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
As a typical small enterprise, FAMKO produces control fixtures, 
welding fixtures, mounts, robotic welding apparatus and hydraulic 
for tier 1 suppliers in auto industry, such as Beyçelik & Gestamp, 
Coşkunöz Metal Form, Tiberina Automotive, Martur and many 
more. 
 
 
Int. 42 
EK-A Yüzey 
Işlem Pres 
Otomotiv Metal 
San. ve Tic. Ltd. 
SMALL Murteza Doğan 
Owner and 
Chairman of the 
Executive Board 
 
Established in 2009, EK-A Yüzey Işlem is a small enterprise which 
provides surface finishing service for upper tier suppliers in 
automotive sector such as Rollmech, Tiberina and TGK 
Automotive. EK-A particularly specialised in trimming, sanding, 
polishing and gas metal arc welding. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Interviewee List of Policy Makers, Business Representatives and Experts in the Automotive Industry 
Interview 
Name of 
Interviewee 
Name of Affiliated 
Institution/Association 
Position of 
Interviewee 
Notes on the role and importance of 
Institution/Association/Interviewee 
Int. 43 Alper Kanca 
Association of Automotive 
Parts and Components 
Manufacturers (TAYSAD) 
Deputy Chairman 
of the Board of 
Directors 
 
Association of Automotive Parts and Components Manufacturers 
(TAYSAD) is the only and most potent representative organisation 
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of the automotive supplier industry in Turkey. Having 343 
members, TAYSAD stands for 65% of the total production of 
Turkish auto supplier industry and 70% of the total export in the 
supplier industry.  
 
The interviewee, Mr. Alper Kanca, is a well-experienced 
businessman who also serves as CEO of KANCA A.Ş.  
 
Int. 44 Cem Bayrak 
East Marmara Development 
Agency (MARKA) 
Senior Expert 
 
East Marmara Development Agency (MARKA) is a regional 
development agency which prepares and coordinates development 
strategies for five provinces in East Marmara, namely Kocaeli, 
Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova. Thanks to its legal power and 
organisational structure, MARKA provides coordination and 
cooperation among public sector, private sector and NGOs in the 
region.  
 
The interviewee, Mr. Cem Bayrak, has been working as an expert at 
MARKA for many years. Particularly, He is well-experienced in 
automotive sector as he has been in charge of coordinating several 
meetings and drawing up reports on the auto industry. 
   
Int. 45 
Dr. Serkan 
 Bürken 
The Technology 
Development Foundation of 
Turkey (TTGV) 
Former Expert 
 
Established in compliance with an international loan agreement 
between the Republic of Turkey and the World Bank, the TTGV is 
the only "Public-Private Sector Partnership" which aims to increase 
the global competitiveness of the Turkish private sector by 
supporting R&D and innovation in Turkey. Thanks to its legal 
status, the TTGV is an intermediary foundation which incorporates 
24 private firms (including some key and sub-industry automotive 
firms), 5 public institutions, 11 umbrella organizations (including 
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OSD and TAYSAD) and 15 individuals into its institutional 
structure.  
 
The interviewee, Dr. Serkan Bürken work for the TTGV as project 
manager and expert for about 7 years since September 2015. Mr. 
Bürken is particularly specialised in R&D funding, technology 
transfer, technology audit, technological networks and clusters. Mr. 
Bürken also obtained his PhD degree at Middle East Technical 
University in Science and Technology Policy, and with a particular 
interest in technology development in Turkish automotive industry. 
 
Int. 46 Mehmet Attila 
The Aegean Region 
Chamber of Industry 
(EBSO) 
Former Head of 
Automotive 
Sub-industry  
Group at the 
EBSO 
 
Founded in 1954, the Aegean Region Chamber of Industry (EBSO) 
is a regional chamber with a total active membership of almost 
4.500 industrial firms. As an internationally accredited and 
recognised chamber, the EBSO has been serving regional and 
national economy by supporting the competitiveness and efficiency 
of its members in the Aegean region. 
 
The interviewee, Mr. Mehmet Atilla, is a  well-experienced 
professional who served as the head of automotive sub-industry  
group at the EBSO. For seven years, Mr. Attila also worked as the 
CEO of Ege Endüstri A.Ş. Currently, Mr Attila provides 
consultancy service in Turkish automotive sector. 
 
Int. 47 
Prof. Dr. Orhan 
B. Alankus 
Okan University 
Research and 
Project 
Development 
Director 
 
The interviewee, Prof. Dr. Orhan B. Alankus, is well-experienced 
academician and professional who has over 30 years of experience 
and expertise in automotive industry. In 1982, Prof. Alankus got his 
PhD degree at Imperial College of Science and Technology, 
London. Before joining TOFAŞ Prof Alankus served as project 
 
 
 
 
2
8
1
 
manager at RDP Ltd, London for two years. Between 1984 and 
1994, Prof Alankus worked for TOFAŞ respectively as 
Computerized Production Systems Expert, Administrator of  
Manufacturing Engineering Department, Vice Manager of 
Technical Services. Between 1994 and 2006 Prof Alankus served 
as R&D Director at TOFAŞ. Later on, he took in charge of the 
General Manager of the Design and R&D Company,of  TOFAŞ-
FIAT, Platfom Inc. Between 2008 and 2009 Prof Alankus served as 
“Technology Consultant” at KOC Holding. Later in 2009, he was 
assigned as Technology and Environment Coordinator at Koc 
Holding. Since September 2011 he has been working for Okan 
University as a professor and director of “Research and Project 
Develeopment. He also served as vice president of Automotive 
Technology Platform and board member of Automotive 
Technologies Research and Development Company. 
Int. 48 Rasit Karakus Hacettepe University Researcher 
 
The interviewee, Rasit Karakus, is a young but well-experinced 
researcher who works at Department of Automotive Enginiering, 
Hacettepe University. Mr Karakus actively participated in Turkey's 
first entirely domestically produced electric car, EVT S1. 
Developed in the university researh and development zone,  EVT 
S1 is one of the most suitable models for mass production. 
 
Int. 49 Confidential  Confidential Confidential 
 
The interviewee is a well-experinced academician and professional 
who has over 20 years of experince in automotive 
industry.Currently, he works as academician at one of the most 
well-known engineering department in Turkey. He also served as 
technical adviser for automotive companies in Turkey and 
conducted several R&D projects in automotive industry. 
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Int. 50 Confidential Confidential Confidential 
 
The interviewee is a long-serving professional who worked as 
general director and vice general director at three different large-
scale auto sub-industry joint ventures in Turkey. As a well-
experienced professional in production planning, information 
technologies and R&D, he currently provides consultancy service 
in automotive and electronics sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Int.51 
 
 
 
 
Confidential 
 
 
 
 
Confidential 
 
 
 
 
Confidential 
 
The interviewee is the secretariat general of one of Turkey’s largest 
chambers of Industry. The chamber of industry, the interviewee 
works for, has considerable number of members from the 
automotive industry and so the chamber stands out as one of the 
represantative channels of auto industrialists in institutional sense. 
The interviewee is a well-educated professional who has years of 
experience striving for expanding the idea and ideals of automotive 
sector 
 
Appendix 4: Interviewee List of Auto Workers 
Interview Name of Interviewee Name of Firm Size of Firm 
Int. 52 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 53 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 54 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 55 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 56 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 57 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 58 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 59 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 60 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
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3
 
Int. 61 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 62 Confidential Confidential LARGE 
Int. 63 Confidential Confidential MEDIUM 
Int. 64 Confidential Confidential MEDIUM 
Int. 65 Confidential Confidential MEDIUM 
Int. 66 Confidential Confidential MEDIUM 
Int. 67 Confidential Confidential MEDIUM 
Int. 68 Confidential Confidential SMALL 
Int. 69 Confidential Confidential SMALL 
Int. 70 Confidential Confidential SMALL 
Int. 71 Confidential Confidential SMALL 
Int. 72 Confidential Confidential SMALL 
Int. 73 Confidential Confidential SMALL 
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Appendix 5: Interview and Survey Questions for Auto Assemblers 
 
A. General Profile of Respondent 
     A.1. Name of respondent: 
……………………………………………………………... 
     A.2. Name of firm: ……………………………………………………………….. 
     A.3. Please identify your position at the company   
     :…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
     A.4. How many years of working experience do you have in automotive sector? 
      ………………..years  
B. General profile of Firm  
 
      B.1. In what year was your Firm founded? :……………………………………… 
      B.2. What type of business entity is your firm? Please tick the appropriate box(es) 
below.  
         ☐ Equity-based joint venture   ☐ Non-equity joint venture   
         ☐ Joint - stock company   ☐ Limited liability company   ☐ Collective Company            
         ☐ Commandite company  ☐Cooperative company    
         ☐ Other, please specify: ………………………………………………………… 
  B.3. If your firm is an equity-based joint venture, could you please specify the current 
ownership structure of your firm? 
          Name of local partner: ………………. Equity share of local partner: ………..% 
          Name of foreign partner: ……………. Equity share of foreign partner: ……. % 
          State-owned equity Share: …………% Publicly owned equity share: ………..%   
  B.4. If your firm is a non-equity joint venture, could you please specify the name of 
your partner and the type of contractual agreement you have? Please kindly state the 
name of your partner(s) by filling the blank below, and tick the appropriate box(es) for 
the type of agreement you have.   
         Name of foreign partner(s): ……………………………………………………… 
         ☐ Licensing agreement  ☐ Brand use agreement   ☐ Distribution agreement  
         ☐ R&D contract             ☐ Joint marketing & promotion agreement 
        ☐ Supply Agreement      ☐ Technical assistance and management agreement         
         ☐ Other, please specify: ………………………………………………………… 
  B.5. How many people are currently employed at your firm? Please tick the         
appropriate box below. 
                 ☐ 1-9               ☐ 10-49          ☐ 50-99          ☐ 100-149 
                 ☐ 150-249       ☐ More than 249, please specify: ……………. 
  B.6. Taking the preceding financial years as point of reference, what is the average 
volume of production your company realise annually?  
     :…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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C. The Nature of Relations within Joint Venture Partnership 
C.1. In retrospect, what have been the respective motivations of the local and foreign partners 
that led them to maintain the continuity of such a partnership in the automotive industry? How 
do you think their respective motivations has changed over time since the foundation of the JV? 
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
C.2. In practice, is there any type of division of roles or expertise between the local and 
foreign partners of the JV? If so, please kindly specify what sort, and how the division 
of roles between partners has changed over time since you first established the JV. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
C.3. In a joint venture, partners make different contributions based on respective 
resources and expertise that they possess. Could you please indicate to what extend the 
local firm and the foreign partner respectively possess each of the following resources 
and expertise as contributions to the JV? (Please tick your response for both partners 
according to the scale of 1-5 given below). 
                  
                   1                          2                       3                        4                             5 
           No Extent          Little Extent      Some Extent      Great Extent     Very Great Extent  
                  ☐                          ☐                     ☐                       ☐                            ☐ 
    
 Local Partner  Foreign Partner 
 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
Brand names & Trademarks ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Patents & Registered Designs ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Product & Process Technology ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Capital & Finance ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Managerial Know-how ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Management Personnel  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Technical Personnel  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Supply of Labourer ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Access to Export Markets ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Knowledge of Export Markets ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Knowledge of Local Environment ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Relations  with Local Government  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
  
C.4. To the best of your knowledge, could you please kindly indicate how decisions are 
usually taken between the local and foreign partners concerning the following areas of 
the joint venture partnership? In each row, please tick your response according to the 
information box given below.  
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1-  Decisions are usually taken by the foreign partner alone  
2- Decisions are usually taken by  the foreign partner after consulting with the local partner 
3- Decisions are usually taken jointly by both partners 
4- Decisions are usually taken by the local partner after consulting with the foreign partner 
5- Decisions are usually taken by the local partner alone 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Royalty  Payments  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Product Development & Research ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Renovating/Designing of Production Process ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Product Pricing ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Launching New Investment Projects ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sourcing of Raw Materials and Components ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Hiring of Executives & Managerial Staff ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sale Targets and Policies at Export Markets ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
C.5. This question aims to find out how you think of the position and role of foreign 
partner within the JV. Could you please kindly indicate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with the following statements concerning the foreign partner of the joint 
venture. 
 
 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Agree 
On the whole, the contributions of 
the foreign partner to the JV have 
been less than expected. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The technological contributions of 
foreign partner to the JV become 
commercially obsolete in a short 
span of time. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The foreign partner is always 
willing to share any kind of 
technological and managerial 
knowledge when the local partner 
demands. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The foreign partner keeps tight 
control over the advance 
technologies, industrial designs, 
trade secrets and technical know-
how it brings to the JV. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The foreign partner’s trademarks, 
patents, industrial design rights 
and trade dress are firmly 
protected by the joint venture 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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agreement that the parent 
company of local partner is not 
able to undertake any independent 
enterprise of the similar product 
under its own brand. 
The foreign partner mostly 
provides trademarks, technology 
and access to global markets 
while the local partner of the joint 
venture mostly provides the 
manufacturing capabilities, and 
the conduct of relations with 
government and workforce. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The top managerial positions at 
the JV are mainly held by 
expatriates, and local personnel 
are relatively given little 
opportunity to participate in the 
top management. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Within the JV, the foreign partner 
has a greater deal of bargaining 
power vis a vis the local partner. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
C.6. Are there any areas of knowledge, expertise and technology that the foreign partner 
is not willing to share with the local one? If yes, please specify what they are and why 
this might be the case. 
 :……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
C.7. Overall, how would you evaluate relationships between the foreign and local 
partners? Particularly, please specify what the main areas of conflict, collaboration and 
competition are in their relationship with each other. 
        
:……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
C.8. Have the local partner ever considered becoming an auto assembler under its own 
brand name instead of operating as the partner of a giant automaker(s). If yes, could you 
please indicate when it considered such an alternative, and what factors held it back 
from doing so up to this time. 
               
:……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
D. The Respective Roles of Partners in Production and Process Upgrading  
 
D.1. What are the major products your firm produces? 
      
:……………………………………………………………………………………….... 
D.2. On an average, what proportion of your firm’s annual production is exported to the 
international markets? Please tick the appropriate box below. 
          ☐ Almost none                 ☐ Less than 25 percent               ☐ 25-50 percent 
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          ☐ 51-75 percent                ☐ More than 75 percent             ☐ Almost all 
D.3. What are the main export markets where your firm trades? Please tick one or more 
boxes as appropriate and if possible indicate their respective shares in your total sales. 
          ☐ Germany: …..%                            ☐ France: …...%                ☐ Italy: …..%     
          ☐ The United Kingdom: ……%       ☐ Russian Federation 
          ☐ Other(s) specify: ……………………………………….. 
D.4. What type of manufacturing role(s) has the local partner performed within the JV 
since the early 2000s? Please tick one or more box(es) as appropriate, and please 
specify on the average what percentage(s) of your total production are realised under the 
selected type(s) of manufacture. 
         ☐ Simple fabrication and primarily employing barrowed technology: ……..% 
         ☐ Replacement Equipment Manufacturer (REM): ………% 
         ☐ Contract Manufacturer (CM): ………% 
         ☐ Original Design Manufacturer (ODM): ……...% 
         ☐ Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM): ……..%  
         ☐ Original Brand Manufacturer (OBM): ………% 
D.5. How has the type of manufacturer role the local partner perform changed over the 
last one and half decades? How and to what extent has the local partner involved in 
business activities such as original design manufacturing, original equipment 
manufacturing or original brand manufacturing? More in particular, please specify what 
factors -internal and external- contributed such a change in local partner’s manufacturer 
role. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.6. How has the volume, range and quality of your products changed over the last one 
and half decades? Has the volume and range of products has been changed along with 
quality improvements? If so, please specify what sort of external and internal factors has 
contributed such a change in your production. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.7. If the volume, range or quality of the products have changed over the period in 
question, how and to what extent do you think the local and foreign partners have 
actively involved in this process? More in particular, please specify the respective roles 
of both partners in such a change in your production. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.8. If the range of your products have changed over the period in question, do you 
think the new product range involves higher value added products compared to the 
previous one? In other words, has your firm introduced into the market technologically 
new or improved products and any new brands or brand extensions? If so please specify 
the respective roles of partners in this process.   
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:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.9. Over the last one and half decades, has your firm ever invested in advanced 
production process technologies, new machinery, equipment or production facilities? If 
so, please kindly elaborate (1) what sort of process technologies, machinery, equipment 
and facilities you firm has installed, (2) what motivations and incentives have laid 
behind the investment decision and (3) How and what sort of roles the local and foreign 
partner have played respectively. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
E. Research and Development 
 
 E.1. Does the Joint Venture have its own in-house R&D unit? If yes, please kindly be 
elaborative on the years of establishment, the annual budget allocated to R&D, the 
scope and limitations of the R&D activities undertaken within the unit, the main 
achievements that have been accomplished so far.   
      
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 E.2. What is the importance of the R&D unit for the foreign partner and its global 
production strategy? More in particular, please specify, what sort of functions the R&D 
unit performs within the global production strategy of the foreign partner, and how the 
local partner has involved in this process. 
      
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 E.3. Over the last one and half decades, have your firm perform R&D on the state-of-
art products or technologies that have already affected or is expected to affect your 
firm’s position in the global automotive industry? If so, please kindly state what these 
products and technologies have been, and what kind of role the local partner has played 
in this process. 
      
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
E.4. Over the one and half decades, what, if any, have been the main problems your 
firm encountered in developing R&D within its own R&D unit? How have you coped 
with these problems? In that case, what sort of supports have you received from the 
foreign partner, state-owned research institutions or universities respectively?  
       :……………….……………………………………………………………………... 
F. The Nature of Relationship with Suppliers and Technology/Knowledge Sharing 
        
 F.1. To the best of your knowledge, how many suppliers does your firm have 
approximately? And, on an average, what proportion of your supplied components is 
sourced from domestic markets? 
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………..... 
 F.2. In general, what kind of components or parts does your firm source from domestic 
and foreign suppliers respectively? Are there any components or parts you only procure 
from international markets? 
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:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
 F.3. In your opinion, how important are the following criteria for your firm when 
selecting the ideal auto component/part supplier for your business? In each row, please 
tick the appropriate box according to the below given scale of 1-5 
 
         1                           2                                  3                          4                     5    
Not Important   Slightly Important   Moderately Important  Important  Very Important     
         ☐                         ☐                                 ☐                        ☐                     ☐ 
 
F.4. How and to what extent your firm involves the suppliers in the process of product 
development and design? Does your firm provide any technological, managerial or 
financial support to the suppliers that you work with? 
              
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
F.5. Does you firm have any particular policy/policies for local procurement? If so, 
please kindly state what sort of policy/policies your firm has towards the local suppliers 
in Turkey, particularly towards ones who are domestically-owned 
              
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G. The Nature State-Business Relations and the Role of State in the Automotive 
Industry 
G.1. Overall, to what extent have you been satisfied or dissatisfied with the government 
policies towards automotive industry? Please tick the appropriate box on the given 
below scale. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to keep cost levels low ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Payment terms and condition ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Compliance with quality standards  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Response speed and the delivery of products on time ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Ability to meet current and potential capacity requirements ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Levels of skill and equipment ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Past business experiences with the supplier ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Decent working conditions and fair terms of trade for 
workers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Social Responsibility ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other specify: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Not all                      Not                     Partially                                                   Highly 
Satisfied                Satisfied                 Satisfied                  Satisfied                 Satisfied 
   ☐                            ☐                            ☐                              ☐                             ☐           
G.2.In each of the following aspects, to what extent do you think state has played an 
instrumental and effective role since the early 2000s in favour of the overall industry in 
general and automotive sector in particular? Please tick your response for both the 
overall industry and the automotive industry according to the below given scale of 1-5. 
          1                           2                        3                        4                             5 
   No Extent          Little Extent      Some Extent      Great Extent     Very Great Extent  
          ☐                         ☐                       ☐                       ☐                            ☐ 
     
 The Overall Industry  Automotive Sector 
 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
Providing Sector-specific subsidies ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Providing tax incentives 
exemptions for industrialists 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Providing favourable financial 
support for start-up firms 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Encouraging domestic industrialists 
vis-à-vis global firms and rivals 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Creating an attractive and 
favourable investment environment 
for foreign firms 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Developing effective networks 
among firms and business 
associations and the state 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Supporting university-industry 
collaboration 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Fostering cutting-edge innovations 
through state-owned R&D 
institutions  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Consolidation of a knowledge-
based economy increasingly geared 
towards higher value-added 
activities 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Investing effectively in human 
capital 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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G.3. Do you think that the relations, interactions and dealings between the state and 
business in automotive sector have been institutionally structured in an effective and 
collaborative manner? If not, please specify your reasons and better ways of improving 
the existing relations and institutional channels between the state and business in 
Turkey. 
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G.4. Specifically, what, if any, are your complains about state’s attitudes and policies 
towards the automotive firms in Turkey?  
      
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G.5. Since the early 2000s, have you ever benefited from any sorts of government 
grants, incentives or R&D support? If yes, please specify what sorts of grants, 
incentives or R&D support they were, and what the positive and negative aspects were 
of the grants/incentives/support you have benefited from. 
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
H. Employment and Industrial Relations  
H.1. Approximately, what are the percentages of workers employed under the following 
employment type?  
- temporary work is  …….%  and permanent work is…….% 
- a definite period is ……….% and an indefinite period is ……% 
- part-time work is …….%  and full-time work is ……% 
H.2. At your workshop, would we say that every worker has similar working conditions 
and employment terms regardless of his/her contractual status or the job he/she 
performs? If not, please specify how the working conditions and employment terms 
differs from worker to worker and what determines such a differentiation.  
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
H.3. How do you control and ensure the working discipline and productivity at your 
workshop?   
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
H.4 How do your firm manage to survive in such a competitive market structure? Do 
you take any cost-cutting measures at your workshop to improve the market 
competitiveness of your firm? If so, what they are.  
  :……………….……………………………………………………………………....... 
H.5. How do you determine a salary increase/pay rise at your workshop? Do you 
negotiate it with the workshop employees? 
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
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H.6. Overall, what is your firm’s attitude towards the trade unionism and labour 
activism at the workshop? Particularly, how do you evaluate your relations with the 
union representatives and unionised workers at your firm? 
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
H.7. Over the one and half decades, what, if any, have been the main issues you faced 
with regards to the workforce at your workshop? Have workshop employees caused any 
trouble? If so, please specify what kind of problem and how you have solved them.  
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
 
 
Appendix 6: Interview and Survey Questions for Auto Component Manufacturers 
 
A. General Profile of Respondent 
     A.1. Name of respondent: 
……………………………………………………………... 
     A.2. Name of company: 
……………………………………………………………….. 
     A.3. Please identify your position at the company   
     :…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
     A.4. How many years of working experience do you have in automotive sector? 
      ………………..years  
B. General profile of Company 
 
 B.1.In what year was your company founded?  
   
   :……………………………………….    
      
  B.2. How many people are currently employed at your company? Please tick the         
appropriate box below. 
                 ☐ 1-9               ☐ 10-49          ☐ 50-99          ☐ 100-149 
                 ☐ 150-249       ☐ More than 249, please specify: ……………. 
  B.3. Taking the preceding financial years as point of reference, what is the average 
revenue your company realize annually? 
         ………………………… Turkish Lira 
C. Firm’s Articulation into Global Value Relations 
C.1. What types of business network has your firm established, and has been operating 
within up to the present? In each row, please tick the relevant box which best suits you. 
                     Type of Business Network       Yes         No 
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Intra-Firm 
Network 
Operating as a subsidiary of  global 
manufacturer 
☐ ☐ 
Operating as a local partner of equity-
based JV 
☐ ☐ 
Operating as a local partner of non-
equity based JV 
☐ ☐ 
Supply 
Network 
Having supply relation with global 
customer(s) 
☐ ☐ 
Having supply relation with major car 
assembler(s) in Turkey 
☐ ☐ 
Having supply relation with upper tier 
Supplier(s)  
☐ ☐ 
Other, specify: ☐ ☐ 
          
If your company is not operating within an intra-firm business network, please 
skip two succeeding questions below and directly go to the question C.4. 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
C.2. If your firm has been operating as a local shareholder with global manufacturer, 
could you please specify with which global manufacturer your firm has been in a 
shareholdership and how the equity shares are currently distributed among the 
shareholders. 
Name of foreign partner: ………………………………………………………….......... 
 Share of local partner: …..% Share of foreign partner:…. % Publicly owned share:….% 
C.3. If your firm has been operating as a local partner within an intra-firm network, 
could you please kindly indicate how decisions on the following matter are usually 
taken between your firm and the foreign partner? In each row, please tick your response 
based on the information box given below.  
1-  Decisions are usually taken by the foreign partner alone  
2- Decisions are usually taken by  the foreign partner after consulting with your firm 
3- Decisions are usually taken jointly by both partners 
4- Decisions are usually taken by your firm after consulting with the foreign partner 
5- Decisions are usually taken by your firm alone 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Royalty  Payments  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Product Development & Research ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Renovating/Designing of Production Process ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Product Pricing ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Launching New Investment Projects ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sourcing of Raw Materials and Components ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Hiring of Executives & Managerial Staff ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sale Targets and Policies at Export Markets ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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C.4. If your firm operates either as a local partner of intra-firm network or a supplier of 
global and domestic buyers, to what extent has your firm been involved in following 
activities or functions since the early 2000s?  In each row please, tick your response 
according to the below given scale of 1-5. 
                 1                             2                           3                                  4                               5 
Not involved at all   Involved a little  Somewhat involved  Very much involved    Completely Involved 
               ☐                         ☐                      ☐                              ☐                          ☐ 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Development of new products  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Development of  new design and specification ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Development of new methods/processes of production ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Suggesting improvements or modifications in product 
features 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Development of new R&D capabilities ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Branding and Brand Extension ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Determining sale targets and policies at export markets ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
C.5. In your supplier relationship with global buyers, the major auto manufacturer or 
upper tier suppliers in Turkey, could please specify how high the share of the first two 
most major buyers is in the total sale of your firm?  Please tick the box which suits you 
best. 
☐ Less than 25%       ☐ 25-50%      ☐ 51-75       ☐ More than 75%       ☐ Almost all 
C.6. In your opinion, how important are the following factors for your buyers -both 
global and domestic- when they are selecting the ideal auto component suppliers for 
their business. In each row, please tick the appropriate box according to the below given 
scale of 1-5. 
         1                             2                                     3                              4                       5 
   Important          Slightly Important      Moderately Important      Important     Very Important  
        ☐                            ☐                                    ☐                             ☐                     ☐ 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to keep cost levels low ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Payment terms and condition ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Compliance  with quality standards  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Response speed and the delivery of products 
on time 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Ability to meet current and potential capacity 
requirements 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Past business experience with the supplier ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Decent working conditions and fair terms of 
trade for workers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Social responsibility ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other specify: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
  
C.7. In your supplier relationship with the global and domestic buyers, how do you 
agree on the price of products? Is the final price usually closer to your initial quote or 
the buyers’ price offer? 
:……………….……………………………………………………………………......... 
C.8. Do you think there is price cutting war among the auto component/part firms? If 
so, please specify what sort of price cutting strategies that firms mostly apply to, and 
what kind of common efforts firms adopt to prevent the price cutting practice. 
:……………….……………………………………………………………………......... 
C.9. If your firm stopped working with largest buyers and switched to alternative buyers 
in the market, how do you think it would affect your firm? To exemplify, do you think 
you would lose any investment, sale or knowledge that have been particularly 
associated with products and process specification of your current major buyer? 
:……………….……………………………………………………………………......... 
C.10. Overall, how would you assess your relationship with global automotive giants 
and the major car assemblers in Turkey?  In particular, please be more elaborative on 
the areas of conflict, collaboration and competition in your relationship with each other. 
:……………….……………………………………………………………………......... 
C.11. In your relations with the global auto giants or major car manufacturers in Turkey, 
are there any areas of technology, knowledge and expertise that they are not willing to 
collaborate or do not want to share with you?   If so, please specify what they are and 
why this may be the case. 
:……………….……………………………………………………………………......... 
D. Product and Process Upgrading in Intra/Inter Business Networks 
 
D.1. What are the major products your firm produces? 
      
:……………………………………………………………………………………….... 
D.2. On an average, what proportion of your firm’s annual production is exported to the 
international markets? Please tick the appropriate box below. 
          ☐ Almost none                 ☐ Less than 25 percent               ☐ 25-50 percent 
          ☐ 51-75 percent                ☐ More than 75 percent             ☐ Almost all 
D.3. What are the main export markets where your firm trades? Please tick one or more 
boxes as appropriate and if possible indicate their respective shares in your total sales. 
          ☐ Germany: …..%                            ☐ France: …...%                ☐ Italy: …..%     
          ☐ The United Kingdom: ……%       ☐ Russian Federation 
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          ☐ Other(s) specify: …………………………………………………………… 
D.4. What type of manufacturing role(s) has your firm (or the local partner) performed 
since the early 2000s? Please tick one or more box(es) as appropriate, and please 
specify on the average what percentage(s) of your total production are realised under the 
selected type(s) of manufacture. 
         ☐ Simple fabrication and primarily employing barrowed technology: ……..% 
         ☐ Replacement Equipment Manufacturer (REM): ………% 
         ☐ Contract Manufacturer (CM): ………% 
         ☐ Original Design Manufacturer (ODM): ……...% 
         ☐ Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM): ……..%  
         ☐ Original Brand Manufacturer (OBM): ………% 
D.5. How has the type of manufacturer role your firm perform changed over the last one 
and half decades? How and to what extent has your firm involved in business activities 
such as original design manufacturing, original equipment manufacturing or original 
brand manufacturing? More in particular, please specify what factors -internal and 
external- contributed such a change in local partner’s manufacturer role. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.6. How has the volume, range and quality of your products changed over the last one 
and half decades? Has the volume and range of products has been changed along with 
quality improvements? If so, please specify what sort of external and internal factors has 
contributed such a change in your production. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.7. If the volume, range or quality of the products have changed over the period in 
question, how and to what extent do you think your partner or buyers have actively 
involved in this process?  
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.8. If the range of your products have changed over the period in question, do you 
think the new product range involves higher value added products compared to the 
previous one? In other words, has your firm introduced into the market technologically 
new or improved products and any new brands or brand extensions? If so please specify 
how such a change has occurred in your production. 
       
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
D.9. Over the last one and half decades, has your firm ever invested in advanced 
production process technologies, new machinery, equipment or production facilities? If 
so, please kindly elaborate (1) what sort of process technologies, machinery, equipment 
and facilities you firm has installed, (2) what motivations and incentives have laid 
behind the investment decision and (3) How and what sort of roles your business 
partner or buyers have played in this process. 
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:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
E. Research and Development 
 
 E.1. Does your firm have its own in-house R&D unit? If yes, please kindly be 
elaborative on the years of establishment, the annual budget allocated to R&D, the 
scope and limitations of the R&D activities undertaken within the unit, the main 
achievements that have been accomplished so far.   
      
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
E.2. Over the last one and half decades, have your firm perform R&D on the state-of-art 
products or technologies that have already affected or is expected to affect your firm’s 
position in the global automotive industry? If so, please kindly state what these products 
and technologies have been, and what kind of role your partner or buyers has played in 
this process. 
      
:………………………………………………………………………………………... 
E.4. Over the one and half decades, what, if any, have been the main problems your 
firm encountered in developing R&D within its own R&D unit? How have you coped 
with these problems? In that case, what sort of supports have you received from the 
business partner, buyers, state-owned research institutions or universities respectively?  
       :……………….……………………………………………………………………... 
F. The Nature State-Business Relations and the Role of State in the Automotive 
Industry 
F.1. Overall, to what extent have you been satisfied or dissatisfied with the government 
policies towards automotive industry? Please tick the appropriate box on the given 
below scale. 
Not all                      Not                     Partially                                                   Highly 
Satisfied                Satisfied                 Satisfied                  Satisfied                 Satisfied 
   ☐                            ☐                            ☐                             ☐                             ☐           
F.2.In each of the following aspects, to what extent do you think state has played an 
instrumental and effective role since the early 2000s in favour of the overall industry in 
general and automotive sector in particular? Please tick your response for both the 
overall industry and the automotive industry according to the below given scale of 1-5. 
          1                           2                        3                        4                             5 
   No Extent          Little Extent      Some Extent      Great Extent     Very Great Extent  
          ☐                         ☐                       ☐                       ☐                            ☐ 
 The Overall Industry  Automotive Sector 
 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
Providing Sector-specific 
subsidies 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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F.3. Do you think that the relations, interactions and dealings between the state and 
business in automotive sector have been institutionally structured in an effective and 
collaborative manner? If not, please specify your reasons and better ways of improving 
the existing relations and institutional channels between the state and business in 
Turkey. 
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
F.4. Overall, how would you evaluate the relationship among domestic firms in the 
automotive sector? Do you think there is a collective and collaborative atmosphere 
among them which is effectively geared to solving the common problems of the 
automotive firms in Turkey? 
      
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
F.5. Does your firm have any institutional affiliations with business federations, 
associations or networks in Turkey. If so, please specify which business 
Providing tax incentives 
exemptions for industrialists 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Providing favourable financial 
support for start-up firms 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Encouraging domestic 
industrialists vis-à-vis global firms 
and rivals 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Creating an attractive and 
favourable investment 
environment for foreign firms 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Developing effective networks 
among firms and business 
associations and the state 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Supporting university-industry 
collaboration 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Fostering cutting-edge 
innovations through state-owned 
R&D institutions  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Consolidation of a knowledge-
based economy increasingly 
geared towards higher value-
added activities 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Investing effectively in human 
capital 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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federations/associations/networks your firm is affiliated with and how and to what 
extent these affiliated institutions represent your commercial interests and promote the 
overall progress of your firm. 
      
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
F.6. Specifically, what, if any, are your complains about state’s attitudes and policies 
towards the automotive firms in Turkey?  
      
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
F.7. Since the early 2000s, have you ever benefited from any sorts of government 
grants, incentives or R&D support? If yes, please specify what sorts of grants, 
incentives or R&D support they were, and what the positive and negative aspects were 
of the grants/incentives/support you have benefited from. 
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G. Employment and Industrial Relations  
G.1. Approximately, what are the percentages of workers employed under the following 
employment type?  
- temporary work is  …….%  and permanent work is…….% 
- a definite period is ……….% and an indefinite period is ……% 
- part-time work is …….%  and full-time work is ……% 
 
G.2. At your workshop, would we say that every worker has similar working conditions 
and employment terms regardless of his/her contractual status or the job he/she 
performs? If not, please specify how the working conditions and employment terms 
differs from worker to worker and what determines such a differentiation.  
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G.3. How do you control and ensure the working discipline and productivity at your 
workshop?   
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G.4 How do your firm manage to survive in such a competitive market structure? Do 
you take any cost-cutting measures at your workshop to improve the market 
competitiveness of your firm? If so, what they are.  
  :……………….……………………………………………………………………....... 
G.5. How do you determine a salary increase/pay rise at your workshop? Do you 
negotiate it with the workshop employees? 
       
:……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
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G.6. Overall, what is your firm’s attitude towards the trade unionism and labour 
activism at the workshop? Particularly, how do you evaluate your relations with the 
union representatives and unionised workers at your firm? 
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
G.7. Over the one and half decades, what, if any, have been the main issues you faced 
with regards to the workforce at your workshop? Have workshop employees caused any 
trouble? If so, please specify what kind of problem and how you have solved them.  
   :……………….……………………………………………………………………...... 
 
 
Appendix 7: Interview Questions for Policy Makers, Business Representatives and 
Experts in the Automotive Industry 
 
A. General Profile of Respondent 
     A.1. Name of respondent: 
……………………………………………………………... 
     A.2. Name of institution: 
………………………………………………………………. 
     A.3. Name of department where respondent works in: 
………………………………... 
     A.4. Please identify your current position and tasks you perform within the 
department 
     : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
     A.5. How long have you been working at your current institution/organization? 
            : 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
A.6. Before the current institution/organization you work for, did you work at any              
other firm/institution/organization that was somehow related the automotive industry?  
If so for which firm/institution/organization you worked for and what sort of 
duties/tasks you performed. 
     :……………………………………………………………………………………. 
     A.7. In total, how many years of working experience do you have within/related to 
the automotive industry? 
     : …………………years 
B. Roles, Activities and Linkages of the Respondent’s Institution within the Auto 
Industry 
B.1.With broad strokes, what type of roles and activities does your institution perform 
within the Turkish auto industry? 
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
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B.2. On the whole, how successful or unsuccessful do you think your current institution 
has been in carrying out and fulfilling its roles and activities related to the auto 
industry?  
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
B.3. More in particular, what sort of supports or assistances does your institution offer 
automotive firms to foster their capabilities in issues such as export competitiveness, 
financial robustness or innovativeness in production and marketing? Please particularly 
specify how and in what forms these assistances or supports get delivered and how 
effective they have been so far? 
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
B.4. Over the last one and half decades, what kind of linkages/relationships has your 
institution established and maintained with domestic firms, business associations and 
state institutions which are somewhat related to the auto industry?  
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
B.5. How and to what extent do you think the established linkages/relationships 
between your institution and the other parties have been successful or unsuccessful in 
promoting domestic auto firms and the overall auto industry in Turkey?  
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
B.6.Taking the established linkages/relationships into consideration, what, if any, have 
been the outstanding areas of discordance or conflict between your institution and other 
parties? 
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
B.7. On the whole, do you think that the linkages/relationships between your institution 
and the other parties have culminated in a well-coordinated and well-sustained process 
of cooperation in institutional terms? If so, please specify how and in what ways it has 
been actualised and what the main achievements and failures have been so far. 
       : …………………………………………………………………………………….  
C. The Historical Progress of Turkish Auto Industry and its Respective Position 
within the Global Automotive Production  
 
 C.1. In retrospect, how would you assess the progress and evolution of Turkish 
automotive industry? In your assessment, please particularly be elaborative on the main 
milestones in development of the auto industry and the respective roles of foreign 
capital, state and domestic industrialists in both the positive and negative ways. 
       : …………………………………………………………………………………….  
         C.2. More particularly, how would you evaluate the recent progress of the 
automotive industry in Turkey since the early 2000s? Do you see any rupture with the 
preceding periods? If so, please specify how and in what terms. 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 C.3. In comparative perspective, how would you position the Turkish automotive 
industry within the broader context of global automotive production? More in 
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particular, please share your positive and negative impressions on the Turkish auto 
industry by paying regard to other newly industrialised countries of the last 30-40 years 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico, India  and so forth. 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
  C.4. In comparison to the first-tier newly industrialised countries such as South Korea 
and Taiwan, what, if any, are the rights and wrongs that have affected the overall 
progress and success of the automotive sector in Turkey. If possible, please be 
elaborative on the matter by particularly taking into account the roles and impacts of 
state and business respectively. 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
D. FDI Regime and State’s Policies Towards Foreign Capital  
 
D.1. In retrospect, how would you evaluate the overall attitude state towards foreign 
capital and its operations within the automotive industry? More particularly, please do 
comment on how the ongoing interplay and relationship between the state and global 
auto companies has affected the development of automotive industry in Turkey 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
            D.2. More in particular, how would you assess the recent policies of government 
towards foreign capital and the foreign auto firms in the last one and half decades?  Do 
you think Turkish state has designed and adopted effective FDI regime and policies in 
line with the requirements of the auto industry and domestic firms? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 D.3. Taking the current state and dynamics of auto industry into consideration, what, if 
any, are the positive and the negative impacts of the foreign capital on the development 
of auto industry in Turkey? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
E. The State-Business Relations and the Institutional Mechanism in Turkish 
Automotive Industry 
 
E.1. In retrospect, do you think that the relations, interactions and dealings between the 
state and business in automotive sector have been institutionally structured in an 
effective and collaborative manner? If not, please specify your reasons and better ways 
of improving the existing relations between the state and business relations in Turkish 
automotive industry. 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
E.2. In your opinion, how has the state-business relations in automotive sector 
particularly changed over the last one and half decades? And, how and in what ways has 
the automotive sector been affected by these changes over the period in question? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
E.3. What are the leading official and quasi-official institutions and business 
associations which take role in shaping the overall structure and dynamics of auto 
industry in Turkey?  
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
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E.4. To what extend the institutions and associations in automotive sector are capable to 
act collectively for benefit of domestic auto firms as a whole and to promote the 
enhancement of efficiency, adaptability, know-how, and innovation within the overall 
auto industry? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
E.5. Do you think that the inter-business relations in Turkish automotive sector have 
been generated and built up on an effective, steady and collaborative institutional 
mechanism? If not, please specify in what terms and why not? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
E.6. Over the last one and half decades, to what extent do you think the business world 
in Turkey has been capable to act collectively and to find common solutions to the 
problems in the auto sector?    
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
E.7. In your opinion, what improvements should be mutually made by state institutions 
and business associations to strengthen the competitiveness and the market position of 
Turkish auto industry within the global economy? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F. Foreign Capital,  Domestic Firms and the Overall State of Auto Industry in 
Turkey  
F.1. In retrospect, what, if any, have been the positive and the negative impacts of 
foreign capital on the development of auto industry in Turkey? 
         : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F.2. What opportunities and facilities do you think the giant automakers and global 
component manufacturer are capable of offering that are not currently achievable by the 
domestic firms? And, what sort of measures and strategies should be adopted to actively 
benefit from these opportunities/facilities? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F.3. Why do you think the global auto giants or foreign original equipment 
manufacturers subcontract their design, production and even the R&D activities out to 
the domestic auto firms in Turkey? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F.4. Do you think there are any areas of activity or expertise that global auto giants or 
foreign original equipment manufacturers are not willing to subcontract to or cooperate 
with domestic auto firms in Turkey? If so, please specify what these are and why they 
are not willing to cooperate in these areas. 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F.5. For Turkish auto assemblers, setting up and running an international joint venture 
(JV) has historically been one of the most favoured business strategy to achieve 
technology transfer, managerial and organizational know-how and international 
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competitiveness in export markets. How and to what extend do you think domestic auto 
makers have been successful in achieving such goals and benefiting from their foreign 
partners? 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F.6. What do you think are the major barriers/challenges encountered by Turkish auto 
companies in seeking access to cutting-edge technologies and production methods, and 
becoming truly global players in export markets? How and in what ways do you think 
these barriers or challenges can be overcomed? And what measures should be taken on 
the side of state and business to overcome these obstacles/challenges. 
        : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
F.7.  Given the existing production capabilities and know-how in Turkish automotive 
industry, how close do you think domestic auto makers are to producing a truly "made 
in Turkey" car under its own brand, rather than one produced for multinational auto 
giants. 
         : ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
G. Incentives, Finance and the Role of State in Turkish Auto Industry  
G.1. How would you evaluate the overall incentives and supports that the state has 
offered the automotive firms in the last one and half decades? More in particular, please 
specify how sufficient and effective the investment incentives and technological 
supports that the state has provided so far.  
       : …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
G.2. On the whole, how and to what extent do you think state-owned or private 
financial institutions have played effective role in assisting domestic auto firms to start 
up and expand their business and gain competitiveness in global export markets?  
        :  …………………………………………………………………………………… 
G.3. Overall, how would you asses the innovation and R&D policy in Turkish 
automotive industry? What are the main institutions which shape the innovation and 
R&D policy in the automotive industry? In practice, how and to what extent do you 
think these institutions are successful in fostering innovation and R&D activities? Are 
there any drawbacks or short-comings in their activities and policies?  
       : …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
G.4. How would you evaluate the development and management of human capital in 
Turkey? In your opinion, what are the positive and negative aspects of the human 
capital policy of state? 
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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G.5. As you know, the state has undertaken a series of structural reforms and 
institutional transformations since the early 2000s through which the economy has been 
increasingly integrated into complex networks of global production. How do you think 
the automotive industry has been affected by all these developments in Turkish political 
economy?  
       : ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
G.6. As you know, on several occasions, the president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has 
appeal to local auto makers to produce a domestic car under a national brand name, but 
on the side of business his appeal hasn’t been keenly welcomed by the domestic car 
assemblers. Why do you think president’s appeal hasn’t been embraced by the domestic 
auto makers and has led to a sort of collective project between state and business?  
       : …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
G.7. How would you assess Turkey’s national car project which has been recently 
announced by the Minister of Science, Industry and Technology, and have been 
carrying out within TUBITAK. Will it bring forth a global auto brand of Turkey? Why, 
why not? 
       : …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
H. The Future Prospect of Auto Industry in Turkey 
H.1. From your point of view, how do you foresee the future prospect of Turkish 
automotive industry in its general terms? 
H.2 Is there anything else you would like to add or that you think hasn’t been covered 
by the interview despite its importance?  
 
Appendix 8: Interview and Survey Questions for Auto Workers 
  
A. General Profile of Respondent 
 
A.1. Name of Respondent: 
A.2. Gender:  Female ☐  Male ☐ 
A.3. Age:        
                 <15 ☐     16-20 ☐   21-25 ☐     26-30 ☐     31-35 ☐     36-40 ☐ 
              41-45 ☐     46-50 ☐      51-55 ☐      >51   ☐  
 
B. Work Background, Recruitment and Contractual Status  
 
B.1. What workshop do you work at?  
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B.2. What is the main activity of the workshop you work for? 
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………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B.3. How many people are currently employed at your workshop? Please tick the 
appropriate box provided. 
 
      1-9 ☐      10-49 ☐      50-99☐      100-149 ☐      150-249☐      More than 249 ☐ 
 
B.4. Could you please identify your title of position and task at the workshop? 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B.5. How long have you been working at your current worksite?  
.................months …………..years 
B.6 In total, how many years of working experience do you have in automotive sector?  
………………..years 
B.7. If you worked at another workshop/s before, what kind of work did you perform 
and what were your reasons for leaving your previous workplace/s. 
………………………………………………………………………………………...... 
B.8. At your current worksite, are you employed under a contract of employment? 
       Yes ☐ No ☐ 
B.9. Is your employment contract written or oral? 
        Written ☐ Oral ☐ 
B.10. Under what kind of employment contract are you currently employed? Please 
specify by ticking appropriate box(es) below. 
- Employment contract for ☐ temporary or ☐ permanent work. 
- Employment contract for ☐ a definite period or ☐an indefinite period. 
- Employment for ☐ part-time or ☐ full-time work. 
- Employment contract for ☐ work-upon-call. 
- Employment contract constituted with ☐ a team contract. 
- Other kind of employment contract ☐ please specify 
………………………….. 
B.11. If you work at another workshop before, what was the contractual status of your 
previous employment?   
………………………………………………………………………………………...... 
 
C. Wage, Social Security and Non-wage benefits 
 
C.1. How much salary (after taxes) do you earn on average per month? Please tick the 
appropriate box as provided. 
Less than 1000 TL ☐       1001-1500 TL ☐       1501-2000 ☐       2001-2500 ☐ 
2501-3000 TL ☐       3001-3500 TL ☐       More than 3500, specify ☐ :…................. 
C.2. With broad strokes, to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your 
monthly salary? Please tick the appropriate box on the given below scale. 
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 Not all                      Not                     Partially                                                   Highly 
Satisfied                Satisfied                 Satisfied                  Satisfied                 Satisfied 
   ☐                             ☐                             ☐                            ☐                            ☐           
C.3. Do you think that in general the employer pay the wage you deserve? If not, please 
specify your reasons. 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
C.4. How often do you get a wage rise? Please tick the appropriate box provided. 
       Never ☐                                Once every six months ☐                  Once a year ☐     
       Once every……years ☐       Other, please specify ☐: ………............................... 
C.5.In general, how would you rate the increases in your wage on a scale of 1-5, with 1 
being “very poor” and 5 being “very good” 
 
  Very Poor                  Poor                         Fair                         Good             Very Good 
     ☐                              ☐                             ☐                             ☐                            ☐       
C.6. Are you currently employed under the social security scheme?  
        Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 C.7. Throughout your employment history since the late 1990s, have you always been 
employed under the social security scheme? If not, please specify how many years on 
average did you work without receiving social security benefits. 
        Yes ☐    No ☐ :…….. years  
C.8. Throughout your employment history since the late 1990, have your social security 
premiums been always paid as predicated on your gross earnings? If not, please specify 
how many years on average your social security premiums have disproportionately paid 
as not based on your real earning ? 
         Yes ☐    No ☐ :…….. years  
C.9. Excluding social security benefits, are there any non-wage/fringe benefits provided 
to you by your current employer? If so please tick the appropriate box or boxes 
provided below. 
Private Health Insurance ☐           Housing Allowance ☐           Travel Allowance ☐    
Paid Sick (paid) ☐             Paid Vacation ☐               Disability Income Protection ☐ 
Child Day Care ☐          Free or Subsidised Meals ☐          Funding For Education ☐ 
Other sort of benefit/s ☐ :……………………………………………………………… 
C.10. Throughout your employment history since the early 2000s, have your wage and 
non-wage/fringe benefits ever been cut? If so, please specify how often, in what ways 
and why. 
.............................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
D. Overall Working Conditions 
 
D.1. How many days per week do you usually work? 
………………….days  
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D.2. What are the standard hours of work per day?  
………hours during the week, ………hours on Saturdays,  ……..on Sundays.  
D.3.Taking the last one and half decades as reference point, how have the length of a 
normal working week changed in your own working life? Please tick the appropriate 
box on the scale given below. 
  Fairly                                     Slightly                                   Slightly                                 Fairly  
Decreased     Decreased        Decreased      No Change       Increased        Increased      Increased      
   ☐                   ☐                    ☐                  ☐                   ☐                   ☐                 ☐ 
D.4. In a standard working day, how many times are you entitled to have rest breaks and 
how long does each rest break take? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
D.5. Do you work in shifts or at night? If so, please specify how many shifts you work, 
and whether you get paid extra remuneration for working night shifts. 
       Yes ☐  No ☐  
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
D.6. If you work in shifts, are you allowed to organise your shifts? 
        Yes ☐  No ☐ 
D.7. How often do you work overtime (more than 45 hours per week) at your 
workplace?     
        Very Frequently ☐       Frequently ☐        Occasionally ☐      Rarely ☐  
        Very Rarely ☐          Never ☐   
D.8. On an average, how many hours of overtime do you usually work per month? 
      ………….hours per month 
D.9. Do you get paid extra remuneration for working overtime? If so, please specify, 
how and what percentage of normal hourly wage.  
         Yes ☐  No ☐  
:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
D.10. Are you allowed to say no to overtime?  
          Yes ☐  No ☐  
D.11. Have there been any cases in which you weren’t paid for overtime working? If so, 
please specify how often and in what ways. 
         Yes ☐  No ☐  
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
D.12. What are the five most pressing problems you confront in terms of your overall 
working conditions? Could you please rank them in order from the most (1) to the least 
important one (5).Some of the potential problems are given in the box provided below. 
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You could select among them or you could write any other problem/s not mentioned 
here. 
 
a) Long working hours h) Job Insecurity  
b) Not ordinary working hours i) Lack of collective bargaining 
c) Poor wage j) Pace and intensity of work 
d) Poor non-wage benefits k) Harsh discipline at worksite 
e) Wage cuts l) Mobbing 
f) Cuts in non-wage benefits (excluding 
social security benefits) 
m) Poor health and safety conditions at 
worksite 
g) Totally or partially unpaid social 
security benefits 
n) Unfair treatment or discrimination at 
worksite  
 
The five most important problems: 
1)………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2)………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3)……………………………………………………………………………………….... 
4)………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5)………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 D.13 Overall, how would you evaluate the changes in your working conditions in the 
last one and half decades? Please elaborate how and in what terms your working 
conditions have been better or worse off.                   
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
D.14. In this question, I would like to find out how the following aspects of your work 
have changed since you started working at your current workshop. Ticking the 
appropriate box in each row, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with 
the following statements. (If you have been working at the same workshop more than 15 
years, please only take the last 15 years of your working experience as point of 
reference) 
  
 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Agree Not Applicable 
I have worked with 
new machines and 
tools  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have worked  in a 
new work 
organization 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have worked in a 
new  production 
method 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have attained new 
technical knowledge  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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I have had  to work  
at a higher pace 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have  had to cope 
with increasing 
workload   
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have had to meet 
increasingly tight 
deadlines   
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have had to do 
increasingly 
repetitive, 
monotonous tasks 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have had to handle 
increasingly tiring 
and painful tasks 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I have been 
increasingly exposed 
to unhealthy and 
unsafe conditions at 
work 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
D.15. Have there been any technological progress or organizational change at your 
workshop in the last 10-15 years? If so please specify what they were and how they 
have affected you in terms of nature and type of work you perform and your overall 
working conditions. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
D.16. Do you think there are any unfair treatment or discrimination at your workplace 
with respect to the working conditions, particularly regarding the employment terms, 
pay, benefits. Promotion opportunities, dismissal and the like. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………  
D.17. Do you think that your health and safety at risk due to the working conditions at 
your workshop? If so, please specify how and in what ways. 
         Yes ☐  No ☐  
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
D.18. On the whole, to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with changes in your 
working conditions over the last 10-15 years? Please tick the box which best suits you. 
                                                                                                                                 
Completely         Mostly       Somewhat                            Somewhat      Mostly     Completely  
Dissatisfied    Dissatisfied   Dissatisfied       Neither         Satisfied       Satisfied       Satisfied    
       ☐                  ☐                  ☐               ☐                  ☐               ☐                 ☐ 
 
E. Trade Unionism, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Action 
312 
 
 
 
 
E.1. Are you a member of a trade Union?  
        Yes ☐    No ☐  
E.2. If you are a union member, which trade union are you a member of, and how many 
years have you been a member? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………...  
E.3. If you are not currently a union member, have you ever been a member of trade 
union before?  
         Yes ☐      No ☐ 
E.4. If you were formerly a union member, which trade union was it and why did you 
revoke your membership? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
E.5. Whether or not you are a trade union member, what is your general attitude towards 
trade unions? Please tick the box which best suits you.  
      Very                                         Somewhat                      Somewhat                            Very  
Unfavourable    Unfavourable    Unfavourable   Neutral     Favourable  Favourable   Favourable 
        ☐                       ☐                       ☐                 ☐               ☐                  ☐                   ☐  
E.6. Over the last one and half decades, has/have your employer(s), either explicitly or 
implicitly, pressurised you to end or change your trade union membership? If so, please 
specify when and in what ways. 
   Yes ☐  No ☐  
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
E.7. In general, how does/would being a member of a trade union affect your 
relationship with your employers? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………….  
E.8. Are there any difficulties of or challenges for being a trade union member at your 
current workplace? If any, please explain what sort of difficulties or challenges they are. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
E.9. Over last one and half decades, to what extend do you think the trade unions’ role 
and power in the following aspects of your working life has changed? Please tick only 
one box in each row.  
 
 Decreased         
Greatly 
Decreased 
Slightly 
Stay 
the 
Same 
Increased 
Slightly 
Increased 
Greatly 
Non 
Applicable 
Improving workers’ job 
security 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Improving contractual ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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status of workers 
Bargaining with 
employers to get better 
salary  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Bargaining with 
employers to get better 
non-wage benefits 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Limiting the length of 
working hours  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Increasing the amount 
of paid annual leave  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Lifting restrictions on 
sick/parental leave 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Improving health and 
safety measures at 
workshop 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Protecting workers 
against unfair treatment 
or discrimination at 
worksite 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
E.10. Overall, do you think that trade unions are truly effective in solving worker’s 
problems in automotive industry? If not, please specify why and in what terms they fail 
to be effective. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 E.11. When you and your co-workers have any problem related to your job and 
working conditions, how do you usually deal with it? Do you form an organized labour 
activity or seek collective response to your common problems at workshop? 
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
E.12. To the best of your memory, how often have you been attended or take part in the 
following actions in the last one and half decades? In each row, please tick the box 
which suits you best.  
 
 Almost Never Seldom Sometimes Often 
Almost 
Always 
Meetings of trade unions or 
labour organizations  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Protests or demonstrations for 
working conditions and labour 
rights  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Petition calling (including e-
mail petitions) for  working 
conditions or labour rights 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Strike action at work place or 
general strike 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Occupation of workshop ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other industrial actions such 
as work-to-rule, go slow, 
overtime ban 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
F. Education, Training and Skill Development 
 
F.1. What is your level of education? Please tick the appropriate box provided below. 
 
      ☐ Illiterate           ☐ Literate           ☐ Primary School           ☐ Secondary School  
      ☐ General High School           ☐ Technical High School          ☐ Foundation 
Degree 
      ☐ Bachelor’s Degree        ☐ Other, please Specify:……………………………......  
F.2. Over the last 10-15 years, have you received any training paid for or provided by 
your employer/s to develop your skills related to your job? If yes, please specify what 
kind of and how long. 
     Yes ☐  No ☐  
:……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
F.3. If you received any training paid for or provided by your employer/s in the last 10-
15 years, how has it affected the nature of your job and your overall working conditions, 
particularly with respect to issues such as your employment terms, your monthly salary, 
non-wage benefits you receive and the pace and intensity of your work. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
G.  Global Buyers, End-User Markets and Working Conditions 
 
G.1. Are you aware of the working conditions and labour activism in auto firms in 
Turkey and abroad? If yes, please specify what you think of the overall working 
conditions and labour activism in Turkey and abroad respectively, and how and in what 
terms this affect you.  
 
G.2. Do you know which global buyers or major auto assemblers your workshop 
produces for? If so, please specify what they are and how long your workshop has 
produced for them. 
 
G.3. In your opinion, what are the pros and cons of working for a workshop which 
directly sells its products to the global brands or major auto assemblers in Turkey?  
 
G.3. Are you concerned about for which global buyers or major auto assemblers your 
workshop produce? If yes, please specify why and how it is related to your working 
conditions? 
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G.4. How important do you think is the role and function of your work within the whole 
production process? To what extent do you think the work you perform is crucial for 
your employer and the firms and buyers which you workshop produce for? 
 
G.5. Have you ever heard code of business ethics, supplier code of conduct or fair 
trade? If yes, please specify what all these notions mean to you and how important or 
effectual they are in your work life.  
 
G.6. Is your workshop visited by the audits or any other people, appointed by the global 
buyers or major auto assembler for which you workshop produce? If so, please specify 
how often they visits and what kind of changes you experiences at the workshop after 
their visits. 
 
Appendix 9: Industrial Innovations and Class Relations 
Time Period  
Schumpeter            
Mandel 
Leading Sector 
(Schumpeter) 
Labour Process 
(Mandel) 
Forms of 
Workers 
Organization 
(Mandel) 
1780s-
1820s 
1789-1848 
Cotton, textiles, iron 
and water power-
canals and miles 
Craft workers operating 
water- and steam-
powered machinery in 
small factories 
Owenite 
unionism and 
Chartism 
1840s-
1870s 
1848-1890s 
Steel, steam, engines 
and railways 
Industrial production of 
machines by 
specialized 
firms+emergence of 
specialist machine 
operators 
Skill-based 
Unions 
1890s-
1920s 
1890s-1930s 
Industrial chemicals, 
electricity and intra-
urban trams 
Taylorist methods of 
production 
Mass unionism 
1940s-
1970s 
1930s-1960s 
Internal combustion 
engine, petroleum and 
motor vehicles 
Assembly lines Great strike 
wave of 1968 
and beyond 
1980s-
Present 
1980s-
Present 
Digitalization, 
microelectronics and 
information 
Continuous-flow, Just-
in-time production 
In formation 
See Selwyn’s  
(2014) Chapter 
5  
Source: Derived by Selwyn (2014, p.120) from Schwartz (2010), Mandel (1980) and 
Schumpeter (1934, 1987). 
 
 
Appendix 10: Two Main Pillars of Analytical Framework 
(Complement Each Other) 
Historical Structural Dependency 
Studies 
 GCCs/GVCs Analyses 
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Strengths  Limitations 
Provides historically-specific, class-
relational and multi-dimensional reading 
of capitalist development by shifting the 
focus of analysis from exogenous, 
structural, market- and exchange-based 
relations to internal factors, changing 
configuration of class forces, state-
society relations and social relations of 
production. 
 Conceptualizes capitalism in a 
reductionist manner as 
exchange-based or market-based 
relations. By viewing capitalism 
in mainly market terms and 
exchange relations, GVC 
analysis implicitly or explicitly 
embraces a sort of neo-Smithian 
comprehension of capitalism 
and capitalist development in 
which capitalism is reduced to a 
system of production for profit 
making.  
Industrial analysis in Dependent 
development approach is based on the 
mutually constitutive relations among 
the three partner of the alliance: The 
multinational corporations, state and the 
local capital so each actor is taken into 
consideration in examining the 
governance of global value chains. In 
connection with this, it puts special 
emphasis on domestic class 
configuration and state-society relations. 
 Inherently firm-centric that it 
obscures the multi-agential 
nature of chain governance and 
ignores the transformative role 
state in the governance of value 
chains. 
Based on the simultaneous possibility of 
an alliance and robust bargaining, 
neither the dominance of multinationals 
nor the subordination of local capital is 
taken for granted. Rather it is assumed 
that both the local capital and the state 
enjoy certain political and economic 
advantages vis a vis the multinationals, 
varying from industry to industry and in 
the course of time. 
 Due to its overly emphasis on 
the firm to firm relations and the 
decisive role of transnational 
firms, both the matter of value 
chain governance and the 
discourse of economic 
upgrading has mainly remained 
limited to firm-based analysis, 
obscuring the transformative 
role of other actors such as state, 
local authorities and labour and 
conceive them as a passive 
bearers of imperatives of global 
value relations.  
Lets us comprehend the uneven, 
exploitative and dependent nature of late 
capitalist development. 
 Due to its techno-industrial 
approach and it overly optimistic 
belief in the likelihood of 
upgrading it obscures and 
overlooks the exploitative and 
dependent nature of capitalist 
development. 
Limitations  Strengths  
Deprived of a set of well-structured 
conceptual tools to understand the new 
dynamics of global division of labour 
and new organization of industry and 
production on a global scale. Since it 
was proposed before the recent shifts in 
global economy, it fails to examine the 
 Provides a really useful 
framework to address most of 
the recent changes in capitalist 
world economy, Looking into 
the asymmetrical distribution of 
power capabilities among 
participants of value chains,  it 
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late capitalist development in relation to 
globalization of trade and production.  
offers precious insights to assess 
the extent to which the benefits 
of globalization are distributed 
to the regions, countries and 
firms across the world. 
 
Lets us do industry analysis in a 
conventional sense but the matter of 
value chain governance and economic 
upgrading has not been theorized in a 
well-structured way. 
 Provides a relatively well-
structured conceptual framework 
to study diverse patterns of 
governance in global value 
chains and their respective roles 
in determining prospects and 
limitations for economic and 
industrial upgrading.  
Source: Derived by the author based on his implications from the literature. 
 
 
Appendix 11: Classification of 58 Developing Countries According to per capita Inflows 
of Non extractive Foreign Direct Investment (1966-1970) 
Group 1 
(Slightly attractive) 
Group 2 
(Moderately Attractive) 
Group 3 
(Highly 
Attractive) 
Chad 
Zahire 
Ethiopia 
Morroco 
Niger 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Tunusia 
Uganda 
Egypt 
Zambia 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Burma 
Ceylon 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
S.Korea 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
South Vietnam 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Syria 
Turkey 
Ghana 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Libya 
Malawi 
Nigeria 
Brazil 
Colombia 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Paraguay 
Taiwan 
Malasia 
Thailand 
Portugal 
Gabon 
Costa Rica 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Venezuela 
Singapore 
Isreal 
Lebanon 
Greece 
Spain 
 
Source: Classified by Root and Ahmed (1979, p.752) according to the average annual per 
capita inflow of non-extractive direct investment over the period 1966-70. 
 
Appendix 12: The Foundation of Organized Industrial Districts in Turkey between the 
years 1961 and 2015 
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Source: Derived and Calculated by the Author based on the data at OSB (2015) website. 
https://osbbs.sanayi.gov.tr/ 
Note: As of  May, 2015 there are 281 OSBs all over Turkey. However, due to the lack of 
information six of them can not included into the calculation. 
 
 
Appendix 13: The Geographical Distribution of Organised Industrial Districts in 
Turkey (May, 2015) 
 
Source: Mapped by the Author based on the data at OSB (14 May, 2015) website. 
https://osbbs.sanayi.gov.tr/ 
 
Appendix 14: Members and Organizational Structure of the Coordination Council for 
the Improvement of Investment Environment (2015)1  
The Members of YOİKK 
             Respective State Institutions                                                 Capital Groups 
State Minister in Charge of Economy (Chairman) Chairman of the TÜSIAD 
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Undersecretary of Ministry of Justice Chairman of the YASED 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Science, Industry 
and Technology 
Chairman of the TOBB 
 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Environment and 
Urbanisation 
Chairman of the TIM 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Economy  Chairman of the MÜSİAD2 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources 
 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Customs and Trade  
Undersecretary of Ministry of Development  
Undersecretary of Ministry Ministry of Finance  
Undersecretary of the Treasury  
Head of Investment Support and Promotion 
Agency  
 
Chairmen of Technical Commitees  
1 YOİKK’s membership and institutional configuration has been changed several times since 
the establishment in 2001. For more info please visit 
http://www.yoikk.gov.tr/detay.cfm?MID=1 
2 MÜSİAD was lately incorporated into the YOİKK’s membership structure in 2014.  
The Members of Steering Committee1 
Undersecretary of the Treasury Secretary General of TÜSIAD 
Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry Secretary General of YASED 
Deputy Undersecretary of the SPO Secretary General of TOBB 
Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Finance 
Secretary General of YASED 
Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce 
Secretary General of MÜSİAD2 
Deputy Undersecretary of Foreign Trade  
1 The Steering Committee was founded in 2005 with the aim of coordinating and monitoring 
the works of the Technical Committees and maintaining coordination between them and 
YOİKK. 
2 As it was in the membership structure of YOİKK, MÜSİAD was incorporated as a member 
of the Steering Commitee in the recent past. 
The List of Technical Commiteees1  
Technical Committee I: Company Transactions and Corporate Governance 
Technical Committee II: Employment 
Technical Committee III: Input Supply Strategy (GITES) and Sectoral Licences 
Technical Committee IV: Investment Location, Environment and Zoning Permits 
Technical Committee V: Taxes and Incentives 
Technical Committee VI: Foreign Trade and Customs 
Technical Committee VII: Intellectual Property Rights and R&D 
Technical Committee VIII: Legislation on Investment Climate and Legislative Procedures 
Technical Committee IX: Access to Finance 
Technical Committee X: Infrastructure 
1 Capital groups have representatives in each Technical Committee chaired by high level of 
bureaucrats. It is worth noting that under certain conditions and with respec to specific issues 
related to their area of interest, the technical commitees also work in coordination with IRAs  
in Turkey. 
Source: Tabulated by the author based on data derived from YOİKK’s website (30 July 
2015) http://www.yoikk.gov.tr 
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Appendix 15: The First Meeting of the Investment Advisory Council in 2004 (The List of 
Members and Participants) 
                 State Protocol     
  
    
    
    
  
  
  
  
   
Name   Status 
1  
Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan  Prime Minister 
2  Ali Babacan  State Minister 
3  Kemal 
Unakıtan  
Minister of 
Finance 
International Organisations The Name of the 
Organisation 
   
   
1  James 
Wolfensohn  
President  The World Bank  
2  Michael 
Deppler  
The IMF’s 
Europe Director 
The IMF  
Multinational Corporations  
(In Alphabetical Order) 
The Name of the 
Firm  
Country  Sector  
1  Paul Matthys  Vice President   Arcelor  France  
Metal/Steel 
Industry 
2  
Jacques de 
Larosiére   
Counsellor of 
Board Chairman  
(the Former 
President of the 
IMF, 1978-1987)  BNP Paribas  France  Finance  
3  Michael Klein  CEO  
Citigroup Inc.  
USA Finance   
4  Giuseppe 
Morchio  
CEO  Fiat S.p.A.  Italy   Automotive 
Industry 
5  Lewis Booth  President  Ford Motor 
Company, Europe 
USA  Automotive 
Industry 
6  Kwang-Heum 
Um  
President and 
CEO   
Hyundai Motor 
Company, Europe 
S. Korea   Automotive 
Industry 
7  Stef 
Wertheimer  
Chairman of the 
Board  
ISCAR  Israel  Metal Industry 
8  Bertrand 
Collomb  
Chairman of the 
Board and CEO  
Lafarge  France   Cement, Concrete 
and Construction  
Industry 
9  Dott. Andrea 
Guerra  
CEO   Merloni 
Elettrodomestici 
SpA  
Italy  Electrical-
electronics Industry 
10  Dr. Hans-
Joachim 
Korber  
CEO  Metro AG  Germany  Retailing  
11  Michael W.O. 
Garrett  
Vice President   Nestlé  Switzerland Food Industry 
12  Pierre 
Lassonde  
President   Newmont Mining 
Corp  
USA Mining Industry  
13  Masood Tariq  Member of Board 
and  President of 
Nortel Networks 
Corp.  
Canada  Telecommunication   
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Global 
Partnerships  
14  Pieter van 
Kesteren  
The Chairman of 
the Board 
Nunza B.V.  Netherland  Food and 
Agricultural 
Industry  
15  Dott.Marco 
Tronchetti 
Provera  
President   Pirelli SpA  Italy   Tyre and Cord 
Industry  
16  Leigh Clifford  CEO  Rio Tinto Plc  UK  Mining Industry  
17  Johannes 
Feldmayer  
Member of Board  Siemens AG  Germany   Electrical-
electronics Industry 
18  Dr. Shuhei 
Toyoda  
President and 
CEO   
Toyota Motor 
Corporation, 
Avrupa  
Japan  Automotive 
Industry   
19  Rachid Rachid  President   
Unilever N.V.,  
Netherland  Food Industry  
The Representatives of Business Associations in Turkey  
1  Rıfat 
Hisarcıklıoğlu  
Chairman    The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
of Turkey  (TOBB)  
2  Ömer Sabancı  Chairman    Turkish Industry & Business 
Association (TÜSİAD)  
 
3  Oğuz Satıcı  Chairman    Turkish Exporters Assembly 
(TİM)  
 
4  Şaban Erdikler  Chairman    International Investors 
Association (YASED)  
 
Source: Tabulated by the author based on data derived from YOİKK’s website (31 July 2015) 
http://www.yoikk.gov.tr/detay.cfm?MID=39 
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Appendix 16: Turkey`s Economic Performance in the Post-2001 Period 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP (US$ billion, 
current prices) 
232.7 304.6 393 484 529.9 655.9 742.1 617.6 735.8 772.3 788.6 819.9 813.3 
GDP per capita (US$, 
current prices) 
3403 4393 5595 6801 7351 8984 10745 8559 10067 10469 10530 10721 10518 
Real GDP growth 
(%) 
6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.6 0.7 -4.7 9 8.5 2.1 4.2 2.9 
Investment (% of 
GDP) 
17.1 17.4 20.7 21.4 22.6 21.8 20.2 17.2 18.9 23.8 20.1 20.5 19.8 
Savings (% of GDP) 18.3 15.1 15.6 15.7 16.2 15.8 6.8 13.1 12.6 13.8 13.9 12.6 14.02 
FDI (US$ billions) 1.49 1.69 2.78 10.03 20.18 22.04 19.50 8.41 9.03 15.90 13.2 12.4 12.5 
Inflation Rate 29.7 18.4 9.3 7.7 9.7 8.4 10.1 6.5 6.4 10.5 8.8 7.4 9.0 
Unemployment (%) 10.3 10.5 10.3 10.3 9.9 9.9 11 14 11.9 9.8 8.4 9.0 9.4 
Source: Calculated by the Author based on the data derived from Turkstat (2015) and IMF (2015) 
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Appendix 17: ISIC REV. 3 International Standard Industrial Classification of 
Economic Activities  
High-technology industries Medium-high-technology industries 
 Aircraft and spacecraft 
 Pharmaceuticals 
 Office, accounting and computing 
machinery 
 Radio, TV and communications 
equipment 
 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments 
 Electrical machinery and apparatus, 
n.e.c 
 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
 Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 
 Railroad equipment and transport 
equipment, n.e.c. 
 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c 
Medium-low-technology industries Low-technology industries 
 Building and repairing of ships and 
boats 
 Rubber and plastics products 
 Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
 Other non-metallic mineral products 
 Basic metals and fabricated metal 
product 
 Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling 
 Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing 
 Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
 Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear 
Source: OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Economic Analysis and 
Statistics Division (17 March, 2015). 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/industryandglobalisation/48350231.pdf 
 
 
Appendix 18: Number of Foreign Companies According to Types of Establishment and 
FDI Inflows, 1954-2012 (million $) 
Year New  Partnership Branch  Total  
FDI 
Inflow 
(million$)                         
1954-1999 
(Cumulative) 
3.357 550 143 4.050 9.337 
2000 305 115 17 437 982 
2001 320 114 28 462 3.266 
2002 354 113 22 489 1.491 
2003 851 208 32 1.091 1.694 
2004 1.515 460 64 2.039 2.785 
2005 2.191 501 58 2.750 10.031 
2006 2.571 653 64 3.288 20.185 
2007 2.991 651 60 3.702 22.047 
Grand Total 14.455 3.365 488 18.308 ----- 
 The Number of Foreign Companies According to Types of Establishment and FDI 
Inflows, 1954-2012 (million $) 
1954-2007 12.632 3.031 436 16.099 ----- 
2008 2.356 605 61 3.022 19.504 
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2009 2.189 549 65 2.803 8.411 
2010 2.665 527 81 3.273 9.038 
2011 3.628 628 91 4.347 15.904 
2012 3.529 286 80  3.895 13.200 
Grand Total 26.999 5.626 814     33.439 137.875 
Source: As the number of foreign-owned companies is revised due to the factors such as closing down 
of companies or passing into hands of domestic capital, there is not a uniform data of the types of 
foreign-owned companies between the years 1954 and 2012. Therefore, the first part of the table is 
taken from 2008 FDI report of the Undersecretariat of Treasury (Turkey), and the second part is 
derived from 2012 FDI report of the Ministry of Economy. The data on FDI inflows is drawn from the 
Central Bank of Turkey. 
 
 
Appendix 19: Collective Bargaining Coverage, Actual Unionization Rates, Strikes and 
Strike Severity Rates in Turkey (1990-2010) 
Year  
Total Number of 
Workers 
(thousand) 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Coverage 
(thousand) (*) 
Actual 
Trade Union 
Density % 
Number of 
Workers 
Involved in 
Strikes 
Days off from 
work in strike 
(thousand) 
Strike 
severity 
rate 
(**) 
1990 7.224 1.433 19,8 166.306 3.466 479.7 
1995 8.551 1.257 14,7 199.867 4.838 565.7 
2000 10.485 1.049 10,0 18.705 368 35.1 
2005 11.436 899 7,8 3.529 176 15.3 
2010 13.762 786 5.7 808 37 2.6 
(*) The four-year average of workers covered by collective bargaining schemes 
(**) Number of days in strike per thousand employees. 
Source: Data on collective barganing coverage and unionization rate is adobted from Celik (2013, p.44). 
The rest of the data is calculated by the author based on the data of The Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security (2015), Turkey. Available at : 
http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/ShowProperty/WLP%20Repository/csgb/istatistikler/1984_2012_grev 
 
 
Appendix 20: Trade Union Density in Selected  OECD Countries, 2002-2011 (%) 
Country 2000 2012 
% 
Variation 
Turkey 9.94 4.54 -54.31 
Hungary 21.66 10.55 -51.29 
United States 12.91 11.08 -14.18 
Poland 17.20 12.52 -27.23 
Mexico 15.61 13.62 -12.79 
Chile 13.29 15.32 15.29 
Spain 16.57 17.47 5.48 
Netherlands 22.93 17.69 -22.84 
Germany 24.57 17.87 -27.27 
Japan 21.54 17.97 -16.58 
Portugal 21.65 20.54 -5.13 
Greece 26.51 21.26 -19.79 
United Kingdom 30.18 25.84 -14.39 
Canada 28.20 27.46 -2.62 
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Italy 34.80 36.28 4.24 
Belgium 56.18 55.02 -2.07 
Denmark 73.93 67.20 -9.09 
Sweden 79.08 67.51 -14.64 
Finland 74.97 68.63 -8.45 
OECD countries 20.24 17.10 -15.51 
Source: Data extracted from OECD.stat. (2015) Available at: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN 
 
 
Appendix 21:Wealth Shares of the Top Percentile, the Succeeding %9 and the Remained 
%90 in Turkey between 2000 and 2014 
 
Source: Data extracted from Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook (2014) Available at: 
https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=5521F296-D460-2B88-
081889DB12817E02 
 
 
Appendix 22: Number of Assembly Contracts by Country of Origin, 1969 
Country of Origin Number Countries 
United States  
(Including Subsidiaries) 
133 43 
France 77 39 
West Germany 56 26 
United Kingdom 48 34 
Italy 30 27 
Japan 59 28 
Source: UNIDO (1972), The Motor Vehicle Industry, ID/78, p.8. 
Note: Between the years 1960-1969 alone, the number of countries with assembly contracts 
increased from 42 to 70.  
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Appendix 23: Number of Assembly Contracts by Major Automakers, 1968 
Automakers Total Number 
Caribbean and 
Latin American 
Asia Africa 
General 
Motors 
24 9 6 2 
Ford 32 8 8 4 
Chrysler 31 10 9 2 
Volkswagen 16 5 3 - 
Fiat 28 5 5 5 
Source: UNIDO (1972), The Motor Vehicle Industry, ID/78, p.8 
 
 
Appendix 24: Automotive Assembly Firms in Turkey by the late 1950s  
Firms  
Foreign 
Automaker 
Involved 
Year of 
Foundation 
Production Capacity 
Foreign 
Involvement 
and Capital 
Ratio 
Willys  
& Verdi 
Willys-Kaiser 1954 
5800 Trucks and 
vans; 7500 Jeeps; 
1000 buses 
25% equity 
Licencing 
Federal 
Kamyon 
(later TOE) 
Federal Trucks 
(later IH) 
1955 
400 Trucks 
(3000 Trucks) 
10% equity 
Licencing 
Nobel 200 Fuldamobil  1958 --- Licencing 
Otosan Ford 1959 
2000 trucks; 400 
minibus; 500 
autobuses 
Licencing 
Ciftciler 
(Farmers) 
Volkswagen 1959 1800 small trucks 
Licencing, 
Permit 
canceled 
Source: Tabulated by the author based on data derived from Ansal (1988, p.83) and Aksoy 
(1990, p.46). 
 
 
Appendix 25: Local Content Requirements in the Turkish Automotive Sector (1964-
1970) 
Years Buses Trucks and Vans Cars 
1964 30 20 -- 
1967 65 45 -- 
1968 70 50 -- 
1969 70 50 65 
1970 75 55 65 
Source: Official Gazette, 14/04/1964 
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Appendix 26: Auto Firms Established in Turkey by the Late 1960s 
Firms 
Foreign 
Automaker 
Involved 
Year of 
Foundation 
Production Capacity 
Foreign 
Involvement 
and Capital 
Ratio 
Otobus 
Karoseri 
Magirus-Detuz 1963 320 buses Licensing 
Genoto Bedford 1963 3000 trucks Licensing 
Chrysler Chrysler 1964 
6000 trucks 
and vans 
60% equity 
Licensing 
BMC British Leyland 1964 
8000 trucks 
and vans 
26% equity 
Licensing 
Celik Motaj 
(Anadolu 
Otomotiv) 
Skoda 1965 2000 vans Licensing 
MAN Man 1966 
600 trucks 
150 buses 
33.3% equity 
Licensing 
Karsan -- 1966 250 bus karose -- 
Otoyol Fiat 1966 
800 buses 
800 trucks 
Licensing 
Unver Tic. Magirus-Deutz 1966 
650 minibus 
300 small trucks 
Permit 
canceled 
Transit AS Ford 1966 500 trucks Licensing 
Otomarsan MercedesBenz 1967 450 buses 
36% equity 
Licensing 
Source: Tabulated by the author based on data derived from Ansal (1988, p.95) and Aksoy 
(1990, p.46-49). 
 
 
Appendix 27: Passenger Car Firms Established in Turkey by the Late 1960s 
Firms 
Foreign 
Automaker 
Involved 
Year of 
Foundation 
Production 
Capacity 
Foreign Involvement and 
Capital Ratio 
Otosan- 
Anadol 
Reliant Company 
of England and 
Ford 
Founded in 
1959 as 
commercial 
vehicle 
producer-
Anadol 
project was 
started in 
1966 
10000 
100% Local (Koc Group)  
Later 30% Ford equity 
Ford Licensing 
TOFAŞ Fiat  1968 20000 
41.5% equity share of 
Italian FIAT 
25% of MKE (Mechanical 
and Chemical industry 
Corporation) 
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22.5% of Koc Group 
10% of Turkish Business 
Bank 
1% of Aegean Petrol 
Fiat Licensing 
Oyak-
Renault 
Renault  1969 20000 
44% equity share of  
Renault 
43% of OYAK (Army 
Mutual Assistance 
Association) 
13% of Yapi Kredi Bank 
Renault Licensing 
Source: Tabulated by the author based on data derived from Nahum (1988) and Aksoy 
(1990) and Azcanli (1995). 
 
 
Appendix 28: Local Content Requirements for Commercial Vehicles in Turkey (1971-
1978) 
Years 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Local 
Content 
(%) 
55 57.5 57.5 60 60 60 65 70 
Source: Ansal (1988, p.99) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 29: Commercial Vehicle Production in Turkey, 1963-1978 (Units) 
Year 
Anadolu 
(Isuzu) 
Aksam  
 
BMC 
Genoto  
General 
MAN 
Otok
ar 
Otoma
rsan 
OTOS
AN 
Otoyol TOE Total 
1963 - - - - - 12 - 1687 - 1401 3100 
1964 - 321 - - - 56 - 1433 - 2273 4083 
1965 - 862 - 120 - 122 - 1769 - 1098 3971 
1966 932 3229 463 804 - 426 - 1312 - 1994 9160 
1967 1834 2261 1982 1224 212 332 - 1896 193 1565 11499 
1968 1874 2407 2876 981 421 249 73 2591 207 1197 12876 
1969 1968 2627 3635 1383 528 373 211 2756 412 1850 15743 
1970 2279 2006 2301 1080 394 308 254 2374 255 982 12293 
1971 916 2676 2343 444 449 137 322 2944 100 1328 11659 
1972 2100 2792 4835 1236 922 150 531 5149 270 1200 19185 
1973 2385 4392 5780 1070 1214 234 790 7654 317 2115 25951 
1974 2533 5248 5418 2111 1112 438 917 8565 359 377 27078 
1975 2811 7869 6825 2088 1242 522 1046 13443 1203 2268 39317 
1976 3409 8247 7551 3492 1331 405 1103 16286 2142 2197 46163 
1977 655 6597 6772 3828 841 523 1090 16087 2783 1335 40511 
1978 1171 1499 4163 1644 1434 629 667 10919 1796 3006 26928 
Source: Tabulated by the author deriving on the requested data from OSD 
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Appendix 30: Number of Assembly Firms in Latin American Auto Industry (early 
1970s) 
Country Number of Car Firms Number of Commercial 
Vehicle Firms 
Brazil 6 9 
Mexico 7 8 
Argentina 7 10 
Chile 10 2 
Peru 9 7 
Venezuela 8 13 
Colombia 3 2 
Source: Jenkins (1984, p.59) 
 
 
Appendix 31: Foreign Firms’ Share of Vehicle Production in Latin American, 1978 
Countries 
Majority Foreign 
Owned  
Minority Foreign 
Owned  
Nationally 
Owned 
Argentina 95.4 - 4.6 
Brazil 99.7 - 0.3 
Chile 85.7 14.3 - 
Colombia 45.0 55.0 - 
Mexico 86.0 9.9 4.1 
Peru 75.0 25.0 - 
Venezuela 77.9 22.1 - 
Uruguay 41.8 - 58.2 
Source: UNCTC (1982) cited in Jenkins (1984, p.55) 
 
 
Appendix 32: Restructuring in the European, the US and Japanese Car Industry 
(Number of Transnational Auto Firms) 
   1970 1980 1990 2003 
Abarth  
Alfa Romeo  
Alpine  
AMC 
Aston-Martin 
BLMC  
BMW  
Chrysler  
Citroen  
Daimler-Benz  
de Tomaso  
Fiat  
Ford  
Fuji H.I.  
GM  
Honda 
Alfa Romeo AMC  
Aston-Martin  
BL  
BMW  
Chrysler Daimler-
Benz  
de Tomaso  
Fiat 
Ford Fuji 
H.I.  
GM 
Honda 
Isuzu Lamborghini 
Lotus  
Mazda Mitsubishi 
Nissan  
BMW  
Chrysler 
Daewoo  
Daimler-Benz  
Fiat  
Ford  
Fuji H.I.  
GM  
Honda  
Hyundai  
Isuzu  
Mitsubishi  
Nissan  
PSA  
Porsche  
Renault  
BMW 
Daewoo Daimler 
Chrysler 
Fiat  
Ford  
GM  
Honda  
Hyundai  
PSA  
Porsche  
Renault  
Nissan  
Rover  
Toyota  
VW 
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Innocenti  
Isuzu  
Lamborghini 
Lotus  
Maserati  
Mazda  
Mitsubishi  
Nissan  
Peugeot  
Porsche  
Prince  
Renault  
Rolls-Royce  
Saab  
Seat  
Simca / Chrysler 
Suzuki  
Toyota  
Volvo  
VW 
PSA  
Porsche  
Renault 
Rolls-Royce Saab  
Seat  
Suzuki 
Talbot / Matra Toyota  
Volvo  
VW 
 
Rolls-Royce  
Rover  
Suzuki  
Toyota  
Volvo  
VW 
 
Source: European Commission (2004) 
 
 
Appendix 33: Shares of the US/Canada, the EU (15), Japan and non-Triad Countries in 
World Motor Vehicle Production (Selected Years) 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated by the author relying on the data derived from OICA (2016). 
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Appendix 34: Exports in the Turkish Motor Vehicle Industry during 1980s (Units) 
Year 
Passenger 
Car 
Bus, Minibus 
and Midibus, 
Truck and 
Pick-up 
Tractor Total 
1980 4515 392 296 95 5298 
1981 5959 965 398 324 7646 
1982 3967 631 802 3333 8733 
1983 3343 324 1136 7361 12164 
1984 3886 145 692 7339 12962 
1985 3760 676 530 7032 11998 
1986 4997 909 1196 481 7583 
1987 4987 476 582 58 6103 
1988 7390 489 619 517 9015 
1989 8220 309 1218 300 10047 
Source: Tabulated by the Author relying on the data requested from OSD 
 
 
Appendix 35: Imports and Exports in the Turkish Automotive Sector during 1990s 
Years 
Productio
n Units in 
Turkish 
Auto 
Industry 
Export Import 
Motor 
Vehicles 
Components Total 
Motor 
Vehicles 
Component Total 
1990 239.015 - - - - - - 
1991 262.802 - - - - - - 
1992 344.482 126.674 442.909 569.583 536.147 2.068.749 2.604.896 
1993 453.465 154.621 404.063 558.684 1.045.825 2.305.496 3.351.321 
1994 268.343 201.029 593.579 794.608 308.585 1.015.400 1.323.985 
1995 326.508 432.522 813.523 1.246.045 470.835 2.674.822 3.145.657 
1996 329.337 485.442 886.377 1.371.819 1.433.069 2.927.970 4.361.039 
1997 399.917 330.654 919.065 1.249.719 2.406.205 3.881.296 6.287.501 
1998 405.002 354.175 1.320.988 1.675.163 2.104.750 4.544.528 6.649.278 
1999 325.297 881.985 1.116.499 1.998.484 1.732.033 3.260.712 4.992.745 
2000 468.381 1.015.705 2.259.169 3.274.874 3.442.076 4.833.854 8.275.930 
Source: Tabulated by the author relying on the data from OSD (2014, p.5) and OSD (2015a, 
p.8). 
 
 
Appendix 36: Motor Vehicle Production in Turkey (2000-2015) 
Years P.Car Truck Pick-Up Bus Minibus Midibus F.Tractor Total 
2000 297.476 28.348 68.807 4.213 20.597 11.506 37.434 468.381 
2001 175.343 6.683 76.672 2.501 6.486 3.000 15.052 285.737 
2002 204.198 12.295 116.872 2.684 6.139 4.377 10.840 357.405 
2003 294.116 19.041 195.606 4.490 13.625 6.794 29.778 563.450 
2004 447.152 31.790 301.563 4.839 28.161 9.903 40.665 864.073 
2005 453.663 37.227 349.885 5.406 26.162 7.109 36.527 915.979 
2006 545.682 37.026 369.862 6.019 20.728 8.263 38.841 1.026.421 
2007 634.883 34.544 391.737 6.946 21.999 9.305 33.518 1.132.932 
2008 621.567 36.800 449.434 7.526 21.123 10.660 24.807 1.171.917 
2009 510.931 8.246 330.044 5.931 11.829 2.624 14.861 884.466 
2010 603.394 23.851 442.408 5.268 16.978 2.658 30.425 1.124.982 
2011 639.734 37.396 479.110 6.907 22.475 3.509 45.506 1.234.637 
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2012 577.296 29.129 426.633 6.427 29.335 4.158 42.255 1.115.233 
2013 633.604 30.082 410.556 8.345 37.750 5.197 40.509 1.166.043 
2014 733.439 29.909 359.911 6.442 35.420 5.324 48.403 1.218.848 
2015 791.027 35.808 468.922 8.789 47.078 7.131 51.238 1.410.034 
Source:  Tabulated by the author relying on the data from OSD (2015a, p.8) and OSD (2015b, 
p.3) 
 
 
Appendix 37: Foreign Trade in the Turkish Motor Vehicle Industry (2000-2015) 
Years 
Export Import 
 Motor 
Vehicles 
 Components Total 
Motor 
Vehicles 
   Components Total 
2000 1.015.705.000 2.259.169.483 3.274.874.483 3.442.076.000 4.833.854.780 8.275.930.780 
2001 1.652.057.000 1.823.033.251 3.475.090.251 768.192.000 1.805.596.825 2.573.788.825 
2002 2.191.614.000 2.127.684.558 4.319.298.558 1.153.186.000 2.755.034.371 3.908.220.371 
2003 4.007.045.000 2.088.174.893 6.095.219.893 3.441.543.000 3.903.865.458 7.345.408.458 
2004 6.874.841.000 3.031.394.689 9.906.235.689 6.711.175.000 6.567.023.489 13.278.198.489 
2005 7.773.473.000 3.625.374.618 11.398.847.618 6.581.074.000 7.365.586.978 13.946.660.978 
2006 9.725.327.260 4.284.005.676 14.009.332.936 6.391.651.410 7.943.393.847 14.335.045.257 
2007 12.754.287.428 5.832.804.841 18.587.092.269 6.749.413.038 9.481.338.650 16.230.751.688 
2008 14.655.928.129 6.394.033.055 21.049.961.184 6.695.908.991 10.239.184.662 16.935.093.653 
2009 9.670.983.396 4.614.978.487 14.285.961.883 5.058.875.833 7.405.538.598 12.464.414.431 
2010 9.908.568.789 5.862.261.198 15.770.829.987 8.410.687.799 6.608.004.162 15.018.691.961 
2011 11.576.173.750 11.570.213.594 23.146.387.344 11.135.621.716 16.142.270.946 27.277.892.662 
2012 10.470.626.908 12.468.523.808 22.939.150.716 9.280.925.851 16.260.298.518 25.541.224.369 
2013 11.997.970.357 10.370.754.809 22.368.725.166 11.032.563.636 12.904.641.733 23.937.205.369 
2014 13.259.499.977 9.504.013.791 22.763.513.769    
2015 12.975.346.180 8.643.538.318 21.618.884.498    
Source: Tabulated by author relying on the data from  OSD (2014, p.5) and OSD (2015c, p.5). 
 
 
Appendix 38: Industry Structure in the  Korean Motor Vehicle Sector (From Early 1980s 
to Late 1990s) 
Firm 
Foreign Automaker 
Involved 
Year of 
Foundation 
Total 
Production 
(Units) 
Foreign 
Involvement 
and Capital 
Ratio 
Hyundai  
Overall, 57 technological 
licensing from 9 
different Countries and 
31 different firms  
1967 1.341.990 
Mitsubishi 
15% 
Daewoo 
Overall, 36 technological 
licensing from 5 
different Countries and 8 
different firms 
1965  
(as Shinjin) 
627.815 
GM 50% 
(from 1972 
to 1992), 
Suzuki, 
Honda 
Kia 
Overall, 15 technological 
licensing from 4 
different Countries and 
13 different firms 
1944 756.753 
Ford 9.4%; 
C. Itoh 2% 
Mazda 7.5% 
 
Ssangyong --- 1954  76.940 Daimler- 
333 
 
 
 
(as Dong A) Benz 5% 
Source: Tabulated by the author based on data derived from (Lautier, 2004, p.221) and Hyun 
(1987, p.45). 
 
 
Appendix 39: Capacity Utilisation in the Turkish Auto Industry (1980-2015) 
 
Source: Karabulut  (2002, p.98) and OSD (2016) Statistics 
 
 
Appendix 40: The Auto Assembly Industry In Turkey, 2016  
Firm 
The 
Production 
Place 
Starting Year of 
Production 
Parent 
Licencing 
Company 
Ownership 
Structure 
Production 
Capacity 
Anadolu 
Isuzu 
Kocaeli 
1966 (founded as 
Celik Motor) 
1984 
(establisment of 
Anadolu-Isuzu 
Parnerhip) 
1986 
(colloboration 
between Anadolu, 
Isuzu and Iltochu) 
ISUZU  
Anadolu Group 
(%53.57) 
Isuzu Motors  
(%16.99) 
Iltochu Corporation 
(%12.75) 
Public Shareholders 
(%16.32) 
Others (%0.37) 
 
13155 
Pickups. 
Trucks 
(%50.9), 
buses (%22), 
minibus 
(%7) and 
midibusses 
(%20.01) 
 
Ford 
Otosan 
Eskisehir  
Kocaeli 
1959 (Foundation 
of Otosan 
Factory) 
1977 (Formation 
of Ford Otosan 
Partnership) 
1984 (Eskihehir 
Factory) 
2001(Golcuk 
Factory) 
FORD 
Koç Holding 
(%41.07) 
Ford Motor Company 
(%41,04) 
Public Shareholders 
(17.89) 
415000 
P.Car 
(%7.2), 
Pickups 
(%80.9), 
truck (%3.7) 
and minibus 
(%8.2) 
 Güleryüz  Bursa 
1967 (Coachwork 
Atelier) 
1982 (First 
production) 
 
Güleryüz Karoseri 
otomotiv A.Ş. 
(%100) 
600 
Bus (%100) 
Hattat 
Tarım  
Tekirdag  
1998 
(Established) 
VALTRA, 
UNIVERSA
Hattat Holding 
(%100) 
15000  
Tractor 
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2002 (Production 
and R&D in 
Local Tractor)  
L, HATTAT (%100) 
Honda 
Türkiye  
Kocaeli 
1992 (Founded as 
a 50/50 JV 
between Anadolu 
Group and Honda 
Motor Co.) 
2002 (became a 
%100 foreing-
owned subridiary 
of Honda Motor 
Co.) 
HONDA 
MOTOR 
CO. 
Honda Motor  Co, 
(%100) 
50000 
P.Car 
(%100) 
Hyundai 
Assan 
Kocaeli 1997 
HYUNDAI 
MOTOR 
CO. 
Hyundai  Motor Co 
(%70) 
Kibar Holding (%30) 
245000  
P.Car 
(%100) 
Karsan Bursa 1966 
HYUNDAI 
MOTOR 
CO. 
BREDA 
MENARINI 
BUS 
Kıraça Holding 
(%63.46) Publıc 
Shareholders 
(%36.54) 
52225 
Pickup 
(%77.5), 
Bus (%3.8), 
Minibus 
(%13.4), 
Midibus 
(%5.1) 
Man 
Türkiye  
Ankara 1966 
MAN 
TRUCK & 
BUS AG 
Man Trucks and Bus 
(%99.9) 
1700 Bus 
(%100) 
Mercedes 
Benz Türk 
Istanbul 
Aksaray 
1968 (Istanbul 
Factory-Buses) 
1985 (Aksaray  
Factory-Trucks) 
MERCEDE
S BENZ 
Daimler-Chrysler AG 
(%66.91), Overseas 
Landing Co. 
(%18.09), Koluman 
Holding (%7.04), 
Turkish Armed 
Forces Foundation 
(%5), The Machinery 
and Chemical 
Industry (%2.96)    
21500 
Truck 
(%81.3), 
Bus (%18.7) 
Otokar Sakarya 1963 
LAND 
ROVER 
FRUEHAUF 
Koç Holding (%45)  
Ünver Holding (%25) 
Public Shareholders 
(%30) 
10300 
Pickups 
(%51.4), 
Bus (%9.7), 
Minibus 
(%14.6), 
Midibus 
(%24.3) 
OYAK-
Renault 
Bursa 1971 RENAULT 
Renault (%51) 
Oyak (%49) 
360000 
P.Car 
(%100) 
Temsa 
Global 
Adana 1987 
MITSUBIS
HI 
TEMSA 
Sabancı Holding 
(%100) 
11500 
Truck 
(%65.2) Bus 
(%17.4) 
Midibus 
(%17.4) 
TOFAŞ Bursa 1971 FIAT  
Koç Holding (%37.8)  
Fiat (%37.8) 
Public Shareholders 
(24.2) 
400000 
P.Car 
(%100) 
Toyota Sakarya 
1994 (Founded as 
Joint Venture 
TOYOTA 
MOTOR 
Toyota Motor Co. 
(%100) 
150000 
P.Car 
335 
 
 
 
Between Sabanci 
Holding and 
Toyota Motor 
Co.) 
2001 (The plant 
became %100 
foreing owned) 
CO. (%100) 
Türk 
Traktör 
Ankara  
Sakarya 
1954  
Koç Holding 
(%37.50) 
CNH Industrial 
(%37.50) 
Public Shareholders 
(%24.93) 
Other (% 0.07)  
50.000 
Tractor 
(%100) 
Source: Tabulated by the author relying on OSD (2016) and Interviews (2016). 
 
